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Abstract 
The many specialists who address the background of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 
concur that the United States and Soviet Union set aside their own disputes for the 
sake of an internationalization agreement which devoted the world's last continent to 
peaceful scientific cooperation. While this is true and must be regarded as a 
formidable achievement, the treaty gains further significance when evaluated in light 
of the Cold War tensions which bore upon it. 
This thesis maintains that the controversy surrounding Antarctica reflected the 
patterns which at a global level threatened to embroil the superpowers in full-scale 
conflict. It contains previously published research which analyzes U.S. Antarctic 
policy in detail, and herein provides the groundwork for establishing links between 
U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-British and U.S.-Chilean relations at large and their relations in the 
far south, as well as between the U.S. internationalization proposals and U.S. national 
security policies. 
The "fractalization" of U.S. Antarctic policy shifts emphasis from the policy 
itself to how Cold War diplomacy and public opinion bore upon it. Physical scientists 
regard objects as "fractal" when their structural complexity is maintained at all levels, 
as in snowflakes or electronic transmissions. This provides an ideal metaphor for the 
analytical framework adopted herein. 
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Preface 
In the footnotes and text the Department of State, Foreign Office, and Foreign Affairs 
Ministry are understood to be U.S., British and Chilean, respectively. Citations such 
as "Department of State to Embassy in Santiago" are understood as to the U.S. 
Embassy in Santiago; "Foreign Office to Embassy in Buenos Aires" as to the British 
Embassy in Buenos Aires; and "Embassy in Washington to Foreign Affairs Ministry" 
as from the Chilean Embassy in Washington. Exceptions are indicated, for example, 
"British Embassy in Washington to Department of State." 
References to the Secretary of State, Foreign Secretary, and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs-or Foreign Affairs Minister-are also understood to be U.S., British 
and Chilean, respectively. There are cases of overlapping titles, such as 
"Undersecretary of State," usually referring to the U.S. Undersecretary of State, but in 
one or more cases to the British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as 
clarified by the organizational and archival references. The term "Under Foreign 
Secretary" is not used as it would be misrepresentative. 
Details are sometimes added for the sake of clarity. For example, "Mr. Leche 
to Mr. Bevin" becomes "Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin)." 
As the latter terminology was originally used as frequently or more frequently than 
the former in the reviewed documents, it is deemed appropriate in all such cases. Last 
names are included in parentheses if originally used, and further identifying criteria if 
available. For example, "Embassy in London (Tibbetts) to Department of State, 16 
July 1953, no. 324; Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 
1953, no. 410, control 10818, NARA, RG 59, 702.022." Numbers and control 
references, often a combination of letters and numbers, are listed after the dates. 
Vl 
NARA, RG and all other acronyms are explained in the following section. 
In the previous example, "Secretary of State (Dulles)" would be more 
accurate, but it was not originally qualified as such. While reference to "702.022/3-
315 3" would be more accurate, and was originally qualified as such, in relation to the 
second document, only "702.022" is used. It is the specific Department of State 
manuscript collection in which both documents were found; the suffix is only a 
numerical reference to the date. This style of reference is preferable as multiple 
documents are often included in the same footnote. When dates appear in 
parentheses, they have usually been derived from the filing protocol. 
In many cases multiple documents from different manuscript 
collections are included in the same footnote. For example, "Department of 
State, Division of European Affairs, Memorandum on Trusteeship Agreement 
for Antarctica, 1 March 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of 
Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary 
ofDefense (Forrestal), 8 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Department of 
State, Report for National Security Council (NSC 21 ), 13 July 1948, NARA, 
RG 218, Records of Policy Planning Staff." 
The first three documents are from the same Department of State manuscript 
collection. The fourth document is from a Joint Chiefs of Staff manuscript collection, 
classified in reference to the Policy Planning Staff-as is another Department of State 
manuscript collection. The overlapping jurisdiction is explained in chapter six. If a 
fifth document were added from "NARA, RG 59, 702.022" or "PRO, FO 371," for 
example, it would be listed as such. Record groups and manuscript collections are not 
listed independently of their archival repository, as indicated by NARA, PRO and 
other acronyms explained in the following section. 
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The repetition of"Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary ofDefense 
(Forrestal)" is deemed appropriate as they refer to separate documents. They are not 
listed as "Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary ofDefense (Forrestal), 1 March 
1948 and 10 June 1948" to preserve continuity of reference: each document is fully 
listed as it originally appeared-given the previous qualifications. If the second 
document had not used the last names, neither would the reference. Numbers and 
control references are generally applicable only to documents from embassies. 
Archival sources reveal inconsistencies which, aside from occasional 
misspellings, are left unmodified. While "Embassy in Santiago (Bowers)" appears to 
refer to "Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers)," it remains as originally used. 
Comm~ications between offices or divisions of the same organization are prefaced 
accordingly, for example, "Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs 
to Division of River Plate Affairs." References such as "Department of State, 
Memorandum of Conversation, Office of American Republic Affairs et al." are 
understood to be of a conversation involving the listed office and others-or if not 
with others, among its own members. Authors of the memoranda are rarely 
identified. The office or division or individual listed is the one which first appeared 
on the document. 
Sources from the Byrd Polar Research Center are generally informal in nature. 
Byrd was close to leading figures throughout the government and armed services, 
such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. He 
often addressed them without using their titles, and was addressed by them in the 
same manner. The official titles have not been included, except when originally used. 
They are deemed less significant than the need to clarify that "Mr. Bevin" happened 
to be "Foreign Secretary (Bevin)." When they are significant, the full names and 
vm 
titles, if necessary, are identified in the text. 
Chilean documents are referred to in English, as this is technically 
uncomplicated and facilitates comprehension. They retain the acronym MRECh in 
reference to the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry or Ministerio de Relaciones 
Extoriores de Chile. Chilean secondary sources are listed by their given titles. 
Chicago-style documentation and American English have been adopted with some 
qualification. Periodicals and newspapers are cited only by name and date. Authors 
and article titles have been omitted. Terms such as "Cold War," "Escudero Plan," and 
"Antarctic Treaty" are treated as proper nouns. Terms such as "Berlin blockade," 
"Suez crisis," and "U-2 incident" are not. This thesis deals with many well-known 
events which if all treated as proper nouns would lead to incessant capitalization. 
The term "free world" is placed in quotation marks to acknowledge its 
subjective nature. The term "American" is used in reference to citizens of the United 
States, though technically it applies Latin Americans as well. The term "North 
American" is alternately used when both types of Americans are under discussion. 
Gender-neutral terms, such as "chairperson," "spokesperson," and "humankind," are 
also adopted-except in the citations if documents use other terms. The term "Royal 
Navy" is used in reference to the British navy, yet the prefix HMS is not used in 
reference to vessels thereof. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
BAS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, published by the Federation of American 
Scientists 
BPRC 
DAFR 
DIA 
FO 
FRUS 
Byrd Polar Research Center, Papers of Admiral Richard E. Byrd, 
Columbus, Ohio 
Documents on American Foreign Relations 
Documents on International Affairs, published on behalf of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 
Foreign Office [archival reference] 
Foreign Relations of the United States, published on behalf of the United 
States Department of State 
MRECh Archives of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry, Diplomatic Department, 
Santiago, Chile. 
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland 
PRO Public Record Office, London, England 
RG Record group 
SIA Survey of International Affairs, published on behalf of Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 
USGPO United States Government Printing Office 
USWA The United States in World Affairs, published on behalf of the Council on 
Foreign Relations 
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Introduction 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is not regarded as one of the more important documents 
of the Cold War, but rather as a minor aberration from the strife which plagued 
U.S.-Soviet relations and fuelled a nuclear arms race which confronted humanity with 
the prospect of self-destruction. The specialists who address the background of the 
treaty have correctly observed that the United States and Soviet Union set aside their 
own disputes for the sake of an internationalization agreement which devoted the 
world's last continent to peaceful scientific cooperation.1 While this achievement 
must be regarded as formidable, many authors have refrained from thoroughly 
. scrutinizing the Cold War context in which it emerged. This is understandable as the 
treaty appeared to be a mere bagatelle in a world filled with animosity and weapons of 
mass destruction.2 
This thesis maintains that the controversy surrounding Antarctica reflected the 
patterns which at a global level threatened to embroil the superpowers in full-scale 
conflict.3 To varying degrees, F.M. Auburn, Peter Beck, Jack Child, Klaus J. Dodds, 
Christopher C. Joyner, Richard S. Lewis, Phillip W. Quigg, Deborah Shapley, and 
others discuss how Cold War dynamics influenced the formation of the Antarctic 
1 For example, Richard S. Lewis, A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure (New York: 
Viking Press, 1965); Peter Briggs, Laboratory at the Bottom of the World (New York: David McKay 
Company, Inc., 1970). For an insightful critique of the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year, see 
Walter Sullivan, "The IGY-Scientific Alliance in a Divided World," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
14, no. 2 (1958): 68-72. 
2 For example, American schoolchildren grew accustomed to civil defense drills which sought to give 
them some "sense of security in an age of overwhelming anxiety." Joanne Brown, "'A is for Atom, B 
is for Bomb': Civil Defense in American Public Education, 1948-1963," Journal of American History 
75, no. 1 (1988): 68-90. 
3 The Department of State's Policy Planning Staff observed, "While it seems unlikely that war could 
break out over disputed claims in Antarctica, it cannot be denied that wars in the past have grown out 
of disputes of even more trivial nature." Quoted in Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of 
Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
1 
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Treaty.4 Some of their works were published before relevant archival materials had 
been declassified; others adopted a less chronologically focused tack or dwelled on 
non-archivally related issues. This thesis seeks to expand the scope of their 
contributions by linking the United States' policy toward the far south with its general 
role in world affairs from 1946 to 1959. It incorporates previously published research 
providing detailed analysis of how U.S. Antarctic policy evolved over this period. 
Official documents reveal no explicit link between the first U.S. 
internationalization proposal in 1948 and, for example, the dispute over the future of 
Berlin which led to the Soviet blockade and Anglo-American airlift. They also reveal 
no such link between the second U.S. internationalization proposal a decade later and 
the ongoing dispute over Berlin which led to a Soviet ultimatum and the implicit 
threat of war. Those involved with the proposals were still likely to have been more 
preoccupied with the war scares over Berlin.5 Antarctica was but one facet of their 
expertise, and they received input from their colleagues throughout the Department of 
State in addition to the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National 
Security Council.6 Though the proposals were innocuously worded and espoused 
4 See F.M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982); Peter Beck, The 
International Politics of Antarctica (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Jack Child, Antarctica and 
South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum (New York: Praeger, 1988); Klaus J. Dodds, Pink 
Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London: LB. Taurus, 2002); E.W. Hunter Christie, The 
Antarctic Problem: An Historical and Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1951 ); 
Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); 
Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel Theis, Eagle over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic (Hanover, New 
Hampshire: University Press ofNew England, 1997); Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., 
Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973); Phillip W. 
Quigg, A Pole Apart. The Emerging Issue of Antarctica (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 
1983); Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age (Washington: 
Resources for the Future, 1985). 
5 See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, vol. 2, 1952-1969 (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1984), 57; Elizabeth Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1983), 121; USWA 1948-1949 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 139, 148. 
6 For clarification of how the latter bodies overlapped, see chapter six. See also Jason Kendall Moore, 
"Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-1949," Polar Record 35, no. 
193 (1999): 125-34. 
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international cooperation,7 they were advised, drafted and circulated by individuals 
whose careers required them to think in terms of conflict, which in this case happened 
to lie at the bottom of the world. 8 
Antarctica's untapped mineral resources provided a strong incentive for 
exploration after the Second World War. The United States promptly dispatched the 
most colossal expedition to date, and the press accurately reported that the 
government was contemplating a territorial claim. After the expedition returned, it 
refrained from doing so and instead proposed a condominium arrangement based on 
the renunciation of sovereignty. Given negative feedback from the seven nations 
which had announced claims-Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New 
Zealand and Norway-it opted to pursue a form of internationalization which 
sustained the indecisive political status quo.9 The early Cold War period was equally 
indecisive, given Washington's inability to reassure allies of its motivations or to 
dissuade adversaries from testing its resolve. 10 This trend was evident in relation to 
U.S. Antarctic policy, the unreliability of which exasperated many officials nearly as 
much as by the risk posed by Soviet involvement. 11 
Like many controversies, the Antarctic involved questions of national prestige, 
economic resources and strategic advantage. What it lacked was the catalyst of an 
indigenous population. However seriously the claimant nations viewed the region, 
they proved unable or unwilling to devote any more resources to it. Further 
7 This is in contrast to many proposals of the era which were not innocuously worded but did espouse 
international cooperation, such as the U.S. arms control proposals--discussed in chapter seven-which 
included provisions the Soviet Union rejected as they appeared to be a guise for espionage. 
8 The reviewed archives do not indicate that officials believed the region's unique geographical 
characteristics offered any panacea for the sovereignty dispute, which was fuelled largely by 
nationalistic sentiments, as discussed most thoroughly in chapter five. 
9 See chapter one. 
10 See USWA 1957 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 26. 
11 See Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg"; Moore, "A 'Sort' of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward 
the Antarctic, 1950-59," Polar Record37, no. 200 (2001): 13-26. Chapter one includes material from 
these articles. 
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expeditions and military bases could not be funded by the expectation of mineral 
wealth or any future concessions to be gained from control of the Magellan Strait. 12 It 
bode well that Argentina, Britain and Chile-whose territorial claims overlapped in 
the peninsular region beneath South America-were in no position to mount 
expeditions on the U.S. scale. Otherwise they might have acted upon their threats of 
war, and the United States would have found itself in an even more precarious than it 
already was for tacitly condoning British actions which Latin Americans throughout 
the Western Hemisphere found objectionable. 13 
As the Anglo-Latin American dispute was beginning to recede, the United 
States chose to include the Soviet Union in the negotiations which culminated in the 
Antarctic Treaty. This decision related to the 1957-1958 International Geophysical 
Year, an eighteen-month event devoted to increasing humankind's scientific 
knowledge. 14 The superpowers joined the seven claimants and three other 
nations-Belgium, Japan and South Africa-in the Antarctic component of this event. 
The USSR re-established its presence on the frozen continent for the first time in over 
a century while its troops remained poised to overrun Western Europe, and the U.S. 
Strategic Air Command awaited orders to eradicate communist population centers.15 
The Antarctic Treaty nominally prohibited those kinds of plans from extending to the 
bottom of the world. This was all the more noteworthy as U.S. officials had expected 
the Soviet Union to "torpedo" the negotiations, and prepared for that possibility by 
12 Chile and Argentina were falsely alleged to harbor this objective. Jason Kendall Moore, "Seven 
Penguins and an Olive Branch: Antarctic Politics in The New York Times," Estudios Norteamericanos 
2, no. 4: 125-136. 
13 The threats of war were most explicitly stated by Chilean Foreign Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo. 
See chapter three. 
14 See John A. Simpson, "The International Geophysical Year: A Study of Our Planet," BAS 13, 10 
(1957): 351-56; Walter Sullivan, "Antarctica in a Two-Power World," Foreign Affairs 36 (1957): 154-
66. 
15 See Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961 (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975), 203; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the 
History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 110. 
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holding a series of clandestine discussions which, if discovered, might have had the 
same effect. 16 
In this way the Antarctic controversy invites analysis as fractal history. 
Physical scientists regard objects as fractal when their structural complexity is 
maintained at all levels, as in snowflakes or electronic transmissions. This discovery 
gave rise to chaos theory which has been applied a variety of innovative ways, though 
H.W. Brands questions if"fractals" contribute anything other than a metaphor to the 
field of history since its practitioners have long agreed that the every level of the past 
is riddled with complexity. 17 This thesis nonetheless adopts the metaphor in reference 
to the "fractalization" of U.S. Antarctic policy, that is, the identification of 
superpower rivalries which shaped the future of the southern continent in keeping 
with the spirit of Geneva to resolve disputes through negotiations rather than armed 
conflict.18 Though the Antarctic Treaty failed to produce a widespread thaw in the 
Cold War, 19 its fruition demonstrated that great ideals could be achieved under the 
least promising circumstances.20 
The title refers to "fractalization" rather than fractionalization since the latter 
might suggest that U.S. Antarctic policy was merely one component, and possibly a 
divergent component, of the Cold War. As previously mentioned, Antarctic literature 
makes this impression while Cold War literature either ignores the Antarctic or refers 
16 See Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Kohler) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of 
State (Daniels), 21April1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
17 H.W. Brands, "Fractal History, or Clio and the Chaotics," Diplomatic History 16, no. 4 (1992), 495-
510. 
18 The legitimacy of this spirit was widely questioned as the superpowers were not only stockpiling 
weapons of mass destruction but threatening to use them. In relation to the Antarctic, it alternately 
became known as the spirit of the International Geophysical Year, which British officials privately 
mocked. See Foreign Office (Hankey) to Colonial Office (Rogers), 16 June 1958, AS 15214/135; 
Colonial Office (Rogers) to Foreign Office (Hankey), 18 June 1958, A 15214/135A, PRO, FO 371. 
19 North American periodicals ran stories which adopted the "thaw" theme. See Newsweek, 26 October 
1959; Time, 26 October 1959; The New Republic, 14 December 1959. 
20 Jason Kendall Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and 
Chilean-Australian Relations through 1959," Revista de Historia 13-14 (2003-4): 173-78. 
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to it only briefly. In The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 
1917-1991, Ronald E. Powaski writes of the 1959 treaty as "the only bright spot" in a 
dismal year of superpower relations.21 Observers at the time reached the same 
conclusion in keeping with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's public statements and 
the undeniably altruistic provisions of the treaty itself.22 The fact that Powaski 
devotes more than a single sentence to the treaty distinguishes his book from 
countless others. Chalmers M. Roberts goes somewhat further to observe that its 
cooperative spirit was questionable in light of the events which surrounded it, most 
notably the following year when the Soviet Union downed a U.S. spy plane over its 
territory .23 
The U-2 incident has been described as the reality of the spirit of Geneva and 
signs of cooperation, such as the meeting of Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. 
Khrushchev at Camp David, as the illusion.24 This thesis applies a similar perspective 
to U.S. Antarctic policy, which fluctuated in many ways except for its promulgation 
of science and international cooperation, objectives which failed to guise its concern 
with strategic issues, but which nonetheless did reach fruition. Eisenhower hailed the 
treaty as an outstanding example of America's devotion to peace andjustice,25 yet it 
had opposed the two articles of greatest political significance, pertaining to the 
suspension rather than the renunciation of sovereignty and the inclusion of a nuclear 
test ban. 26 Moreover it had chosen to involve the Soviet Union only due to a lack of 
21 Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States andthe Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 125. 
22 The New York Times, 16 June 1960; James R. Killian, Jr., "Science and Public Policy," BAS 15, no. 4 
(1959): 168-72. For further analysis of the U.S. press, see chapter five. 
23 Chalmers M. Roberts, The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-70 (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1970), 50-51. 
24 SIA 1959-60 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 10. 
25 The New York Times, 8 January 1960. 
26 According to U.S. documents, another divisive issue pertained to the treaty's accession clause. From 
a technical standpoint, this issue was of little consequence until it had been decided what nations would 
7 
viable alternatives. The peace and justice to which Eisenhower referred had been 
neither premeditated nor enthusiastically welcomed by government officials. 27 
This thesis highlights two major components of U.S. Antarctic policy, 
diplomacy and public opinion. The Eisenhower administration engaged in forms of 
psychological warfare with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, with the 
American people.28 Central to its military strategy was the doctrine of massive 
nuclear retaliation which effectively prevented the Soviet Union from using its 
superior conventional forces to overtake Western Europe.29 While it seemed unlikely 
that the doctrine would be applied to limited conflicts, officials including former 
President Harry S. Truman alluded to that possibility on numerous occasions.30 Their 
hope was to preserve a "delicate balance of terror" which intimidated the Soviet 
Union without absolutely horrifying the American public.31 U.S. Antarctic policy 
reflected a benign variation of the strategy to "keep the communists [and everyone 
else] guessing."32 Until the treaty was signed in December 1959, the other nations 
dreaded the possibility that Washington might reverse its non-claimant policy and 
further complicate prospects for a harmonious settlement. 33 
Of the many reasons why the government did not advance a territorial claim, 
be acceding to. See Department of State, Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 
399.829. 
27 Chapter five deals with this issue most poignantly by incorporating the opinions of Admiral Richard 
Evelyn Byrd. 
28 See Kenneth Osgood, "Form before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare 
and Negotiations with the Enemy," Diplomatic History 24, no. 3 (2000): 405-33; Kenneth A. Osgood, 
"Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (2002): 85-
107. 
29 See Martin J. Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a 
Cold War Campaign," Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 4 (1997): 571-93; A.J.C. Edwards, Nuclear 
Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1986), 23. 
30 Truman's containment doctrine, announced while the United States held an atomic monopoly, 
foreshadowed the doctrine of massive retaliation. His statements during the Korean War indicated that 
serious consideration was being given to using the atomic bomb. See chapters two and six. 
31 See Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (1959): 211-34. 
32 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961 (London: 
Heinemann, 1965), 295. 
33 See chapters one and three. 
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few Americans contemplated that their security might someday depend on the control 
of the Antarctic, as naval officers periodically suggested. 34 The frozen continent 
seemed peripheral to the future of either democracy or communism, and proposals for 
its internationalization failed to generate widespread public interest. 35 If the treaty 
had not required congressional ratification, the vast majority of Americans might have 
been unaware of its existence. Those who followed the debate perhaps empathized 
with the minority of senators who denounced it for unnecessarily legitimating the 
Soviet Union's presence in the far south. As one senator bemoaned, the affirmative 
vote reflected an unjustified faith in the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy.36 
The other signatory nations generally did not possess that faith, 37 yet they also ratified 
the treaty. They, like the United States, saw merit in permanently demilitarizing the 
one continent which lacked either swords or ploughshares. 38 
The limited strategic significance of Antarctica only partially explains the 
Eisenhower administration's willingness to involve the Soviet Union and leave U.S. 
rights un-stated. To do otherwise would have further damaged the credibility of its 
public diplomacy, one aspect of what Kenneth Osgood defines as psychological 
warfare.39 After the Second World War, U.S. rhetoric grew increasingly 
anticommunist and urged Eastern Europeans to defy Soviet rule. After the 1956 
Hungarian uprising was brutally suppressed without so much as a threat of U.S. 
intervention, the nation's public diplomacy suffered a major setback. It then turned to 
less confrontational realms and began to emulate the Soviet Union's "peace 
34 The New York Times, 15-16 April 1947, as further discussed in chapter five. 
35 That is, the proposals failed to generate widespread public interest among U.S. citizens. They were 
more closely followed by Argentines, Britons and Chileans, for example, due to the sovereignty dispute 
presented most thoroughly in chapter three. 
36 The New York Times, 11 August 1960, as further discussed in chapter six. 
37 See chapters one and three. 
38 See Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History." 
39 See footnote 27. 
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offensive."40 The eventual discovery of the Central Intelligence Agency's infiltration 
of various cultural organizations, unbeknownst to their members, dealt another blow 
to American prestige.41 The success of the Antarctic Conference can only be viewed 
as a minor victory for U.S. propaganda-as it was shared by the other 
participants-whereas its failure due to a reversal of the non-claimant policy would 
have constituted an embarrassing defeat.42 
This thesis adopts a contextually oriented framework encompassing three 
chapters based on previously published research, focusing on the Antarctic, and four 
others which explore better-known aspects of the Cold War. The first context is the 
most general, U.S. Antarctic policy coupled with an overview ofU.S.-Soviet 
relations--chapters one and two, respectively. Until the International Geophysical 
Year, U.S. Antarctic policy was motivated by the desire to exclude the Soviet Union. 
This was predictable in the early Cold War as the superpowers demonized each other. 
However, the assumption that Cold War motivations extended to the Antarctic can be 
interpreted in many ways, requiring clarification based on a review on how the 
superpowers vied for hegemony on the world stage. Though the Antarctic was a 
much lower-profile issue than the crises over Berlin and the Formosa Strait, for 
example, the events surrounding it coincided with overall trends.43 In the 1950s the 
4° For example, "The West as Portrayed by Communist Propaganda," The World Today 10, 12 (1954): 
532-41; Phyllis A. Greenlaw, '"Peace' in Soviet Strategy," Russian Review 13, no. 2 (1954): 99-119; 
Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Co-Existence," Foreign Affairs 38, no. 1(1959):1-18; William 
Henry Chamberlain, "Communist Basic Tactics: Rule or Ruin." Russian Review 20, no. 1 (1961): 3-
10. The "peace offensive" included calls to relax international tensions. The Council on Foreign 
Relations warned that Soviet rhetoric to this effect was highly disingenuous since communist "leaders 
have shown that they can turn tensions on and off as it suits their own strategy." Council on Foreign 
Relations, "Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy," in the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Foreign Policy: Compilation of Studies (Washington: USGPO, 1961), 641-61. 
41 James Critchlow, "Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications," 
Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 1 (2004): 75-89; Ambrose, Eisenhower 2: 94-96. 
42 This thesis deals with the success of the conference at which the Antarctic Treaty was signed, as well 
as the success of the signatory nations' ratification thereof. It does not deal with the success of the 
Antarctic Treaty itself, as this would not be substantiated for decades. 
43 Both crises involved U.S. perceptions of communism. Chapter two discusses how these perceptions 
often failed to distinguish among the Soviet, Chinese and North Korean varieties which were, in many 
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Soviet Union began to equal or surpass U.S. technology,44 providing a strong 
incentive for U.S. officials to re-evaluate the need for its involvement in the far south. 
The second context deals with U.S.-British-Chilean relations, both pertaining 
to the Antarctic and in general-chapters three and four, respectively. The Chilean 
Escudero Plan, tabled in response to the first U.S. internationalization proposal, called 
for temporarily setting aside the question of sovereignty for five to ten years during 
which the seven claimant nations and the United States were to negotiate the less 
divisive issues of an agreement. The United States later incorporated the Escudero 
Plan into its second internationalization proposal, having discussed the plan with 
Britain and in so doing violated its pledge of confidentiality. It also followed British 
advice to involve the USSR, carrying its "apostasy" to a higher level.45 Chapters 
three and four address this issue in depth. It is mentioned here to explain why these 
two nations receive special consideration. Argentina and Australia, for example, 
played roles which were significant but failed to alter the course of U.S. policy.46 
ways, very similar. U.S. officials viewed the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s as a positive 
development, but it had negligible bearing on the Antarctic Treaty. The treaty was signed while both 
U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese tensions remained extremely high despite indications that they might 
not lead to military conflict. 
44 See James R. Killian Jr., Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special 
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1977). 
45 This term has been used to describe U.S. Antarctic policy from a Chilean perspective since the 
Escudero Plan was concocted during the administration of President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, one of 
the most fervent anti-communists on the planet, at a time when Washington also sought to exclude the 
USSR from the far south. The Department of State significantly modified the plan by applying its 
suspension of sovereignty indefinitely and using it to include the Soviet Union. See Jason Kendall 
Moore, "Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.-Chilean Relations, 
1939-1949," Journal of Latin American Studies 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-38; Moore, "Thirty-Seven 
Degrees Frigid: U.S.-Chilean Relations and the Spectre of Polar Arrivistes, 1950-1959," Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 14, no. 4 (2003): 69-93. 
46 For details of the Australian role, see Hall, Origins of the Antarctic Treaty. The Argentine role was 
less "constructive," as Hall defines the Australian role. During the later 1940s through the mid-1950s, 
the regime of President Juan Domingo Peron nurtured its anti-U.S. reputation. Thereafter the 
government adopted a more conciliatory attitude but failed to table any Antarctic proposals as 
significant as the Chilean Escudero Plan, like the other nations which participated in the International 
Geophysical Year. See Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History"; Department of State, 
Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 
February 1947, NARA, RG 59; British Ambassador in Chile (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 29 
January 1948, AS 970/305/2, PRO, FO 497/2. 
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U.S.-British-Chilean relations were largely but not exclusively influenced by 
U.S.-Soviet relations as well as concerns about U.S. national security policies. 
Britain and Chile both sought and required U.S. military and financial assistance at a 
time when anti-U.S. sentiment was prevalent among their citizens. The U.S. style of 
anticommunism failed to generate widespread enthusiasm in these nations, resulting 
in a backlash even among moderate citizens, and their officials sought to eschew the 
appearance of being subservient. For most of the period under consideration, they 
were mildly disappointed with the United States and highly suspicious of each other. 
By the time of the twelve-power negotiations over Antarctica, however, they 
considered the alternative of forging their own arrangement in cooperation with 
Argentina, in case the general negotiations were to fail, as often seemed likely. 
The third context presents the domestic variables of U.S. Antarctic policy, 
coupled with an overview of U.S. national security policy-chapters five and six, 
respectively. North American journalists, politicians and a handful of citizens 
expressed disappointment that their government never formalized a sovereignty claim 
based on exploration, most notably, that of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd. The 
admiral was one of the best-publicized explorers of all time, and his recommendations 
in favor of a claim were repeatedly neglected. After his death in 1957, journalists 
began to adopt his view that the United States should announce a claim, as would 
have been in keeping with U.S. policies designed to halt Soviet expansion and 
eliminate the influence of domestic communists. Their perspective, like that of Byrd, 
was subordinated to national security concerns which grew so extreme as to silence 
meaningful criticism of the government's position in the Cold War. In this case that 
included not provoking a Soviet counter-claim by forwarding U.S. rights on the basis 
of exploration and discovery. 
12 
Each of these contexts relies on an initial chapter to provide a detailed survey 
of U.S. Antarctic policy, and a subsequent chapter to provide an overview of related 
aspects of the Cold War, followed by an interpretive synthesis. This format seeks to 
enhance the clarity of analysis, whereas the integration of all components might 
distort the connection between events aside from hindering the narrative flow. The 
chapters based on previously published material could still be read as independent 
contributions to historiography. Those dealing with the Cold War could not be, as 
they tum to issues which are not self-evidently germane to the Antarctic. They are 
bracketed with variations of the preceding themes for the sake of "re-enacting" the 
context in which U.S. Antarctic policy unfolded. While this thesis addresses history 
rather than the philosophy ofhistory,47 it does so in keeping with R.G. Collingwood's 
thesis that since all history is the history of thought, it must be critically "re-
enacted. "48 
The last context is only a single chapter in length-chapter seven-and 
expands on the topic which overshadowed all others: the arms race. Specifically it 
deals with the global anti-nuclear movement foreshadowed by the scientists involved 
with the U.S. atomic program who recommended establishing international control 
mechanisms before using the bomb against Japan. By the time the United States 
circulated the second internationalization proposal for Antarctica, it had joined a 
voluntary test suspension with the Soviet Union and Britain. The possibility of a test 
47 More technically this thesis address the past rather than history, a term often used in reference to 
books or articles written about the past opposed to what actually might have transpired. While this 
thesis cites many books and articles, it is based on original research. 
48 See Doug Mann, "Reconstructing the Past: A Structural Idealist Approach," Clio 27 (1998): 221-49; 
Louis 0. Mink, "Collingwood's Historicism: A Dialectic of Process," in Michael Krausz, ed., Critical 
Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 154-78. Collingwood 
espoused a philosophy of history which shifted attention from the "facts" to their broadest possible 
significance. This thesis applies his philosophy to specifically defined contexts rather than to "human 
experience as a whole." See R.G. Collingwood, "The Nature and Aims ofa Philosophy of History," in 
R.G. Collingwood, Essays in the Philosophy of History, William Debbins, ed. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1965), 34-56. 
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ban for the frozen continent was not discussed until the closing days of Antarctic 
Conference. The U.S. delegation initially opposed it but relented for the sake of 
permitting the other nations "to sell" the treaty at home, as The New York Times 
simplified.49 More accurately it relented since otherwise the thirteen years of 
policymaking under consideration might have been for naught. 
The four contexts move from the most general to the most specific. 50 The 
latter two explore factors bearing on U.S. foreign policy but which lie outside the 
sphere of inter-governmental relations, and thereby assume a higher degree of 
interpretive latitude.51 The significance of the anti-nuclear movement, one response 
to U.S. national security policies, is underscored by its presentation as the final 
context. While each of the others alludes to the arms race, it goes further to link the 
Antarctic Treaty to the partial nuclear test ban signed four years later by the United 
States, the Soviet Union and Britain. In the interim the treaty signatories had begun to 
forge an effective system of peaceful scientific cooperation while the superpowers' 
dispute outside the Antarctic escalated to the verge of nuclear war. The test ban 
incorporated into the 1959 treaty established the only precedent for the one signed in 
1963, and both manifested to the growing influence of world opinion.52 
The last context might be regarded as the most important since the arms race 
became synonymous with the Cold War long before the Antarctic Treaty was signed. 
If a nuclear exchange had transpired, the future of the southernmost continent would 
have been of little concern except to the scientists and explorers stationed there at the 
49 The New York Times, 1December1959. 
50 However, the individual chapters within the first three contexts move from the specific to the 
general. That is, from the multilateral diplomacy pertaining to Antarctica to the nature ofU.S.-Soviet 
relations; from the trilateral diplomacy pertaining to Antarctica to the nature ofU.S.-British and 
U.S.-Chilean relation; and from the limited extent ofU.S. Antarctic opinion to the ideological nature of 
U.S. national security programs during the Cold War. 
51 That is, the U.S.-Soviet context is more general and the U.S.-British-Chilean context more specific. 
The domestic context ofU.S. Antarctic policy, involving questions of ideology and national security, is 
more general and the anti-nuclear context more specific. 
52 See chapter seven. 
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time, whom most others suddenly would have envied. The first three contexts all 
refer to the arms race pertaining to U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-British relations, as well as 
U.S. national security policies. The fourth permits the arms race to be analyzed on its 
own terms, that is, relative to the anti-nuclear movement which transcended national 
boundaries and political dogma, in spite of its association with communists, 
communist sympathizers and Soviet propaganda. 
Many types of sources are utilized herein. They include archival material 
drawn from U.S., British and Chilean repositories; official documents published at the 
time or when later declassified; press dispatches, international surveys and journal 
articles from the decades under consideration; and more contemporary scholarship. 
In keeping with the traditional historical method, they are synthesized to reach 
determinations which have been either neglected or underemphasized. 53 The 
originality of this thesis lies not in its reinterpretation of major Cold War events or of 
the previously published research included herein. Its originality lies in depicting 
U.S. Antarctic policy relative to the events which shaped the latter half of the 
twentieth century. The structure provides multiple interpretations of political 
developments germane to Antarctica as well as of their broader significance. None of 
the interpretations is held to be any more legitimate than any other, and neither does 
the order of their presentation seek to imply overall coherence. U.S. Antarctic policy 
unfolded in a manner which can be, and has been, described as both incoherent and 
self-defeating,54 as often asserted of the U.S. role in the Cold War. 
The reviewed manuscript collections, with the exception of those from the 
53 Like major Antarctic events, such as Operation High Jump, major Cold War events are discussed in 
multiple contexts. The crises over Berlin in the late 1940s and the late 1950s are germane to 
U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-British relations as well as to U.S. national security policies. While the 
significance of these events varies accordingly, their factual nature requires some degree of repetition. 
The two internationalization proposals are most repeatedly analyzed. Each chapter returns to them as 
they were indispensable in establishing the basis for the Antarctic Treaty. 
54 See footnote I 0. 
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Byrd Polar Research Center, are diplomatic in nature. The operational details of 
various expeditions might or might not contain references to the political scenario. In 
the best case they might help to illuminate the challenges faced by U.S. policymakers, 
yet those difficulties can be reliably established using Department of State papers, 
augmented by papers from the Foreign Office and Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
The papers of Byrd indicate that, as previously mentioned, his recommendations were 
consistently neglected. Herein that is significant only as related to his indirect role in 
building public support for a territorial claim. The possibility of a U.S. claim 
generated unease among the seven nations with claims already in place, thus 
becoming an issue of both domestic and international significance. 
Sources from the other signatories of the Antarctic Treaty might enhance 
certain aspects of this project. The same might also be true of influential non-
signatory nations such as India. H. Robert Hall and Sanjay Chaturvedi, for example, 
have effectively used such materials to reach conclusions directly or indirectly related 
to the considered era of U.S. Antarctic policy,55 and they are cited where deemed 
most appropriate. The possibility exists that, as with some primary sources, some 
relevant secondary sources have not been reviewed or have been reviewed but not 
cited. Non-U.S. perspectives are limited to those of Britain and Chile, the nations 
which often appeared to be the United States' closet allies in the world or in Latin 
America, respectively. The previously published research included herein thoroughly 
documents these three nations' relationship pertaining to the Antarctic, providing the 
groundwork for more general analysis ofU.S.-British and U.S.-Chilean relations. 
While this thesis prioritizes the use of multi-archival sources, it makes no effort to be 
55 See H. Robert Hall, Origins of the Antarctic Treaty, PhD thesis, University of Tasmania, 1994; 
San jay Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis (New Delhi: Segment Books, 
1990). 
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multicultural,56 an objective which would necessarily diminish the U.S. perspective. 
The omission of Soviet documents, potentially the most intriguing of those not 
reviewed, is mostly due to their non-translation or non-availability outside Russia or 
both. Though U.S.-Soviet relations overshadowed the internationalization of 
Antarctic, both superpowers acted with considerable restraint in withholding their 
territorial claims. The reviewed diplomatic papers contain no evidence of extensive 
U.S.-Soviet or British-Soviet discussions about the Antarctic prior to the 1957-1958 
International Geophysical Year (IGY), by which time Soviet participation in the 
informal, twelve-power discussions had become virtually unavoidable. As one the 
Department of State's Antarctic specialists observed, the USSR had as legitimate, 
exploration-based rights as the United States did, and enjoyed a much longer-standing 
reputation for its expertise in the polar regions. U.S. and British archives indicate that 
it was these two factors, rather than any evidence of malicious intent, which stoked 
U.S. concerns of Soviet encroachment. 57 
The following chapters tend to reinforce John Lewis Gaddis' determination in 
We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War that the United States lacked a grand 
strategy and that its reputation for leadership often exceeded its influence. 58 Melvyn 
P. Leffler, another widely respected historian, praises Gaddis for also defending the 
56 A survey conducted in the mid- l 990s found that many U.S. historians viewed multiculturalism as 
exacerbating what Hayden White once referred to as the "conceptual anarchy" of their discipline. 
Since then the New Historicism movement has gone further, insisting that history is an interdisciplinary 
phenomenon and therefore devoid of a specific method. See Kenneth Cmiel, "History against Itself," 
The Journal of American History 81 (1994): 1169-74; Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 12-13; 
Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), 19. 
57 For example, Department of State, Office oflntelligence Research (Boggs) to Bureau of British 
Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Ronhovde), 12 June 1953; Embassy in London 
(Rutter) to Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs 
(Crowley), 28 February 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Department of State, Office oflnter-American 
Regional Political Affairs (Wilson) to Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, 20 November 1957, National 
Archives, RG 59, 399.829; Embassy in Washington (Hood) to Foreign Office (O'Neill), 13 March 
1958, A 15214/81, PRO, FO 371. 
58 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 27. 
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once-traditional U.S. view which blames the Soviet Union for having instigated the 
conflict.59 Though others make persuasive arguments to the contrary,60 the United 
States' policy toward the Antarctic underscored both the limits of its power and its 
willingness to accommodate the USSR-if only grudgingly and when comparatively 
little was at stake. 
Gaddis' post-revisionist interpretation of the Cold War acknowledges some 
U.S. responsibility while placing most of it on the Soviet Union. A similar 
interpretation of this thesis is certainly possible, even likely if one is seeking further 
evidence to support a traditional interpretation. Since the originality of this thesis lies 
in portraying the Antarctic's relationship to the Cold War, and not the larger dispute 
itself,61 questions of ideology are not paramount. It still must be conceded that the 
adopted perspectives are increasing leftist, 62 shifting from pure diplomacy to the non-
governmental factors which influenced the nuclear-related aspect of U.S. Antarctic 
policy. Unlike Jean-Jacques Salomon, the present author finds no cause to smile at 
the communist-sympathetic ideals promulgated in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 63 
59 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Know Now'?" American Historical Review 104, 
no. 2 (1999): 501-24. 
6
° For example, see; John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 
1941-1960 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 68-69; S.R. Ashton, In Search of Detente: 
The Politics of East-West Relations since 1945 (London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1989), 8; Michael 
Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall 
Plan," Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (2005): 97-134. 
61 Many years ago one author prudently observed, "The Cold War has been discussed in a literature so 
massive, much of it so excellent, that it takes what may be a foolish intrepidity ... to venture into the 
scholarly debate over the great conflict." Edward Pessen, "Appraising American Cold War Policy by 
its Means oflmplementation," Reviews m American History 18, no. 4 (1990): 453-65. 
62 The perspectives are increasingly leftist without emulating the moralistic tone of"New Left" 
revisionists who have underestimated the extent to which the Soviet Union actively sought to impose 
its will through domestic communist parties. Recently opened Eastern-bloc documents provide 
evidence of an ideologically driven conspiracy at times equal to the worst predictions of U.S. Cold 
Warriors. See Michael Leigh, "Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?" 
Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 1(1974):101-16; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc 
Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," International Studies 
20, no. 3 (1995-96): 152-88; Odd Arne Westad, "A 'New', 'International' History of the Cold War," 
Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995): 483-87; David A. Hounshell, "Epilogue: Rethinking the 
Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; Rethinking the Social Study of 
Science and Technology," Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 289-97. 
63 Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," Science Studies 1, no. 1 (1971): 23-43. 
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The integrity of its contributors was not only admirable; it helped to produce both the 
1963 partial nuclear test and the ban included with the Antarctic Treaty. Whatever 
the ideological ramifications of this circumstance, it benefited all humanity. 64 
The first chapter turns to the Department of State's effort to reach an 
internationalization agreement for the Antarctic which other nations found acceptable 
and which also preserved its own interests. Heightening the complexity of this 
objective was that it refused to announce its rights. While that position appeared to be 
conspiratorial in nature, it was equally the product of uncertainty. By no means is 
Gaddis the only author to have reached the same overall conclusion about the U.S. 
role in the Cold War.65 He is mentioned by name to iterate that this thesis is a work of 
scholarship, not of polemics. 66 
64 F.M. Auburn dissents, repeating the Department of State's belief, discussed in chapter seven, that in 
some cases nuclear explosions could be deemed constructive, "The White Desert," The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1970): 229-56. 
65 For example, Jan Nijman, "The Limits of Superpower: The United States and the Soviet Union since 
World War II," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82, no. 4 (1992): 681-95. See also 
footnote 61. 
66 It remains arguable that U.S. policies encouraged the USSR to assume great-power status, such as by 
developing the atomic bomb and an impressive space program. For one compelling ''New Left" 
perspective to this effect, see D.F. Fleming, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 366 (1966): 127-38. 
1. Multilateral Diplomacy 
After the Second World War the United States enjoyed an unprecedented opportunity 
to export its democratic ideals around the world. Antarctica could not be its first 
priority since ideological disputes on the other continents brought entire populations 
into conflict. As Eastern Europe succumbed to communism, the United States proved 
unwilling to mount an effective military deterrent. It did, however, seek to exempt 
the Antarctic from a similar fate by proposing a limited internationalization 
agreement with the seven nations which had announced territorial claims to the 
region-Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway. This 
initiative failed to produce the desired consensus due to the other nations' 
unwillingness to renounce their sovereignty. The Department of State, though 
disappointed by this outcome, maintained its resolve to reach a satisfactory 
compromise. Eleven years later it secured that objective, though now in cooperation 
with the Soviet Union. 
Christopher Joyner and Ethel Theis credit the United States with having 
assured that the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 upheld the principles of demilitarization, 
international scientific cooperation and the suspension of sovereignty disputes. 1 
Frank G. Klotz suggests that the United States might have upheld the first two 
objectives by forwarding a claim and persuading the other claimant nations to join an 
arrangement excluding the USSR. Though the government did consider many drafts 
of a U.S. claim, it withheld them in favor of pursuing what seemed to be a more 
1 Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, Eagle over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic (Hanover, 
New Hampshire: University Press ofNew England, 1997). 
This chapter includes material from Jason Kendall Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States 
Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-1949," Polar Record 35, no. 193 (1999): 125-34; Moore, "A 'Sort' 
of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1950-59," Polar Record 37, no. 200 (2001), 
13-26. 
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reliable means of achieving international cooperation. This decision frustrated some 
officials within the Department of State, in addition to Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd, 
one of the best-known Antarctic explorers of the twentieth century who failed to 
convince the government would ratify the extensive claims which he had made on its 
behalf.2 While Klotz attributes this to the government's lack of "wherewithal,"3 the 
decision prudently sought to balance the nation's ideals with its strategic 
considerations. 
This chapter examines the conclusion of John D. Negroponte, Barbara 
Mitchell and Lee Kimball that the United States' Antarctic policy demonstrated its 
concept of enlightened self-interest.4 It seemed to have this effect as the United 
States abandoned non-essential interests to promote goodwill, yet officials considered 
many other possibilities. As much of the world suspected, these included a unilateral 
effort to gain access to the continent's untapped mineral resources. Officials publicly 
recognized that the hope of discovering such resources motivated U.S. exploration 
after the Second World War. However, they soon began to consider more altruistic 
means of regulating the frozen continent. The shift reflected their desire to prevent 
the conflict between Britain and the Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, 
whose claims overlapped in the peninsular region, from escalating to the point that it 
might have thwarted any form of international agreement. 
U.S. Antarctic policy underwent several phases ofrevision over the two 
decades which preceded the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The first phase corresponded 
2 See Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for 
Non-Claimancy, 1946-1961," Polar Record 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30. 
3 Frank G. Klotz, America on Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues (Washington: National Defense University, 
1990). Other authors recognize that U.S. policy was highly indecisive. For example, Phillip W. 
Quigg, A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 
1983), 141. 
4 John D. Negroponte, "The Success of the Antarctic Treaty," Department of State Bulletin 87 (1987): 
2123; Barbara Mitchell and Lee Kimball, "Conflict over the Cold Continent," Foreign Policy 35 
(1979): 124-41. 
21 
to the 1939-1945 era when the threat posed by German exploration prompted the 
creation of the U.S. Antarctic Service, which permitted Byrd to coordinate his third 
expedition with cabinet-level officials. This phase reflected Washington's desire to 
extend the Monroe Doctrine to the South Pole, as well as the need to set this objective 
aside due to its involvement with the global conflict. The second corresponded to the 
1946-194 7 era during which Byrd commanded the largest Antarctic expedition to 
date, Operation High Jump, and the government appeared ready to forward an official 
claim. The third phase unfolded in the 1948-1953 era when the first U.S. 
internationalization proposal was rejected, and the conflict between Britain and the 
Southern Cone nations grew increasingly volatile. The last phase spanned the 
1954-1959 era during which the trilateral dispute began to recede and the 
International Geophysical Year involved twelve nations in the Antarctic which would 
become the original signatories of the treaty. 
Throughout each of these phases, U.S. officials responded moderately to 
developments which jeopardized prospects for reaching an international agreement. 
They failed to achieve a unanimous consensus pertaining to Antarctica's strategic 
value, and therefore chose to uphold the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which required 
sovereignty claims to be based on permanent exploration rather than discovery or 
exploration. In some ways this position amounted to following the course of least 
resistance, 5 though it proved effective in discouraging the outbreak of large-scale 
hostilities between Britain and the Southern Cone nations.6 U.S. policy also 
subordinated ideological concerns to the practicality of involving the Soviet Union. 
Otherwise, it was feared, the USSR might have taken the opportunity to portray itself 
5 See Moore, "Bungled Publicity." 
6 See Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary ofDefense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014; Embassy in Santiago (Belton) to Department of State, 18 February 1958, no. 829, NARA, RG 
59, 702.022. 
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as a victim and to increase the effectiveness of its anti-U.S. rhetoric.7 While the Cold 
War could not be ignored, it was not permitted to defeat one unique example of 
international cooperation guided toward the scientific advancement of humankind. 
Encouraging this result was that the continent's economic and strategic 
potential could not be substantiated, and the White House therefore refrained from 
making a sovereignty claim. In the late 1930s, the Department of Interior had 
observed that the continent might yield mineral resources which were valuable though 
not essential.8 The North American continent had not been fully exploited, and its 
depletion did not appear imminent, in spite of the high rate of U.S. consumption. 
Neither had the Antarctica's value been substantiated. Military officials compared 
making a declaration of U.S. rights to "buying a pig in the poke" which even if found 
to be worthless might oblige them to defend it. 9 Antarctic specialists within the 
Department of State favored making a claim for two reasons. They doubted there that 
any need to defend the continent would arise, given its distance from major powers, 
none of which appeared likely to risk antagonizing the United States for an 
undetermined benefit. 10 Even in that case diplomatic officials would remain 
comfortably seated in their offices. 
In March 1939 Lincoln Ellsworth informally claimed a large Antarctic sector for the 
United States. He explained this as consistent with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
personal support for Admiral Byrd's earlier claims, based on the administration's 
7 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with Representatives of Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 15August1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
8 Department of State, Office of Historical Adviser (Boggs) to Division of Communications and 
Records (Hickerson), 14 October 1937, NARG 59, 800.014. 
9 Department of State, Office of South American Affairs (Watrous), Memorandum for the Files, 23 
April 1957, NARG 59, 702.022. See also Department of State, Bureau oflnter-American Affairs, 
Office Memorandum, 21 May 1955; Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and 
Northern European Affairs (Raynor), Memorandum for the Files, 25 May 1955, National Archives, RG 
59, 702.022. 
10 See chapter five. 
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stance that the Monroe Doctrine should encompass the South Pole. 11 While neither 
explorer's claims would gain official ratification, the senate passed a resolution 
endorsing any decision by the president to use his executive authority to make a 
territorial claim. 12 As Byrd prepared to depart in late 1939, Roosevelt ordered the 
expedition members to deposit and record their unofficial claims to support a possible 
reversal of the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which held that neither discovery nor 
exploration provided a legitimate basis for sovereignty claims. The Department of 
State seriously contemplated this and announced the United States' reservation of all 
rights.13 
The reservation of rights was technically not a claim, yet the distinction 
aroused concern from the seven nations which had formalized their rights. France 
observed that U.S. officials appeared unable or unwilling to accept that its claim to 
Terre Adelie was ''unquestionable," however the Roosevelt administration might 
attempt to rationalize U.S. rights. Norway expressed similar concerns though, like 
the United States, it was not eager to debate the most legitimate means of sustaining 
its rights or those of any other nation. 14 Antarctica did not appear at risk of becoming 
the next U.S. state, yet the world properly surmised that the Roosevelt administration 
had territorial ambitions. It established the U.S. Antarctic Service to facilitate 
planriing the expedition's technical and political aspects at the cabinet level. 15 The 
president was a long-time friend and supporter of Byrd who had little difficulty 
persuading congress to fund the expedition. 16 As a result, unlike any other twentieth-
11 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum for R. Walton Moore, 15 June 1939, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
12 Department of State, Memorandum by Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs), 11 August 1930, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
13 FRUS, 1939, vol. 2, General (Washington: USGPO, 1956), 1, 11-14. 
14 FRUS 1939, 2: 2-5. 
15 FRUS1939, 2: 7. 
16 The New York Times, 3 June 1939, 7 July 1939. Byrd referred to Roosevelt as "one of my oldest 
friends." R.E. Byrd to R.B. Fosdick, 23 March 1931, BPRC, folder 1648. 
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century U.S. expedition,17 it was official in nature and sought to augment the 
government's interests in the region by establishing three bases. 18 
The importance of this objective related to Germany's stated desire to exploit 
the Antarctic in its quest for raw materials. In the previous 1938-1939 season the 
National Socialists had dispatched a large expedition whose airplanes dropped 
swastika flags as they covered over 100,000 square miles of uncharted territory. 19 
This development accompanied signs that Japan also sought to exploit the continent.20 
Though the United States still hesitated to accept its role as the forebear of democracy 
in the rapidly approaching global struggle, it insisted on maintaining its standing in 
the far south. Byrd and Roosevelt publicized their conviction that the Momoe 
Doctrine justified efforts to protect the region from the threat of external aggression.21 
The Argentine government immediately declared that the other American republics 
had never recognized or been asked to recognize the legitimacy of that doctrine,22 the 
unilateral character reinforced perceptions that the United States was engaged in a 
strategically oriented race for the Antarctic.23 The New York Times observed that the 
"whole nature" of exploration had assumed a more nationalistic tenor than ever 
before.24 
The Southern Cone nations responded to this by coordinating efforts to protect 
17 U.S. Naval Reserve (Black) to Department of State, Division of Latin American Affairs, 10 February 
1945, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
18 FRUS 1939, 2: 7-14. 
19 Embassy in Berlin (Geist) to Secretary of State, 20 March 1939, no. 638, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; 
The New York Times, 11 March 1939, 12 April 1939; Thomas R. Henry, The White Continent: The 
Story of Antarctica (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), 255. 
20 Department of State, Memorandum on Japanese Claims in the Antarctic, 28 January 1946, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014; The New York Times, 24 December 1939. 
21 President Roosevelt, Memorandum for R. Walton Moore, 15 June 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; 
The New York Times, 12 January 1939, 8 July 1939, 15 July 1939. 
22 The New York Times, 25 July 1939. 
23 R.E. Byrd to Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Cumming), 15 July 1939; 
Department of Interior, U.S. Antarctic Service, Memorandum for R.E. Byrd, 22 August 1939, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014. 
24 The New York Times, 6 August 1939. 
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their rights. 25 Their most significant difference of opinion with the United States 
pertained to the Monroe Doctrine. From their perspective, shared by most Latin 
Americans, that doctrine was not only unilateral and therefore illegal; it flagrantly 
contradicted U.S. unwillingness to protest Britain's presence in the Falkland Islands 
and the Falkland Island Dependencies, located in the Antarctic archipelago.26 Chile 
also expressed displeasure over the U.S. refusal to acknowledge any other nation's 
Antarctic rights, and promptly asserted its own over the sector from 53° to 90° West, 
located beneath South America in the region where British and Argentine claims 
overlapped. U.S. officials predictably denied the legitimacy of the claim,27 but 
heeded the recommendation of Ambassador Claude G. Bowers to do so as mildly as 
possible to avoid inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the region.28 These 
sentiments were known to be most poignant in the Southern Cone nations due to the 
influence of Axis sympathizers.29 
Bowers reported that Chilean officials appreciated the U.S. stance but felt 
compelled to protect their rights.30 He believed that, despite the rhetorical passion of 
their claim, they would be willing to participate in any future negotiations which the 
United States might chose to instigate.31 Since there were also indications that the 
Argentines might take a flexible approach, 32 and neither Southern Cone nation was 
25 Embassy in Buenos Aires to Secretary of State, 29 February 1940, no. 506, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
26 The Falklands are alternately known the Malvinas. 
27 The New York Times, 8 November 1940. 
28 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; 
"Recent Argentine and Chilean Decrees Related to the Antarctic," Polar Record 5, nos. 35-36 (1948): 
223-27; "Argentine and Chilean Decrees Related to the Antarctic, 1942-49," Polar Record 5, no. 39 
(1950): 478-82. 
29 See Claude G. Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows, 1939-1953 (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1958), 99-103, 120-24. 
30 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 9 November 1940, no. 957; Department of 
State, Memorandum by Undersecretary of State (Welles), 8 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
31 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 15 November 1940; Department of State, 
Memorandum by Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs) et al., 13 August 1946, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
32 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Armour) to Secretary of State, 12 March 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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able to challenge the U.S. Antarctic program,33 the Department of State refrained 
from investigating the geographical and historical bases of the Chilean claim, or that 
of any other nation. 34 It instructed Bowers to repeat U.S. allegiance to the non-
claimant, non-recognition stance based on the Hughes Doctrine. Meanwhile its 
specialists continued assessing the viability of reversing that stance.35 The "race" to 
Antarctica had not gathered sufficient intensity to convince U.S. officials of the need 
to take a more assertive position.36 
The Second World War diverted U.S. attention from the Antarctic, leading to 
the demise of the Antarctic Service while Admiral Byrd focused on other tasks to 
promote an Allied victory.37 The global conflict had no such effect on the Southern 
Cone nations which hesitated to align themselves with the U.S.-led war effort and 
continued to dwell on the advantages which might accrue from their sovereignty 
claims. The U.S. Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Norman Armour, expressed concern 
that pro-Axis newspapers praised their joint expeditions to the peninsular region. He 
believed that the two nations would make a prolonged effort to invoke the Monroe 
Doctrine, not because they respected U.S. authority in the Western Hemisphere, but 
rather as a means of prompting a British withdrawal. Equally to his displeasure, most 
Latin Americans viewed the United States as an apologist for British colonialism.38 
The Department of State correctly predicted that further U.S. exploration 
33 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 9 November 1940, no. 957, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
34 See Department of State, Division of River Plate Affairs (Hussey) to Division of North and West 
Coast Affairs (Brundage) et al., 13 August 1946; The New York Times, 8 November 1940. 
35 Department of State, Office of Geographer (Saucerman) to Office of American Republic Affairs 
(Woodward) and Division of European Affairs (Cumming), [28 July 1942]; Department of State, 
Division of American Republics, Analysis and Liaison Branch, Study of Antarctica, 25 July 1944, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
36 See H. Robert Hall, "The 'Open Door' in Antarctica: An Explanation of the Hughes Doctrine," 
Polar Record25, no. 153 (1989): 137-40. 
37 For example, Byrd was involved with establishing bases in the South Pacific. R.E. Byrd to Chief of 
U.S. Naval Personnel, 10 May 1943, BPRC, folder 306. 
38 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Armour) to Secretary of State, 22 March 1943, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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would serve to reinforce perceptions of an Anglo-American conspiracy against the 
Southern Cone nations.39 While Chile and Argentina were unable to maintain a 
substantial Antarctic presence during the war, Britain dispatched Operation Tabarin to 
indicate that it, even in the face of German aggression, it was unwilling to retreat 
from the disputed peninsula.40 After defeating the Axis powers, U.S. specialists 
determined that it was imprudent to hold the nation's Antarctic policy hostage to the 
Monroe Doctrine.41 They still hesitated to forward a sovereignty claim on the basis of 
discovery and exploration,42 but they abandoned the possibility of forging a 
condominium arrangement with the Southern Cone nations-as had once been 
contemplated for the sake of undermining the validity of other nations' claims.43 This 
shift corresponded to the two nations' reluctance to join the Allied cause and their 
ongoing hesitancy to prosecute Axis sympathizers. 44 
In November 1946, as the U.S. Navy's Operation High Jump was preparing to 
depart, the Department of State entertained a UN trusteeship for the Antarctic.45 The 
navy objected that this might curtail its possibilities for cold-weather training and the 
acquisition of atomic materials. It preferred engaging in aggressive exploration for 
the purpose of making a large claim.46 Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
attempted to bridge the divergence of perspectives by repeating Roosevelt's 
instructions for explorers to deposit claims which might be invoked if a trusteeship 
39 Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming) to Division of American 
Republics, 2 December 1944, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
40 See The New York Times, 24 April 1944; Klaus Dodds, Pink Jee: Britain and the South Atlantic 
Empire (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 15. 
41 FRUS1947, vol. 1, General (Washington: USGPO, 1973), 1043-50. 
42 Department of State, Office of the Geographer (Saucerman), Memorandum on Sovereignty of 
Deception Island, [28 July 1942], NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
43 See Department of State, Division of American Republics to Office of American Republic Affairs 
(Briggs), 18 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
44 See FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, General (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 963-65; Bowers, Chile 
through Embassy Windows, 99-101. 
45 FRUS 1946, vol. 1, General (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 1492-93. 
46 U.S. Navy, Office of Judge Advocate, Top Secret Brief on Ulterior Mission and Objectives of Naval 
Expedition to Antarctic, 21November1946, in U.S. Navy (Dennison) to Department of State, Division 
of Northern European Affairs (Cumming), 22 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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were to prove infeasible or undesirable.47 Specialists nonetheless grew frustrated that 
U.S. policy was somehow to promote the nation's undetermined rights while 
simultaneously fostering international cooperation. 48 They questioned Byrd's 
conviction that preserving the indecisive status quo would benefit the United States 
since Operation High Jump, which had been placed under his command, would leave 
it in an unrivalled position to assert rights based on exploration and discovery. 49 
The New York Times attributed the massive scale of High Jump-thirteen 
vessels, including an aircraft carrier, with a crew of over four thousand-to 
Antarctica having become a strategically essential part of the world. It noted that the 
mission's technicians, sailors and scientists had been individually chosen to gather 
evidence of uranium and test weapons in the polar environment. Naval spokesmen 
confirmed that the expedition was militarily oriented and designed to bolster U.S. 
claims. Byrd's denial that it reflected hegemonic designs failed to reduce anxiety 
among the claimant nations. 50 As the Latin American press decried the appearance of 
"Yankee imperialism,"51 otherwise friendly Europeanjoumalists ventured that 
Washington was pulling Antarctica into a grand design for warfare with the Soviet 
Union. 52 High Jump was not only the "most ambitious" expedition to date, as 
Thomas R. Henry describes it. It was a "luxury cruise" compared to all that had come 
before, as evidenced by its surplus of amenities and transport of the very latest 
47 FRUS1946, 1: 1497-98. 
48 FRUS1947, 1: 1043-50. 
49 Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946; 
Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Assistant Secretary of State 
(Braden), 25 April 1947, 25 April 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
50 See The New York Times, 9 November 1946, 13 November 1946. For further reference to the navy's 
agenda, see Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North and West Coast Affairs and 
Office of American Republic Affairs, 25 September 1946, NARA, RG 59, Office of American 
Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile. 
51 Embassy in Lima to Department of State, 21November1946, no. 722, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
52 Embassy in Paris (Caffery) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1947, no. 7582, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
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weapons, some of which had never been used in battle. 53 
Operation High Jump returned in early 1947 without having gained evidence 
that uranium was among the minerals lying beneath the ice cap. Even if it had been, 
there were presently no means of gaining access to it. The Department of State began 
to reconsider the merit of a trusteeship arrangement as the seven claimants had not 
agreed on uniform criteria for recognizing each other's rights.54 Since an additional 
claim would have complicated progress to this end, U.S. officials refrained from 
asserting one. Instead they concentrated on devising a more limited, eight-power 
arrangement to quell the sovereignty dispute, exclude the Soviet Union and promote 
the scientific betterment ofhumankind.55 They accordingly urged Britain to refrain 
from involving the United Nations in its attempt to find some resolution with the 
Southern Cone nations. 56 
In February 1948 the Department of State's geographical adviser, Sheldon W. 
Boggs, transformed these considerations into a draft condominium arrangement, 
alternately referred to as a "special regime." The draft called for consulting with the 
United Nation on all related issues, though limiting its jurisdiction to territory where 
uranium was found. The UN Atomic Commission would assume control of such 
regions to ensure that the continent would remain demilitarized. 57 The Department of 
the Interior lent support to this plan which it considered likely to grant the United 
States access to other potentially valuable resources. 58 While not yet dismissing the 
possibility of a U.S. claim, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also favored the special regime as 
53 Herny, The White Continent, ix. 
54 Department of State, Office of European Affairs to Division ofNorthem European Affairs, 27 
January 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
55 Department of State, Division of European and Northern European Affairs to Division ofNorth and 
West Coast Affairs, 8 September 1947; Department of State, Secret Memorandum, 6 November 1947, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
56 FRUS 1947, 1: 1055-58. 
57 Department of State, Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs), Draft Agreement on the Antarctic, 22 
March 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
58 FRUS1948, 1/2: 962. 
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it seemed more likely than a trusteeship to exclude the USSR.59 This was one 
objective upon which civilian and military officials concurred.60 
Before the Department of State shared the plan with the claimants, dramatic 
tensions mounted which did not involve the USSR. Chilean President Gabriel 
Gonzalez Videla accompanied a voyage to establish his country's second military 
base in Tierra O'Higgins, which the British referred to as Graham Land,61 and 
Argentina reinforced its own presence by sending a number of vessels for operations 
in Tierra del Fuego. Perturbed by this challenge to its sovereignty, Britain responded 
by dispatching the Nigeria, one of its heaviest cruisers. Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall gravely disappointed Latin Americans by stating that the United States 
refused to become involved, and his denial that the British maneuver violated the 
194 7 Rio Treaty appeared to constitute a passive form of involvement. The 200-mile 
defensive perimeter which the treaty drew around the Western Hemisphere 
theoretically extended to the South Pole. However, the United States denied its 
applicability to the Antarctic sovereignty dispute. 62 
This potentially volatile situation led the Department of State to withhold the 
internationalization proposal until June 1948. By that time the onset of winter in the 
Southern Hemisphere prevented any further naval displays. However, much to the 
Washington's disappointment, five of the seven claimant nations immediately 
rejected the proposal. The remaining two, Britain and New Zealand, only expressed 
59 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1830/1, United States Antarctic Policy, 30 January 1948; Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, JCS 1830/4, United States Antarctic Policy, 8 March 1948; Joint Chiefs ofStaff(Leahy), 
Memorandum for Secretary ofDefense, 26 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File. 
60 Department of State, Division of European Affairs, Memorandum on Trusteeship Agreement for 
Antarctica, 1 March 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary ofDefense (Forrestal), 10 June 
1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary ofDefense (Forrestal), 8 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014; Department of State, Report for National Security Council (NSC 21 ), 13 July 1948, NARA, 
RG 218, Records of Policy Planning Staff. 
61 The New York Times, 10 February 1948. 
62 The New York Times, 16 February 1948, 19 February 1948; FRUS 1947, vol. 8, The American 
Republics (USGPO, 1972), 90-93. This issue is discussed at greater length in chapter three. 
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willingness to discuss some form of internationalization which bypassed the 
proposal's call for the renunciation of sovereignty. 63 The Department of State 
attempted to revive the proposal by announcing that serious consideration was being 
given to formalizing its own sovereignty claim. This course would have placed it in 
the same category as the other nations, thus permitting it to lead by example, 
eventually renouncing its own rights.64 At the same time there was no means of 
reversing the non-claimant, non-recognition policy without calling into question the 
philanthropic objectives of U.S. exploration. 
In July 1948 the Department of State sent Caspar Green to urge the Southern 
Cone nations to reconsider the U.S. proposal. As Ambassador Claude G. Bowers had 
predicted, Chilean officials refused to cede their Antarctic territory to either a UN 
trusteeship or an eight-power arrangement.65 The Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry 
presented Green with an alternative known as the Escudero Plan, which called for 
suspending sovereignty disputes for a five- to ten-year period during which the 
nations would be able to better appraise their interests, thus far based purely on 
speculation, and determine a mutually satisfactory resolution.66 While appreciating 
the moderate nature of this course, Green grasped that there was nothing moderate 
about the government's devotion to the Chilean Antarctic. As Julio Escudero 
Guzman, author of the Escudero Plan, had made clear, "While other nations have 
claims to Antarctica, Chile has rights."67 Green then proceeded to Argentina whose 
63 FRUS 1949, vol. 1, National Security Affairs (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 800-3. 
64 Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Hickerman) to Legal Division (Gross), 17 June 
1948; Undersecretary of State (Lovett) to Secretary ofDefense (Forrestal), [14 July 1948], NARA, RG 
59, 800.014; FRUS 1948, 112: 989. 
65 Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs and Office of American Republic Affairs, 19 
July 1948, no. 475, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
66 FRUS1948, 112: 795-96. 
67 Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs et al, 19 July 1948, no. 475, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
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officials were equally passionate but less constructive,68 refusing to accept the U.S. 
1 b . £ d" . 69 proposa even as a as1s or 1scuss1ons. 
His journey was not entirely a failure since Chile and Argentina were the most 
difficult of the claimant nations from the U.S. perspective, and officials had long 
feared that they might forge an Antarctic alliance hostile to Anglo-American 
interests.70 Though the neighbors both sought to curtail North American influence in 
the W estem Hemisphere, Argentina regarded the Escudero Plan as detrimental to its 
Antarctic collaboration with Chile.71 The U.S. proposal for internationalization, 
though unsuccessful on its own terms, contributed to eroding the neighbors' effort to 
stand firm in defending their joint sector from 25° to 90° West.72 Chilean officials 
publicly retreated from earlier declarations that they were only willing to cooperate 
with Argentina, and privately they indicated receptiveness to negotiating directly with 
the United States. 73 Ambassador Bowers reported that the commander of the Chilean 
armed forces, Raul Cafias Montalva, was a "sincere and even militant friend of the 
United States" who opposed any form of alliance with Argentina beyond opposing 
the British presence in Antarctica. 74 
The Department of State recommended postponing a U.S. claim since the 
latest, exploration-based draft overlapped with the Southern Cone nations' sector. Its 
68 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 21 July 1948, no. 504; Embassy in Buenos 
Aires (Ray) to Secretary of State, 21July1948, no. 730, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
69 FRUS1948, 1/2: 1011. 
70 Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of 
State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
71 Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 March 1948, no. 165, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
72 See "Argentine and Chilean Decrees." 
73 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 6 August 1948, no. 537, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
74 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 2 August 1948, no. 508; Department of 
State, Memorandum by Division ofNorth and West Coast Affairs (Davis), 9 September 1948, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014. See Mauricio Jara Fernandez, "Richard E. Byrd y Ramon Cafias Montalva: 
Contrapunto de Dos Visiones Antarticos," in Consuelo Leon Woppke, Mauricio Jara Ferdandez et al., 
1,Convergencia Antartica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antartica Chi/ena, 1939-1949 (Valparaiso, 
Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 2005), 151-58. 
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announcement, officials feared, would unleash a new tide of anti-Yankee opinion and 
perhaps renew an exclusive form of collaboration between the neighbors.75 In August 
1948 Secretary Marshall lamented that Washington's effort to resolve the dispute had 
seemed to complicate prospects for negotiation.76 Many of the claimant nations, like 
most of the world, questioned its Antarctic policy in light of the military orientation 
of Operation High Jump and numerous official statements which acknowledged 
strategic motivations. The Department of State hoped to mitigate this impression by 
exerting no direct or indirect pressure for the claimant nations to accept the 
proposal, 77 and considered revising it to incorporate the tenets of the Chilean 
Escudero Plan.78 
The following year Britain and the Southern Cone nations signed an 
agreement to end their hostile naval displays. 79 Encouraged by this development, 
Dean Acheson, the new secretary of state, endorsed the Escudero Plan which in his 
view offered the best hope for preserving U.S. interests while also encouraging some 
form of international resolution. 80 Britain was not convinced of the wisdom of 
ignoring the question of sovereignty,81 but since the Southern Cone nations refused to 
accept outside arbitration,82 it consented to the U.S. shift of policy.83 Its reluctance to 
do so had also been overcome by assurances that it would be involved with revising 
75 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 3 August 1948, no. 530; Department of 
State, Division ofNorthem European Affairs (Hulley) to Office of European Affairs (Thompson), 24 
August 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
76 FRUS1948, 1/2: 1000-03. 
77 Department of State, Division of River Plate Affairs (Dearborn) to Division ofNorthem European 
Affairs (Bream) et al., 25 March 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
78 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation by Division of Northern European Affairs 
(Hulley), 23 March 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
79 The New York Times, 19 January 1949. 
8
°FRUS1949, 1: 795-96, 804-9. 
81 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation by Division ofNorthern European Affairs 
(Hulley), Memorandum, 20 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
82 The New York Times, 8 February 1948. 
83 FRUS1948, 1/2: 1013-15. 
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the Escudero Plan before it was presented to the other claimant nations. 84 Whereas 
the United States had once sought international cooperation on a grand scale, it began 
to view direct negotiations as preferable to a conference, for the time being, and the 
only means by which one might be agreed upon in the future. 85 
In July 1950 the Soviet Union announced that it would deny the legitimacy of 
any agreement from which it was excluded. It held that the Russian explorer 
Thaddius von Bellingshausen had been the first to discover the Antarctic continent 
during his 1819-1821 voyage. Aware that negotiations were taking place between 
the claimant nations and the United States, it requested information about the nature 
of plans under consideration.86 The Department of State did not meet this request 
since it hoped to exclude the USSR with the eight-power agreement it was discussing 
with Chile and Britain. 87 It contemplated making a territorial claim to deter the 
Soviets from doing likewise, though Chile cautioned that this action would likely 
derail the negotiations currently under way. 88 Mario Rodriguez, counsel to the 
Chilean Embassy in Washington, expressed hope that the threat of Soviet 
encroachment might hasten all the claimant nations and the United States in reaching 
an agreement,89 yet the Antarctic controversy defied traditional Cold War parameters. 
The only immediate danger pertained to the inability of the "free world" to resolve 
the sovereignty dispute. 
84 See Department of State, Memorandum by Office of South American Affairs (Baral!), 5 March 
1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
85 Department of State, Division ofNorthern European Affairs (Hulley) to Office of European Affairs 
(Thompson) and Office of American Republic Affairs (Woodward), 26 August 1948; British Embassy 
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86 Soviet Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 8 June 1950, no. 145108, NARA, RG 59, 
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88 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Owen) 
et al., 7 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
89 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office ofNorth and West Coast Affairs (Owen) 
et al., 13 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
35 
This issue aside, the Department of State doubted that Antarctica held great 
military or economic significance. It still remained committed to excluding the 
Soviet Union and viewed the Escudero Plan as a "limited advance" toward that 
objective.90 However, its leading Antarctic expert, Sheldon W. Boggs, urged that a 
claim be made as quickly as possible. In his perspective Antarctica's untapped 
mineral resources warranted protection.91 His colleagues in the Bureau of European 
Affairs presented a new draft claim, extending from 130° East to 105° West, north 
from the South Pole; 130° to 15° East, north of75° South; and 105° to 35° West, 
north of 81 ° South. Unfortunately they had no advice for how to reverse the non-
claimant policy without creating an international uproar. Of equal concern was how 
to interpret the National Security Council's resolution that a U.S. claim should be 
made prior to the signing of an international agreement-a distant prospect--or 
protected in lieu of such an agreement.92 
The Department of State presented Chile with a map depicting a 
Byrd-Ellsworth sector as a less ambitious, tentative U.S. claim.93 The map omitted 
any reference to the Chilean claim, first declared in November 1940 and restated on 
numerous occasions thereafter, each time with the Chilean public's impassioned 
support. In a formal letter of protest, Santiago referred to the map as unacceptable for 
this reason and because it suggested that the United States accepted the "sector 
principle," which defined claims in terms of latitude extending to the South Pole, for 
itself but not for other nations.94 The Department of State apologized for the 
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oversight and misunderstanding, respectively,95 and pledged to take no action before 
the two nations had finished incorporating the Escudero Plan into a new 
internationalization proposal. 96 
This slow trend toward international cooperation met a formidable setback in 
February 1953. The Royal Navy dismantled an Argentine outpost on Deception 
Island which had been constructed despite warnings. Sailors from Snipe encountered 
no vigilance from the non-commissioned officers posted there to defend the South 
Orkney Islands from "the bad habits of antiquated [British] imperialism," as Chilean 
President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla had once described it. 97 The British "imperialists" 
then proceeded to dismantle a nearby Chilean outpost which was unoccupied at the 
time. Though diplomats informally agreed to avoid exaggerating the significance of 
the episode,98 accusations of bad faith immediately arose when reports leaked to the 
press. The same pattern had accompanied earlier incidents, such as the previous 
season when Argentine soldiers had fired over the heads of a British geological team 
attempting to disembark from John Biscoe.99 
U.S. officials feared that the Southern Cone governments might issue a joint 
statement so belligerent that Britain would recall its ambassadors. 10° From the 
Southern Cone's perspective, Britain had been allowed to make a mockery of the 
95 Department of State to Chilean Embassy in Washington, 16 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
96 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of European Affairs et al., 11 March 
1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy 
of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1988), 20. 
97 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 96, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014; The New York Times, 20 February 1953. For similar allusions to British "imperialism," see 
Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 3 March 1948, nos. 121-23; Embassy in 
Santiago to Department of State, Office of European Affairs and Office of American Republic Affairs, 
no. 477, 19 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
98 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Department of State, 23 February 1953, no. 1067, NARA, RG 
59, 702.022. 
99 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Secretary of State, 22 February 1953, no. 628, control 9115, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022; The New York Times, 3 February 1952. 
'
00 Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 20 February 1953, no. 341, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
37 
security zone drawn around the Western Hemisphere by the Rio Treaty of 1947.101 
Argentine President Juan Domingo Peron warned that the Southern Cone nations 
might be forced to divide the Antarctic between them like "good brothers," unless 
outside interference were to cease.102 His counterpart, Carlos Ibafiez del Campo, 
refrained from making logistically infeasible predictions, but journalists speculated 
that he might sever diplomatic relations with Britain. 103 The U.S. Embassy in 
Santiago doubted this in spite of the president's anti-British reputation. 104 It predicted 
that the he would prefer a negotiated settlement to armed conflict. 105 
The United States favored the more moderate course but hoped to avoid 
having the issue taken before the Organization of American States (OAS), where its 
benign neglect of the Rio Treaty was bound to be harshly condemned. In that case 
U.S. officials foresaw a breakdown of relations with the Southern Cone nations, 
which might lead to the disintegration of the Pan-American system and have serious 
repercussions in the United Nations. 106 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
instructed the U.S. Embassy in Santiago to discourage the government from involving 
the OAS or making any "unwise" naval displays. 107 The Ibanez administration 
heeded this recommendation despite tremendous public pressure to the contrary .108 It 
went further than requested and dismissed Foreign Affairs Minister Arturo Olavarria 
Bravo, whose public statements had appealed to those sectors of the military which 
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sought to retaliate against the British, even at the risk of provoking a full-scale war. 109 
The Chilean government took a further step to defuse the situation by 
withdrawing its demand for Britain to reconstruct its facility. 110 While these 
developments were encouraging, Ambassador Bowers believed that the Deception 
Island incident had negated prospects for the revised internationalization proposal 
based on the Escudero Plan. 111 Chilean officials still wished to postpone its 
circulation as their relations with Argentina remained poor,112 and their U.S. 
colleagues were in no rush, as they remained uncertain of how large a U.S. claim 
should be and when-or if-to announce it. Two years passed without any 
demonstrable progress on the issue. Pleased that Latin American and British naval 
officers had maintained a stiffly courteous attitude toward each other in the Antarctic, 
the Department of State lost any sense of urgency. It simply recommended further 
study to determine Antarctica's value and the appropriate scale of U.S. 
involvement.113 
Within the Department of State, an ad hoe committee on the Antarctic had 
been holding general meetings on a biweekly basis for two years, with representatives 
of the air force and navy, while a technical group had been focusing on issue of a 
clairn. 114 These officials believed that the question of time had become most 
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significant, as other nations were consolidating their rights by opening new Antarctic 
stations in preparation for the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), an 
eighteen-month event sponsored by the United Nations. 115 If the government upheld 
the Hughes Doctrine much longer, they warned, other nations' claims might saturate 
most or all of the continent. It was possible that the existing claims might be 
extended into the sector from 90° to 150° West, the only presently unclaimed sector 
which, as such, would be the least controversial over which to declare U.S. rights. 116 
The U.S. Navy's Operation Deep Freeze I departed for Antarctica in October 
1955 with seven ships and a crew of eighteen hundred. In a goodwill gesture, 
Washington had invited each of the claimant nations to send observers, 117 but this 
only partially reduced fears that it might choose to act unilaterally. Five Globemaster 
aircraft would be broadening the scale of discovery as never before possible, as well 
as reinforcing the basis for a U.S. claim. By name alone the planes seemed contrary 
to the promulgated spirit of international cooperation. Australia grew especially 
concerned when New Zealand informed it that the U.S. Air Force was planning to 
establish a base within its divided sphere, from 45° to 136° East and 142° to 160° 
East. The Department of State had failed to mention the base in its earlier discussions 
with Australia. 118 Lest this had been an intentional oversight, Canberra demanded 
that the United States promptly consult with it regarding any future decisions which 
involved its sector. 119 
The Department of State assured the two Commonwealth nations that its first 
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priority was to exclude the USSR. 120 Before the draft proposal could be circulated, 
due to incertitude over the size of a U.S. claim and decreasing cooperation with 
Chile, 121 the USSR greatly complicated this objective. In February 1956 Moscow 
formally petitioned Australia for the right to establish bases in its Antarctic sector.122 
Australia had little alternative but to accept since, as the Kremlin persuasively argued, 
no international organization had assumed jurisdiction over the Antarctic and those 
nations with conflicting claims had not sought arbitration.123 The U.S. National 
Security Council feared that the USSR's presence eventually might compromise the 
Western Hemisphere's security, much as the Southern Cone nations interpreted the 
British presence. The council believed that open aggression by the Soviet Union was 
less likely than the gradual deterioration of U.S. rights, yet this was sufficient cause 
for alarm, given the upsurge of activities related to the IGY. 124 
Operation Deep Freeze I led to the resurgence of suspicions that the United 
States planned to test nuclear weapons in the Antarctic. Eddie Rickenbacker, one of 
the most famous pilots in U.S. history, had given an unofficial speech a decade 
earlier, proposing that nuclear weapons should be used to gain access to the 
continent's untapped mineral reserves. 125 Although natural resources remained a 
motivating factor for Antarctic exploration, the Cold War had equated the use of 
nuclear weapons with Armageddon. For this reason India called for placing the 
Antarctic on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, and it also sought to ban any 
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allegedly peaceful applications of nuclear technology. It was less concerned about 
the dispute over the peninsular region than over the fate of the rest of the continent 
where most of the hypothetically exploitable minerals were believed to lie. Although 
it might have empathized with Chile and Argentina, which were also developing 
nations, it opposed the notion that any nation had a right to exclude any other from 
the frozen continent. 126 
The Department of State avoided taking an immediate position, instead 
requesting an elaboration on India's objectives to be discussed with the other 
American republics. 127 Officials appreciated that they would "badly" need the 
support within the Western Hemisphere ifthe subject were to be discussed and they 
were to follow their natural instinct to oppose UN involvement. While the Latin 
American delegations expressed opposition to the measure, 128 they did so out of their 
sense of solidarity with the Southern Cone rather than with Washington. Worse, the 
Department of State feared that if the General Assembly were to become involved, 
Chile and Argentina might "stimulate a substantive proposal" addressing the conflict 
over the peninsular region, as the Indian proposal did not. 129 Not only was this an 
unappealing prospect for U.S. diplomats; the Department ofDefense held that since 
the continent's untapped resources might yet prove to be of major strategic value, 
they should be carefully guarded until evidence emerged to the contrary. 130 
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When hope passed that India might quickly withdraw its proposal, 131 the 
Department of State decided that the best alternative was to support it in hope that the 
language could "be watered down to [an] innocuous statement."132 This contingency 
would be manageable though still less than ideal since, officials believed, UN 
involvement would make any later reversal of the non-claimant policy appear to be 
motivated by narrow self-interest. 133 India, apparently of its own free will, later 
abandoned its threat to involve the General Assembly. The Department of State, 
though relieved, was cognizant that the issue would re-emerge if it were to announce 
a sovereignty claim. 134 This issue highlighted the need to determine the extent of 
U.S. rights and whether or not they should be formalized. The Department of State 
recommended doing so, if only over the unclaimed sector, but had failed to persuade 
the National Security Council. 135 
Meanwhile Byrd had returned from commanding Operation Deep Freeze I and 
redoubled his efforts to promote a consensus within the government, first in relation 
to what he believed to be the general wisdom of a claim, and then in relation to its 
delineation. Like many within the Department of State, he believed that the United 
States was permitting its rights to erode, 136 whereas the USSR appeared to be on the 
verge of formalizing its rights. The Soviet expedition's radio broadcasts to Moscow 
dwelled on the region's great strategic value. The U.S. Embassy in Canberra was also 
131 Acting Secretary of State (Hoover) to Delegation to United Nations et al., 3 September 1956, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
132 Delegation to United Nations to Secretary of State, 14 September 1956, no. 216, control 8128, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
133 Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DePalma) to Bureau of 
European Affairs et al., 9 August 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
134 Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs (Rubottom), 6 March 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
135 Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy) to Assistant Secretary ofDefense for International 
Security Affairs (Sprague), 11 March 1957, NARA, RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff, 
1957-1961. The National Security Council was composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and 
each of the three branches of the armed forces, and chaired by the president. For further elaboration, 
see chapter six. 
136 For example, Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European 
Affairs (Raynor) to Bureau of European Affairs, 29 April 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
43 
unsettled by this, but it cautioned that any declaration of sovereignty might appear to 
substantiate rumors of the alleged Anglo-American nuclear agenda, and thereby 
defeat any chance for an agreement. 137 The Australian government, however, did 
share this perspective. It joined Britain in encouraging that United States to make a 
territorial claim as a means of containing the Soviet Union.138 
Robert E. Wilson, one of the Department of State's Latin American specialists 
most familiar with the Antarctic, appreciated that divergent pressures weighed upon 
the president and his most senior advisors. Nonetheless frustrated by their 
unwillingness to support a U.S. claim, he chose to simplify matters. The non-
claimant policy could not secure its own objectives, which he deemed un-ambitious. 
The United States could not take its freedom of action for granted since it had allowed 
the Soviet threat to be transformed into a reality, and correspondingly set aside its 
initial objective to prevent this from happening. The non-claimant policy, intended to 
reduce tensions, was having the opposite effect of "increasing irritation and a sense of 
insecurity" among the other countries. He also chastised the policy for ignoring the 
Antarctic's most troublesome conflict between the Southern Cone nations and Britain. 
For these reasons he believed it was essential to assert rights over the sector from 90° 
to 150° West, a move which congress supported, and to which no other nation was 
likely to object, as the region had not yet been claimed.139 
Wilson also appreciated the Eisenhower administration's tendency to 
postpone decisions until every possible alternative had been considered, reconsidered 
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and considered again. 140 At risk of contributing to the indecision which he detested, 
he outlined another possibility, arguably the most creative to date. In addition to the 
previous sector, he suggested claiming the interior sector from 45° East to 20° West, 
between Norway's claim and the South Pole; urging New Zealand to cede 150° to 
165° West, transferring "Little America" to U.S. territory; and offering Chile and 
Argentina 90° to 110° West in exchange for relinquishing to Britain all territory east 
of 60° West. The Southern Cone nations would then be left with a sector spanning 
approximately from the latitude of Easter Island to the Falkland Islands, which 
Wilson envisioned them dividing at 74° West. One of his colleagues referred to this 
as "a very logical [and] reasonable formula," though it seemed unlikely to satisfy the 
Southern Cone nations "whose positions are more emotional."141 
The Department of State opted to maintain its support for the more moderate 
first course and to proceed with attempts to convince the government of its 
feasibility. 142 In June 1957 it modified the draft proposal for internationalization to 
permit cooperation with specialized agencies within the United Nations while barring 
the organization itself from assuming jurisdiction over the Antarctic.143 This 
development, though significant, did not assuage Wilson's disappointment that the 
government had failed to determine its position on a claim.144 He considered the 
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Department ofDefense short-sighted for refusing to assume military or financial 
responsibility to enforce a claim, and he considered the rest of the National Security 
Council short-sighted for believing that a claim should be postponed until its 
logistical support could be guaranteed. He viewed his colleagues outside the 
Department of State as reasonably open-minded but poorly informed-for otherwise 
they would have shared his viewpoint. 145 
Admiral George Dufek, commander of Operation Deep Freeze II in the 
1956-57 season, recommended starting the process of international agreement by 
establishing tripartite condominium with Australia and New Zealand. 146 Though 
Washington enjoyed positive relations with the two Commonwealth nations, they 
insisted that an Anglo-American agreement be reached first-as soon as possible, in 
fact-at which time it would accept virtually any plan. Representatives of all four 
nations agreed to hold discussions to coordinate their positions. A ware that the other 
claimant nations, especially Chile and Argentina, would resent being excluding, they 
made every effort to conceal their discussions. 147 In September 1957 serious 
consideration turned to the United States and two Commonwealth nations signing a 
formal pact as a means of enticing the other claimants to join. Britain was to be 
initially excluded for the sake of conveying that it had not been party to the 
discussions.148 
Meanwhile the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry announced that it viewed 
developments in the Antarctic as holding direct national security consequences, 
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including the risk ofwar. 149 The population at large feared that missiles could be 
launched against it from Soviet bases in the Antarctic. Nonetheless, the U.S. 
Embassy in Santiago attempted to persuade officials of the need to include the Soviet 
Union in an international agreement.150 Adamantly rejecting the Soviet Union's 
presence as a rationale for its formal involvement, the Chilean government countered 
that the United States should announce a territorial claim to prevent further 
communist advances. The time had come, it insisted, to confront the political 
ramifications of Antarctica.151 In attempting to do the same, it faced a very different 
challenge; the Chilean public strongly opposed any form of agreement, with or 
without UN or Soviet involvement, which might be viewed as limiting its rights. 152 
After the press reported that the United States, Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand were engaged in secret negotiations, the four nations anticipated that the 
Chilean government might issue denunciation harsh enough to negate any realistic 
hope for international cooperation. They decided to admit that negotiations were 
underway between Britain and the two Commonwealth nations, to portray this as only 
natural given their ties, and to avoid any reference to U.S. involvement, 153 while 
redoubling their efforts to prevent further leaks. 154 They believed that renewed 
conflict with the Southern Cone nations was inevitable after the IGY.155 Since the 
United States and Soviet Union had announced plans to remain, 156 their ongoing 
149 Embassy in Santiago (Belton) to Department of State, 18 February 1958, no. 829, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
150 Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 17 September 1957, no. 293, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
151 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels et al., 8 
November 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
152 See The New York Times, 15 February 1958. 
153 Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 13 February 1958, no. 804, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
154 British Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 13 February 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
155 Embassy in London (Whitney) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1958, no. 4781, control 7091, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
156 The New York Times, 14 June 1957, 15 June 1957, 30 June 1957. 
47 
presence would unavoidably prolong fears that they might advance territorial claims 
which overlapped those already in place, further complicating the Anglo-Latin 
American dispute. The four nations whose negotiations had been exposed thereby 
reasoned that it was best for the United States to maintain a semblance of 
neutrality. 157 
The Department of State opposed any new initiative being presented before it 
had decided on its own course of action. It declined Santiago's offer to host a 
conference of all interested parties, excluding the Soviet Union, on the basis that this 
would be premature. 158 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expected Chile to 
reinitiate debate over the Rio Treaty, perhaps more strenuously than before. He 
reminded U.S. embassies throughout Latin America of the government's stance to 
deny that the treaty extended to Antarctica. Diplomats were to avoid the issue if at all 
possible. Otherwise, they were to indicate that the United States could not extend the 
treaty as demanded since that would amount to recognizing the Southern Cone 
nations' claims. 159 While this form of neutrality held little promise of being 
perceived as such, the United States had few alternatives, short of denouncing British 
colonialism, and this was unfathomable. 160 
In late March 1958, announcing no claim beforehand, the United States 
formally presented the seven claimant nations, Belgium, Japan, South Africa and the 
USSR, with a proposal for an international agreement based upon the freedom of 
scientific research and a prohibition of non-peaceful activities. These broad tenets, 
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borrowed from its unsuccessful initiative of the previous decade, now held greater 
appeal since they included a political status quo moratorium which forbade nations 
from citing their present expeditions to support new claims or to expand previous 
claims. 161 This aspect was a vestige of the Chilean input which had virtually ceased 
after the United States had indicated receptiveness to Soviet participation. If the 
unilateral proposal surprised the Chileans, it had the same effect on the British who 
had enjoyed an unparalleled degree of confidence with U.S. officials-unparalleled 
by not full. 162 
Since the proposal aroused little dissent, the Department of State soon 
followed it with another calling for an international conference, 163 which was 
accepted. Military officials believed that it was only wise, at this point, to discuss 
Antarctica with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 164 The government had no 
intention of reversing it formal agenda, but it had grown accustomed to devising, 
though not always acting upon, contingency arrangements. Few citizens of the 
United States or elsewhere were likely to have believed otherwise, or to have 
maintained that diplomacy should be ingenuous. President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
nonetheless announced that his administration had no political or military agenda as 
regards the Antarctic, and that its sincerity of purpose would rally support among "all 
other peoples of the world."165 This position was consistent with the Department of 
State's view that the draft treaty fully upheld the principles of the UN Charter even 
161 Department of State to Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR and the United Kingdom, 24 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
162 Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in London, 31March1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
163 Foreign Office to Department of State, 22 May 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
164 Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Paris, 25 April 1958, no. 3860, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
165 Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy) to Secretary of State, 28 
May 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
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though it sought to avoid the organization's jurisdiction.166 
Preliminary twelve-power negotiations commenced in Washington to forge 
agreement on a treaty. Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, the Department of State's 
special advisor on Antarctic affairs, joined U.S. representatives there, while his 
colleagues elsewhere pondered other alternatives, which as yet did not appear to 
warrant NATO intervention. U.S. officials merely hoped to be prepared if 
negotiations were to break down. 167 They had been conditioned to expect as much 
over the ten years since their first internationalization proposal-to which they 
themselves had grown "lukewarm," as the British had observed. 168 Events soon 
appeared to justify their cautious approach, as India renewed its threat to involve the 
General Assembly and afford every member the opportunity to join the treaty. Chile 
countered with its own threat to withdraw from the negotiations and, perhaps, from 
the General Assembly, if the United States were again to remain mute. 169 This time 
the U.S. delegation at the United Nations unhesitatingly announced its opposition to 
the Indian initiative, 170 and New Delhi promptly desisted. 171 
At the negotiations in Washington, the United States held firm against a 
Soviet proposal to allow open admittance to the conference, the date and location of 
which had yet to be determined. 172 Considering the laborious pace of the twelve-
power negotiations, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that broadening 
166 Secretary of State (Dulles) to All Diplomatic Posts, 20 June 1958, 20 June 1958, CA-11231, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
167 Department of State, Draft Position Paper on Antarctic Conference by Office of Deputy 
Undersecretary of State (Owen), 4 May 1959, 4 May 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
168 FRUS 1948, 1/2: 1013-15. 
169 Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in New Delhi, 11 June 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
170 Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Wellington, 14 July 1958, no. 06786, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
171 Department of State, Memorandum of Meeting of Representative of the Twelve IGY Nations, 2 
October 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
172 Embassy in Canberra (Sebald) to Secretary of State, 6 June 1958, no. 651, control 4053, NARA, 
RG 59, 702.022. 
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the scope of involvement would render the treaty hopelessly unmanageable.173 He 
concurred with British officials that the USSR might be able to force this issue before 
the United Nations and win support for championing the rights of the unrepresented 
members. 174 While this did not occur, Soviet objections to Article IV, the political 
status quo moratorium based on the Chilean Escudero Plan, emerged as an equally 
serious concem. 175 To plan for the worst dilemma-a Soviet withdrawal from 
negotiations, followed by an assertion of sovereignty-it convened a meeting of 
assistant secretaries from five germane regional bureaus and its experts in law, 
disarmament and science, plus Ambassador Daniels. 176 The working group arrived at 
no firm conclusions and, by good fortune, it was not required to as the Soviet Union 
continued its participation. 
In October 1958, while numerous technicalities were being debated, Daniels 
met with representatives of Argentina, Britain and Chile. He inform them that his 
nation's decreased activity in the Antarctic was not due to any "legal disability." If 
the U.S. Navy were to go there in the future, it would do so without prior 
consultation, and it would disregard either notes of protest or post-facto invitations. 
The three nations, whose representatives he addressed like errant school children, 
were foolish to bicker over the question of ownership, as the region defied established 
legal precedents, and he charged that their tit-for-tat shenanigans had distracted 
attention from more constructive approaches-for example that of his own 
173 Secretary of State (Dulles) to All Diplomatic Posts, 20 June 1958, 20 June 1958, CA-11231, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
174 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with Representatives of Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 15 August 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
175 Further negotiations were deemed futile if Article IV were discarded. Department of State, Bureau 
of Far Eastern Affairs (Robinson) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy), 22 April 
1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
176 Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Kohler) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of 
State (Daniels), 21 April 1959; Department of State, Memorandum by Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
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government.177 
The twelve-power negotiations stagnated to such a degree by the following 
March that Argentina feared that the United States had lost its will to hold a 
conference. The most elementary question of all, when and where to hold it, had still 
not been finalized. The claimant nations remembered that Washington had lost 
enthusiasm for its first proposal, then started to advocate the Escudero Plan, and 
finally decided against circulating a new eight-power proposal which incorporated its 
avoidance of the sovereignty question. It was again evident that the U.S. government 
faced international divisions, as Department of State personnel broke protocol to 
inform Argentine officials. Ambassador Daniels' absence from the negotiations 
heightened anxiety over U.S. intentions, although it was only temporary due to 
illness. 178 
The negotiations-which pertained to legal jurisdiction, the treaty's duration, 
administrative arrangements and inspection rights, among other issues-proceeded 
slowly but without any major disruption until the Antarctic Conference opened in 
October 1959, conveniently still in Washington. The Department of State, intent on 
avoiding last-minute debacles, assured Chile that it fully respected that nation's 
attitude toward maintaining sovereignty. 179 This change of tack owed in part to 
knowledge that the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry had been divided over whether 
to participate in the conference, since the resulting treaty might allow for 
circumvention of the one signed in Rio de Janeiro.180 U.S. officials sought to assuage 
177 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels et al., 16 October 
1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
178 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political 
Affairs (Luboeansky) et al., 20 March 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
179 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State for lnter-
American Affairs (Rubottom) et al., 2 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
180 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Daniels et al., 11July1958, 
NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
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this concern by volunteering to make a joint declaration with the Southern Cone 
nations that both treaties would be upheld fully and without amendment.181 
The United States also chose to accept Article V, which banned nuclear 
explosions until a broader international agreement were to be reached governing the 
use of atomic energy. Until the final days of the conference, it had hoped that such 
explosions might be permitted under certain circumstances, given the unanimous 
consent of the signatories. As this scenario seemed extremely unlikely, given the 
power of modem weapons and the much-dreaded risk of fallout in the Southern 
Hemisphere, the U.S. delegation had consented to the test ban was, from a practical 
standpoint, no more than a formality. 182 The Soviet Union's acceptance of Article 
VIII was somewhat more substantial. This article opened the treaty to UN members, 
as the U.S. delegation supported, and other nations unanimously approved by the 
signatories.183 The Soviet Union had wished to grant membership to any nation 
which so desired, whereas now the all signatories gained the kind of veto power 
which, in some perspectives, had crippled the United Nations. 
The Antarctic Treaty, signed on 1December1959, indiscriminately 
compromised the national interests of its twelve signatories. This served the cause of 
international cooperation and scientific advancement. While the Treaty avoided 
falling under UN jurisdiction, it established liaisons with the organization's 
specialized agencies. This also served the cause of international cooperation and 
scientific advancement. At the same time the cause being served required faith that 
its objectives were immutable, and this was what the treaty could not ensure. Its 
terms seemed designed to the contrary. They offered no effective criteria for 
181 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs (Rubottom) et al., 2 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
182 That is, without the test ban, the United States still would have faced tremendous, if not 
insurmountable difficulty gaining the unanimous consent of the other signatories. 
183 Department of State, Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
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distinguishing between civilian and military activities. As most or all of the 
signatories must have recalled, Britain and Southern Cone nations had nominally 
upheld a prohibition of naval displays while their vessels had continued to prowl 
disputed waters and their governments had made jingoistic declarations. The 
conference had been a success, yet there was no guarantee that the same would be 
true of the treaty. 
Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd once wrote that the government's emphasis on 
international cooperation and scientific advancement was only a means of diverting 
attention from Operation High Jump's military objectives. At the time he was not 
engaged in a conspiracy of any sort, let alone one of atomic nature, as widely 
speculated. He was sharing his candid thoughts with the navy pertaining to how the 
Department of State had advised him to handle the press. 184 He had made every 
effort to comply by speaking in a highly equivocal manner, yet experienced little 
success as the non-claimant policy begged credulity, however dutifully he attempted 
to explain it. 185 Twelve years later, when the Antarctic Treaty was signed, many 
nations remained convinced that the United States would seek every opportunity to 
circumvent the demilitarization protocols. 186 What they failed to appreciate was that 
the idealistic rhetoric of U.S. policy-which had dwelled on science and international 
cooperation-had become a reality. 
Throughout the period under consideration, U.S. officials often appeared 
disingenuous while they attempted to seek a resolution to the Antarctic controversy. 
184 For example, Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of American 
Republic Affairs et al., 29 November 1946; Department of State, Division ofNorth and West Coast 
Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
185 R.E. Byrd to C.W. Nimitz, 15 April 1947, BPRC, folder 7295. 
186 For example, Embassy in Buenos Aires to Department of State, 3 November 1959, no. 693, NARA, 
RG 59, 399.829. 
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For example, Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden once told Chilean officials 
who inquired about Operation High Jump that he knew as little about the massive 
operation as they did. 187 It was true that he knew only a few generalities provided by 
the Department of State's specialist,188 yet his words seemed unconvincing in an era 
when journalists around the world depicted the Antarctic as a uranium mine for 
established and aspiring atomic powers. 189 Interestingly the Joint Chiefs of State and 
National Security Council failed to be convinced that the region was valuable enough 
to warrant a sovereignty claim, and they preferred to avoid any responsibilities which 
might emerge related to its defense. For this reason they supported the Department of 
State's first internationalization proposal, based on the renunciation of sovereignty, 190 
as well as its later decision to accept the political status quo moratorium. 191 
As Caspar Green explained to the United Press in early 1948, U.S. Antarctic 
policy was highly flexible, seeking to accommodate new developments and to take 
heed of foreign opinions. 192 This attribute frustrated other governments, as it 
permitted the United States to justify reversing its stance on the Monroe Doctrine, 
altering the terms by which to achieve an eight-power arrangement before yielding to 
the necessity of involving the Soviet Union in a twelve-power agreement. The 
Department of State recognized that the government's policy did appear to vacillate, 
though it regarded this as less significant than appearing to be exempt from the 
"selfish petty wrangling" which characterized the dispute between Britain and the 
187 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 12 
November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
188 Department of State, Division of American Republics, Top Secret Memorandum on Antarctic 
Expeditions, 15 August 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
189 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 August 1946, no. 14302, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014; The New York Times, 6 November 1946, 16 November 1946. 
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Southern Cone nations.193 
While the United States sought to preserve cordial relations with the Southern 
Cone nations, it refused to permit its hemispheric ideals from being directed against 
Britain.194 The Southern Cone nations did have some basis for perceiving an 
Anglo-American conspiracy against their Antarctic rights, 195 yet the United States 
privately reprimanded the British for taking a heavy-handed tack in the sovereignty 
dispute. 196 Though it refrained from publicly criticizing the British on the basis of the 
Monroe Doctrine or the Rio Treaty, 197 it also declined to acknowledge their rights in 
the Antarctic while pursuing a solution which gravely undermined the concept of 
sovereignty. 198 The Southern Cone nations and Britain-like the other 
claimants-had cause to doubt the reliability of the United States in the far south. 
The Department of State nonetheless chose to take a "hands off' approach, as this 
helped to prevent the sovereignty dispute from escalating to the point that it might 
have thwarted any international agreement. 199 
Much had changed since President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Department 
of State had considered pursuing a tripartite arrangement with Southern Cone nations, 
justifying an Antarctic claim in terms of the defense of the Western Hemisphere. 
Over the following decade U.S. officials had begun to fear that a Latin American 
nationalism might surpass the danger of Germany's quest for raw materials and the 
193 Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Lister) to 
Bureau of European Affairs (Jones), 3 June 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
194 Secretary of State (Marshall) to Embassy in London, 4 March 1948, control 906, NARA, RG 59, 
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197 Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 604; Secretary of State 
(Marshall) to British Ambassador in Washington (lnverchapel), 27 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
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later spread of communism.200 They accordingly were cautious to bring their own 
policy in accord with the Escudero Plan since Chile, like Argentina, had been 
reluctant to join the Allied struggle against totalitarianism, and in the post-war era 
many of its citizens sympathized with anti-democratic ideals.201 Aside from this, 
Peter J. Beck observes that the Southern Cone nations appeared to be "trigger happy" 
in their quest to prompt a British withdrawal from the Antarctic sector where their 
claims overlapped.202 Many U.S. officials no doubt agreed with Frank Debenham's 
conclusion that all three nations were behaving like spoiled children.203 Fortunately 
the Department of State succeeded in encouraging them to refrain from actions which 
might have divided the "free world" against itself. 
Deborah Shapley writes that that U.S. Antarctic policy reflected officials' 
contradictory desire to take advantage of the unique possibilities for strategic 
expansion while also being perceived as anti-imperialist.204 This conclusion 
encapsulates the factors bearing upon their decision to withhold a sovereignty claim 
despite their unrivalled ability to assert one on the basis of discovery. Like Byrd, 
many U.S. journalists and politicians regretted that the government was willing to 
pursue abstract ideals which diverged from the Cold War's priorities. One 
congressman referred to the Antarctic Treaty as marking a "dismal end" to the legacy 
of U.S. Antarctic explorers dating back to Nathaniel Palmer. Indeed, after the Treaty 
was signed, there remained a distinct possibility that senators would fail to ratify it 
due to their failure to comprehend the benefits of intemationalization.205 It served the 
200 Moore, "Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid," 85. 
201 See Jason Kendall Moore, "Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: 
U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949," Journal of Latin American Studies 33 (2001): 713-38. 
202 Peter J. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 35-36. 
203 Frank Debenham, Antarctica: The Story of a Continent (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1961), 227-28. 
204 Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age (Washington: Resources 
for the Future, 1985), 21. 
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world's best interests that a majority of U.S. senators appreciated that at time 
cooperation had to be viewed as an end in itself. 
The consul general of the French Embassy in Quebec City found time in his 
schedule to mock the U.S. non-claimant policy. In one public speech, he referred to 
the Hughes Doctrine's tenet that sovereignty rights were to accrue by permanent 
settlement. "To support its thesis," he proclaimed, "[the United States] has even 
refused to recognize discoveries made by its own nationals."206 Indeed many U.S. 
citizens within and outside government also had difficulty explaining this 
phenomenon, although they derived no amusement from it. From a certain 
perspective U.S. Antarctic policy had forsaken tangible national interests, and 
unnecessarily as sovereignty did not preclude scientific cooperation. From a broader 
perspective, it had avoided an unnecessary conflict with its Cold War allies and an 
equally unnecessary point of conflict with the Soviet Union. 
The Department of State correctly predicted that the government's decision to 
wait for an ideal moment to advance a sovereignty claim would amount to forfeiting 
the opportunity altogether. After Operation High Jump, that course would have 
appeared to confirm allegations that it was militarizing the planet's last frontier. 
After the Nigeria incident, it would have complicated a resolution of the dispute 
between Britain and the Southern Cone nations. After the Soviet Union's demand for 
involvement, it would have insulted the communist bloc, perhaps leading to a Soviet 
expedition before the International Geophysical Year (IGY) had been announced or a 
Soviet counter-claim or both. After the Deception Island incident, it would have 
reignited the previously existing sovereignty dispute. Once preparations were 
underway for the IGY, a U.S. claim would have violated the cooperative spirit to 
206 Embassy in Quebec City (Mitchell) to Department of State, 24 January 1950, no. 11, NARA, RG 
59, 702.022. 
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which the United Nations was devoted. Moreover, Washington had reason to be 
skeptical of those nations which encouraged a U.S. claim, for they had emphatically 
discouraged it prior to Soviet involvement at which time it would have been far more 
opportune. 
Many years after the consul general in Quebec City had jested of these 
dilemmas, the French Embassy in Washington expressed concern that the Antarctic 
Treaty was deeply flawed since it refused to acknowledge sovereignty while at the 
time same implicitly guaranteeing it. The Department of State replied that it fully 
appreciated that perspective, but had to disagree. No nation, it explained, had spent 
more time than the United States analyzing the sovereignty issue. While many 
individuals had favored announcing a claim, the government had determined that the 
Hughes Doctrine provided a better means of securing international cooperation. 
Implicitly its self-denial was to continue serving as an example for the other 
signatories, promoting a degree of good will which would surmount technicalities. 207 
The French were unlikely to have accepted this, yet U.S. officials were not entirely 
unjustified to glorify the restraint of their nation's Antarctic policy.208 
The following chapter turns attention to U.S.-Soviet relations, which heavily 
influenced how U.S. officials sought to build cooperation in the Antarctic. The two 
internationalization proposals which they tabled corresponded to their shifting 
perceptions of the Soviet threat. Between the proposals, the USSR developed the 
atomic bomb and then appeared to surpass U.S. technology. Antarctica could not be 
separated from the Cold War, yet there it remained one of the most benign arenas of 
superpower competition. 
207 Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Western European Affairs (Jova), 8 July 1958, 
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2. U.S.-Soviet Relations 
It is unsurprising that U.S. Cold War historiography minimizes or omits the 
importance of the superpowers' cooperation in the Antarctic. Officials at the time 
empathized with journalists' description of the sovereignty as a comic opera, 1 and 
their debate over the wisdom of making a claim was hardly vociferous. The failure of 
their first internationalization proposal, like the need to include the USSR' s in their 
second proposal, was merely a "headache."2 Historians have preferred to dwell on 
issues which suggest that either or both superpowers were to blame for overreacting 
to the threat posed by the other.3 In the Antarctic, that threat was purely hypothetical 
and little dwelled upon in the global battle to win hearts and minds. It is therefore 
poorly suited to the traditional, revisionist or post-revisionist categories and countless 
subcategories into which Cold War literature is divided.4 
The early hope of U.S. officials to exclude the Soviet Union from Antarctica 
reflected their apprehension that the communist effort "to take over the world step-
by-step" might extend to the southernmost reaches of the planet.5 Developments in 
the Mediterranean, Europe and Asia suggested that the USSR had no respect for the 
principle of self-determination and no intention of fulfilling its wartime pledge to 
1 For reference to the dispute as a "comic opera," see Frank Debenham, Antarctica: The story of a 
continent (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), 234-35. For similar U.S. press reports, see 
"Antarctica: The Very Cold War," Newsweek, 1March1948; Antarctica: Cold War," Time, 1 March 
1948. 
2 The Department of State once acknowledged that an internationalization agreement might become a 
"headache" to manage, and that this description also applied to the indecisive nature of its Antarctic 
policy. Department of State, Office of European Affairs (Raynor), Memorandum on Trusteeship 
Agreement for Antarctica, 1March1948, NARG 59, 800.014; FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part2, General 
(Washington: USGPO, 1976), 1003. 
3 See Robert Stover, "Responsibility for the Cold War: A Case Study in Historical Responsibility," 
History and Theory 11, no. 2 (1972): 145-78; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in 
the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," International Studies 20, no. 3 
(1995-96): 152-88. 
4 See Michael Leigh, "Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?" Political Science 
Quarterly 89, no. 1 (1974): 101-16. 
5 See World Peace Foundation, DAFR 1951 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), 
1-4. 
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hold free and fair elections in regions under its occupation.6 Americans, convinced 
that their own intentions in the world were genuinely idealistic, began to accept the 
responsibility of opposing the domination of any nation over another. Some officials 
feared that they might revert to an isolationist mentality,7 but that grew unlikely as the 
Soviet Union imposed its will over Eastern Europe with increasing brutality. U.S. 
satisfaction with having defeating the Axis powers was short-lived as many 
considered Marshal Joseph Stalin to be another AdolfHitler.8 
This chapter addresses the digression ofU.S.-Soviet relations from the end of 
the Second World War through the early Cold War period. Events quickly revealed 
that the former collaboration between the two nations could not be sustained. U.S. 
officials attempted to counteract this pessimistic reality by declaring that their own 
system was eventually bound to triumph, and in the meantime that it would be able to 
halt the spread oftotalitarianism.9 Rhetoric alone was unable to do so. The task 
called for long-term perseverance, as the Soviets refused to desist even after U.S. aid 
largely immunized Western Europe from communism. 10 Though few Americans 
questioned the righteousness of their latest crusade for freedom, many of their allies 
did question its black-and-white assumptions about the world.II By the 1950s the 
superpowers' diplomacy amounted to little more than a forum for hostile propaganda 
which guised their mutual insecurity. IZ The Eisenhower administration's effort to 
6 See World Peace Foundation, DAFR 1947 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), 
120-21. 
7 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History, 2nd ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 181; DIA, 1947-1948 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1952), 153-55. 
8 Ronald E. Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism and 
Europe, 1901-1950 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 201-2; Paul E. Zinner, "Marxism in Action: 
The Seizure of Power in Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs 28, no. 4 (1950): 644-58. 
9 USWA 1945-194 7 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 194 7), vii-viii. 
10 See John W. Young, Cold War and Detente 1941-91 (London: Longman, 1993), 2, 17. 
11 Henry L. Stimson, "The Challenge to Americans," Foreign Affairs 26, no. 1 (1947): 5-14. 
12 Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 
71; Lord Vanisttart, "The Decline of Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 28, no. 2 (1950): 177-88; John 
61 
reverse this trend succeeded most notably in the Antarctic, one region, unlike many 
others, where the superpowers never contemplated war. 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 indicated that the relaxation of superpower 
tensions could be selectively achieved. The first U.S. internationalization proposal in 
1948 had unsuccessfully attempted to exclude the Soviet Union from Antarctica. 
While the seven claimant nations-Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New 
Zealand and Norway-had supported this objective in principle, they had been 
unwilling to accept the proposal's call to renounce their sovereignty. Negotiations to 
form a modified eight-power agreement stalled after the Korean War broke out, and 
many years passed before the United States forwarded a second internationalization 
proposal which left the question of sovereignty unresolved. The success of this tack 
related to its inclusion of the Soviet Union and the claimant nations' acceptance that 
U.S. leadership could be effective without being bold, adapting itself to new 
circumstances rather than sustaining bygone hopes. Soviet involvement in the 
Antarctic might not have been ideal but, unlike the U.S. reluctance to assist Eastern 
European uprisings against Soviet rule, it did not compromise the destiny of freedom-
loving populations. 
Many factors contributed to the evolution ofU.S.-Soviet relations over these 
years. Among them was President Harry S. Truman's lack of experience when he 
assumed the presidency after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Unlike his 
predecessor, who was known for his grace and dignity, Truman was a forthright man 
Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II, 6th ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 
3-4. See Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945 (New York: 
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with a reputation for being pugnacious. 13 He relied heavily on his own advisors and 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who concurred with the need to take a firm 
stance against the Soviet Union. 14 This encouraged him to pursue a U.S. sphere of 
influence despite its inconsistency with the ideals for which the Second World War 
had been fought. 15 Though the Soviet Union tacitly consented to U.S. dominance in 
Western Europe, Japan and throughout the Pacific, Truman rebuked its desire to 
maintain or impose friendly governments along its borders. 16 Some historians have 
alleged that he was needlessly uncooperative than Stalin, but John Lewis Gaddis 
emphasizes the gravity of the Soviet threat as by 1947 communism had been imposed 
on eleven states with a combined population exceeding one hundred million. 17 
When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953, he went 
beyond the containment doctrine to advocate communist rollback, though his policies 
demonstrated considerable restraint. 18 Ending the Korean War had been an important 
campaign pledge which he fulfilled by negotiating an armistice rather than insisting 
on total victory, as had been possible during the Second World War. The theme of 
communist rollback was domestically popular but impractical as it entailed the risk of 
nuclear retaliation. The U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons had passed, and now the 
superpowers gravely menaced each other as well as the survival of the humanity. 
Eisenhower accordingly sought opportunities to minimize U.S.-Soviet tensions. He 
shared the anticommunist fervor of his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, but did 
13 John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 1941-1960 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 95, 98. 
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not permit it to cloud his judgment.19 Throughout the period under consideration, the 
United States and the Soviet Union tended to view world as they imagined it, not as it 
was,20 but they fully appreciated the need to avoid mutual destruction.21 
In April 1945, shortly after taking office, Truman told the Soviet foreign minister that 
he expected the USSR to hold democratic elections in Poland and to abide by the 
outcome, whatever it might be.22 Stalin had agreed to this two months earlier at the 
Yalta Conference where the Big Three-the United States, Britain and the Soviet 
Union-had issued a joint declaration on the future of postwar Europe. Nonetheless 
each power sought to preserve or expand its influence in the region. Many authors, 
like many politicians of the time, have portrayed the Yalta Conference as a betrayal of 
Eastern Europe.23 Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill had spoken of great ideals while 
tacitly agreeing to partition the world as suited their national interests.24 John Patrick 
Diggins observes that Yalta was not responsible for initiating the Cold War. Instead 
it revealed that the United States and the Soviet Union held fundamentally different 
historical perspectives.25 Truman was less willing to accommodate this circumstance 
than Roosevelt appeared to have been.26 When the Soviet foreign minister suggested 
19 M.L. Dockrill, The Cold War 1945-1963 (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988), 61. 
20 Diggins, The Proud Decades, 73-75. 
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that his tacit warning related to Poland was inappropriate, Truman retorted that the 
USSR had no excuse whatsoever for breaking its agreements.27 
Though discouraged by this exchange, Truman pondered the value of enlisting 
Soviet troops to defeat the Japanese in Manchuria and northern China. The German 
surrender appeared to be inevitable, but the Japanese army was recruiting volunteers 
for a last stand to be waged with the fanaticism which motivated Kamikaze pilots. 
Some military officials predicted that an invasion would cost up to a half million 
American lives. The involvement of Soviet troops had little bearing on this estimate, 
aside from risking that they might remain to impose their political will. The Yalta 
agreement had provided an incentive for the USSR to enter the war against Japan; in 
that case it was to be granted possession of the Kurile Islands.28 In July 1945, two 
months after Germany had accepted an unconditional surrender, the Big Three met at 
Potsdam to discuss the last phase of the war effort. They restated their objection to 
the principle of spheres of influence but agreed to maintain separate zones of 
occupation in Germany.29 While this arrangement laid the basis for future conflict, at 
the time there were more pressing concerns. 
Truman had begun to forfeit hope that the Soviet Union understood anything 
other than force. There had been no indication that the Polish government-in-exile 
would be permitted an opportunity to re-establish itself, and numerous indications 
that the USSR opposed relinquishing its dominance throughout Eastern Europe and 
other regions where its troops were stationed. Bearing this in mind, Truman 
concluded that it was best to avoid involving the Soviet Union to defeat Japan.30 That 
27 Truman, Memoirs 1: 85. 
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appeared to be possible when he received news that the atomic test conducted by 
scientists of the highly classified Manhattan Project had succeeded beyond 
expectation, reportedly causing a blind woman to see light.31 This long-awaited 
development absolved the need for either a U.S. invasion or Soviet entry into the war. 
It was understandably regarded as a "godsend" which Truman and his advisers hoped 
would also curtail Soviet expansion. 32 Since it remained premature to employ any 
overt form of coercion, Truman merely informed Stalin that a new weapon had been 
developed which might be decisive when employed against Japan.33 
The atomic bomb did bring the Second World War to an end, though not as 
immediately as had been anticipated. On 6 August the first weapon fell over 
Hiroshima, instantly killing 75,000 people, after which Truman referred to it as "the 
greatest thing in history."34 One senator went further in comparing it to the birth of 
Jesus Christ,35 yet the Japanese government refused to accept an unconditional 
surrender, insisting that the emperor be retained. On 9 August the United States 
dropped a second weapon over Nagasaki, killing an additional 39,000 people. Even 
this failed to cause the Japanese to acquiesce, and they did not until five days later 
upon receiving informal assurances that the emperor would not be deposed.36 Most 
Americans derived unqualified satisfaction from having avenged the bombing of 
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Pearl Harbor on such a dramatic scale.37 The others had to acknowledge that the 
conventional bombings of Tokyo and Dresden had killed as many or more civilians,38 
and that countless American lives had been saved. While the destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been "distasteful," officials regarded it as fully 
justifiable. 39 
The atomic bomb did not prevent the Soviet Union from becoming involved. 
It declared war against Japan two days after Hiroshima was laid to ruins, and its 
troops were firmly established in Manchuria a week later when Japan finally accepted 
defeat. 40 The Red Army was large enough to maintain a simultaneous presence 
throughout Eastern Europe. U.S. officials appreciated that it was too large for being 
stopped by atomic weapons, if that need were to arise.41 The risk of an atomic bomb 
or bombs being used against civilian targets also failed to intimidate the Soviet Union 
since it had lost twenty million during the war, compared to which the death toll from 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was miniscule.42 Truman, while not seriously considering a 
pre-emptive strike, did hope that the atomic bomb would persuade the Soviet Union 
to be more responsive to U.S. ideals. It had no such effect in part because of the 
37 Charles C. Alexander, Nationalism in American Thought, 1930-45 (Chicago: Rand McNally & 
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superiority of Soviet conventional forces,43 and in part because of Soviet faith that the 
communist system was bound to triumph, with or without military confrontation.44 
The tenor ofU.S.-Soviet relations grew increasingly negative as the year drew 
to a close. According to Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, this 
was largely due the Soviet press making no effort to reciprocate the desire of the 
American people to reach a mutual understanding. Instead the state-controlled press 
dwelled on the racial injustice and economic disparities of the U.S. system, which it 
attributed to the inherent weakness of capitalism.45 In public speeches Stalin berated 
the United States for harboring imperial ambitions in contrast to the social and 
humanitarian ideals which guided the Soviet Union's behavior.46 The two nations 
shared an ability to credit themselves with having the best intentions and an inability 
to fathom the same of each other. The United States' secrecy about the atomic bomb 
had contributed to this, as had the Soviet Union's clearly opportunist declaration of 
war against Japan, and the number of other factors was rapidly increasing. 
In February 1946 George F. Kennan, the consul at the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow, who shared Harriman's despondent views, recommended a "patient but firm 
and vigilant containment" of Soviet designs on the world. His dispatch to this effect, 
known as the Long Telegram, implied that the government should respond to Soviet 
advances wherever they might take place. While that course of action was not 
without merit, it neglected fiscal constraints and the need to prioritize national 
interests.47 The Long Telegram nonetheless earned regard as a foreign policy 
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blueprint.48 In the process it extinguished any lingering hope that the ideals expressed 
at the Yalta Conference might yet be achieved. Martin McCauley writes that the 
Long Telegram exerted the single largest influence on how Truman approached the 
USSR.49 Previously he and other officials had declared that the United States would 
neither intervene in the internal affairs of other states nor condone less scrupulous 
nations which might choose to do so. Now they acquired a rationale to intervene 
based on the assumption that other nations' freedom from Soviet influence warranted 
the extension of U.S. influence.50 
Two weeks later Churchill declared that the Soviet Union had drawn an "iron 
curtain" around Eastern Europe, attempting to quarantine it from the democratic 
impulse which prevailed in the West. The United States and Britain, he believed, 
shared a unique destiny to ensure that this effort would not succeed. He advocated "a 
fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples" which in many ways already 
existed, as those peoples shared a deep commitment to individual freedom and 
representative government. Though couched in defensive terms, the overtones of his 
message were not only provocative; they undermined faith that the United Nations 
might still function as planned and help to ameliorate U.S.-Soviet relations.51 There 
were few indications that anything would have that effect. The USSR was known to 
persecute its citizens for ideological non-conformity. It had, according to The World 
Today, become a more efficient police state than the Tsars had imagined possible.52 
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Since Truman concurred with this assessment, he appreciated Churchill's willingness 
to publicize the harsh realities with which they both had to contend.53 
One of the many points of contention was the Soviet Union's reluctance to 
withdraw its troops from Iran. Its leaders claimed that the iron curtain speech and 
Truman's tacit endorsement of it were to blame for their inaction. From their 
standpoint the hostile attitude of the Anglo-Americans nations justified reneging on 
their earlier pledges.54 From the standpoint of the Anglo-American nations, the 
Soviet consolidation of power over Eastern Europe justified their resolve to halt the 
spread of the "totalitarian virus."55 Walter Bedell Smith, who had replaced Harriman 
as the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, reported that the Soviet press regularly indicted 
Truman for betraying Roosevelt's legacy as a peacemaker. 56 Smith acknowledged 
that the U.S. press, like the U.S. public, had turned more anti-Soviet since the end of 
the war, yet he attributed this to the Soviet government's policies and declarations 
rather than to U.S. provocation.57 Tensions also persisted at the official level as 
Soviet spokespersons charged that the United States failed to appreciate how much 
the USSR had suffered during the war.58 
While the Soviet Union did withdraw from Iran,59 it did not become any more 
responsive to U.S. wishes at large. Instead it expanded its "subversive" activities in 
Greece and Turkey. 60 In March 194 7 Truman appealed to congress for a $400 million 
53 Gardner, Architects of Illusion, 104. 
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aid package to prevent these nations from being drawn into the Soviet sphere of 
influence. The requested funds were substantial but, he pointed out, only a tiny 
fraction of the amount which the United States had invested in defeating the Axis 
powers.61 After two months of deliberation, congress approved the president's appeal 
and, in his words, "served notice that the march of communism would not be allowed 
to succeed by default."62 This development formalized the U.S. commitment to 
contain communism-a commitment which became known as the Truman Doctrine, 
though it might well have been attributed to Kennan, Churchill or a number of other 
officials. Ronald Steel writes that the Truman Doctrine expanded the Monroe 
Doctrine beyond the Western Hemisphere to every comer of the world in hope of 
establishing an American empire.63 
In June 194 7 Secretary of State George C. Marshall furthered this impression 
by proposing a $13 billion European Recovery Program to be distributed over four 
years. While this generated unease among fiscally conservative members of 
congress, it appealed to the need for Americans to prove that their "tough talk" 
corresponded to policies. Citizens also responded enthusiastically to the notion that 
assisting Europe was in their own best interests.64 Britain's inability to maintain its 
presence in Greece and Turkey had demonstrated that without economic assistance 
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few nations would be able to purchase U.S. exports.65 John Gimbel writes that the 
I 
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were pragmatic as well as ideological in nature. 
He notes that Kennan recommended simply telling the European nations that they 
must accept the Marshall Plan because the United States had determined that it was 
necessary. There was, in Kennan's view, no reason to engage in any form of 
negotiation which might question this basic assumption. 66 
The government took a less arbitrary stance, giving Eastern European nations 
the opportunity to participate in the Marshall Plan if they agreed to disclose all 
economically related information. As this prerequisite would have exposed their 
heavy reliance on the Soviet Union,67 it was viewed as an attempt to intervene in their 
domestic affairs.68 Most Eastern European nations promptly embraced the Soviet 
alternative known as the Molotov Plan, which essentially reinforced their 
dependency.69 Thomas G. Paterson writes that Stalin actually feared the Marshall 
Plan more than the atomic bomb since it threatened to expose the communist system's 
inability to rival the material benefits associated with capitalism.70 Soviet officials 
naturally avoided this issue, instead charging that the United States was pursuing the 
"capitalist encirclement" of Eastern Europe. 71 In September 194 7 they established 
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the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, to redouble propaganda that the 
Soviet system was not only preferable but ideal.72 
The democratically elected government of Czechoslovakia, while professing 
allegiance to socialist values, also expressed willingness to participate in the Marshall 
Plan. The Soviet Union viewed this as evidence that the local Communist Party 
preferred to compromise with non-communist elements rather than to heed the 
Kremlin's wishes. The party soon discarded its agreement to coordinate policies with 
the Social Democrats, but otherwise remained averse to following Soviet dictates. In 
February 1948 the USSR responded by overthrowing the government.73 U.S. 
officials, like much of the world, expressed outrage at such violent disregard for 
representative institutions. At the same time they made no effort to intervene, lest 
they precipitate a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.74 As that conflict seemed to 
have become unavoidable, whether immediately or at some point in the future, the 
U.S. Senate approved the Marshall Plan.75 The Czech coup appeared to be in keeping 
with the Soviet Union's desire to expand its influence as widely as possible by any 
means necessary. 76 
Shortly thereafter, the United States, Britain and France announced plans to 
introduce a new currency in their zones of occupation in Germany. The Soviet 
Union, which occupied the fourth zone, charged that this action violated the Potsdam 
agreement which had called for using a single currency to facilitate integration. The 
western nations disagreed, noting that the agreement had called for political as well as 
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economic integration, the latter of which no longer served any purpose given the 
Soviet Union's obstruction of the former. 77 While the technicalities of the agreement 
could be debated, they guised a larger ideological and strategic dispute. If the 
western nations were to compromise, they feared not only imperiling the success of 
the Marshall Plan, but also encouraging the Soviet Union to stage further coups 
throughout Europe. If the Soviet Union were to compromise, it feared losing 
credibility among those Europeans-perhaps a minority-who genuinely sought its 
protection against "capitalist encirclement."78 
When the western nations introduced the new currency in June 1948, the 
Soviet Union terminated their access to Berlin. The city lay deep within the Soviet 
zone but, given its importance, had been divided into four zones of occupation.79 The 
western zones were now unable to be re-supplied using the overland routes upon 
which they had depended thus far. The Truman administration put aside its initial 
consideration of a military response in favor of staging an airlift with the British. 80 
Despite public anxiety that the crisis might precipitate a world war,81 officials 
surmised that the Soviet Union wished to avoid that possibility.82 This proved correct 
as U.S. and British planes drew no enemy fire while flying to and from the besieged 
city. West Berliners were grateful for this but remained objective, viewing questions 
of ideology as subordinate to their preservation of a more comfortable lifestyle than 
possible in the Soviet-occupied zone. 83 Over the eleven months that it remained in 
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place, 84 the blockade assumed greater significance for outsiders. For example, 
Truman referred to it as a tribute to America's "dedication to the cause of freedom."85 
Whether of not the United States had earned the right to be self-
congratulatory, that impulse now diverged from its historical aversion to becoming 
embroiled in European affairs. The Berlin blockade crystallized the transformation of 
U.S.-Soviet relations, and by default U.S.-European relations, which the Truman 
Doctrine had set in motion. The USSR had some basis for claiming that it had been 
provoked, but the excessive nature of the blockade affronted the most lenient 
interpretation of a defensive maneuver. At the time Arthur Toynbee referred to the 
Soviet action as "folly."86 Later historians have deemed it a humiliating blunder 
which permitted the United States to rationalize its longing to intervene.87 Daniel 
Yergin adopts a broader perspective, writing that the blockade-whomever might be 
blamed for it-indicated that the recent triumph over the Axis powers had failed to 
establish a lasting peace. Instead it had foreshadowed the "armed truce" between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.88 
In April 1949, just prior to the Berlin blockade being lifted, the United States 
signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with Canada and ten 
European nations. All parties had been forced to recognize the inadequacy of the 
U.S. atomic monopoly to deter communist aggression. While they had a total of 
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fourteen military divisions in Europe, the Soviet Union had well over a hundred.89 
An atomic bomb or bombs might inflict tremendous damage without preventing 
Western Europe from being overrun-a scenario which NATO sought to prevent. 
The United States was to cooperate in defending any member against an attack, as 
well as to join any war which might follow. Though a more entangling alliance could 
not be envisaged, congress ratified it by a wide margin. 90 Truman then proposed $1.5 
billion military aid package for Europe. The most effective argument in its favor 
came in August when the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb. The aid 
proposal soon gained approval,91 providing a further justification for Soviet to be un-
conciliatory. 92 
Events in China were equally discouraging. As the Soviet Union had been 
preparing its atomic bomb, the United States had terminated aid to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek whose forces were being forced to surrender their positions on the 
mainland. 93 Further aid was deemed unable to reverse their pending defeat and to 
alienate the majority of Chinese who appeared to support the leadership of Mao Tse-
tung. The Truman administration also nurtured hope that Mao, despite being a 
communist, might seek independence from Moscow.94 That hope began to wane as 
Mao and his colleagues publicized their admiration for the Soviet Union, which 
reciprocated by signing a treaty of friendship and extending $300 million in aid. 
Communist China seemed to become the junior partner of the Soviet Union rather 
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than one of its satellites,95 and there was no solace in the distinction. Either way U.S. 
officials determined that the global balance of power was shifting in favor of 
communism.96 Further undermining their position, several U.S. allies chose to 
recognize Mao's government.97 
If North Korea hoped for a similar response when it invaded the South in June 
1950, it was mistaken. Its troops blatantly violated the 38th parallel in an effort to 
overthrow the Republic of Korea whose government, unlike that of North Korea, was 
recognized by the United Nations. The Security Council promptly condemned the 
invasion and called for providing military assistance to the Republic. Truman upheld 
the containment doctrine by ordering U.S. forces to South Korea and dispatching the 
Seventh Fleet to guard Formosa against a possible attack.98 The Soviet Union 
denounced the Security Council resolution as providing a "cloak" for U.S. 
intervention, yet it did not veto either that resolution or the subsequent one which 
placed the UN military effort under U.S. leadership.99 Instead it chose to abstain, as 
this course stopped short of exonerating North Korea while giving Soviet officials a 
high-profile opportunity to malign the United States. While the conflict was 
nominally Asian, U.S. officials viewed the Soviet Union as fully responsible for 
having inspired the North Korean invasion as part of a larger strategy to deplete U.S. 
strength in Europe. 100 
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The Korean War, though undeclared, provided the most glaring example of 
aggression since Pearl Harbor. The situation in Europe was far more convoluted as 
the superpowers remained there at the behest of their allies, and the region was held 
to be of unrivalled importance.101 The United had accordingly begun to refocus 
priorities by withdrawing its forces from South Korea in mid-1949. Consistent with 
military advice, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had announced that the nation no 
longer fell among the vital interests which the United States would automatically 
defend. 102 It had not been contemplated that North Korea would invade without any 
form of provocation. As such the Truman administration had not hesitated to reverse 
its non-committal stance, yet it accepted that pursuing total victory might unleash a 
global conflict. General Douglas Macarthur, the commander of UN forces, was duly 
replaced after stating his willingness to take that risk. 103 After a year of fighting 
resulted in a stalemate, the Soviet Union proposed a truce which the U.S.-led forces 
rejected in favor of prolonging the stalemate.104 
Nonetheless, Americans supported the decision to intervene as it proved that 
they had overcome "the tragedy oftimidity."105 That condition had been exemplified 
by the U.S. refusal to send troops to Greece and Turkey or to directly confront the 
Soviet Union over the Czech coup or Berlin blockade. Korea, though less than a final 
showdown, was unmistakably a war by proxy. U.S. officials ventured that the Soviet 
Union might instigate a major conflict elsewhere-and not necessarily by proxy-if 
North Korea were to triumph. Whatever their plans might have been, Soviet officials 
expressed grave concern at reports that the U.S. military was considering a pre-
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emptive strike against them. 106 Fortunately neither scenario came to pass by the time 
Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency and honored his pledge to end the 
hostilities. 107 The armistice signed in July 1953 established that the Korean Peninsula 
was to remain divided along the thirty-eighth parallel.108 
The death of Stalin earlier in the year had led to a power struggle within the 
Kremlin. While this had dampened the Soviet Union's revolutionary fervor and 
contributed to ending the Korean War, 109 the nation's political infrastructure remained 
firmly intact. The new style of collective leadership continued efforts to discredit the 
United States and undermine its alliances. 110 Its more flexible diplomatic posture led 
many Americans to underestimate the communist threat, 111 which U.S. officials 
viewed as fundamentally unchanged. 112 Events suggested the contrary: that by 
appearing to repudiate Stalin's legacy, but actually following it, the Soviet Union had 
become more dangerous. 113 That risk, the Department of State believed, could be 
seen either as an opportunity for strong leadership in the cause of peace or renewed 
efforts to confront and destroy Soviet communism. 114 Eisenhower did not view these 
106 FRUS 1950, 4: 1230-32, 1254-58. 
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as mutually exclusive alternatives. In this way his approach to world affairs would be 
"responsible. " 115 
Shortly before the Korean armistice was signed, the residents of East Berlin 
protested their occupation by the Soviet Union, the arbitrary nature of which had not 
improved despite Stalin's death. What had appeared to change, however, was U.S. 
receptiveness to supporting anticommunist uprisings. The new secretary of state, 
John Foster Dulles, frequently urged resistance to Soviet-style totalitarianism. While 
Eisenhower exerted a more moderate influence over U.S. foreign policy, both men 
were closely associated with the theme of communist rollback. This more aggressive-
sounding version of the containment doctrine failed to yield results when the Soviet 
Union violently suppressed the East German protestors.116 U.S. inaction revealed that 
officials, despite their rhetoric, hoped to stimulate anti-Soviet unrest without 
provoking an actual confrontation. 117 This relieved most Western Europeans, for it 
indicated that the Eisenhower administration was less reactionary than its declarations 
suggested. 118 
The United States' commitment to the "free world" persisted despite its 
hesitation to act at the every level. In January 1954 Eisenhower announced that the 
New Look, a military strategy based on reducing conventional forces and increasing 
115 For one definition of"responsible power politics," see Osgood, Limited War, 284. 
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the production of atomic weapons. 119 Not only was this far more economical; it was 
to permit the United States to respond instantly and decisively to future episodes of 
communist aggression. Critics referred to it as the doctrine of massive retaliation,120 
and while this term lacked any positive connotation, it was in keeping Eisenhower' s 
explanation to congress that it was designed "to blow hell out of [the communists] in 
a hurry if they start anything."121 He later assured the press that that there was no 
basis for portraying the New Look as jingoistic; it was simply "an attempt by 
intelligent people to keep abreast of the times. "122 Officials throughout the 
administration began making an effort to counteract the anxiety which the New Look 
produced. They repeatedly asserted that their desire was not to antagonize the Soviet 
Union but merely to discourage it from engaging in provocative behavior. 123 
However legitimate its motivation, the New Look failed to dissuade the 
Chinese from launching artillery strikes against the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 
the Formosa Straight. This action, which commenced in September 1954, suggested 
that the communist government might go further and launch an invasion of 
Formosa. 124 The Eisenhower administration responded by signing a mutual defense 
treaty with the island, 125 yet China not only continued to shell Quemoy and Matsu; it 
overran Nationalist forces on the Tachen Islands.126 The White House then began to 
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consider a pre-emptive strike against China and perhaps even the Soviet Union if it 
were to intervene. 127 The situation recalled the Department of State's earlier warning 
that Formosa might involve the United States in "extensive and protracted 
hostilities."128 Congress granted Eisenhower full discretion to embark on that 
course. 129 It was a testament to his restraint that he gave China the opportunity to 
volrmtarily desist. 130 
Britain and France would soon be given the same opportunity. Their 
expectation of U.S. support after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956 was 
rmderstandable but misplaced. The previous month, as Britain was withdrawing the 
last of its occupation forces, Israel had mormted a series of attacks against its Arab 
neighbor which, like the entire region, demonstrated hostility toward the Jewish state. 
Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser had turned to the Soviet bloc for weapons 
after the United States refused his appeal, and Czechoslovakia had obliged. Though 
acknowledging that Nasser was a not a communist, U.S. officials had withdrawn 
funding for the Answan Dam-a major infrastructure project designed to enhance 
Egypt's self-sufficiency. Nasser's willingness to deal with communists had been 
deemed rmacceptable for any reason. Resentful of this decision, aside from 
America's perceived responsibility for the creation of a Jewish state, Nasser had 
chosen to nationalize the Suez Canal. 131 His statements thereafter were as critical of 
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the United States as of Britain and France, which had previously held control and 
h bl. h . b d' . 132 soug t to re-esta 1s 1t y sen mg m paratroopers. 
The United States empathized with the need of Britain and France to 
guarantee that traffic through the Suez Canal would not be interrupted since nearly 
half of their petroleum supplies flowed through it. 133 At the same time it felt obliged 
to support UN resolutions condemning their invasion, for otherwise it would have 
been perceived as defending European imperialism and the equally unpopular specter 
of Zionism. 134 The Eisenhower administration endorsed the UN resolutions which 
censured its allies, yet in doing so it failed to win Nasser's confidence. 135 After 
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev publicly supported him, Eisenhower warned 
that if the Soviet Union were to intervene, the United States would be forced to do so 
on the other side. 136 Meanwhile threat of U.S. economic sanctions persuaded Britain 
and France to withdraw. 137 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later suggested, 
only partly in jest, that they should have ousted Nasser before leaving.138 
In October 1956 Hungarians staged a large uprising to withdraw from the 
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-led equivalent of NATO, as well as to reduce or eliminate 
Moscow's intervention in their domestic affairs. The USSR dispatched 
approximately two hundred thousand troops and five thousand tanks to suppress the 
lightly armed rebels. To the distress of many onlookers, over twenty thousand 
Hungarians perished while the United States refused to intervene on their behalf.139 
In part to divert attention from this, Khrushchev repeated allegations that the United 
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State, Britain and France were all "imperial" powers despite their apparent 
disagreement over the Suez Canal. 140 That disagreement might have addressed the 
means rather the ends of "imperialism," but it remained very serious, prompting 
speculation that the western alliance might never recover.141 As the Hungarian 
uprising had showcased the extreme nature of Soviet rule, the Suez crisis had 
showcased the extreme unpredictability of U.S. leadership. 142 
U.S.-Soviet relations entered a phase of heightened insecurity.143 Eisenhower 
sought and acquired congressional authority to forcibly intervene in the affairs of any 
Middle Eastern nation which appeared to be at risk of communism. Ronald E. 
Powaski refers to the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine as "the concluding link in the 
chain of [U.S.] security commitments" which extended to over forty nations. Critics 
questioned the wisdom of this "pactomania" for many reasons. 144 In the case of the 
Middle East, the Arab-Israeli dispute constituted the greatest threat to stability, and 
its non-resolution invited exploitation by the Soviet Union. 145 By excluding Israel the 
Eisenhower Doctrine avoided estranging the rest of the Middle East, but failed to 
generate widespread confidence. The U.S. network of alliances included many 
nations whose interests otherwise diverged and whose number prevented the United 
States from being able to defend them simultaneously. 146 
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The Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite, Sputnik, in October 
1957, appearing to substantiate its claim to possess the technology to deliver inter-
continental ballistic missiles. 147 Khrushchev boasted that "bomber planes can now be 
put in museums,"148 and suggested that now the USSR might be able to neutralize the 
United States as a precursor to defeating NATO forces in Europe. 149 Eisenhower 
assured the American people of his full confidence that the Strategic Air Command 
remained a highly effective deterrent. 150 The Department of State nonetheless urged a 
prompt demonstration of U.S. ballistic technology to counteract Sputnik's damaging 
"psychological effects."151 After the United States quickly launched its own, much 
smaller satellite, the American public remained despondent, 152 for it now seemed 
possible that the communist system might triumph. 153 
The following August, China again started to bombard islands in the Formosa 
Strait. Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union would fully support the Chinese 
against any U.S. intervention, and that it would not hesitate to use nuclear warheads if 
the conflict were to escalate. 154 Undeterred by this, Eisenhower ordered the U.S. 
Navy to escort Nationalist vessels in the disputed waters. As anticipated, the Chinese 
held their fire while U.S. officials pressured Chiang Kai-shek to substantially reduce 
his troops on Quemoy and Matsu-which numbered approximately 100,000-and to 
abandon the highly impractical objective of reclaiming mainland China.155 These 
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developments greatly reduced the risk of a major regional conflict or global war, 156 
yet the superpower's diplomacy, unlike their military strategies, had not undergone a 
New Look. 157 It reflected a traditional reliance on issuing threats while pursuing 
calculated retreats. 
This pattern re-emerged in November 1958 the Soviet Union demanded 
negotiations to resolve the four-power occupation of Berlin within six months. If the 
United States, France and Britain were to refuse, it pledged to yield control of its zone 
to East Germany and to support that government in any conflict which might follow. 
The western powers, though resentful of this ultimatum, were loath to underestimate 
its seriousness. They immediately consulted with NATO and gained its approval to 
reply that negotiations would be acceptable only if the Soviet Union withdrew its 
threat and agreed to discuss Berlin relative to overall European security 
arrangements. 158 Soviet officials consented for two reasons. They appreciated that, 
like themselves, their western counterparts did not wish to seem overly compromising 
and had little incentive to do so as the regional balance of power appeared to be 
shifting to their advantage. For example, United States had recently deployed 
missiles in Central Europe while the Soviet Union appeared unable to do so in 
Eastern Europe-despite its bravado to the contrary.159 
The superpowers appeared closer than ever before to a direct conflict from 
which neither would be able to emerge victorious. 160 Their nuclear arsenals had 
approximately quadrupled since the United States had announced the New Look. 161 
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Though no progress was made in renegotiating Berlin's status within the six-month 
framework, the superpowers agreed to resolve the "abnormal situation" by diplomatic 
rather than military means. 162 In May 1959 they held a foreign ministers conference 
in Geneva with representatives of Britain, France, as well as West and East Germany, 
the latter of which gained de facto recognition in the process. 163 The conference 
demonstrated that the superpowers and their principle allies shared an overarching 
commitment to their own self-preservation. 164 Khrushchev and Eisenhower carried 
this further by meeting face-to-face, and they established a degree of cordiality which, 
though it did not resolve the Berlin crisis, put an end to the war scare.165 
The hopeful though indecisive nature ofU.S.-Soviet relations was epitomized by 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. As discussed in the previous chapter, this article 
stipulated that the seven claimant nations would make no attempt to enforce their 
sovereignty rights and that the five other signatories would refrain from declaring 
any. These terms established the basis for an agreement which was geographically 
far removed from the major arenas of superpower conflict. In substance, however, it 
was closely linked. By December 1959, when the Antarctic Treaty was signed, the 
United States and Soviet Union had been forced to accept that their respective designs 
for humanity could not be fulfilled except at risk of mutual annihilation.166 Peaceful 
coexistence had become equally imperative for both, and the frozen continent 
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provided an ideal arena in which it could be achieved without jeopardizing the 
ideological alignment of an indigenous population. 
The Department of State summarized U.S. Antarctic policy before 1939 as 
having adopted a passive tack based exclusively upon the non-recognition of other 
nation's territorial claims. Thereafter the policy entered a more "positive" phase with 
the establishment of the U.S. Antarctic Service under the command of Admiral 
Richard Evelyn Byrd. Long after the Second World War temporarily suspended the 
U.S. effort to establish rights on the basis of permanent occupation, as stipulated by 
the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, U.S. policy remained in a state of abeyance. The United 
States withheld a claim partially due to the evolution of its relations with the Soviet 
Union. 167 While the first internationalization proposal of 1948 had sought to bar the 
USSR, the second, presented a decade later, extended to it. The 1957-1958 
International Geophysical Year provided the most direct explanation for this. Its 
influence also coincided with the pattern of superpower relations which often 
demonstrated that the limits of U.S. "hegemony."168 
Operation High Jump, which departed south in November 1946, appeared to 
indicate that the U.S. Antarctic policy would be divorced from the tenet of non-
claimancy. The expedition was by far the largest to date, as its objective was the 
most urgent: to search for evidence of uranium which might be used to solidify the 
U.S. atomic monopoly.169 Though no such evidence was discovered, common sense 
appeared to dictate that the government would forward an exploration-based 
167 See Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Acting Secretary of State (Hoover) to Delegation to United Nations, 9 March 
1956, no. 526, 9 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. Two years before the Chilean Escudero Plan 
called for suspending the question of sovereignty, the Department of Interior had recommended a 
similar course. Department oflnterior, Board of Geographical Names (Burri!), to Department of State, 
Division of Geography (Saucerman), 25 April 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
168 See Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 119. 
169 Jason Kendall Moore, "Seven Penguins and an Olive Branch: Antarctic Politics in The New York 
Times," Estudios Norteamericanos 2, no. 4 (2001): 125-36. 
88 
territorial claim over most or all of the continent.170 This would have been consistent 
with the Truman Doctrine to oppose Soviet expansion wherever it might take place. 
Antarctica, though a relatively low priority, did hold possible economic and military 
significance. The Soviet Union denounced Operation High Jump as a form of 
"imperialist aggression" which, 171 like the Marshall Plan, suggested that the United 
States was modeling itself after the Roman Empire.172 At the same time, the U.S. 
emphasis on Europe dictated a reduction of its other commitments, 173 and High Jump 
had already placed it in a far stronger position in the Antarctic than any of the seven 
claimant nations or the USSR. 174 
The Department of State reasoned that it was less important to secure rights 
over the Antarctica than to promote some form of international cooperation which 
would exclude the USSR and enhance U.S. prestige in the rest of the world. 175 In 
June 1948 it attempted to secure this objective by proposing a "special regime" with 
the claimant nations, 176 which proved unwilling to renounce their sovereignty as 
stipulated. Fourteen months later, the United States chose to pursue an agreement 
based on the suspension rather than the renunciation of sovereignty. This shift 
demonstrated that U.S. officials sought to avoid imposing solutions on their Cold War 
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allies, and to pursue their common objectives independent of the United Nations-in 
which the Truman administration had lost all confidence. 177 Unlike the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the first U.S. internationalization proposal failed. They 
were both anti-Soviet in design, yet the need for this was far less urgent in the 
Antarctic, where nature posed a far more immediate threat than ideology.178 
Given Soviet willingness to confront the United States over Berlin, it was no 
surprise that Moscow was willing to do so over the Antarctic. Not only had the 
internationalization proposal been reported; it was publicly known that the United 
States and the seven claimant nations remained at odds. In June 1950 the USSR 
indicated that it would deny the legitimacy of any agreement reached without its 
participation.179 From a certain perspective this development appeared to be an 
attempt "to keep the western powers off balance as part of a calculated 'Cold War' 
strategy."180 While Antarctic was not exempt from the bipolar struggle, the 
1819-1821 Bellingshausen expedition provided a non-ideological rationale for the 
Soviet position. This expedition had been one the first to venture into Antarctic 
waters, whether or not it had actually discovered the continent, as the USSR 
claimed.181 While negotiations for an eight-power arrangement were underway, 
Sheldon W. Boggs, the author of the U.S. proposal, made an "unorthodox" 
recommendation to cooperate with the Soviet Union rather than seeking to exclude it. 
177 Hammond, The Cold War Years, 28. 
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Indeed this might have been more effective means of garnering national prestige 
while also helping to reduce superpower tensions at large.182 
Within weeks of the Soviet declaration of interest in the Antarctic, North 
Korean troops invaded the South, and the United States chose to lead the UN-
sanctioned war effort, which indirectly appeared to justify the internationalization 
proposal's exclusion of the USSR. It also temporarily suspended U.S. officials' 
concern over the future of Antarctica and discouraged their intervention in the dispute 
between Britain and the Latin American claimant nations. To some extent the 
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had encouraged the Soviet Union to tighten its 
grip over Eastern Europe, and thus precipitated the Czech coup and Berlin 
blockade. 183 These policies' only responsibility for the Korean War, however, was 
having failed to discourage the USSR from acting by proxy. This exacerbated fears 
that the USSR might be able to exploit the Antarctic dispute between Britain and the 
Latin American nations, 184 yet like the United States it was unprepared to devote 
substantial time or resources to the frozen continent. 
The Truman administration proved unable to use the U.S. atomic monopoly to 
gain concessions from the Soviet Union. 185 The iron curtain remained firmly in place 
by the time the USSR tested its first warhead in August 1949, and thereafter it grew 
virtually impenetrable. The containment doctrine appealed to Americans' sense of 
global responsibility,186 yet many of their allies questioned the reliability of U.S. 
leadership. Though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established an impressive 
182 Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) to Bureau of British Commonwealth 
and Northern European Affairs (Ronhovde), 12 June 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
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framework for collective defense, U.S. officials indicated that they would not 
automatically enforce it unless the aggression were overt, and even in that case they 
refused to specify the retaliatory measures which might be implemented. 187 The 
alternatives soon became obvious, and they were both atomic in nature: massive 
deterrence or massive retaliation, the latter of which carried the risk that Washington 
might act independently and thereby subject its allies to a devastating Soviet counter-
strike for a decision which some or all of them might oppose. 188 
The failure to reach an eight-power agreement for Antarctica reflected similar 
perceptions of U.S. unreliability .189 The claimant nations were perhaps discouraged 
by the United States having excluded the Korean peninsula from its defense perimeter 
and then promptly committed itself to defending the South. 190 This suggested any 
number of possibilities. It might make a territorial claim in the Antarctic but then 
refuse to acknowledge its suspension; it might both make and suspend a claim but 
then not enforce an agreement ifthe Soviet Union were to intervene, as in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary; or it might respond to Soviet intervention even if no 
agreement were in place and then maintain an equally undesirable position. The 
worst possibility was that it might conduct nuclear tests in the Antarctic and subject 
the Southern Hemisphere nations to the risk of fallout. 191 
The New Look promulgated by the Eisenhower administration encouraged 
this kind of speculation. Though less new than the title suggested, it did substantially 
increase the reliance of the "free world" upon U.S. weapons of mass destruction. The 
187 Raymond Aron, "French Public Opinion and the Atlantic Treaty," International Affairs 28, no. I 
(1952): 1-8; USWA 1950: 102-3. 
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in place. See FRUS 1948, vol. 1, part 2, General (Washington: USG PO, 1976), 1000-1. 
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president fortunately sought opportunities to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, 
despite the bombastic rhetoric of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.192 While his 
effort failed to curtail the escalating arms race, Eisenhower's experience as the former 
commander of Allied forces was a valuable resource. It cast his moderation not as a 
form of appeasement, but rather as the sagacity of a wartime hero.193 This 
contributed to why he was able to side with the Soviet Union in condemning the 
Anglo-French invasion of Egypt without incurring charges that he must be a 
communist sympathizer. In relation to the Antarctic, this decision gravely offended 
two of the principle claimant nations.194 It also indicated that U.S. allegiance could 
not be taken for granted even by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Those Argentine and Chilean officials who still hoped to eject Britain from the 
Antarctic must have derived some satisfaction from its public humiliation. At the 
same time they must have grasped that their own nations held far less significance to 
the United States. 
As predicted, the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
heightened tensions over the Antarctic, 195 for now there was little hope of excluding 
the Soviet Union except forcibly and contrary to its UN invitation to participate in the 
eighteen-month event. The Eisenhower administration concurred with one 
Department of State official who ventured that "the United States has enough on its 
hands without undertaking to enlarge its domain" by announcing a territorial claim. 196 
This course of action was viewed as likely to provoke a Soviet counter-claim and add 
192 Dockrill, The Cold War , 61. 
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another layer of complexity to a dispute which already would have confounded 
international jurists for many years if, by some miracle, the claimant nations were to 
consent to arbitration.197 As no such miracle could be expected, the United States 
abandoned its tentative plan to forward a claim as a prelude to an eight-power 
agreement. It now chose to include the Soviet Union-as well as Belgium, Japan and 
South Africa, the other non-claimant nations active in the south polar component of 
the IGY. This functional approach had become imperative since the USSR had 
established bases in the Australian Antarctic sector, and had no intention of leaving 
after the IGY. 198 
In May 1958 the United States circulated a proposal to the eleven other IGY 
nations which was accepted as a basis for negotiations.199 Its concern that the USSR 
might assert itself more forcefully in the Antarctic intensified after the launch of 
Sputnik,200 which most Americans regarded as evidence of a missile gap. 
Eisenhower, though aware that no such gap existed,201 recognized that Soviet 
technology had in some way surpassed that of the United States, a fact which 
heightened his desire to reduce international tensions. The death of Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles before the Antarctic Conference was also fortuitous in this regard. 
His bellicose rhetoric had suffered after the White House refused to intervene in the 
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Hungarian uprising, and become anachronistic by the end of the decade.202 His less 
confrontational successor, Christian A. Herter, appeared better suited for involvement 
with the Antarctic Conference where it became necessary for the U.S. delegation to 
k . h h . . h h . d 203 ma e greater concessions t an ot erw1se m1g t ave entertame . 
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson observed that in the 1950s the 
United States began to lose the confidence of its allies due to its unwillingness to 
address the issues which they deemed most important.204 He cited the arms race as an 
example of this which severely handicapped the effectiveness of diplomatic 
initiatives, aside from failing to deter military confrontations.205 Indeed, U.S. 
officials had trouble devising effective policies since their hope for greater stability 
in the world did not permit them to ignore the unlikelihood that it could be 
achieved.206 Their effort to find a satisfactory middle-ground frustrated U.S. allies. 
Pertaining to the Antarctic, they pondered a territorial claim which either reflected the 
full scope of U.S. exploration or was limited to the last uncontested sector from 90° to 
150° West.207 Some of the claimant nations encouraged the latter alternative to dispel 
202 Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 246. 
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concerns of the former, yet Washington chose neither to the disappointment of all 
parties.208 
Many factors hampered the United States' desire to gain recognition for 
seeking the harmonious resolution of disputes.209 This objective was not entirely 
compatible with the its unwillingness to renounce or limit its rights in any way, but 
throughout the period under consideration, it did prove responsive to outside 
influences-most notably the Chilean Escudero Plan and the Soviet-sponsored 
nuclear test ban. As such, its policy achieved its publicly stated goal of adapting to 
fluctuating circumstances in pursuit of a viable international agreement.210 This 
success appeared to exemplify the hope for U.S. leadership in the world to become a 
showcase of "creative ideas [and] constructive proposals."211 
As Mary Kaldor observes, the Cold War demonstrated a number of 
inconsistencies which cannot be simply explained.212 However creative U.S. 
leadership might have been in the Antarctic, it often revealed a degree of hubris 
which Soviet leaders found intolerable and many others found discouraging.213 The 
first internationalization proposal falsely assumed that the claimant nations would 
renounce their interests for the sake of accommodating a non-claimant nation whose 
citizens boasted of their reputation of being able "to sell refrigerators to Eskimos and 
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cigarettes to people with sore throats."214 Though the claimant nations were generally 
unreceptive to the Soviet Union's anti-capitalist propaganda, they hesitated to accept 
the U.S. system as a model for the world.215 They accepted the second 
internationalization proposal not because it was particularly innovative,216 but 
because, after ten years of stagnation, it made a belated effort to accommodate their 
interests and prestige.217 
While U.S.-Soviet relations heavily influenced U.S. Antarctic policy, they 
were not the only set of relations to have that effect. U.S.-British-Chilean relations 
were equally significant as they demonstrated the extent to which the "free world" 
faced challenges in deterring Soviet expansion to the far south. The next two chapters 
explore this reality in which the United States' loyalties were split between its 
foremost allies in Europe and Latin America, the region to which it was nearer but 
which it regarded as far less significant. 
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3. Trilateral Diplomacy 
The significance of British-Argentine Antarctic relations is perhaps more widely 
appreciated than that ofU.S.-Chilean or U.S.-British-Chilean Antarctic relations. 
Klaus J. Dodds writes that in the 1940s and 1950s British officials failed to 
thoroughly address Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands and Falkland Island 
Dependencies in hope that the dispute would remain indefinitely suspended. 1 Many 
signatories questioned the viability of Antarctic Treaty's political status quo 
moratorium,2 and the later Falklands or Malvinas War indicated that their skepticism 
had been warranted, even though the hostilities did not spread to the frozen continent. 
The previously published research included in this chapter demonstrates that the 
political status quo moratorium-without which there might have been no 
agreement-was the byproduct ofU.S.-Chilean relations, and that British officials 
later maintained pressure to include the USSR. While the influence of the other 
signatory nations should not be discounted, it was far more "limited," as the 
Australian role has been described.3 
After the Second World War, the United States sought to nurture its reputation 
for pursuing the harmonious resolution of conflict, and the Antarctic provided an 
ideal opportunity for doing so. However, its reluctance to formalize its right had a 
counterproductive effect on the seven nations which had announced territorial claims 
1 Klaus-John Dodds, "Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British Representatives of Argentina 
1945-1961," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 19, no. 3 (1994): 273-90. 
2 For example, see the French position as discussed in the previous chapter. 
3 H. Robert Hall, "Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty," in Julia Jabour-Green and 
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Research Centre for the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, 2002), 27-33. 
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to the region-Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and 
Norway-for they properly surmised that U.S. officials were entertaining plans to 
bring most or all the region under their jurisdiction. This fear was greatest in the 
Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, which like most Latin American nations 
doubted their Good Neighbor warranted recognition as such. Similar concerns were 
prevalent in Britain where officials both resented the U.S. non-recognition policy and 
dreaded that a forthcoming U.S. claim might extend to the peninsular region, 
complicating its sovereignty dispute with the Latin American nations. 
Klaus Dodds writes that Britain actually viewed the North American 
challenge as more "problematic" than the South American. The Royal Navy was 
unable and unwilling to challenge the U.S. Navy, whereas it went to great lengths to 
discourage Chilean and Argentine advances in the disputed territory.4 Deborah 
Shapley maintains that the United States sought to remain neutral in this increasingly 
dangerous competition between its Cold War allies.5 In many ways this is true, yet 
her position underemphasizes the pro-British tenor of U.S. policy,6 as well as the 
reservations which Britain and Chile shared toward the wisdom of accepting U.S. 
leadership in the far south. As more contemporary research has suggested, the direct 
and indirect collaboration among these three nations with laying the groundwork of 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. This chapter scrutinizes the elements of mistrust which 
bore upon their alliance. 7 
4 Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 
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William F. Sater has described Chile and the United States as Empires in 
Conflict, despite their restraint from engaging open conflict,8 while Lionel Gelber has 
described Britain and the United States as "a married couple who seem unable to live 
happily together and yet cannot live apart."9 The three nations' interaction pertaining 
to the future of Antarctica revealed similar dynamics which finally led Britain and 
Chile to set aside their own dispute and consider forging an agreement independent of 
the United States. Although the smaller nations were unable to act upon that 
contingency-and had no reason to given the signature of the Antarctic Treaty-it is 
revealing that they so much as entertained it. They did not regard U.S. policy as 
merely indecisive, as Phillip W. Quigg refers to it, 10 but rather as hypothetically more 
destabilizing than their own conflict of interests. 
As officials at the time conceded, the United States was likely to gain 
approval for any means of conflict resolution it chose pertaining to the Antarctic 
quagmire. That was self-evident given its naval might and comparatively unlimited 
resources in the postwar world. These factors coupled with its leadership of the "free 
world" suggested that any agreement it sought would be endorsed, at least by the 
claimant nations which all shared a cautious to hostile attitude toward the Soviet 
Union. However, U.S. relations with Britain and Chile, two of the most 
anticommunist nations among the claimants, demonstrated that the extension of U.S. 
leadership to the far south was more circumstantial than circumspect. At a number of 
junctures, the U.S. refusal to deal forthrightly with the sovereignty dispute threatened 
8 William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens, Georgia: The University 
of Georgia Press, 1990). 
9 Lionel Gelber, The Alliance of Necessity: Britain's Crisis, the New Europe and American Interests 
(London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1967), 13. 
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to permit the eruption of hostilities on a scale which would have undermined any 
satisfactory resolution. 
This chapter presents the trilateral relationship as unfolding in four phases. 
The first corresponds to the U.S. Navy's 1946-1947 Antarctic expedition, Operation 
High Jump, which led to predictions that the government would be reversing its non-
claimant policy. The second phase traces the personal activism of Chilean President 
Gabriel Gonzalez Videla during the following season, Britain's dispatch of the heavy 
cruiser Nigeria, the first U.S. proposal for internationalization, and the Chilean 
counter-proposal known as the Escudero Plan, which the United States chose to 
accept in 1949. The third phase extends from the Soviet Union's demand to 
participate in any agreement to the hostile encounters between Britain and the 
Southern Cone nations in 1952 and 1953, which derailed negotiations pertaining to 
the Escudero Plan. The last phase surveys the remaining six years, toward the end of 
which Britain and Chile sought to devise their own agreement in case the negotiations 
surrounding the Antarctic Treaty were to collapse. 
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In November 1946 the United States dispatched the largest Antarctic expedition to 
date. Thirteen naval vessels and over four thousand sailors participated in Operation 
High Jump, commanded by Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd whose previous expedition 
in 1939 had sought to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the South Pole. 11 Shortly 
thereafter the Second World War had shifted U.S. priorities to Europe and the Pacific, 
and the U.S. Antarctic Service disbanded before having the opportunity to act upon 
the government's Pan-American themes, including the possibility of a three-power 
condominium arrangement with the Southern Cone nations.12 If seven years of polar 
inactivity had been difficult for Byrd, his patience was abundantly compensated. 
Operation High Jump was not simply the largest Antarctic expedition to date; its 
massive scale trivialized all that had come before. U.S. interest in the region had 
greatly increased, 13 and officials were giving serious consideration to reversing their 
policy of territorial non-claimancy. High Jump was to circumnavigate the white 
continent for the first time ever, and in doing so made a strong case for exploration-
based rights. 14 
The U.S. Navy also gained the opportunity to test military hardware which 
had not been utilized against the Axis powers. 15 This aspect of its motivation 
generated hostile speculation, exacerbated by the navy's refusal to permit foreign 
observers. By default the operation was military in nature, given the navy's 
involvement, and the secrecy about its details generated the impression that the 
United States sought to militarize the planet's last frontier. Rumors of uranium lying 
11 R.E. Byrd to Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Cumming), 15 July 1939, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014; The New York Times, 12 January 1939. 
12 Department of State, Division of American Republics to Office of American Republic Affairs 
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beneath its ice cap led many domestic and foreign journalists to concur that High 
Jump was initiating a race for atomic materials among the United States and the seven 
claimants. 16 The Department of State regretted that even government-affiliated 
newspapers of its closest ally, Britain, published allegations to this effect. 17 The 
navy's admission that it viewed the Antarctic as a highly strategic resource was not 
helpful in counteracting alarmist speculation.18 
The Chilean press took an especially suspicious attitude, calling for its 
government to act decisively.19 The nation had formalized its sovereignty claim over 
the sector from 53° to 90° West only six years earlier, but from the earliest days of 
statehood had regarded the Antarctic peninsula as an extension of its mainland.20 
British officials expressed concern that High Jump would be active in their sector 
from 20° to 80° West,21 but the intimacy of Anglo-American relations limited their 
"hysteria," as U.S. officials dismissed the Chilean reaction.22 Unlike Pan-American 
relations, Anglo-American relations had always benefited from a sense of linguistic, 
cultural and political unity. The term Good Neighbor, though earnestly intended, 
most often conveyed irony when uttered south of the Rio Grande. While British 
officials were prone to empathize with their former colony, Chilean officials took a 
far more cautious approach. The Defense Ministry renewed its collaboration with 
Argentina, first to defend the Southern Cone nations' joint sector, from 25° to 90° 
16 The New York Times, 6 November 1946; Time, 18November1946; The New Republic, 18 
November 1946. 
17 Embassy in London (Harrison) to Secretary of State, 7 November 1946, no. 2465; Ambassador in 
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West, and then to pursue a satisfactory delineation of their own overlapping claims.23 
U.S. officials regretted that the Latin Americans refused to acknowledge any other 
nation's rights or to accept Britain's proposal to seek a ruling from the International 
Court of Justice at The Hague.24 
In January 1947, as Operation High Jump was asserting North America's 
undeniable military aptitude, Chile dispatched a small, two-vessel Antarctic 
expedition.25 What it lacked in size was compensated for by the presence of high-
ranking domestic officials and Argentine representatives. Ambassador Claude G. 
Bowers informed the Department of State that Chileans wished to display their 
opposition to U.S. "designs" to gain a monopoly over Antarctica's strategic and 
mineral resources.26 Officials in Washington interpreted this as an effort by anti-U.S. 
sectors of the population to maximize their allegations of North American 
imperialism. 27 In fact Byrd and the Department of State believed that High Jump 
would establish an unquestionable basis for a U.S. claim.28 They urged the White 
House to re-evaluate the merits of the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which stipulated that 
permanent occupation, rather than discovery, must be established prior to formalizing 
rights.29 While Chilean officials expressed a desire for cooperation with the United 
23 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 15 November 1946, no. 1003, NARA, RG 
59, 800.014. 
24 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Burrows) to Secretary of State, [22 November 1946], no. 1305, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014. 
25 The New York Times, 10 January 1947. 
26 Embassy in Santiago (Millard) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1947, no. 14796, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
27 Department of State, Division ofNorth and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of 
State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; British Ambassador in Santiago 
(Leche), Annual Report on Chil~1946, 30 January 1947, AS 970/32/9, PRO, FO 497. 
28 Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Assistant Secretary of State 
(Braden), 25 April 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
29 For example, Joint Chiefs ofStaff(Leahy) to Secretary ofDefense, 26 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, 
Geographical File; Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Bonbright) to Deputy 
Undersecretary of State (Matthews), 15 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
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States, 30 they also made no secret of their contempt for its failure to heed the 
inviolability of their Antarctic rights.31 
After High Jump returned to the United States, having failed to substantiate a 
cornucopia of resources, atomic or otherwise, the race to Antarctica lost some of its 
appeal. Byrd and his second-in-command, Admiral Richard H. Cruzen, shifted 
emphasis from the continent's untapped wealth to its strategic value relative to 
hemispheric defense. Their mission's overall accomplishments had been impressive. 
It had charted over three hundred thousand square miles of new territory, as well as 
devising means of constructing airstrips on the polar ice cap. 32 Though Washington 
still hesitated to advance a sovereignty claim, the explorers' statements revealed 
ongoing consideration of that alternative. 33 Anxiety persisted among the claimant 
nations since a U.S. claim was likely to overlap their own. The foreign ministers of 
the Southern Cone nations took preventative action by signing the Donoso-La Rosa 
agreement, which formalized their commitment to joint defense.34 
Due to this politically inhospitable climate, though ostensibly for economic 
reasons, the United States cancelled plans for Operation High Jump II.35 The 
Department of State had a number of more urgent issues to address in the postwar 
world. Few career diplomats and elected politicians were alarmed by predictions that 
U.S. security hinged on control of the frozen continent. Relative to Eastern Europe, 
for example, Antarctica was a low priority, however beneficial it had been for 
30 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 16 October 1947, 6 August 1948, no. 15673, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
31 British Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 27 January 1947, AS 
918/32/9, PRO, FO 497. 
32 The New York Times, 9 February 1947, 7 March 1947. 
33 See Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 11February1948, no. 80, NARA, RG 
59, 800.014. 
34 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Leeper) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 23 July 1947, AS 4461/8/51, PRO, 
FO 497. 
35 R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, BPRC, folder 33; Consuelo Leon Woppke, "High Jump II: 
Ambivalencias de la Politica Estadounidense en 1949," Estudios Norteamericanos 3, no. 2 (2003): 91-
107. 
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conducting an undisclosed range of military tests. Uranium remained desirable but 
Antarctica, supposing it possessed any, was resistant to the era's mining technology. 
High Jump II still would have instigated a new round of consternation throughout 
Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. U.S. officials sought to avoid this, and unlike 
their colleagues in Britain and the Southern Cone, they were under no pressure to act 
rashly.36 
In January 1948 Chilean President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla announced his 
plans to join an expedition to reinforce the nation's Antarctic sovereignty. 
Journalists, like the population at large, responded with great enthusiasm, aware that 
he would be the first head of state to venture into the disputed territories.37 During 
the weeks before his departure, Britain and Argentina exchanged notes of protest over 
the latter nation's construction of a base on Deception Island in the disputed 
archipelago.38 The language was extremely polite, whereas the message was not; the 
nations firmly rejected each other's rights.39 Buenos Aires permitted the notes to be 
published, as they indicated its willingness to negotiate, not as the British had 
proposed, by going before The Hague, but by holding an international conference.40 
Britain's receptiveness to this was unlikely since its colonial possessions in Honduras, 
the Falkland Islands, and the Falkland Island Dependencies antagonized most Latin 
36 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 2070/1, Importance of Operation High Jump II to National Security, 5 
November 1949, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File. 
37 British Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Prime Minister (Attlee), 10 January 1948, AS 441/2/9, 
PRO, FO 497; Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1948, no. 85, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014; La Estrella, 10 January 1948, 12 February 1948. Many of the relevant 
Chilean newspaper articles from the dates cited herein have been reproduced in Consuelo Le6n 
Woppke and Mauricio Jara Ferdandez, eds., Antartica: Testimonios Periodisticos, 1947-1957 
(Valparaiso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, [2003]). 
38 La Estrella, 22 January 1948. 
39 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Leeper) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 30 January 1948, no. 58, AS 
920/16/51, PRO, FO 463; La Estrella, 23 January 1948. 
40 La Estrella, 7 February 1948. 
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Americans. Its possible receptiveness to the proposal evaporated when Argentina 
sent two cruisers and six torpedo boats into the contested waters.41 
Britons took umbrage at the Southern Cone's assertiveness.42 The Royal 
Navy dispatched the heavy cruiser Nigeria southward to put an end to Latin American 
bravado.43 The New York Times falsely predicted that Gonzalez Videla's trip might 
be delayed or aborted by news of the British decision.44 Instead, the Chilean 
president forged onward to inaugurate a new military base. The ceremony revealed 
"genuine emotion," according to La Estrella, and the president recalled that from the 
days of their independence, Chileans had viewed the Antarctic as an essential 
component of their identity. Politicians across the ideological spectrum agreed that 
their national rights were beyond question and should not be subject to any form of 
compromise. The Chilean Antarctic, they believed, was a natural extension of the 
Chilean mainland, and Britain's denial of this fact was to be ignored.45 
The popularity of Gonzalez Videla's statements concerned British officials in 
part because of the Axis sympathies prevalent in the Southern Cone nations. While 
the governments often sought to downplay this issue, the British regarded their 
presence in Antarctica as both a strategic and ideological threat.46 Latin Americans, 
on the other hand, resented what they perceived as British colonialism in the Western 
Hemisphere, an issue which heightened the appeal of radical doctrines. The 
41 The Times, 7 February 1948; La Estrella, 17 February 1948. 
42 See Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, 5 March 1948, A-589, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
43 See The Times, 17February1948. 
44 The New York Times, 16 February 1948. 
45 La Estrella, 17 February 1948, 18 February 1948. 
46 See Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 21 January 1947, AS 638/32/9; 
Foreign Secretary to British Ambassador in Santiago, 29 January 1947, no. 35, AS 3371/16/9, PRO, 
FO 497; Jaime Antonio Etchepare and Hamish I. Stewart, "Nazism in Chile: A Particular Type of 
Fascism in South America," Journal of Contemporary History 30 (1995): 577-605. 
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Department of State, which shared Britain's concems,47 repeated its stance denying 
that the hemispheric defense provision included in the Rio Treaty of 1947 applied to 
Antarctica. 48 Privately Secretary of State George C. Marshall considered Nigeria's 
involvement gratuitous and even somewhat undignified,49 yet he still empathized with 
Britain's desire to halt the Latin Americans' "ostentation and defiance," as The Times 
described it. 50 
Though Argentina had dispatched the larger task force, Chile led in the sphere 
of rhetoric. Gonzalez Videla's declarations encapsulated anti-colonial sentiments 
throughout Latin America.51 His vision of Antarctica as the land of the future and his 
appeals to the Rio Treaty dominated the front pages or entire sections of newspapers 
throughout the region.52 Meanwhile the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry informed 
Washington that Britain's actions violated not only the Rio Treaty's hemispheric 
defense perimeter, as outlined in Article IV, but also Article III, which defined an 
attack on any American nation as an attack against all American nations. 53 The 
Chilean government made no distinction between its continental and polar 
sovereignty, and rectified any confosion about this by placing its Antarctic sector 
under jurisdiction of the Magellan province.54 
47 For example, Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Office of 
American Republic Affairs (Hussey), 31October1946, NARA, RG 59, Office of American Republic 
Affairs, Memoranda on Chile; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs 
(Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
48 The New York Times, 19 February 1948. 
49 FRUS1948, vol. 1, part2, Genera/(Washington: USGPO, 1976), 963-65. 
50 The Times, 19 February 1948. 
51 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 26 February 1948, no. 109, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
52 Embassy in Chile (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 19 February 1948, no. 133, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
53 The Times, 20 February 1948. 
54 La Estrella, 24 February 1948 
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Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin deeply resented Gonzalez Videla's public 
statements attacking Britain's "imperialist aims." 55 The Chilean Ambassador in 
London, Manuel Bianchi, suggested that the translation had distorted the president's 
language, but journalists around the world translated the most inflammatory excerpts 
identically--consistent with the Foreign Office's own personnel. Bevin condemned 
Chile's approach to the dispute as unreasonable, counterproductive, and reflective of 
the nation's sympathy for totalitarian methods, implicitly those of the defeated 
National Socialists.56 In later discussions Bianchi noted that Bevin's remarks before 
~ the House of Commons were equally impassioned and offensive to Chileans. Bevin, 
unable to deny this, warned that Gonzalez Videla was acting as though Britain were a 
second-rate power, and that it would respond as forcefully as necessary to defend its 
rights. He surprisingly chose this moment to ask the ambassador for his personal 
reaction to president's behavior, and Biachi confessed that it absolutely delighted 
hi 57 m. 
After returning from Antarctica, Gonzalez Videla continued to rail against 
British "aggression," and he won broad public support with his appeal for the United 
States to intervene in keeping with the so-called Good Neighbor Policy.58 The 
Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry, placing little faith in Washington, invited Argentine 
officials to a ceremony affirming their joint rights.59 By the time Nigeria arrived to 
Deception Island and the British Governor of the Falkland Islands handed a note of 
protest to the Argentines stationed there, 60 no Southern Cone vessels remained in the 
55 The Times, 25 February 1948. 
56 Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 18 February 1948, AS 1132/16/51; 
Foreign Secretary to Ambassador in Santiago, 28 February 1948, AS 1417/16/51, PRO, PO 463. 
57 Foreign Secretary (Bevin) to Ambassador in Santiago (Leche), 2 March 1948, AS 1502/16/51, PRO, 
PO 463. 
58 The Times, 4 March 1948. 
59 La Estrella, 4 March 1948. 
60 The Times, 26 February 1948, 6 March 1948. 
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vicinity, and the immediate risk of an encounter passed. The Department of State did 
not accept Chile's position that the presence of the British vessel necessarily 
constituted an act of "aggression,"61 and it declined to be enter into four-power 
negotiations as they held the possibility of compromising U.S. or British interests or 
both.62 
Officials in Washington turned their attention from staging another expedition 
to regulating the continent in some manner to prevent a relapse of hostile naval 
displays. In late August 1948 they circulated a draft internationalization proposal to 
the seven claimant nations. It sought to forge an eight-power condominium based on 
the renunciation of sovereignty. From the Department of State's perspective, this 
arrangement was perfectly innocuous as the United States had no claim and therefore 
nothing to renounce. The nation's leadership of the "free world," though not always 
popular, was an undeniable reality which officials believed could be projected 
southward without great difficulty. However, none of the claimant nations was 
willing to renounce its rights either to accommodate Washington or for any reason 
whatsoever.63 This attitude was most firmly held in Britain and the Southern Cone 
nations, for the proposal failed to acknowledge, much less to resolve the popular 
motivations for their dispute. 64 
The proposal had been vague about the nature of an eight-power arrangement 
since many different viewpoints might have emerged. That stage of discussions never 
took place due to the sovereignty issue, which been dealt with bluntly rather than 
61 See Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North European Affairs (Green), 17 July 
1948, in Embassy in Santiago to Department of State, 19 July 1948, no. 477, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
62 FRUS 1948, 1/2: 969. 
63 The British were believed to accept the U.S. proposal in principle, though that became a matter of 
semantics as they, like all of the claimant nations, opposed renouncing their rights. See Embassy in 
Washington (Nieto de! Rio) to Chancellery, 28 August 1948, Confidential Cable 4821; Embassy in 
Washington (Nieto del Rio) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 9 September 1948, MRECh. 
64 See Embassy in Washington (Nieto de! Rio) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 3 September 1948, Cable 
4937, MRECh. 
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vaguely. While the claimant nations agreed that Antarctic's scientific value surpassed 
its immediate strategic or economic potential, 65 they did not accept an inverse 
corollary between cooperative research and the preservation of their national rights. 
The Southern Cone's earlier recommendation for an international conference now 
might have been followed to redraft the proposal, though the Department of State 
regarded that course as unwise.66 The U.S. proposal floundered badly and there 
appeared to be no alternative until Chile tabled the Escudero Plan. Upholding the 
principle of sovereignty, it called for a five- to ten-year political moratorium to reduce 
tensions and permit the nations to reconsider their alternatives.67 This initiative was 
highly practical except for its assumption that the passage of time would be conducive 
to reducing tensions. 
With U.S. encouragement, Britain and the Southern Cone nations signed an 
agreement banning further hostile naval displays. Its terms were to confine their 
activities to normal levels, a meritorious ideal even though all parties continued to 
expand their military bases, issue notes of protests, and remain highly suspicious of 
each other.68 More dangerous challenges nonetheless did subside as the United 
States slowly abandoned hope for the success of its internationalization proposal. In 
August 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson accepted the need to pursue an 
agreement based on the Escudero Plan in consultation with Britain and Chile. 69 
Given assurances that its rights would not be compromised, Britain overcame its 
initial aversion to the Chilean scheme.70 The smaller American republic appeared to 
65 See Foreign Affairs Ministry, Secret Memorandum, 9 August 1948, MRECh. 
66 Embassy in Washington (Nieto de! Rio) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 29 August 1948, Cable 
4823/419, MRECh. 
67 Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 2 September 1948, no. 592, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014; La Estrella, 21September1948, 3 November 1948. 
68 For example, Foreign Office Minute, 30 March 1951, 17 November 1951, A 15216, PRO, FO 371; 
La Estrella, 20November1950, 6 March 1951; The Times, 26 November 1951. 
69 FRUS1949, vol. 1, National Security Affairs (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 804-6. 
70 British Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 18 October 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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have gained the opportunity to share leadership in determining the future of 
Antarctica.71 
Meanwhile the Soviet Union had begun to express interest in basing rights on 
a nineteenth-century Russian expedition. The claimant nations and the United States 
hoped to avoid that prospect since a new set of disputed rights might indefinitely stall 
a general agreement. Some Department of State officials favored making a U.S. 
claim even before reaching an eight-power agreement,72 while others believed that 
maintaining the non-claimant policy, at least for the time being, was the best means of 
deterring Soviet action.73 British officials largely blamed the indecisiveness of U.S. 
policy for granting Moscow time to draft an official memorandum demanding that it 
be involved in any future decisions.74 It remained possible that the USSR might not 
interfere with an eight-power agreement signed without it, but the conclusion of such 
an agreement faced many obstacles.75 
Like U.S.-Chilean negotiations, U.S.-British negotiations addressed how to 
coordinate scientific research while maintaining the political status quo, pursuing a 
resolution to the sovereignty issue, and regulating the activities of non-signatory 
powers.76 Disagreement emerged over whether to include fishing and whaling 
71 Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Secret Memorandum for President, [17 January 
1950], NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
72 Department of State, Division of River Plate Affairs (Dearborn) to Division of Northern European 
Affairs (Bream) et al., 25 March 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
73 Embassy in Washington to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 20 July 1950, no. 583, PRO, FO 371. 
74 Soviet Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 8 June 1950, no. 145108, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022; Embassy in Moscow (Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, no. 238, A 
1529/36, PRO, FO 371; Foreign Office to Embassy in Washington (Franks), Memorandum on Soviet 
Antarctic Claims, 4 July 1950, no. 861, A 1529/18, PRO, FO 463. 
75 Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, South American Department, 15 February 1949, [AS] 
1057; Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Office (Fordham), 8 March 1949, AS 1485, PRO, FO 
371; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs 
(Owen) et al., 13 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
76 Embassy in Washington (Franks) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 24 October 1950, no. 930, A 
1529/40, PRO, FO 371. 
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provisions, 77 but it was minor relative to the common desire to pre-empt the Soviet 
Union and other potential adversaries. The United States chose to negotiate 
separately with its two allies given the conflictive tenor of their own relations. It did 
not, however, choose to maintain an equal degree of confidentiality. The Department 
of State and Foreign Office made detailed revisions to the Escudero Plan while 
denying that they were involved in anything more than general discussions,78 as 
would have been permissible under the U.S.-Chilean terms of understanding. Wary 
of inflaming anti-imperial sentiments throughout Latin America,79 U.S. and British 
officials made a high priority of concealing the extent of their dialog. 80 
The Soviet Union took no further initiative after issuing its declaration of 
interest, and negotiations surrounding the Escudero Plan failed to produce results. 
While the Anglo-American powers issued no response to the Soviet declaration, 81 the 
Southern Cone powers abruptly denounced it. 82 Britain might have preferred to do 
so, but hesitated since any rationale used to deny Soviet rights might also have been 
used to deny U.S. rights. Chile and Argentina were unwilling to accommodate either 
of the non-claimant superpowers. Instead they reiterated their joint defense 
agreement and unwillingness to recognize any other nation's rights.83 Hypothetically 
their position, like a U.S. claim, might have encouraged a hardening of the Soviet 
line. Given their minor standing in world affairs and their involvement with the 
77 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Owen) 
et al., 7September1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
78 Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, American Department, 13 January 1950, 1521/3/50, A 
1529/1, PRO, FO 371. 
79 See Embassy in Washington (Franks) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 20 July 1950, no. 583, A 
1529/22, PRO, FO 463. 
8° Foreign Office Minute, 24 February 1951, A 15216/1, PRO, FO 371. 
81 Foreign Office to Embassy in Moscow (Nichols), 11January1951, no. 9, A 1529/36, in Embassy in 
Moscow (Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, no. 238, A 1529/36, PRO, FO 371. 
82 La Estrella, 22 August 1950, 30 August 1950. 
83 Embassy in Santiago (Hall) to Department of State, 12September1950, no. 259, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022; Foreign Affairs Ministry, Confidential Memorandum, 19 May 1950; Foreign Affairs Minister 
(Vergara Donoso) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, Confidential Memorandum, 31July1951, MRECh. 
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peninsular dispute, it only had that effect on the British line. The Foreign Office 
anticipated that the two nation would seek to provoke conflict for domestic political 
reasons.
84 
In February 1952 Argentina and Britain reached a new level of provocation 
for which they each blamed the other. The Argentine commander at Hope Bay-at 
the northern tip of the disputed peninsula-warned a British party of his orders to 
prevent any attempt to establish foreign bases. Since the party made no effort to deny 
that this was its purpose, the commander emphasized that he had every intention of 
following his orders. The Britons perhaps questioned his sincerity as they were 
unarmed civilians, and they even disregarded the machine-gun fire directed over their 
heads. Only when approached and surrounded by Argentines did they retreat to their 
vessel.85 Though the episode involved neither bloodshed nor a heavy cruiser, such as 
Nigeria, it gained front-page coverage in The New York Times and papers around the 
world. The leading U.S. daily provided a factually based account which nonetheless 
portrayed the British as victims and the Argentines as victimizers. 86 
The British Embassy in Buenos Aires offered a more balanced perspective, 
noting that the Argentine government had expressed "what amounted to an apology" 
even before the incident gained headlines. It also disagreed with those who held that 
the incident was part of a conspiracy to provoke hostilities. 87 Publicly the Argentine 
government declared that its soldiers had acted in error and been given more precise 
orders to avoid any further misunderstandings.88 British authorities in the Falkland 
84 Foreign Office (Noble) to Colonial Office (Martin), [26 November 1950], A 1529/43, PRO, FO 371. 
85 The Times, 4 February 1952; Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office to High 
Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, [February 1952], A 15211/20, 
PRO, FO 371. 
86 The New York Times, 3 February 1952. 
87 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Allen) to Foreign Office (Cecil), 3 February 1952, A 15211117; Colonial 
Office (Harrison) to Foreign Office (Cecil), 19 March 1952, A 15211/30, PRO, FO 371. 
88 The Times, 5 February 1952; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Office, 4 February 1952, 
no. 33, A 15211/6, PRO, FO 371. 
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Islands insisted that this explanation lacked credibility and that there was no excuse 
for using machine-gun fire under any circumstance, whether against civilians or 
military personnel.89 Despite his administration's official stance, Argentine President 
Juan Domingo Peron extolled the patriotism of the commander responsible for 
turning back the intruders. The British embassy asked what it was to infer from this, 
only to receive a passing assurance that there was no cause for alarm.90 
Officials in London determined that it was unwise to trust the Latin 
Americans. Aside from dispatching the frigate Burghead Bay to augment their 
presence in the contested archipelago,91 they resolved to establish a station at Hope 
Bay sometime in the future.92 The Argentines, they recognized, were fully capable of 
matching them base-for-base.93 However, to be dissuaded by this fact seemed 
tantamount to surrendering, aside from being highly detrimental to recruitment for the 
British Antarctic program. Negotiations to disarm the Latin Americans would be 
hopeless, whereas arming British civilians was beyond consideration.94 The situation, 
difficult from all perspectives, might have erupted if, as reported, London had 
dispatched six to eight warships to forcibly remove Argentines posted throughout the 
disputed territories. 95 While those reports were false, their spirit would be realized 
the following season. 
89 British Government in Falkland Islands to Colonial Secretary, 2 February 1952, A 15211/9, PRO, 
FO 371. 
90 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 3 May 1952, no. 95, A 15211/31, 
PRO, FO 371. 
91 The New York Times, 5 February 1952. 
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93 British Government in the Falkland Islands (Clifford) to Colonial Secretary, 31 January 1952, A 
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94 Colonial Office (Bennet) to Foreign Office (Cecil), 5 February 1952, A 15211/18, PRO, FO 371. 
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The Southern Cone nations had erected small outposts on Deception Island in 
the South Orkneys within four hundred yards of a British airstrip.96 The Royal Navy 
expressed concern about destroying the outposts, though it, like the Argentine 
commander at Hope Bay, had to follow orders. It predicted that the "defensive" plan 
would provoke harsh condemnation and the possibility of serious retaliation. The 
government, which did not deny this, held that that the destruction of the outposts was 
imperative regardless of the consequences. The maneuver was only to involve a 
single vessel, yet the government believed it would demonstrate a firm commitment 
to defend a popular remnant of the British empire. It discounted the navy's concern 
that only one other vessel would be able to provide assistance if resistance were 
encountered, a prospect which it regarded as highly unlikely.97 
The British Embassy in Santiago recommended informing the Chileans 
beforehand and encouraging the withdrawal of their personnel. Since the days when 
Gabriel Gonzalez Videla had led efforts to defend the Chilean Antarctic,98 the new 
president, Carlos Ibanez del Campo, had established a friendly rapport with British 
diplomats, suggesting that he might warrant being ''spared humiliation."99 The 
Foreign Office acknowledged that Chile's presence on Deception Island was not 
intended as a form of provocation, but simply as a token of its rights. The arrest of 
Chileans was still deemed necessary to prevent them from intervening or later 
choosing to reinforce their position. 100 Though not directly informed of the 
96 British Magistrate (Clarke) of Deception Island to Officer Commanding Argentine Land Forces, 19 
January 1953, PRO, FO 371. 
97 Foreign Office (Garvey), Record of Meeting with Admiralty (Brock), 2 February 1953, A 15121/8, 
PRO, FO 371. 
98 Alejandra Mora Sepulveda, "Estados Unidos y la Antanirtica en los Cien Primeros dias de! Gobiemo 
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99 Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Foreign Office, 4 February 1953, A 15212/9, PRO, FO 371. 
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upcoming maneuver, they were issued a note of protest indicating that their refusal to 
go before The Hague had exhausted Britain's patience. 101 
In February 1953 Snipe deployed one British magistrate, two policemen, and 
fifteen marines to remove any trace of the South American outposts on Deception 
Island. 102 They did so without difficulty or compunction, in the process arresting and 
detaining the two Argentines and then deporting them to Buenos Aires.103 The frigate 
docked in Port Foster held an additional eighteen marines in reserve and was prepared 
to counter any retaliatory strike.104 The Southern Cone governments responded very 
mildly and hoped to avoid publicity since otherwise they might be compelled to 
assume an compromising stance. They were reluctant to confront the Royal Navy, 
even though the remainder of its fleet was too widely dispersed to provide support.105 
A brief hiatus ensued as the three governments waited for one of them to issue an 
apology or propose some form of appeasement. Unfortunately they had little time to 
determine how to prevent the incident from spiraling beyond control--or nearly 
beyond control. 
Four days later The New York Times falsely reported the episode as having 
transpired on Valentine's Day. The Foreign Office held the Department of State 
responsible since that was the originally planned date which had been shared in 
confidence beforehand. British officials expressed displeasure but not surprise, given 
that the White House had often authorized such leaks. 106 They informed the 
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Eisenhower administration that the non-disclosure of secrets was essential to preserve 
confidence in Anglo-American relations. 107 That issue aside, they felt compelled to 
release a brief public statement to justify their operation. Several officials, perhaps 
speaking without authorization, emphasized that the operation had sought to dispel 
any hope that Britain would compromise its rights. 108 Journalists throughout the 
Southern Cone denounced Britain's heavy-handed approach.109 Chilean Foreign 
Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo expressed "deep astonishment" that London had 
violated the three nations' agreement to avoid publicity. 110 
The Foreign Office correctly predicted that the circumstance would quickly 
deteriorate. 111 Public outrage inveighed heavily against prospects for a solution based 
on mutual compromise. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden dispelled any such hope by 
going before the House of Commons to denounce the Southern Cone's 
"encroachment."112 He was greeted with cheers and applause, behind which there 
lurked a nostalgia for an empire which Latin Americans found anathema. Their 
resentment extended beyond trite cliches to mockery. Chilean journalists referred to 
Britain as a "toothless lion" which sought to atone for its loss of positions around the 
world by turning to smaller Latin prey. Though this portrayal must have insulted the 
Foreign Office, as intended, it led some diplomats to concede an element oftruth.113 
The Southern Cone governments unsuccessfully demanded the reconstruction 
of their bases. They were aware that the Antarctic season had grown too late for 
107 Foreign Office Minute (Ridsdale), 19 February 1953, A 15212/96, PRO, FO 371. 
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that, 114 yet the weather failed to deter their own maneuvers. Chile transferred aircraft 
from the southern city of Punta Arenas to U shuaia, Argentina, in preparation for a 
counterstrike which was to be disavowed unless successful. Meanwhile 
reconnaissance flights attempted to monitor Snipe and its contingent of thirty-two 
marines. 115 The Foreign Office, duly informed of this, warned that any strike would 
incur casualties, 116 as British troops had been ordered to fire against a raiding party .117 
Some intelligence reports held that the Latin Americans were losing their resolve; 
others held that they had chosen a date in mid-March for the joint maneuver. 118 On 
some level British officials might have longed for another encounter, if only because 
they believed that they were likely to triumph. 119 
The month of March passed without open hostilities or new prospects for 
mediation. U.S. officials discouraged Britain's serious reconsideration of involving 
the Organization of American States rather than the International Court of Justice. 
The Department of State believed that this alternative would only embarrass Britain 
and stoke Latin American resentment toward the United States. It urged Britain to 
negotiate directly with Chile and Argentina, 120 yet the feasibility of this could hardly 
be taken for granted. Perturbed by Britain's opposition to reconstructing the Chilean 
base, Foreign Minister Olavarria issued a scathing denunciation which afforded no 
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room for retreat. 121 The Chilean congress, armed forces, and public rallied behind his 
call to defend the nation's rights at all costs, including war with Britain.122 President 
Ibanez and his cabinet, on the other hand, ignored that kind of appeal since any war 
with Britain would invite defeat. Olavarria dutifully-and somewhat 
apologetically-heeded the expectation for him to resign. 123 
Later in the year Chile and the United States concluded a draft agreement for 
an overall settlement, but withheld it for several reasons. Argentina no longer seemed 
receptive to U.S. or British involvement,124 and the Deception Island episode had 
displaced hope for any form of multilateral cooperation. 125 The diplomatic storm 
gradually receded as there were no further incidents or viable prospects for an overall 
resolution. In October 1954 the United States announced its preparation of a major 
expedition the following season, the scale of which exceeded the Department of 
Defense' s original plan. 126 Domestic journalists lamented that the South Pole 
appeared to be drawing the attention of individuals who thought in terms of ''jet 
bombers and intercontinental missiles."127 British officials were not immune to that 
concern, but neither could they believe the reports by their own journalists that the 
United States sought to conduct nuclear tests in Antarctica. That seemed anathema to 
the forthcoming 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) which was to unite 
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36 nations to advance humankind's knowledge of the planet.128 British officials 
determined it was only prudent to inquire about the rumors, and they received the 
unequivocal denial which they had expected. 129 
The Foreign Office still resented the departure of Atka, in preparation for the 
first Operation Deep Freeze, since the vessel would delve into the peninsular region 
and thereby violate British sovereignty. From the Southern Cone nations, the British 
expected as much, but not from the United States whose earlier internationalization 
plan they, unlike officials in the other claimant nations, had accepted for basis for 
discussion. 130 U.S. officials had not informed them of the vessel's destination before 
it was publicly announced. The British had not lobbied actively for U.S. recognition 
of their territorial rights, but they had expected a token of respect. For example, they 
might have replied to a visa request by issuing an invitation, bypassing the need for 
paperwork which might later be claimed to hold legal implications. This grievance 
heightened their sense that Washington was concealing or misrepresenting essential 
aspects of its Antarctic policy. 131 
Months later the British received a further indication of U.S. duplicity or 
vicissitude or both. The North Americans held that they had not yet delineated their 
territorial claim, but it would soon be forthcoming and likely exceed the draft claims 
previously under discussion. This foreshadowed a U.S. claim beyond the uncontested 
sector, 90° to 150° West, into the British sector, 20° to 80° West. Atka's disregard for 
the polar remnants of the British empire would have been trivial compared to that 
scenario-which also would have infuriated the Southern Cone nations whose joint 
128 The New York Times, 11December1954. 
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sector extended from 25° to 90° West. Prime Minister Anthony Eden was keenly 
aware of the irony that the two superpowers held the greatest influence over the future 
of Antarctica, yet neither one had chosen to formalize its claim, leaving the other 
nations in a state of apprehension.132 
As the Foreign Office suspected, the Department of State viewed U.S. 
participation in the IGY as a means of bolstering the nation's prestige and the 
effectiveness of its Cold War propaganda.133 The reticence of British officials toward 
these objectives only pertained to infringements upon their sovereignty. The larger 
issue was monitoring Soviet intentions to prevent the spread of communism to the 
bottom of the world. The indecisiveness of U.S. policy was not helpful in this regard. 
While pondering the least controversial way to modify the non-claimant, non-
recognition policy, the Department of State instructed its representatives to report any 
information of Soviet plans for an expedition.134 It happened that no such 
information became available prior to its public announcement in December 1955.135 
An earlier indication would have been preferred, but it most likely would have had no 
effect. U.S. policy had remained passive for years, despite earlier predictions that the 
IGY would have the effect of ushering the Soviets into Antarctica. 136 
Increasingly urgent circumstances failed to mend divisions within the U.S. 
government. The Department of Defense prudently sought to avoid new military 
commitments. Accordingly it wished to postpone a sovereignty claim until further 
investigation might clarify Antarctica's strategic and economic value. The 
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Department of State, on the other hand, believed that the upcoming IGY substantiated 
the region's worth, and continued avoidance to state U.S. rights would cause them to 
erode. 137 Both viewpoints were intrinsically logical. Their divergence reflected 
defense officials' concern about the link between territorial disputes and war, and the 
focus of their diplomatic colleagues on possible benefits. Government declarations 
falsely implied that the White House had accepted the Department of State's 
perspective. For example, one official told journalists that a forthcoming U.S. claim 
would envelop over half the continent.138 
In May 1957, one month before the IGY commenced, the Department of State 
reconsidered pursuing an agreement with the seven claimant nations. This hearkened 
back to the Escudero Plan with which Chile had responded to the first U.S. proposal 
for internationalization. Previous bilateral negotiations for such an agreement, to be 
facilitated by temporarily neglecting the sovereignty dispute, had stalled after the 
Deception Island incident. They had remained dormant as the IGY approached, 
bringing with it a new, more complex set of variables. All that had been left 
unchanged was a common desire to exclude the Soviet Union.139 The United States 
addressed this by engaging in clandestine discussions with Australia, Britain and New 
Zealand. All involved officials appreciated that, if exposed, their talks might 
seriously disrupt cooperation with the IGY nations. 140 In their perspective that risk 
was necessary to ensure that the English-speaking nations would have a dominant 
role in whatever larger negotiations might follow. 141 
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Years earlier it had been revealed that the Department of State was informing 
the British of its ostensibly confidential negotiations with Chile. The Chilean 
Embassy in Washington had brought this to the attention of U.S. officials,142 who 
surprisingly did not reconsider the wisdom of clandestine negotiations, the disclosure 
of which undermined their quest for prestige. The Department of State nonetheless 
supported taking that risk. 143 When the press revealed that Britain was holding secret 
talks with Australia and New Zealand, the Foreign Office admitted that the 
negotiations were taking place and successfully concealed U.S. involvement in them. 
Otherwise, it was feared that Chile might have refused to join any international 
agreement. 144 
The only understanding reached at the four-power talks, where dissent 
persisted over the Soviet Union, was that no resolution would be possible without 
U.S. approval. 145 While this seemed to be ideal for Washington, it had not 
determined the course of its own policy. The Department of State repeated its plea to 
forward rights over the unclaimed sector, 146 and the Department of Defense continued 
to dissent. President Dwight D. Eisenhower merely amplified U.S. devotion to the 
cooperative spirit of the IGY. A more pertinent development, which relieved 
Anglo-American strategists, was that the Southern Cone nations had not increased 
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their Antarctic operations. Their nationalistic sentiment had been limited to 
declarations, which neither British nor U.S. officials deemed intolerable.147 
Frustrated by the tension between its anticommunism and the non-claimant 
policy, the United States opted for greater ideological flexibility. Its declaration of 
rights over the unclaimed sector would have reduced anxiety among the claimant 
nations only if accompanied by the forfeiture of its rights over the rest of the 
continent. The Departments of State and Defense held many incompatible 
perspectives, but agreed that the White House should not entertain that kind of 
forfeiture. Once announced, a U.S. claim should have the possibility to expand, they 
believed, and this dictated the reservation of all rights. Such insistence might have 
been discarded to forge an eight-power arrangement, but now it seemed useful in 
guarding against a Soviet claim. The reservation of rights was also more expedient 
than becoming involved with territorial disputes. For these and other reasons, U.S. 
opposition to excluding the USSR began to wither.148 
In March 1958 the Department of State completed a draft proposal which 
extended the Escudero Plan's political status quo moratorium indefinitely, rather than 
for a five- to ten-year period as originally intended. U.S. officials viewed this as the 
most expedient manner in which to pursue a twelve-power agreement, and 
accordingly stopped repeating their denial of other nations' rights. The previous 
pattern had burdened diplomatic relations, especially with the Southern Cone nation, 
and this was not compatible with the spirit of the IGY. With the least encouragement, 
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Latin Americans seemed likely to rally in defense of their Antarctic rights. Worse, 
from the U.S. perspective, they could be expected to demand implementation of the 
Rio Treaty's hemispheric defense provisions. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
therefore instructed U.S. representatives to decline any comment on the issue.149 
Weeks later the North Americans circulated their proposal. The Soviet Union, 
they believed, was drafting its own proposal either for distribution to the IGY nations 
or to be brought before the UN General Assembly. The latter alternative was more 
repugnant for U.S. officials since it would have more severely curtailed their 
influence. The former alternative was also to be eschewed since it would have 
permitted the Soviet Union to steal the publicity which both superpowers desired.150 
While the Foreign Office did not question the legitimacy of such concerns, it had 
expected but not received any notification of the U.S. timetable. That expectation had 
seemed reasonable as British officials had convinced the United States to include the 
Soviet Union.151 As great as their influence had been in this regard, it had not offset 
the exasperating unilateral bent of North American diplomacy. 
Chile's reaction to the U.S. proposal was less negative than its reaction to the 
secret four-power negotiations would have been, but neither was it uniformly 
positive. The Foreign Affairs Ministry drafted a lengthy message dwelling on Article 
2, Clause 7 of the UN Charter which forbade intervention in the internal affairs of 
states. It insisted that this article was applicable to the Chilean Antarctic, over which 
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the government had extended sovereignty nearly two decades earlier. The message 
proceeded to insist that the Rio Treaty would need to be revisited at the proposed 
Antarctic conference. Though not encouraged by the tone of the message, the 
Department of State was satisfied that it had revealed a grudging willingness to 
participate in an international forum. 152 
All of the I G Y nations accepted the principle of a conference and joined 
preliminary negotiations in Washington. These negotiations progressed far more 
laboriously than anticipated, and often seemed on the verge of dissolving for 
ideological reasons guised as technical disputes. Contrary to North American 
prophesies, Soviet involvement did not account for the only or most central 
difficulty. 153 None of the participants was certain ifthe United States would reverse 
its non-claimant policy, how Moscow might respond in that case, and whether 
twleve-power negotiations would be left with any reason to continue. The 
Department of State still had not ruled out the possibility of a claim, but ongoing 
disagreement within the U.S. government had the effect of reinforcing the non-
claimant stance.154 The most serious threat to the negotiations arose from India's 
threat to involve the General Assembly in determining Antarctica's future. 
While the United States wished to prevent Antarctica from being placed under 
UN jurisdiction, General Assembly discussions might not have led to that result. 
India was believed to have no interest in seeking a trusteeship or establishing a 
presence on the continent. Rather its motivation related to fears that the continent 
would be militarized by the United States. The Department of State was distraught by 
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ongoing rumors to this effect, as well as the prospect that UN involvement might 
prompt the Southern Cone nations to table a proposal forcing the resolution of 
territorial disputes. As this would have capsized the Escudero Plan and invited 
unforeseen consequences, Chile stridently opposed involving the General Assembly 
while the United States remained silent. Only after it threatened to abandon the 
twelve-power negotiations did Washington choose to oppose the initiative and to 
exert due pressure for it to be withdrawn.155 
The Foreign Office regarded cooperation with the Southern Cone nations as 
essential as they were among the IGY nations most leery of internationalization. 
Chile, despite its recent stance, shared India's concern about U.S. motivations while 
the Britain had lost faith in Washington's ability to spread goodwill within the 
Western Hemisphere.156 In September 1958 the two nations entered into negotiations 
with Argentina to establish their own agreement, either to function within the context 
of an overall agreement or independently if necessary. Chilean officials expressed 
doubts about its feasibility, but the Foreign Office remained optimistic as it now 
viewed them as both reasonable and cooperative.157 The Argentines, whom it viewed 
as both less reasonable and less cooperative, happened to be more responsive to the 
idea. They viewed it as a means of resisting North American intervention, 158 which 
had become a more practical objective than winning U.S. support against British 
colonialism in the Falkland Island Dependencies. 
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The budding coalition of former rivals quickly met a setback. The U.S. 
representative to the twelve-power negotiations called for expanding the three-power 
arrangement into a quadripartite scheme. 159 The British and Latin American 
representatives believed that Washington had no legitimate rights in the peninsular 
region, whether it was called Graham Land, Tierra O'Higgins or Tierra San Martin, in 
tribute to their own explorers. While they would remain divided over which term was 
most appropriate, they agreed that there was no basis for referring to it as Palmer 
Land, in reference to the nineteenth-century U.S. whaler alternately credited with 
discovering the region. Displeased by this tum of events, which had occurred when 
the trilateral negotiations were showing promise, a British official bemoaned that the 
United States appeared ready to foil any solution pursued without its direct 
involvement.160 
Meanwhile the general negotiations continued unimpeded since most 
delegations were unaware of various sub-negotiations. 161 This is not to depict the 
negotiations as exceptionally productive or productive at all. They were so much to 
the contrary that speculation arose of the United States having lost enthusiasm for its 
own proposal, as it had for the first internationalization proposal. 162 That speculation 
coincided with rumors that a large U.S. claim was in the offing, regardless of its 
effect on internationalization.163 With resolve, if not enthusiasm, the White House 
abstained from that path to ensure full attendance at the conference it planned to host 
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in October 1959. The preliminary meetings had not settled all contentious issues, 
such as how to interpret demilitarization, but neither had they disintegrated. 
Twelve high-ranking delegations soon converged in Washington from every 
region of the world. Within weeks this impressive feat had to contend with signs that 
the rumors of a U.S. nuclear agenda were not fictitious. The Southern Hemisphere 
nations demanded a nuclear test ban, which the United States opposed, hoping that 
explosions might be deemed scientific rather than military in nature. 164 While Britain 
was not necessary averse to gaining a new testing ground for its own weapons, the 
Southern Hemisphere nations refused to compromise. Instead they endorsed the 
unequivocal ban sponsored by the USSR, and the U.S. delegation finally yielded lest 
its Cold War rival seek to exploit a breakdown of the conference.165 With that 
impediment removed, all parties signed the treaty in December 1959, and at last its 
ideals had gained a meaningful opportunity to flourish. 
The Chancellor of Sweden once commented that reason played a much smaller role in 
governing the world than people generally assumed. 166 Three centuries later the 
United States, Britain, and Chile demonstrated the truth of his words by failing to 
secure their common objective to bar the Soviet Union. Many events discussed 
herein appear to explain this outcome, but its final significance must be judged 
unreasonable. To most of the world, ownership of the frozen continent held no 
significance, but for Britain, Chile, and Argentina-whose diplomatic role was 
negligible by comparison-it held significance comprehensible to ordinary citizens. 
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What the British wished to retain as a token of their decaying empire, 167 the South 
Americans valued for its economic potential and anti-colonial symbolism.168 The 
years under consideration demonstrate that prejudices, misperceptions and 
intransigence can undermine the objectivity with which international affairs are 
conducted. 169 
The desire of U.S. officials to appear neutral lacked either genuine neutrality 
or a reliable degree of bias. Since their discussions with Britain violated their pledge 
of confidentiality with Chile, they attempted first to conceal and then to deny their 
behavior, and neither effort proved successful. Between the Nigeria and Hope Bay 
incidents, the Chilean Embassy in Washington revealed knowledge of the Department 
of State's surreptitious approach. At the time that knowledge incurred 
disappointment but did not seriously effect U.S.-Chilean relations. After the 
Deception Island episode inspired threats of war and preparations for a counter-strike, 
Latin Americans throughout the Western Hemisphere denounced British colonialism 
as well as their Good Neighbor's benign neglect thereof. It was widely alleged that 
Washington must have approved of Snipe's agenda. 170 While the "damaging" 
transcripts which confirmed this were destroyed, U.S. neutrality remained highly 
unconvincing.171 
From this standpoint the U.S. role was duplicitous, whereas from the British 
standpoint it was merely frustrating. Department of State press leaks were 
bothersome but did not impinge on the unique nature of Anglo-American relations, 
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which Alexander DeConde defines in terms of shared culture, racial superiority, and 
global mission. 172 U.S. and British officials shared pejorative attitudes toward Latin 
America. For example, they attributed the Southern Cone's activism to the 
"emotional and violent" Latin temperament.173 Since British operations were equally 
strident, the perception of temperaments hinged on cultural perceptions. 174 Many 
U.S. officials involved with the Antarctic dispute, such as Ambassador Claude G. 
Bowers, were known for their contempt of Latin Americans. 175 Thomas Borstelmann 
notes that during these years Department of State officials internalized the prejudices 
of their era, most notably Secretary Dean Acheson whose disdain for Latin Americans 
extended to most non-Europeans, 176 whereas his successor, John Foster Dulles, was 
known to strike fear or loathing in the hearts of Europeans and non-Europeans 
alike.177 
Race and ideology were factors in the dispute over Antarctica, yet there is no 
conclusive evidence that they overwhelmed other factors, or that any specific factors 
were responsible for preventing a major escalation of the sovereignty dispute. The 
1946-1959 era recast the ancient struggle between faith and reason as a struggle 
between pride and caution. Moreover it revealed that diplomacy had not evolved 
beyond the kind of intrigue capable of precipitating global conflict. According to 
Andrew Gyorgy, the parochialism of career diplomats had been replaced by the 
greater technical expertise and impartiality of professionals. Gyorgy believed that 
172 Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy (Boston: Northeastem 
University Press, 1992). 
173 For example, Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 11 February 1949, AS 
1018/1011/9, PRO, FO 497; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Allen) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 13 
February 1952, A 15211123, PRO, FO 371. 
174 See Cannadine, How the British Saw their Empire, xxi. 
175 Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 1 July 1949, AS 3535/1902/9, PRO, 
F0497. 
176 Thomas Borstelmann, "Jim Crow's Coming Out: Race Relations and American Foreign Policy in 
the Truman Years," Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (1999), 549-69. 
177 s h . ee c apter six. 
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international relations had begun to be based on open covenants, openly arrived at, 
the ideal championed by President Woodrow Wilson. 178 He did not mention the 
Antarctic Treaty perhaps because of its unique nature and relatively low significance 
for the North American public. He also might not have mentioned it because the 
preliminary negotiations were held in secret, and even the conference proceedings 
were anathema to Wilson's ideal. 179 
U.S.-British-Chilean Antarctic relations suffered from a high degree of 
suspicion which extended to all parties involved in the negotiations which culminated 
in the 1959 treaty. The finally achieved ideals were substantial enough to convince 
many North American journalists that their officials had acted with vision and 
foresight. 180 While this assumption was inconsistent with many of the previously 
described events, the treaty encouraged selective memory. To emphasize the 
dichotomy between scientific and political cooperation would have been to question 
the harmonious spirit upon which the treaty's success depended. As such North 
American journalists did not explore why secrecy had been required to debate ideals 
cultivated for the good of humankind. They also ignored what had led Washington to 
abruptly imply its nuclear agenda after years of having denied it. 181 The world at 
large was hesitant to contemplate that the Antarctic Treaty might be another Munich 
Agreement. 
For quite different reasons, Britain and Chile were the two nations most likely 
to influence U.S. Antarctic policy and to limit the southward projection of U.S. 
178 Andrew Gyorgy, "International Relations: Concept and Application," in Saul Bernard Cohen, 
Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), 291-318. 
179 See Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Lister) 
to Bureau of European Affairs (Jones), 3 June 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Paul C. Daniels, "The 
Antarctic Treaty," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report 
from Antarctica (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 31-45. 
180 Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for Non-
Claimancy, 1946--1961," Polar Record 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30. 
181 The New York Times, 3 March 1955. For reports of U.S. opposition to the nuclear test ban, see The 
New York Times, 26 November 1959, 28 November 1959. 
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dominance. Britain, aside from having defined much of its former colony's political 
and cultural identity, had become its most essential Cold War ally. Though 
Anglo-American unity began to falter in the Antarctic, it finally did adapt to the 
unique environment. U.S. receptiveness to a twelve-power agreement originated in 
Britain's determination that anti-colonial trends worldwide were undermining its 
Antarctic rights. The Foreign Office therefore saw greater advantage in gaining credit 
for promoting an international solution.182 With persistent encouragement, the United 
States would accept that rationale on its own terms, deciding that prestige was more 
valuable than any official delineation of rights might have been. The Chilean 
Escudero Plan thereby served as the modus vivendi for a general agreement, as well as 
for Anglo-American "pretensions," a term once used to disparage the Southern Cone 
nations' Antarctic rights. 183 As such the United States, Britain and Chile forged an 
alliance which, however mistrustful, bore substantial results. 
The next chapter explores their non-Antarctic context ofU.S.-British and 
U.S.-Chilean relations, which were united perhaps most of all by the prevalence of 
"anti-Yankee" sentiment in the smaller nations. To some degree this contributed to 
their willingness to ponder an Antarctic agreement which excluded the United States. 
Though Britain enjoyed much greater influence in world affairs than Chile did, 
neither nation was able to compete with "colossus of the north," as Latin Americans 
alternately referred to their Good Neighbor. 
182 Royal Institute oflnternational Affairs (Chatham House) to Foreign Office (Vincent), 16 November 
1956, A 15238/2, PRO, FO 371. 
183 U.S. officials regarded the Southern Cone nations' Antarctic "pretensions" as disruptive to 
international cooperation. Embassy in Buenos Aires (O'Connor) to Department of State, 23 January 
1958, no. 1089, NARA, RG 59, 702.022 
4. U.S.-British and U.S.-Chilean Relations 
The uncertainty which Britain and Chile shared in relation to U.S. Antarctic policy 
was characteristic of the other signatories of the 1959 treaty. It held greater 
significance as these two nations were directly involved in revising the first U.S. 
internationalization proposal to include the political status quo moratorium which 
served as the basis for the twelve-power negotiations. The Chilean Escudero Plan had 
outlined the political status quo moratorium which set aside the sovereignty dispute 
between the Southern Cone nations and Britain for up to a decade while less divisive 
aspects of an agreement were to be negotiated. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Department of State breached its pledge of confidentiality with the Chileans to 
seek British advice pertaining to the Escudero Plan. The department then tabled its 
second internationalization proposal without consulting beforehand with either nation, 
at which time British officials felt as perturbed as their Chilean counterparts had been 
as regards the U.S. breach of confidentiality. 1 
This chapter analyses the general trends ofU.S.-British and U.S.-Chilean 
relations which help to illuminate the three nations' interaction pertaining to the 
Antarctic. Britain and Chile valued their relations with the United States more than 
with each other, and their dispute over Antarctica generally did not imperil their 
mutual respect and cordiality .2 The most important and dangerous exception was in 
1 See Jason Kendall Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and 
Chilean-Australian Relations through 1959," Revista de Historia 13-14 (2003-4): 173-78; Moore, 
"Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in U.S.-Chilean Antarctic Relations through 1959," 
Estudios Norteamericanos3, no. 2 (2003): 69-80. 
2 During the late 1940s their notes of protest in relation to each other's Antarctic presence were written 
and exchanged in a cordial manner. The cordiality might have been "skin deep" as many officials 
believed, but Chileans retained a high degree of respect for Britain in general. See Embassy in 
Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 16 November 1948, AS 6418/3/9; Embassy in Santiago 
(Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 11February1949, AS 1018/1011/9, PRO, FO 497. The extent to 
which Chile and Britain valued their relations with the United States more than with each other, or any 
other nation, can be measured in terms of dependency. While a formal "theory" of dependency did not 
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early 1953 when the Chilean foreign minister threatened war in response to the British 
attack on Deception Island in the South Orkneys. After it became clear that his threat 
would not be carried through, British-Chilean relations began to mend while anti-U.S. 
sentiment persisted in both nations. The terms of U.S. financial assistance were the 
major source of malcontent, yet their officials also resented U.S. interference in their 
negotiations for a trilateral Antarctic agreement, including Argentina, in case the 
second internationalization proposal were to fail.3 
The Soviet Union's presence at the Antarctic Conference of 1959 encouraged 
the "free world" nations to set aside questions of ideology as well as of sovereignty. 
U.S. officials sought to discourage the USSR from provoking a dissolution of the 
conference as might have permitted it a new means of gaining support among the 
developing nations of the world. If their own clandestine negotiations with Australia, 
Britain and New Zealand, and later with Argentina, Britain, Chile and had been 
discovered, it is unlikely that Soviet officials would have refrained from a major 
publicity campaign detrimental to the future of Antarctica.4 The United States had 
sufficient difficulty generating favorable publicity among its allies. The exasperation 
of British and Chilean officials regarding its intervention in their Antarctic 
discussions paralleled their desire to act independently of it in other arenas.5 Former 
British Minister of Labor Aneurin Bevan summarized the issue in terms of "American 
dollars being pushed into pockets from which the bottoms had been cut by American 
policies."6 
emerge in Latin America until the 1960s, its Marxist-oriented assumptions were commonplace in the 
preceding decades. See Louis A. Perez, Jr., "Dependency," Journal of American History 77 (1990): 
133-42. 
3 See chapter three. 
4 See Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History," 174. 
5 See Elizabeth Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (London: The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1983), 231-33. 
6 Aneurin Bevan, "Britain and America at Loggerheads," Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 (1957): 60-67. 
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The administration of Harry S. Truman viewed its assistance to Britain and 
Chile as both magnanimous and imperative to limit the spread of communism. 
During the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949 Britain began to assume leadership of the 
pro-U.S. bloc of Europe while the Chilean government demonstrated the eagerness, 
though not the ability, to do so in Latin America. 7 The administration of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower faced new challenges, in Britain related to the Anglo-French invasion of 
the Suez Canal, and in Chile related to the election of a former National Socialist as 
president. These challenges were formidable though not insurmountable. They 
receded in the wake of the Soviet launch of the world's first satellite and the Chilean 
government's unwillingness to act upon threats to nationalize U.S. copper companies. 
British and Chilean officials tempered their south polar nationalism while remaining 
concerned that the United States might reverse its non-claimant policy or otherwise 
contribute to a breakdown of the negotiations which produced the Antarctic Treaty.8 
The British approach to the Soviet Union was more accommodating than that 
of the United States, and for most of the period under consideration the same was true 
of the Chilean approach.9 British officials were in a position to counsel U.S. restraint 
during events such as the Korean War and Berlin crises which held the risk of 
instigating a global conflict. Chilean officials enjoyed no such opportunity but shared 
the British desire to prevent Washington from acting upon its confrontational rhetoric, 
7 The policies of the 1946-1952 Gonzalez Videla administration were in some ways more 
anticommunist than U.S. policies, whereas the 1952-1958 Ibafiez administration initially 
entertained--0r threatened to entertain-a pro-Soviet alignment, as discussed hereafter. For reference 
to the British approach to the Soviet Union and the United States, see Geoffrey Warner, "From Ally to 
Enemy: Britain's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948," in Michael Dockrill and Brian 
McKercher, eds., Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221-43; Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 
1945-1991 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 66; Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in 
Anglo-American Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 10-14; Lionel Gelber, The 
Alliance of Necessity: Britain's Crisis, the New Europe and American Interests (London: Robert Hale, 
Ltd., 1967), 32. 
8 See chapter three. 
9 See footnote seven. 
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most notably the doctrine of massive retaliation. The two sets of officials had no 
reason to imagine that the failure of the Antarctic Conference would precipitate a 
nuclear exchange. Neither did they possess unreserved faith in U.S. leadership in the 
world-not even as it extended to the far south. The success of the Antarctic 
Conference negated any need for the contingency plans briefly under discussion, but 
not their motivation. Many aspects of U.S. foreign and economic policy contributed 
to perceptions of"Yankee imperialism."10 
The Second World War left Britain in a far more precarious circumstance than the 
United States. Its infrastructure had been seriously damaged and its industry had 
plummeted, transforming it the world's largest debtor nation. 11 In the process of 
staving off German aggression, it had depleted its resources while granting U.S. 
access to many of the foreign markets which it had previously dominated.12 It had 
suffered nearly three times as many casualties, relative to its total population, and 
over that many fatalities. 13 The prolongation of America's wartime assistance seemed 
appropriate for these reasons and because, as Prime Minster Clement Attlee declared, 
the two nations exemplified "the moral precepts upon which our whole civilization is 
founded." 14 Truman's decision to end the lend-lease program in late August 1945 
was greeted with dismay, for it suggested that the United States failed to appreciate 
10 The issue of"anti-Yankee" sentiment is discussed hereafter. It was less prevalent in Britain, though 
many authors suggest that it is the reason why the Anglo-American relations were not genuinely 
"special." For example, John W. Young, Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold 
War 1951-1955 (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1996), 337. 
11 Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 
1865-1980 (London: Fontana Press, 1981), 317-18. 
12 Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941-1949 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 123. 
13 John Biggs-Davidson, The Uncertain Ally (London: Christopher Johnson, 1957), 104-5. 
14 World Peace Foundation, DAFR 1945-1946 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1948), 845. 
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the extent to which Britain had sacrificed for the Allied cause. 15 
Truman recognized the need to provide evidence to the contrary. Though 
opinion polls indicated that Americans felt no particular responsibility for the British 
financial crisis, 16 he sought to preserve some form of the wartime alliance. As yet it 
remained possible that the Soviet Union might adhere to postwar agreements in a 
manner which both nations found satisfactory, and their own continuity of interests 
was less questionable. In December his administration offered to extend a $3. 7 5 
billion loan which the British parliament approved despite concerns that the terms 
were both unfair and unsustainable. The U.S. Congress did likewise since it further 
eroded British trade protections and laid the basis for unity against the Soviet Union if 
that were to become necessary.17 Repayment issues would force both sides to make 
unpleasant concessions, yet the sustainability of the agreement revealed that the 
smaller nation preferred to link its future to the United States rather than Europe. 18 
Culture and language were among the most obvious factors which explained 
the Anglo-American bond. Another related to the nations' cooperation in developing 
the atomic bomb which had hastened the Japanese surrender. The British role had 
been modest though crucial in London's perspective, and officials hoped that the joint 
research effort would now be continued for the sake of producing a British weapon. 
A number of agreements had indicated that this would be possible. During the war 
the U.S. weapon had been prioritized since most of the nuclear physicists were either 
American or American-based, and Washington had been able to divert over $2 billion 
15 See John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 
1984), 29; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. l, Year of Decisions 1945 (Hodder and Soughton, Limited, 
1955), 145. 
16 Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 
1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), 63-69. 
17 See Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 (London: The 
Penguin Press, 1971), 18; Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign 
Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 55-56. 
18 See SIA 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 71-72. 
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to the project.19 In August 1946 the congress negated all previous commitments by 
passing the Atomic Energy Act which forbade the disclosure of secrets to any other 
nation.20 John Baylis writes that, although most British were incensed by this 
development, some viewed it as beneficial in forcing them to rely upon their own 
. . 21 
mgenmty. 
Britain's status as a major power continued to erode in December when it 
discontinued aid to Greece and Turkey.22 Preserving its influence in the 
Mediterranean was no longer feasible as its economic crisis had persisted despite the 
U.S. loan. Officials contemplated that the Soviet Union might seek to fill the vacuum, 
but this did not appear imminent since it had also been devastated by the war and had 
started withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe, its most important sphere of 
influence.23 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced that Britain sought a 
cooperative relationship with the USSR and renewed a bilateral treaty to that effect.24 
Truman took a less amenable position, urging congress to extend $400 million in aid 
to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from becoming Soviet satellites. His dramatic 
speech outlined the need to contain communism and maintained that the British 
withdrawal had placed the "free world" in jeopardy. While some U.S. officials 
privately admitted that this was not so, they did not contest the nature of the 
president's appeal. 25 
The U.S. loan quickly disappeared over the harsh winter of 1946-1947, and 
19 See Peter Pringle and James Spiegelman, The Nuclear Barons (London: Michael Joseph, 1981), 32-
34; Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964), 
177, 234. 
20 See Herbert Nicholas, Britain and the USA (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 58-67; 
Margaret Gowing, Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952, vol. 1, 
Policymaking (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1974), 108, 111. 
21 Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations , 33-34. 
22 Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 76-79. 
23 Melvyn Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 
1945-1952," Journal of American History 71, no. 4 (1985): 807-25. 
24 Nicholas, Britain and the USA, 42-44. 
25 Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War," 808, 816. 
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the plummeting exchange rate further disadvantaged the British, reducing the total 
value by approximately one-quarter. The stipulated austerity measures could not be 
upheld without sacrificing the basic welfare services upon which many citizens 
depended.26 The Truman administration appreciated the sources of British 
dissatisfaction relating to the terms of the agreement.27 It consented to more flexible 
terms also to discredit Soviet allegations that its true objective was to place Britain in 
a subservient position. The revised terms included an assurance that there would be 
no further suspension of payments if disagreements were to arise. They sought to 
clarify that the United States regarded Britain as its foremost ally in the United 
Nations, in the struggle against communism and in every other arena.28 
In June 194 7 congress approved the European Recovery Program which more 
effectively began to ameliorate Britain's circumstance and raise standards of living 
throughout the region.29 It also prompted a re-evaluation of the nation's cooperative 
stance toward the Soviet Union, which had declined to be involved with program and 
instead developed its own to consolidate its influence in Eastern Europe.30 This 
outcome had not disappointed the Truman administration since cooperating with the 
USSR would have been highly infeasible.31 The Marshall Plan, as the program was 
also known, had been designed to prevent communist exploitation of economic and 
social unrest. The offer to include it had been a diplomatic gesture which failed to 
26 See "The Anglo-American Loan Agreement," The World Today 2, no. 4 (1947): 141-44; "The 
Sterling Crisis," The World Today 8, no. 4 (1952): 140-48. 
27 DIA 1947-1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 170-71; FRUS 1947, vol. 3, The British 
Commonwealth; Europe (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 1-3, 9-13. 
28 FRUS 1947, 3: 90-93. 
29 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and 
the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), 183; Gardner, Architects of 
Illusion, 135; Thomas Balough, "The Outlook for Britain," Foreign Affairs 26, no. 4 (1948): 665-81. 
30 Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States andthe Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 74. 
31 R.B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European 
Unity 1947-56 (London: Willmer Brothers Limited, 1972), 8-10. 
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halt the further partitioning of continent.32 When the Soviet Union warned Britain not 
to join the Marshall Plan, Bevin retorted that it would not be intimidated. This 
exchange helped to resolve any uncertainty of the need for Britain to assume 
leadership of the pro-U.S. bloc.33 
Developments in Palestine strained Anglo-American unity in the region which 
provided the petrol supplies essential for Britain and the overall success of the 
Marshall Plan. The seven-member Arab League expressed solidarity with the 
Palestinians whose territory had been placed under British control after the First 
World War, and who strenuously opposed the Zionist agenda to establish a Jewish 
state. British troops had difficulty preserving order as Jewish immigration steadily 
rose and Palestinian resistance mounted. The Truman administration urged London to 
liberalize its immigration quota while refusing to intervene against Jewish 
organizations which funded illegal voyages and paramilitary activities. While Bevin 
appreciated that many Jews sought to flee memories of the Holocaust, he profoundly 
resented U.S. willingness to condone their violence.34 
When the British mandate terminated in May 1948, the state of Israel declared 
independence and the Arab League upheld its pledge to intervene in defense of the 
Palestinians.35 Truman immediately recognized Israel to the chagrin of the many of 
his advisors and the British whose troops were hastily withdrawing. His decision 
was in keeping with American public opinion as well as the strength of the Jewish 
32 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1977), 314-15; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Marshall Plan 
Revisited," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. 
Heath and Company, 1974), 167-74. 
33 Nicholas, Britain and the USA, 46-47. 
34 Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy, 364-65; Jason Kendall Moore, "Destabilizing the Middle 
East: U.S. Policy toward Palestine, 1943-1949," Journal of Church and State 43, no. 1 (2001): 115-
34. 
35 The Arab League had made this pledge upon its formation in February 1945. Moore, "Destabilizing 
the Middle East," 118. 
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lobby.36 It seriously damaged U.S. prestige throughout the Middle East,37 though less 
than if the arms embargo had been lifted in favor of the Israelis. In that case he 
appreciated that the British might do the same in favor of the Arabs, embroiling the 
two allies in a war by proxy. That scenario, contemplated by officials on either side 
of the Atlantic, failed to transpire given Israel's rapid success in the field. The U.S. 
stance had exasperated but not alienated the Britain; it had also helped to ensure that 
the Jewish state would align itself with the "free world."38 
Shortly after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet Union blockaded 
western access to Berlin. The discontinuity of U.S. and British interests in the Middle 
East was ofless significance than the prospect of the USSR gaining control over the 
city, as might have precipitated much further Soviet expansion. David Dimbleby and 
David Reynolds credit Bevin with persuading Truman to avoid a military response in 
favor of staging an airlift, and thereafter with moderating his rhetoric since British 
experts believed that the Soviet Union did not seek war.39 The foreign secretary also 
gained support for having sixty atomic-capable U.S. bombers stationed on British 
soil-despite receiving no authority over their use. 40 In August they were 
supplemented by thirty more bombers, and there was no question of Britain's role as 
the most essential base for the deployment of U.S. power.41 The Truman 
36 Thomas G. Paterson, The Making of the Cold War(NewYork: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 
107. 
37 See H.W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 
1918-1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 191-92; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 
239-42; Moore, "Destabilizing the Middle East," 130. 
38 John W. Young, Cold War and Detente 1941-91 (London: Longman, 1993), 109-10. Britain's 
difficulties in Palestine at this time corresponded to its general weakness in world affairs. Francis 
Boyd, British Politics in Transition 1945-1963: A Short Political Guide (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1964), 185-86. 
39 David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and 
America in the Twentieth Century (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), 177-78. 
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administration wisely concealed that none of bombers had carried atomic weapons, 
and very few of them had been modified to do so.42 
The U.S. Ambassador in London, Lewis W. Douglas, informed the 
Department of State of "an undercurrent" of negativity toward the United States 
among British officials and citizens at large. The suspicious manner in which they 
often dealt with him-for political rather than personal reasons-had recently turned 
irritable as well. In his estimation this was due to their anxiety that the Truman 
administration might permit the Berlin blockade to unleash to a war which would 
ensure their own destruction, regardless of how the United States might fare.43 
Douglas empathized with the circumstance in which they found themselves. As never 
before they had to accept having little or no control over their security and economy, 
and nearly every day brought further evidence of their dependence on the United 
States. He encouraged the administration to deal with them as generously as possible, 
for he believed that circumstances rather mismanagement were to blame for their 
predicament, and that they fundamentally accepted the need for Anglo-American 
unity.44 
The Berlin blockade produced a standoff which transformed the city into a 
"heroic symbol ofliberty" and appeared to united the "free world."45 The risk of 
military escalation had substantially decreased by April 1949, yet the United States 
42 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 258. 
43 FRUS1948, vol. 3, Western Europe (Washington: USGPO, 1974): 1113-17. The telegram 
mentioned fears that the Berlin blockade might lead to war. It did not elaborate that in such case 
Britain's destruction would be assured. That opinion, however, was rife as the nation was a much 
closer target for the USSR. See Chester Wilmont, "Britain's Strategic Relationship to Europe," 
International Affairs 29, no. 4 (1953): 409-17. 
44 FRUS1948,3: 1113-17. 
45 Arnold J. Toynbee used the phrase "heroic symbol of liberty." Quoted in John Patrick Diggins, The 
Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 1941-1960 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 
1988), 81. At the same time he refrained from glorifying either of the superpower's ideology or role in 
world affairs. Instead he urged them to abandon their "semi-religious faith and fanaticism" and deal 
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demonstrated the firmness of its resolve by signing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization with ten of its European allies and Canada. This decision would 
contribute to the formation of the Warsaw Pact and more immediately, as hoped, to 
ending the blockade. Elizabeth Barker writers that it also fulfilled Bevin's long-
standing objective to harness U.S. military might to the defense of Western Europe.46 
In the less optimistic perspective of Sean Greenwood, it carried the Britain's 
economic subservience to the United States into the military realm.47 Despite 
criticism to that effect from left-wing parliamentarians, the government faced no 
serious opposition to joining the military alliance.48 
The communist victory in China in January 1950 presented Britain with a 
dilemma. Its alignment with the United States was unmistakable, though its trade 
with China remained a high priority. As important, officials believed that China 
would necessarily remain allied with the Soviet Union, for Yugoslavia had recently 
distanced itself from Moscow to pursue its own form of communism. They chose to 
recognize the government of Mao Tse-tung in spite of U.S. opposition, proving their 
willingness to act independently of their senior ally in cases when the survival of the 
"free world" was not directly threatened.49 Their own legacy of imperialism, though 
perhaps no more benevolent than that of the United States, was certainly more 
flexible. Paul Kennedy contrasts it with America's inexperience in world affairs and 
the ambitions stoked by its ascendancy in the postwar era. The British government 
accepted the often thankless responsibility of serving as a bridge between the United 
46 Barker, The British between the Superpowers, 145. 
47 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 66. 
48 See R. Gerald Hughes, "'We Are Not Seeking Strength for its Own Sake': The British Labor Party, 
West Gennany and the Cold War, 1951-64," Cold War History 3, no. 1 (2002): 67-94; H.C. Allen, 
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States, Europe and, in this case, communist China.so 
After North Korean troops invaded the south in June 1950, Britain was among 
the nations which most heartily endorsed the war effort, and it provided the largest 
non-American contribution.s1 The UN Security Council authorized a multinational 
force to be placed under the command of U.S. General Douglas Macarthur. Soviet 
officials protested that this was illegal, but their arguments failed to persuade non-
communist nations to tolerate the North Korean aggression.s2 U.S. and British 
military expenditures rose substantially to meet the demands of collective security.s3 
Americans accepted the need for this with few reservations, whereas a large segment 
of the British public deemed it inappropriate as financing the war directly impinged 
upon their social programs. Numerous members of the government resigned in 
protest of this development which they viewed as anathema to their nation's socialist 
orientation. s4 
In November the Chinese forces intervening on behalf of North Korea dealt a 
major setback to UN forces, and Truman issued a statement indicating that the atomic 
bomb might be used. General Macarthur had made it known that he favored this 
alternative despite the risk that it might lead to a general war with China and perhaps 
the Soviet Union as well.ss While it was the president who retained final authority for 
any such decision, his words suggested that it might soon be granted. Over one 
hundred British parliamentarians sent a letter of protest to Prime Minister Clement 
so See Arthur Bryant, "Factors underlying British Foreign Policy," International Affairs 22, no. 3 
(1946): 338-51; Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy, 333. 
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54 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 100-1; SIA 1951: 72. 
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Attlee, 56 who shared their unease about being drawn into a broader conflict. He 
promptly flew to Washington to consult with Truman but failed to obtain the desired 
assurance.57 The president merely expressed hope that atomic weapons would not be 
necessary and pledged to keep the British "informed of developments which might 
bring about a change in the situation."58 
Truman's later dismissal of Macarthur helped to avoid the worst-case scenario 
without dispelling concerns that Britain's alliance with the United States was 
fundamentally misguided. This issue had produced a schism within the Labor Party 
which contributed to the re-election of Winston Churchill as Prime Minister in 
October 1951.59 As the Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs observed, there were 
no major changes of policy. Churchill remained committed to the Korean War while 
seeking to ease tensions with the nation's European allies, which like the many 
Laborites decried its obsequiousness to Washington.60 He discounted allegations of 
this nature, instead seeking to revive the "grand alliance" of the Second World War. 
However, both the Truman administration and that of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who 
was elected the following November, responded tepidly to his overtures.61 
The United States and its UN allies accepted a negotiated settlement to the 
Korean War in July 1953. The doctrine of containment had proved effective though 
not resoundingly triumphant, as the armistice re-established the original border along 
the thirty-eighth parallel.62 The same outcome might have been achieved years earlier 
56 Truman, Memoirs 2: 418-20. 
57 Young, Winston Churchill's Last Campaign, 36. 
58 FRUS1950, 3: 1787. 
59 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 100-1. 
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but for the Truman administration's reluctance to compromise, lest it be charged with 
appeasement.63 In the United States, Senator Joe McCarthy had dwelled on that issue 
and generated concerns, articulated by former Prime Minister Clement Attlee and 
others, that he was more powerful than the executive branch. McCarthy indignantly 
retorted that "comrade Attlee" must secretly endorse communist plans for Korea.64 
This allegation bore similarity to one of Attlee's discussions with Truman in 
December 1950, which the Department of State recorded as suggesting that he 
"wished all of Korea to be governed by the North Koreans."65 
The Berlin blockade and Korean War had resulted not in peace but rather "a 
precarious balance, a crisis always short of catastrophe" as Daniel Yergin describes 
the Cold War.66 These interludes had also failed to demonstrate that Britain 
warranted recognition as a world power or that the United States duly appreciated its 
contribution to securing mutual objectives. Ambassador Douglas predicted that the 
latter trend held the capacity to seriously undermine U.S. foreign policy.67 Britain's 
explosion of an atomic weapon the previous year had suggested that a more equitable 
relationship might yet be achieved. It had developed the technology independently 
and in doing so established a degree of parity with the superpowers. 68 The 
Eisenhower administration had responded by successfully urging congress to 
liberalize the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to permit the exchange of non-military 
communist roll-back in place of containment. It proceeded to broadcast this theme even though the 
North Koreans had not been rolled back, and it did not support anti-communist uprisings in East 
Germany and Hungary, as mentioned in chapter two. See Kenneth Osgood, "Form before Substance: 
Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy," Diplomatic 
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information with Britain.69 
Britain hoped that the United States might be of assistance in July 1956 when 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.70 Instead the 
Eisenhower administration refrained from any appearance that it sought to re-establish 
the colonial presence which Nasser and many leaders of the developing world held 
responsible for their own difficulties. At the same time U.S. officials appreciated that 
the British economy could not be sustained without access to the region, and they 
shared British concerns as regards Nasser's receptiveness to the Soviet Union.71 They 
urged a diplomatic resolution to assure that Egypt would operate the canal in an 
efficient and fair manner.72 This moderate position evoked resentment throughout 
Western Europe, a region where U.S. leadership was designed to counter Soviet 
influence, 73 yet in this case the superpowers had set aside their differences, each 
seeking favorable publicity for taking an anti-colonial stance.74 
In October, as negotiations were failing to produce satisfactory results, Britain 
and France invaded the Suez Canal. They had not sought Washington's approval 
beforehand and promptly aborted plans to carry military operations beyond Port Said, 
lest the United States impose economic sanctions, as had been threatened in keeping 
with its support for a UN resolution condemning the invasion. 75 Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles privately expressed disappointment that they had not proceeded to 
69 Nicholas, Britain andthe USA, 67-79. 
70 SIA 1956-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 41. 
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72 FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 16, Suez Crisis July 26-December 3I, I956 (Washington: USGPO, 1990), 
46-47, 100-2, 126-27. 
73 FRUS 1955-1957, 16: 922-24; USWA 1956 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 270. 
74 SIA 1956-58: 70-71. 
75 Biggs-Davidson, The Uncertain Ally, 187-90; Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations 
I939-I984, 73; Boyd, British Politics in Transition, 187. 
149 
overthrow the Egyptian government. 76 The Eisenhower administration had 
considered that objective but refrained since it would have further damaged U.S. 
prestige in the Arab world.77 However, Dulles believed that by overthrowing Nasser 
the British and French would not have damaged their credibility much more than they 
already had, and he regretted that it was unwise for his government to publicly defend 
them.78 Harold Macmillan, the new British prime minister, suggested that Americans 
might respond differently if their own empire were in a state of demise. 79 
The Suez crisis produced the most serious rupture in Anglo-American 
relations in the twentieth century. It demonstrated that Britain relied so heavily on the 
United States that it was unable to assert itself even in the developing world. 80 Most 
citizens viewed the government's decision to withdraw troops as a source of national 
humiliation, and the press exhibited an unprecedented degree of hostility toward the 
United States. Macmillan, despite his exasperation with U.S. policy, sought 
opportunities for reconciliation. In March 1957 he met with Eisenhower in Bermuda 
to discuss the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in Britain.81 The monumental 
nature of that agreement was surpassed later in the year when the Soviet Union 
launched the world's first satellite, indicating that it possessed the technology for 
longer-range missiles than currently in the U.S. arsenal. This danger reinvigorated the 
Anglo-American alliance, leading to an agreement which established the unfettered 
76 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), 
381. 
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exchange of nuclear information. 82 Though Britain would remain unable to compete 
in the arms race, it had recently tested its own thermonuclear device, and the 
agreement further enhanced its standing. 83 
In November 1958 the Soviet Union declared that ifthe four-power 
occupation of Berlin were not renegotiated, it would withdraw from its quadrant and 
fully assist the East Germans in any conflict which might arise. Macmillan played a 
key role in helping to prevent an escalation of the dispute. He visited Moscow the 
following February, convincing leaders there to withdraw their demand for a solution 
to be achieved within six months. He was able to maintain credibility as an "honest 
broker" since his administration sought to transform the abstraction of peaceful 
coexistence into an actual improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. By 
assuring Washington that Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was responsive to this, 
Macmillan laid the groundwork for the four-power conference held in Geneva, as well 
as for Khrushchev's later visit to the United States which ended the war scare, albeit 
without resolving the status ofBerlin.84 His diplomatic skills were a tribute to his 
nation's long-standing objective to serve as a bridge between the East and West.85 
By 1960 animosity surrounding the Suez crisis had begun to dissipate. 86 
While the United States had established predominance over much of world, Britain 
had established a partnership with it in which its own role was neither equal nor 
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subservient. It had been willing to pursue independent courses of action, as well as to 
retreat when they failed to yield the desired results. With U.S. assistance it had 
overcome its economic and military weakness after the Second World War, and 
effectively promoted the belief that the future of western civilization hinged on 
Anglo-American relations. 87 Its most crucial role was to limit confrontation with the 
Soviet Union both through its own policies and by moderating those of the United 
States. 88 As Margaret Gowing observes, it made every to avoid the final showdown 
which U.S. officials frequently seemed to be courting.89 The tension between U.S. 
jogma and the British pragmatism yielded results which benefited the entire world.90 
Over the same period ofU.S.-Chilean relations, the smaller nation also confronted 
severe economic conditions which required U.S. assistance. Not regarding Latin 
America as a high priority, the United States limited its assistance to small-scale loans 
and private investments.91 The disappointment which this generated was perhaps 
greatest in Chile even though it received a disproportionately high amount of 
assistance.92 During the late nineteenth century it had vied with the United States for 
hegemony in the Pacific, at one point threatening to send the U.S. fleet to the bottom 
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of the ocean unless Washington stopped meddling in its disputes with its neighbors.93 
Thereafter the bilateral relationship had maintained a competitive, though less 
adversarial tenor,94 and Chile's power gradually declined while the United States laid 
the groundwork for the distinctly "American" half of the twentieth century.95 The 
nations' rivalry would prevail in spite of their gross disparity of resources. 
Chileans regretted the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor perhaps less than the 
pressure which it generated for them to join the Allied war effort. Like most Latin 
Americans, they questioned the legitimacy of the Pan-American ideals which the 
United States had promulgated for decades.96 Economic development in the Western 
Hemisphere was so inequitable that many perceived their Good Neighbor as merely 
self-interested.97 Unlike most Latin Americans, their population was largely of 
German descent, and that segment and others were extremely sympathetic to National 
Socialism.98 Even citizens who preferred the U.S. model questioned the wisdom of 
joining the Allied cause as it might render their long coastline vulnerable to a 
Japanese attack. 99 President Juan Antonio Rios appreciated these concerns but 
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subordinated them to the consequences of estranging the United States. In January 
1943 he announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, 
emphasizing that this decision was in no way directed against the German people who 
had contributed so much to the nation. 100 
Months later Vice President Henry A. Wallace visited Chile, one of the many 
destinations on his trip throughout Latin America which sought, in his own words, "to 
create the maximum of goodwill toward the United States."101 While Chile was 
among most challenging nations in that regard, thousands of citizens greeted his 
arrival with enthusiasm. Their response affirmed his hope that the nation would 
remain a bulwark of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Despite interludes of 
military rule, its system of governance had retained many similarities with the U.S. 
model. 102 The U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, observed that never 
in Chilean history had a foreign visitor been as well received as Wallace, suggesting 
that the political climate was inhospitable to the Rios administration being overthrown 
by a pro-Axis coup, as had been attempted years earlier by Carlos Ibaiiez del Campo, 
the nation's former dictator. 103 
U.S. officials maintained pressure for Chile to join the Allied cause if only as a 
token of hemispheric unity.104 To minimize the backlash which might follow such a 
decision, they recommended "soft-pedaling" a declaration of war, that is, announcing 
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the formalization of a pre-existent state of belligerency. 105 The Chilean government 
consented to this, provided that its statement could refer to Japan instead of Germany. 
In February 194 5, after the Department of State determined that this would be 
satisfactory, 106 Rios issued the statement as mildly as possible. Chileans responded 
without great protest or enthusiasm, as the president expressed no intention of 
contributing troops to the war effort and by this time Germany's defeat appeared 
inevitable. Moreover factually based rumors held that otherwise their nation would 
be excluded from post-war negotiations and assistance. 107 Bowers viewed those 
rumors not as a threat so much as a friendly warning. 108 
The Allied victory did not bring an immediate termination of the black lists 
which the U.S. government had imposed against foreign entrepreneurs believed to be 
sympathetic to the Axis powers. Though not the only nation to be dealt with in this 
manner, Chile found the policy especially frustrating since neither the lineage nor the 
beliefs of its population had changed. Its officials made some effort to comply 
without persuading the Department of State of their resolve. 109 The black lists fuelled 
anti-U.S. opinion, as had previous allegations Axis espionage networks had been 
permitted to function with impunity. 110 The Department of State left the lists in place 
until July 1946 due to reports that the influential German segment of the population 
was attempting to rehabilitate Nazism. Any further extension might have been 
counterproductive in terms of publicity. 111 It also would have failed to address the 
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106 FRUS1945, 9: 768-70. 
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growing number of citizens had begun to embrace communism, an ideology which 
more directly threatened U.S. interests. 112 
In October 1946 Gabriel Gonzalez Videla won the presidential election, 
becoming the fourth member of the Radical Party to lead the governing coalition 
established eight years earlier.113 William F. Sater writes that the Popular Front, as it 
was known, included members of the Radical, Socialist and Communist Parties who 
shared little in common except their disdain for rightist parties and each other. 114 The 
Truman administration was not favorably predisposed to Communist Parties 
anywhere, given their perceived subservience to the Soviet Union, but it welcomed 
the election of Gonzalez Videla. It chose to demonstrate its support on a remarkably 
large scale, sending an entire war fleet-one aircraft carrier, one battleship and three 
destroyers-to the inauguration ceremony .115 Communist journalists portrayed this as 
a harbinger of increased U.S. intervention in the nation's affairs. Further to their 
dismay, the new president told U.S. representatives that he sought to expand bilateral 
economic cooperation. 116 
That desire was understandable as the nation confronted serious financial 
difficulties. Although it had not joined the war effort until the last year, it had 
contributed throughout by providing the Untied States with nitrates and strategic 
minerals. 117 The most important of these had been copper, the sale of which had 
sharply decreased after the war, creating widespread economic and political 
112 Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Division of River 
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turmoil. 118 Gonzalez Videla sought to deal fairly with the U.S. companies which 
dominated the industry while upholding the rights of Chilean workers, and this 
objective was not to be envied. The companies believed that they were being 
overtaxed; the workers believed that they were being exploited; and the president 
believed, as communists and others alleged, that Washington was intervening in the 
nation's internal affairs. At the same time he feared that the communists were using 
h . h . 1 . d 119 t at issue to promote t err own revo ut10nary agen a. 
The Department of State fully supported Chile's application for a $10.3 
million loan from the Export-Import Bank, an institution directly administered by the 
U.S. government. The bank approved this relatively modest sum which was used to 
sustain the nation's most basic infrastructure.120 Gonzalez Videla proceeded to sign a 
comprehensive trade agreement with Argentina in December, securing a credit 
seventeen times that large and raising concerns about the possible formation of a 
Southern Cone bloc hostile to U.S. interests. Earlier in the year, the Department of 
State had unsuccessfully attempted to thwart the election of Argentine President Juan 
Domingo Peron whose campaign had dwelled on anti-U.S. themes. 121 The 
department recognized that Gonzalez Videla had no personal affinity for Peron, but it 
properly inferred that the bilateral agreement sought to counteract U.S. influence. 122 
The New York Times ventured that it would be "more important to Argentina than the 
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taking of Austria or Czechoslovakia was to Hitler."123 
While the Southern Cone nations often viewed the United States as their 
common enemy, they had a number of their own disputes related to sharing one the 
longest borders on the planet. Not long before the trade agreement was signed, Peron 
had expressed his resolve to secure access to at least one of Chile's Pacific ports 
either through negotiation or armed conflict. 124 Thereafter he had assumed a less 
menacing tone, yet few Chileans believed that his intentions were benevolent. 125 
Bowers viewed the government's willingness to deal with him as directly related to its 
reliance on Argentine wheat and beef. 126 Gonzalez Videla was certainly not among 
those Chileans who looked favorably upon his authoritarian style of leadership. 
During the war he had led an organization expressing solidarity with those Argentines 
who opposed the military regime in which Peron gained prominence. 127 The two 
leaders tended to view each other as cautiously as they viewed the United States.128 
In April 194 7 Gonzalez Videla dismissed the communist members of his 
cabinet as he held their party responsible for inciting labor unrest. 129 The Department 
of State referred to the situation as potentially disastrous, for the government had 
already been forced to ration coal, electricity and petrol. Any further strikes seemed 
likely to impair its provision of basic services as well as the repayment of its external 
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Contextos de la Historia Antartica Chilena, 1939-1949 (Valparaiso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 
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debt. As yet it had resisted pressure to nationalize the U.S. companies widely blamed 
for the nation's woes, but its high taxation of them remained a serious point of 
contention. 130 Gonzalez Videla' s anticommunist orientation provided the best hope of 
durability in U.S.-Chilean relations. His speeches repeated themes from the doctrine 
of containment, emphasizing that his administration rejected any involvement with 
the "treacherous" agenda of the Communist Party, 131 whose members were soon 
removed from all levels of the government and their party outlawed. 132 
These measures failed to produce tranquility. Clashes between workers and 
government authorities grew more numerous and more violent, often resulting in 
fatalities. The strike of eighteen thousand coal miners in October threatened to 
paralyze the nation's industrial production. They refused to return to work even after 
the government met their demand for a forty percent wage increase and a guarantee of 
their continued employment. Their recalcitrance appeared to be part of an effort to 
undermine the government's stability, as later confirmed when officials intercepted 
the Communist Party's instructions to the miners. To help Chile defeat this "test of 
strength," as the Department of State referred to it, the United States provided an 
emergency shipment of coal in addition to a further loan from the Export-Import 
Bank. This assistance was essential in permitting the government to resolve the strike 
on its own terms while surviving the hiatus before full production could be 
resumed. 133 
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Gonzalez Videla was so infuriated by the strike that he broke diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. 134 Aside from appearances that the domestic 
Communist Party was an appendage of Moscow, Russian-language documents had 
been found among the leaders of the strike.135 The president ordered the detention of 
the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago until all Chileans in Moscow were given 
exit permits. Most citizens supported this move as the Soviet Union was reported to 
mistreat of their own officials, aside from challenging their nation's economic 
independence.136 The president's anticommunist rhetoric hardened in line with his 
policies. Earlier he had declared war against Chilean communists while he now 
referred to the inevitability of a global conflict between the forces of "democracy and 
Red totalitarianism."137 He berated those citizens who refused to accept this due to 
their "uncontrollable hatred of the United States."138 
The Department of State urged the Export-Import Bank to substantially 
increase its loans to Chile, which currently totaled $48 million, 139 a miniscule fraction 
of U.S. credit and direct grants flowing to Western Europe and the Mediterranean.140 
Though Latin America was not directly at risk of Soviet expansion, officials valued 
Gonzalez Videla's ideological fervor which equaled or surpassed their own. Bowers 
observed that after breaking relations with USSR, he became the head-of-state most 
detested by communists around the world. 141 That status enhanced his ongoing 
requests for assistance lest it appear, as communists claimed, that the United States 
134 FRUS1947, 8: 511-12. 
135 The New York Times, 17October1947. 
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137 FRUS1947, 8: 501-3; The New York Times, 2 February 1948. 
138 The New York Times, 21November1948. 
139 FRUS1948, vol. 9, The Western Hemisphere (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 435-37. 
140 Latin Americans strongly resented not receiving a comparable amount U.S. assistance. Among 
them Chileans were especially resentful as their prices had risen threefold since the late 1930s. See 
Rabe, "The Elusive Conference," 285; Bierck, The United States and Latin America, 26; USWA 1948-
49: 253, 368-70. 
141 Bowers, Chile through Embassy Windows, 170. 
160 
was willing to discard its allies to promote the business interests of its own citizens. 
By mid-1949 the economic situation had again deteriorated, and Gonzalez Videla 
insisted that it could not be remedied without further U.S. assistance. The 
Export-Import Bank approved an addition $25 million loan to help the nation avoid 
catastrophe. 142 While this objective was technically successful, it unleashed a violent 
series of protests against both the president and the United States. 143 
In April 1950 Gonzalez Videla traveled to the United States at Truman's 
invitation. His visit, while producing no changes of policy, underscored Chile's 
alignment with the "free world." The New York Times displayed a front-page picture 
of the two leaders smiling broadly, anticommunists invigorated to be in each other's 
presence. 144 The image captured a moment which was genuine but fleeting, for after 
Gonzalez Videla departed, bilateral relations reverted to economic themes. U.S. 
assistance fell short of expectation despite being augmented by Truman's program of 
technical assistance for Latin America.145 Point Four, as the program was known, 
relied on private investment rather than grants over which governments would have 
held far more discretionary power. 146 It also failed to generate enthusiasm since its 
objective was not purely humanitarian but designed to halt the spread of 
communism. 147 Gonzalez Videla supported this objective without having any affinity 
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for the U.S. companies which controlled ninety-five percent of the copper industry 
and generated approximately half of the national revenue.148 
The Department of State reported that by early 1951 many Chileans had lost 
faith that the government was either able or willing to defend their interests from U.S. 
pressure. The communist-inspired phrase "Yankee imperialism" had gained currency 
throughout the population from the extreme left to the extreme right. 149 Concerned by 
the volatility of this situation, U.S. officials negotiated an arrangement establishing 
the Chilean government's control over twenty percent of the copper industry. 150 This 
concession was formidable, given the scale of U.S. investment, yet it failed to resolve 
disputes over the price at which the copper was to be sold. The government 
threatened to seize control over the entire industry ifthe price were lowered without 
its consent. 151 Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. 
Miller wrote to Bowers of his outrage to be threatened in that manner; "To me it is 
just one more instance of Gonzalez Videla and the Chileans going off half-cocked 
without [taking] any responsibility for their action."152 
Further negotiations yielded no progress. Chilean officials insisted that 
domestic opinion prevented them from making concessions, to which their 
counterparts retorted that they were making no attempt to improve public perceptions 
of the United States, aside from being ungrateful for its loans and technical 
assistance. 153 The appearance of ingratitude reached a higher level in May when 
Gonzalez Videla acted on previous threats to assume full regulatory power over the 
148 FRUS I95I, 2: I242-58. 
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industry. He simultaneously expressed willingness to continue negotiations, though 
the Department of State observed that he was now holding "a gun at our head" as 
Chilean copper remained essential for the U.S. defense industry. 154 Truman was 
infuriated that the nation which he viewed as the United States' closest regional ally 
was now threatening to undermine its position the Korean War. Though his opinion 
of Chileans, especially Gonzalez Videla, might have faltered, his sense of pragmatism 
did not. Within weeks he authorized an agreement which both recognized the Chilean 
government's control over the industry and met its demand for higher prices.155 
In September 1952 Chileans elected Carlos Ibafiez del Campo primarily due to 
high inflation and the perpetually low standard of living. 156 Gonzalez Videla' s 
campaign had also suffered from his reluctance to unequivocally denounce the United 
States, whereas Ibafiez had publicized his desire to nationalize U.S.-owned copper 
mines, as more in keeping with the anti-Yankee spirit of the era. 157 The Department 
of State viewed his election as "a severe blow" comparable to the 1946 election of 
Juan Domingo Peron. 158 The two leaders were close friends united by their 
authoritarian predisposition and disdain for foreign intervention. Interestingly Peron 
had established a functional relationship with the United States after distancing 
himself from the Soviet sphere. 159 Bowers expressed confidence that this would be 
possible with Ibafiez as he grasped that he needed the United States more than it 
154 The words "a gun to our head" were used by Edward G. Miller. FRUS 1952-54, 5: 672-79. 
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needed him.160 His background as a military dictator, who thereafter served as 
president of the National Socialist Party, was not considered dangerous. By his 
seventies, he had lost some of his revolutionary fervor. 161 
The United States sent representatives to the inauguration ceremony in hope 
that Bower's analysis would prove correct.162 The Peron administration did likewise 
in hope that his election would mark an end to U.S. dominance in Chilean affairs. 
While the Southern Cone nations signed an agreement renewing their cooperation, 
updating the one signed during the Gonzalez Videla administration, it seemed 
improbable that they would become too closely aligned as their own rivalries had not 
subsided. U.S. officials were more concerned by the new president's re-establishment 
of diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union. His extreme form of 
nationalism appealed to many communists and communist sympathizers because it 
opposed intervention by either superpower. 163 Without specifically mentioning Chile, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned this kind of non-alignment as 
immoral. 164 Fortunately his colleagues in Chile dwelled on more routine issues, such 
as copper prices and means of ensuring that U.S. companies would not be 
nationalized. 
The Chilean government's control of the copper industry partially fulfilled its 
longing for "independence" but otherwise produced disappointing results. 165 By mid-
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1953 the nation had become the world's highest-priced supplier and accumulated a 
large surplus of unsold copper. Since the United States did not offer to purchase more 
than usual, the government indicated that it might be forced to sell to the Soviet bloc. 
The Department of State warned the Eisenhower administration that this would cause 
"irreparable damage" to U.S.-Chilean relations aside from being militarily valuable 
for the communist sphere. It urged further loans to Chile, demonstrating that the 
nation had more to gain from the United States than from the enemies of freedom. 166 
As many loans had already been extended-and would later be 
increased-Eisenhower instead authorized negotiations to purchase the surplus copper 
if Chile agreed to prohibit sales to the Soviet bloc. After months of further 
negotiations, these terms were accepted and presented to the Chilean senate for final 
approval. 167 
As Bowers had predicted, Ibanez was not opposed to compromising with the 
dreaded "colossus of the north."168 In fact he pledged to veto any provision which the 
senate might add to the detriment of U.S. interests, and to support legislation to 
reduce the rate at which U.S. companies were taxed while re-establishing their control 
of sales. Like most Chileans, he presumed that additional loans would be contingent 
upon these issues, and the Department of State believed that this was perfectly 
appropriate. The current tax rate claimed over eighty percent of companies' profits, 
which were further diminished by government-imposed price controls. The 
department observed that this was highly inconsistent with allegations that Chile was 
166 FRUS 1952-54, 5: 697-99. 
167 The surplus weighed 100,000 tons, and the final agreement for to its sale was reached in March 
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being exploited-aside from the fact that it had received more U.S. assistance per 
capita than any other Latin American nation.169 Willard R. Beaulac, the new U.S. 
Ambassador in Santiago, concurred that anti-Yankee sentiment was unwarranted, and 
suggested that it was the product of Latin Americans' tendency to blame others for 
their own failings. 170 
Passage of the new copper legislation in mid-1955 so pleased U.S. companies 
and their shareholders that they increased their investment. The government's anti-
inflationary policies were also starting to produce signs of economic stability. 
Heeding the Department of State's recommendation, Washington increased its loans 
and encouraged the International Monetary Fund to do likewise. The Ibafiez 
administration, unlike the earlier Popular Front coalitions, was demonstrating a strong 
commitment to both the theory and the practice of the free market. The negative 
themes of the president's campaign had been abandoned, modified or reversed, as in 
the case of his opposition to military cooperation with the United States. At a meeting 
of American presidents in July 1956, Ibafiez took the opportunity to thank Eisenhower 
and members of the Department of State for their support. 171 
In September 1958 Chileans chose Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez to carry forth 
the economic policies which had benefited many Chilean households and started to 
erode the popularity of anti-U.S. slogans. His election demonstrated the strength of 
the rising middle class, and the Department of State was optimistic that he would 
uphold his campaign pledge to form "a businessman's government."172 Alessandri's 
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17
° FRUS 1955-1957, 7: 783. This tendency of Latin Americans cannot be empirically verified. The 
ambassador's reference to it was in keeping with the perceptual difficulties which bore upon 
U.S.-Chilean relations throughout the era. See Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends." 
171 FRUS1955-1957, 7: 792-93, 804-6, 814-17, 823-27. 
172 Alessandri was a member of the Liberal Party whose coalition was dominated by Conservatives. 
Pike, Chile and the Untied States, 249. See Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
(Rubottom) to Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 13 February 1959, in FRUS 
1958-1960, vol. 5, American Republics, microfiche supplement (Washington: USGPO, 1991). 
166 
first year in government met Washington's highest expectations, resulting in further 
loans to bolster the population's resistance to communism and to restore its 
confidence in the effectiveness of the democratic system. 173 The U.S. Embassy in 
Santiago commended Alessandri's inclusion of leading economists in the decision-
making process, as well as his opposition to all forms of totalitarianism. These 
factors, in its estimation, were responsible for generating an unprecedented degree of 
goodwill in the history ofU.S.-Chilean relations. 174 
Four years later historian Frederick B. Pike observed that Chile's reputation in 
foreign relations surpassed its size and population.175 He did not specifically link this 
to Gonzalez Videla's activism pertaining to the Antarctic-as discussed in the 
previous chapter---or his virtual extortion of U.S. loans, but these issues demonstrated 
that he refused to be dealt with like a Central American, as he once warned 
representatives of a U.S. company prior to seizing control over the copper industry. 
Ibanez, despite his anti-Yankee rhetoric, proved more accommodating of U.S. 
interests, and Alessandri made no effort to guise his capitalistic orientation. The loans 
which all three presidents secured benefited the nation, though anti-Yankee sentiment 
remained high due to perceptions that the terms were unfair. The presidents often 
empathized with these perceptions, but dealt with U.S. officials and businessmen in a 
manner which they believed was necessary, and which often revealed both dignity 
and anger. 
Neither were British leaders exempt from outbursts when Washington 
appeared to discard their interests. For example, the controversy over Palestine 
173 President Eisenhower to Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, [February 1959]; Department of State, 
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infuriated Prime Minister Clement Attlee while entailing much greater risks than if 
U.S. companies in Chile had been nationalized. The creation oflsrael embroiled the 
Middle East in a war which might have been indefinitely prolonged if the 
Anglo-American nations had lifted their arms embargoes. While the Department of 
State dreaded the possible formation a Southern Cone bloc hostile to U.S. interests, it 
did not predict that such a bloc would instigate a major conflict. U.S.-Chilean 
relations could not rival the international significance ofU.S.-British relations, yet 
both sets of relations entailed a degree of resentment. It was much higher in Chile 
though more poignant in Britain as citizens generally expected more from the United 
States and were less suspectable to radical forms of nationalism. 176 
U.S. Antarctic policy was less consistently pro-British than many Latin Americans 
believed. In refusing to acknowledge the disputed sector beneath South America as 
part of the Western Hemisphere, as stipulated by Rio Treaty of 1947, 177 it 
handicapped efforts to coerce a British withdrawal by non-violent means. This bias 
was both real and apparent, though otherwise the policy made few allowances for 
Britain's unique importance to the United States. On occasions to the contrary, 
British officials were dissatisfied that U.S. support remained highly equivocal to 
176 U.S. intelligence reports viewed the election oflbafiez as consistent with the rise ofradical 
nationalism in Chile and throughout Latin America. FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 2, part l, National Security 
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avoid the impression of bias. 178 They also found that the policy reflected the 
unpredictability which characterized the nation's role in world affairs, and 
accordingly chose to defend their Antarctic interests more assertively than the United 
States preferred. They did so in anticipation that the sovereignty dispute would not 
escalate to the point of being exploited by the Soviet Union. U.S. officials, though 
less certain of this, refrained from publicly criticizing British actions which were 
detrimental to a pacifistic resolution of the sovereignty dispute. 179 
The announcement of the Operation High Jump in late 1946 generated 
widespread concern that United States sought to militarize the Antarctica. British 
officials expressed displeasure that Washington had not sought their permission since 
the operation would be active in the British Antarctic sector. 18° Chilean officials, like 
a large segment of the population, responded with alarm, announcing plans to increase 
their cooperation with Argentina.181 The conflict of British and Chilean interests in 
the far south was, if nothing else, clearly delineated, whereas the reversal of the U.S. 
non-claimant policy might have entailed a declaration of rights over the entire 
continent. A declaration of U.S. rights over the uncontested sector from 90° to 150° 
West would have assuaged those fears, though at the expense of not recognizing the 
full extent of U.S. exploration. 182 The non-claimant policy was indecisive rather than 
178 For example, Embassy in Washington (Beeley) to Foreign Office, American Department, 9 April 
1953, A 15212/219, PRO, FO 371. 
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pro-British or pro-Chilean. By the time Operation High Jump returned, however, the 
Truman administration had outlined global priorities among which Latin America was 
. "d . 183 a mmor cons1 eratlon. 
High Jump greatly increased the exploration-based criteria for U.S. Antarctic 
rights while contributing to anxiety that a U.S. claim would extend into the already 
disputed peninsular region. Chile responded by dispatching two small expeditions, 
the latter of which was led by Gonzalez Videla at a time when his nation was 
confronting severe economic difficulties. As The World Today noted, his personal 
involvement with the sovereignty dispute helped to divert attention from these 
difficulties. 184 It also reflected his strong leadership in dealing with the Communist 
Party, the Soviet Union and the United States. Though notorious for his 
anticommunist fervor, he had already started making the threats to seize control of 
U.S. companies which he later carried through to the horror of the Department of 
State and Truman himself. 185 His defense of the Chilean Antarctic paralleled his 
resolve to limit interference in the nation's economic affairs by either superpower. 
Allegations that he was beholden to Yankee imperialism distorted a reality which his 
opponents were able to criticize but not to surmount. 
As the United States would have preferred Chile to assume a milder tack in the 
Antarctic, it would have preferred Britain not to dispatch the battle cruiser Nigeria as 
a warning to the Southern Cone nations. 186 This action forced Washington either to 
183 Mark T. Gilderhus writes that U.S. leaders often "embraced Latin American governments as 
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condone European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, contrary to the Monroe 
Doctrine, or to indirectly endorse Argentine and Chilean rights in the "American" 
Antarctic. 187 It pursued the first course in keeping with the European emphasis of its 
foreign policy and its "special" relationship with Britain, as dramatically showcased 
during the Berlin airlift. Gonzalez Videla denounced British colonialism nearly as 
passionately as he denounced communism, yet the Anglo-American alliance 
remained central to the "free world" with which he sought alignment. The Truman 
administration had also been careful to avoid committing itself to the extension of the 
Rio Treaty's hemispheric defense boundaries to the South Pole.188 This decision had 
corresponded to the increasingly anticommunist-rather than anti-British-focus of 
Pan American relations. 189 
When the Department of State tabled its first internationalization proposal for 
the Antarctic in 1948, there were no indications that Britain, Chile or the other 
claimant nations would be willing to renounce their sovereignty, as called for, to forge 
an eight-power agreement barring the Soviet Union. The administrations of Clement 
Attlee and Gonzalez Videla shared Washington's anticommunist orientation while 
objecting to the price of its extension to the far south. The proposal carried the non-
recognition policy to the least tolerable extreme, reflecting the general insensitivity of 
the U.S. foreign relations which stoked anti-U.S. opinion in Britain, Chile, and around 
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the world. The Escudero Plan offered hope of a satisfactory outcome, yet its 
distribution through the Chilean Embassy in Washington-without prior U.S. 
approval-was in keeping with the periodically un-conciliatory manner of Gonzalez 
Videla. The U.S. decision to confide with British officials about it, as later exposed, 
also served to undermine prospects for an immediate compromise. 
The British destruction of Southern Cone outposts on Deception Island 
curtailed the limited progress which had been made by early 1953. The U.S. refusal 
to involve the Organization of American States frustrated Latin Americans, Chileans 
and Argentines most of all, but without leading to a breakdown of Pan American 
institutions or producing a schism within the "free world," as some officials had 
envisioned. 190 Washington's moderate response helped to preserve hemispheric unity 
against the danger of communist insubordination. This feat was all the more 
noteworthy since Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo, who 
threatened war against Britain, was as anti-U.S. as he was anti-British, and the new 
president, Carlos Ibanez del Campo, had been elected with the support of both 
communists and National Socialists.191 His administration had many characteristics 
of"red fascism," a term used by Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson in reference to 
the post-war merger of Soviet and German totalitarianism in the North American 
mind. 192 
The United States conducted its Antarctic policy as cautiously as it led the UN 
war effort in Korea. Its allies feared that it would permit the conflict to escalate 
190 Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to Embassy in London, 10 April 1953, A-1362, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. For earlier concerns of this nature, see FRUS 1947, 1: 1057-58. 
191 See Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs 
(Miller), 23 June 1952, NARA, RG 59, Records of Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American 
Affairs (Miller), 1949-1953; FRUS 1952-54, 5: 693-97. 
192 Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia in the American Image ofTotalitarianism, 1930s-1950s," American Historical Review 75, no. 4 
(1970): 1046-64. Another author observes that throughout Latin America, anti-U .S. sentiment was not 
merely a campaign issue, but a "widely held political value." Herbert Goldhamer, The Foreign Powers 
in Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 279-80. 
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beyond control, as suggested by Truman's remarks about using the atomic bomb. The 
president then dismissed General Douglas Macarthur to assure that he would retain 
final authority over any decision to that effect, which he truly hoped would not be 
necessary despite his refusal to pledge to seek British consent beforehand. The final 
armistice revealed that his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, also accepted the need 
for containment in cases where communist roll-back might precipitate a nuclear 
Armageddon. His moderate stance was not unlike that of lbafiez who once elected 
accepted the impracticality of acting upon his anti-Yankee rhetoric. 193 In refraining 
from overt favoritism, the Eisenhower administration's policy toward the Antarctic 
was able to sustain viable relationships with both Britain, Chile, and the nine other 
signatories of the Antarctic Treaty .194 
The long interval between the first and second U.S. proposals related most 
directly to the sovereignty dispute which had re-emerged in the last months of the 
Korean War. Any hope ofreviving an eight-power condominium arrangement 
incorporating the Escudero Plan began to fade when the Soviet Union established its 
presence in the Antarctic in preparation for the 1957-1958 International Geophysical 
Year. Documents indicate that British officials deserved credit for persuading the 
United States to include it in discussions of the second proposal.195 While this was 
consistent with their tendency to mediate between East and West, it remains possible 
that the United States would have pursued that course without encouragement. The 
Soviet Union had already indicated that it would deny the legitimacy of any 
agreement reached without its participation, 196 and fortunately the Ibanez 
193 See Sater, Chile and the United States, 126. 
194 That is, the nine other original signatories of the treaty. 
195 Foreign Office Minute, 9 September 1958, A 1527/34, PRO, FO 371. 
196 The Soviet Union had indicated this publicly as well as at an official level. Embassy in Moscow to 
Department of State, 15 February 1949, no. 86, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; The New York Times, 12 
February 1949, 10 June 1950. 
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administration, unlike that of Gonzalez Videla, did not object in principle to dealing 
with communists. 
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 
1959 bode well for the Antarctic Conference which opened the following month. His 
trip demonstrated that the superpowers were willing to resolve-or attempt to 
resolve-their disputes through negotiations rather than armed conflict. 197 The 
demilitarization clauses of the Antarctic Treaty were fully consistent with this trend, 
yet the U.S. delegation opposed the last-minute Soviet proposal to include a nuclear 
test ban. It finally yielded to prevent the conference from ending in failure and 
leaving it without an alternative. The option of forging an arrangement with Britain, 
Chile and Argentina-as briefly contemplated-would not have been viable as the 
Latin American nations insisted on the test ban. Like the other nations of the 
Southern Hemisphere, they were not swayed by the U.S. position that nuclear tests 
should be regarded as a legitimate form of scientific inquiry rather than a violation of 
the treaty's demilitarization clauses. 198 
On this crucial issue the Southern Hemisphere nations gained influence in 
direct proportion to their support from the Soviet Union. They would have faced 
enormous pressure to comply if both superpowers had opposed a test ban. Even 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, whose alliance with the United States was 
unquestionable, acknowledged that it was difficult to resist the united will of "the two 
great powers." He feared that Khrushchev's visit to the United States might lead to an 
agreement pertaining to Berlin without his involvement which would then be held 
"over [my] head."199 The signature ofthe Antarctic Treaty marked the end of a more 
complex series of negotiations to which Britain and Chile had made indispensable 
197 USWA 1959 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960): 163-64. 
198 See chapter three. 
199 Beschloss, Mayday, 184. 
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contributions-encouraging Soviet involvement and contributing the Escudero Plan, 
respectively. In this context the two nations were not just allies of the United States 
but super-allies, as Hope M. Harrison describes nations aligned with either 
superpower which maintained a high degree of independence and significantly 
influenced its policy.200 
Harrison specifically uses that term to reference to East Germany as it 
overcame Soviet reluctance to build the Berlin wall. Khrushchev viewed the Berlin 
crisis as a means of securing U.S. recognition of East Germany and promoting a long-
term improvement in Cold War relations. The East Germany leader, Walter Ulbricht, 
lacked patience for these objectives and argued in favor of simply closing the border, 
a course which also helped to consolidate his power. A secondary objective of the 
decision to build the wall in August 1961 was to encourage him to assume a more 
cooperative attitude toward Moscow.201 On the last day of the Antarctic Conference, 
Secretary of State Christian Herter issued a single-sentence declaration that the United 
States, Chile and Argentina agreed that that the Antarctic Treaty would in no way 
affect the Rio Treaty.202 He did not elaborate that United States refused to accept the 
Latin American position that the British Antarctic constituted a violation of the Rio 
Treaty's hemispheric defense perimeter.203 The declaration of agreement was more 
200 Hope M. Harrison, "Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower and the Building 
of the Berlin Wall, 1958--61," Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 53-74. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Department of State, The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15 -December 1, 1959: 
Conference Documents, the Antarctic Treaty and Related Papers (Washington: USGPO, 1960), 68-69. 
203 The Foreign Office briefly considered justifying the Soviet Union's exclusion from the first 
internationalization proposal on the basis of the Rio Treaty, even though Latin Americans sought to 
invoke it against the British presence in Antarctica as well as the Honduras. See Embassy in Moscow 
(Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, no. 238, 152.2/24/50, A 1529/36; Embassy in 
Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, American Department (Cecil), 24 October 1950, A 1529/41, PRO, FO 
371; FRUS 1948, 9: 88; FRUS 1949, 2: 430-35; Foreign Affairs Ministry, Division of Treaties and 
Boundaries, to Ambassador in Britain, 12 September 1947, Confidential no. 10; Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, Bianchi Mission, Circular Confidential no. 4, 1April1948, MRECh. 
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technically of disagreement,204 and this was the very quality which distinguished 
super-alliances from other types of alliances. 
The Department of State once speculated that Britain was in such a weak 
position after the Second World War that it would not dare to "go out on a limb 
alone."205 Chile was initially in better position, as it had not been subject to attack, 
but its economic dependency on the United States proved more difficult to surmount. 
Many individuals in both nations held that the expectations which accompanied U.S. 
support far outweighed the benefits. Episodes such as the Suez invasion-by which 
time Ibafiez had abandoned his anti-Yankee platform-proved that the repercussions 
of truly independent action were serious enough to be deemed counterproductive. 
British and Chilean officials nonetheless maintained a degree of autonomy which the 
majority of citizens found acceptable. Their effort to form an Antarctic arrangement 
excluding the United States, while neither successful nor necessary, given the 
signature of the treaty, revealed a longing for self-determination which transcended 
the Rio Treaty.206 
Anti-Yankee sentiment overshadowed U.S.-Chilean relations more than 
U.S.-British relations. Though U.S. intervention in European affairs was not always 
popular, its Cold War justification was more compelling. Latin America was at little 
risk of"Sovietization," whereas the U.S. concept of hemispheric defense undermined 
the region's hope to remove all vestiges of British colonialism and to prevent its 
204 There was incessant Anglo-Chilean disagreement over Article IV of the Rio Treaty. U.S. officials 
assured Britain that, consistent with their public statements, they had no intention of recognizing its 
applicability to the Antarctic. See Embassy in Chile (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 19 February 
1948, no. 133; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Division ofNorthem European 
Affairs (Green), 10 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Embassy in Santiago (Sterling) to 
Foreign Office, 21 February 1953, no. 33, A 15212/87, PRO, FO 371. 
205 In the words of Ambassador Averill Harriman. Quoted in Patterson, The Making of the Cold War, 
65. 
206 For further analysis ofU.S.-British Antarctic relations, see Consuelo Leon Woppke, 
"Convergencias y Divergencias entre los Interes Anglo-Americanos en la 'Antartica Sudamericano' a 
Mitad de! Siglo Pasado," Estudios Norteamericanos 3, no. 3 (2004): 149-58. 
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governments from being overthrown if unreceptive to Washington's strategic designs. 
Even if Pan-American ideals had been pursued on a more equitable basis, they would 
have had difficulty rivaling the influence of Anglo-American relations or the Anglo-
American-led military alliance. Chile perhaps took a leading role in Antarctic 
diplomacy to atone for its relatively minor standing in world affairs. While Britain's 
standing greatly had decreased after the Second World War, it assumed an equally 
important role pertaining to the inclusion of the Soviet Union. The roles played by 
these two nations indicated that, although the Cold War would persist, its terms would 
not be exclusively dictated by the superpowers. 
The next two chapters evaluate the domestic factors which bore upon U.S. 
Antarctic policy. Officials spent considerably more effort promoting an international 
consensus pertaining to the future of the region than attempting to persuade elected 
representatives that the consensus advanced U.S. national interests. In fact the treaty 
was difficult to reconcile with the anticommunist sentiment embodied by Senator Joe 
McCarthy and the policies adopted by White House in the years which preceded and 
followed him. By including the Soviet Union, the Antarctic Treaty appeared to 
contradict the values which most Americans held dear. 
5. U.S. Antarctic Opinion 
Many Americans viewed the government's non-claimant policy toward the Antarctic 
as unnecessarily restrained and even inappropriate, given the legacy of U.S. explorers. 
As the policy remained in place, despite widespread rumors that it might reversed, 
journalists assumed an increasingly nationalistic tone which corresponded to the 
perspective of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd, who embodied U.S. Antarctic 
exploration during the era-and whose advice the government discounted. Elizabeth 
A. Kendall, an enigmatic and seemingly isolated citizen activist, kept officials 
throughout the Department of State and congress informed of her disdain for the non-
claimant policy. Indeed her letters foreshadowed why a substantial minority of 
senators would oppose ratifying the Antarctic Treaty. Like Byrd, Kendall and many 
journalists, they viewed non-claimancy as an affront to the national interest based on 
the questionable assumption that it was necessary to avoid provoking a Soviet claim. 
This chapter analyzes the domestic factors which bore upon U.S. Antarctic 
policy. When the Antarctic Treaty took effect in 1961, after being ratified by the 
twelve signatory nations, it established an unprecedented standard of international 
cooperation. Scholars have many reasons to dwell on its effectiveness and 
legitimacy, 1 yet in the process they simplify the nature of U.S. leadership by 
separating it from domestic factors. This tendency is understandable since U.S. 
Antarctic opinion posed a real but unrealized challenge to regime formation, whereas 
British and Latin American nationalism involved vindictive rhetoric and actual 
confrontations over disputed territory. The patriotic sentiment which many 
1 For example, 0. Stokke and D. Vidas, eds., Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and 
Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
This chapter includes material from Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big 
America and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946-1961," Polar Record 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30. 
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Americans held toward the Antarctic was mild by comparison, though not 
insignificant.2 
Deborah Shapely and Christopher C. Joyner concur that Antarctica has failed 
to hold the attention of Americans and their leaders for more than brief periods.3 The 
truth of this assessment underscores the value of simulating a cultural perspective of 
the formative era when no international or domestic outcome could be taken for 
granted. Without the emergence of an organized pro-claimant lobby, the Antarctic 
Treaty's ratification passed by only eight votes. The narrowness of this margin 
invites consideration of what factors might have precipitated a legislative defeat in 
Washington, the very capital where the Antarctic Conference had been held to 
negotiate a U.S.-drafted proposal. A defeat in any of the capitals might have had an 
equally negative effect in practice, but not in theory. Since U.S. officials viewed the 
Antarctic as a valuable showcase for their enlightened leadership in world affairs, and 
had repeatedly made statements to this effect, they would have greeted treaty's non-
signature or non-ratification with particular dismay.4 
It was fortunate for all parties that U.S. domestic opinion never rallied against 
the government's willingness to suspend more traditional national interests. In 
hindsight it might appear unfair to criticize the Department of State for not taking 
measures to counteract the treaty's defeat, as it was devoted to foreign policy and did 
manage to unite a wide array of nations in the cause of devoting a continent to 
science. 5 Criticism might seem trite as much as unfair if the department had been so 
2 See Time, 22 August 1960. 
3 Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age (Washington, DC: Resources 
for the Future, 1985); Christopher C. Joyner, "The Role of Domestic Politics in the Making of United 
States Antarctic Policy," in Stokke and Vidas, Governing the Antarctic, 409-31. 
4 Department of State, Division of European Affairs and Division of North and West Coast Affairs, 
Memorandum, 8September1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
5 See Richard S. Lewis, A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure (New York: Viking Press, 
1965). 
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inundated with other responsibilities that it never fathomed domestic opinion curbing 
U.S. leadership in the far south. Moreover, since its commitment to the 1924 Hughes 
Doctrine was only tentative, attempting to generate support for the non-claimant 
policy might have been counterproductive and, even if not, had little bearing on the 
success or failure of the Antarctic Treaty.6 
While these issues are not without merit, publicity became a key component of 
U.S. Antarctic policy during the 1939-1941 Byrd expedition when the frozen terrain 
began to assume heightened political significance, and it remained so until the treaty 
was signed. 7 Official statements consistently sought to allay other nations' concerns 
about U.S. motivations. Their first themes included Pan-Americanism and the 
Monroe Doctrine, while later themes would allude to the "red menace" and finally to 
more ecumenical ideals formulated, if necessary, to permit a limited rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union. The earlier themes were compatible with priorities shared by 
most Americans, or at least not actively protested. The last theme was purposefully 
more nebulous, as by then most Americans loathed communists anywhere-definitely 
on a continent that had been portrayed as a strategic and economic bonanza. 
Prior to late 1946 some Americans who isolated themselves from the press 
might have been unfamiliar with either Byrd or the Antarctic itself. Thereafter, 
however, U.S. expeditions, the 1957-1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), and 
the Antarctic Conference itself gained an amount of publicity difficult to ignore. 
While reports might not have been carefully scrutinized, their essence was easily 
understood, and it led to the question of why "big America" not yet brought Little 
America-as the informal U.S. sector was known-under its legaljurisdiction.8 It 
6 As discussed hereafter, senators were more concerned with the treaty's inclusion of the USSR. 
7 FRUS, 1939, vol. 2, General (Washington: USGPO, 1956), 11-14; Cordell Hull to F.D. Roosevelt, 1 
August 1940; Patrick Hurley to C. Hull, 14 July 1942, BPRC, folders 1879, 1886. 
8 See The New York Times, 14 July 1956. 
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only seemed to be a matter oftime before the government would fulfill that objective, 
which it was known to have been under consideration for decades. 
The Department of State shared that hope but defined its "foremost" objective 
as removing the Soviet Union from Antarctica after the IGY and excluding it from 
any later agreement. The treaty signed in December 1959 substantiated that the 
government's approach had the opposite effect.9 While not relinquishing plans to 
forward a claim, it had hesitated to do so over the uncontested sector from 90° to 150° 
West, lest that be interpreted as forfeiting its right elsewhere, or based on its vast 
exploration, lest that antagonize the seven claimant nations. One of the perceived 
advantages of withholding a claim was to discourage the Soviet Union from 
responding with a counter-claim, 10 yet the risk persisted that it might announce a 
claim without any form of provocation. 11 
In January 1939 President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared that the Antarctic regions 
previously claimed by Byrd might be included in a sovereignty claim. He hesitated to 
propose one at the time due to the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which required claims to be 
based on occupation rather than discovery, but his words reflected that advisers 
through the government recognized the benefits of abandoning that criterion given the 
9 Department of State, Office oflnter-American Regional Political Affairs, Memorandum, 22 July 
1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. See Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary ofDefense (Forrestal), 
10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
10 See Department of State, Memorandum by Office oflnter-American Regional Political Affairs 
(Wilson), 22 July 1957; Assistant Secretary of State (Hill) to House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Gordon), [17 April 1957]; Department of State, Regional Planning Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs 
(Green), to Embassy in Tokyo (Horsey), 14 January 1958, in Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassies 
in Canberra and Wellington, 11February1958, CA-6914, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Secretary of State 
(Dulles) to Embassies in Buenos Aires, Canberra, London, Moscow, Oslo, Paris, Pretoria, Santiago and 
Wellington, 18November1957, no. 4572, NARA, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff. 
11 Department of State, Bureau oflnter-American Affairs to Secretary of State, 4 April 1958; House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (Engle) to Secretary of State (Dulles), 5 February 1957, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
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increasing need to secure access to natural resources. 12 Well-known German 
ambitions to that effect provided a further incentive to establish permanent bases in 
support of a U.S. claim. As such, Roosevelt had little difficulty persuading congress 
to fund Byrd's third expedition to the far south.13 
The admiral sought to avoid the impression of engaging in a race with 
Germany or any other nation, though that impression was difficult to avoid. 14 
Nineteen thirty-nine marked an upsurge of international competition to secure 
Antarctic rights. 15 The Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, were highly 
interested in the peninsular region located directly beneath them. Since they had not 
yet made formal sovereignty claims, they had not yet come into conflict with Britain, 
which claimed part of the peninsular region, but conflict was foreseeable. Not only 
were pro-German sentiments high in the Southern Cone nations; 16 Argentina 
explicitly rejected the Roosevelt administration's reference to the Monroe Doctrine as 
one rationale for the Byrd expedition. Like Chile it viewed the peninsular region as 
falling within the Western Hemisphere while denying that Latin America must accept 
U.S. leadership therein.17 
The Byrd expedition appeared to indicate that U.S. officials recognized the 
need to engage in long-range strategies to preserve their nation's high standard of 
living. 18 The fact that Antarctic's natural resources were untapped assumed greater 
12 Division of European Affairs to Office ofCounselor (Moore), 13 June 1939; Office ofCounselor 
(Moore) to President (Roosevelt), 14 June 1939; Department of Interior to Department of State 
(Cumming), 12 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
13 The New York Times, 12 January 1939, 3 June 1939. 
14 R.E. Byrd to Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Cumming), 15 July 1939, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014. 
15 Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946, NARA, 
RG 59, 800.014. 
16 For example, Embassy in Santiago (Bentinck) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 4 January 1938, PRO, 
BW42. 
17 See The New York Times, 25 July 1939. 
18 The Christian Science Monitor observed that government sponsorship of his third expedition 
revealed a healthy degree of susceptibility to the "lure of resources unknown," which as never before 
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importance than the questions of how soon technological advances might permit them 
to be exploited and whether serious controversy might emerge as that prospect drew 
near. 19 Moreover, self-interested exploration did not offend the United States' 
historical reluctance to engage in colonial practices. The continent was unpopulated 
and the seven nations which had announced or were preparing sovereignty 
claims-Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and 
Norway-were unable to agree among themselves on the most appropriate criteria for 
doing so. The Byrd expedition planned to establish three permanent bases to fulfill 
the criteria outlined by the Hughes Doctrine.20 
This was not the primary reason why the American public took heed of the 
expedition. Antarctica's geopolitical significance was comprehensible though hardly 
urgent compared to Europe where Germany's quest for natural resources was 
precipitating a major conflict. The Snow Cruiser provided Americans with a 
completely unique distraction from this issue. Designed by Dr. Thomas E. Poulter of 
the Armor Institute of Chicago, this vehicle weighed thirty-seven tons and used the 
largest rubber wheels ever produced, exceeding ten feet in diameter, which could be 
independently powered, steered, and hydraulically raised and lowered. Painted bright 
red with silver stripes extending the length of its 55-foot body, the Snow Cruiser was 
to "zigzag" effortlessly across the frozen tundra with a crew of four whose member 
was arousing public interest. The Christian Science Monitor, 29 July 1939. See Jason Kendall Moore, 
"Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-1949," Polar Record35, no. 
193 (1999): 125-34. 
19 See President to Secretary and Undersecretary of State, 28 July 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. The 
government was willing to consider means of placing a sector of the Antarctic under Pan American 
jurisdiction, though its immediate priority was to substantiate U.S. rights. FRUS 1939, 2: 9-10. 
2
° For years the Department of State had contemplated that a sovereignty claim would appeal to most 
citizens without provoking much controversy abroad. Department of State, Memorandum by Office of 
Historical Adviser (Boggs), 23 May 1930, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. See The New York Times, 15 July 
1939. 
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would sleep onboard.21 Poulter, a physicist who had previously accompanied Byrd to 
the Antarctic, had devised a means of surmounting the explorers' exclusive 
dependence on sled teams and camp sites.22 
En route from Chicago to Boston, where the expedition was preparing to 
depart, the Snow Cruiser drew tens of thousands of onlookers and hordes of 
journalists, followed by a truck which broadcast music to enhance the festive 
atmosphere.23 Its progress was not impressive. The "monstrous, Martian-like 
creature" caused numerous traffic jams, getting stuck at roadsides, on bridges and in 
the countryside-locations which seemed to pose little challenge compared to the vast 
Antarctic expanses which it was conquer.24 One disappointed young man remarked 
that he would rather take a old-fashioned tractor ifhe were in Byrd's place. He 
predicted, "That thing won't go far in the snow if it can't navigate sand."25 Poulter 
remained steadfast in his conviction that the tests which it had undergone, though 
limited, were sufficient to ensure that it would meet the challenges before it.26 He and 
the other crew members scoffed allegations to the contrary .27 
The Snow Cruiser's struggle to reach Boston in time for the expedition's 
departure was far more entertaining than the government's agenda to the lay the 
groundwork for a sovereignty claim. Aside from becoming stuck at several junctures, 
the vehicle reached a top speed of only ten miles per hour, less than half of its 
21Hobart Gazette, 26 October, 1939; Michigan City News-Dispatch, 26 October 1939; Gary Post-
Tribune, 26 October 1939; Life, 30October1939; The New York Times, 16 November 1939. 
22 See Hammond Times, 26 October 1939. 
23 LaPorte Herald-Argus, 26 October 1939; Hammond Times, 26 October 1939. 
24 Hobart Gazette, 26 October, 1939; Valparaiso Vidette-Messenger, 26 October 1939, 27 October 
1939; Hammond Times, 29 October 1939; Michigan City News-Dispatch, 30 October 1939; Chesterton 
Tribune, 2 November 1939; LaPorte Herald-Argus, 26 October 1939; Life, 13 November 1939; The 
Lima News, 23 January 2002. 
25 Valparaiso Vidette-Messenger, 26 October 1939; Hammond Times, 27 October 1939. 
26Michigan City News-Dispatch, 26 October 1939. 
27Gary Post-Tribune, 26 October 1939; Michigan City News-Dispatch, 27 October 1939; Hammond 
Times, 29October1939. 
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estimated capacity.28 It nonetheless did manage to reach Boston in time for North 
Star's departure while Byrd remained behind to depart with his own Bear of Oakland, 
the expedition's other vessel. While all 160 crew members would reach the frozen 
continent unscathed, the four who planned to cover more over 670,000 miles of 
territory with the Snow Cruiser never gained that opportunity.29 Their vehicle, though 
billed as a "monument to pioneering ingenuity,"30 overheated and proceeded to sink 
through the snow and from there to the bottom of the ocean.31 
While the dismal fate of the Snow Cruiser was left unpublicized, funds for the 
expedition threatened to be withheld due to allegations that Byrd was earning 
"fabulous sums" through commercial endorsements. Congressmen grew alarmed by 
reports that he had sold the rights for one company to promote its dog food in 
association with the expedition's sled teams.32 These reports were consistent with 
magazine stories which quoted Byrd as once having boasted, "I've put exploration 
into big business." It was well-known that his past sponsors had included John D. 
Rockefeller, Edsel Ford and others in whose honor he had named vessels, planes and 
newly discovered lands. His numerous exploration-based books were estimated to 
have earned over $1 million of which he had taken a high percentage in royalties. 
According to Reader's Digest, he was so profit-oriented that he had once considered 
returning with penguins to sell to zoos or any individuals who might be interested and 
willing to maintain them. 33 
28Life, 13 November 1939. 
29 See The New York Times, 15 July 1939, 16 November 1939. 
30 Dean R. Freitag and J. Stephen Dibben, "Dr. Poulter's Antarctic Snow Cruiser," Polar Record23, 
no. 143 (1986): 129-141. 
31Christian Science Monitor, 16 April 1998. 
32 R.E. Byrd to U.S. Maritime Commission (Mulroy), 28 September 1939; R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 
14 October 1940, BPRC, folders 2348, 1407. 
33 Reader's Digest, January 1940. Byrd was reported not to have profited directly from his 
explorations, although his 1935-1936 speaking engagements had earned approximately $190,000. 
Life, 30 October 1939. See Edwin P. Hoyt, The Last Explorer: The Adventures of Admiral Byrd (New 
York: The John Day Company, 1968), 71. 
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During the investigatory hearings officials testified that at present Byrd was 
engaged in no form of profiteering whatsoever-the company in question had not 
sought or received authorization, its only goal being to increase sales, not to provide 
an alternate means of subsidizing the mission or enriching Byrd. 34 Additional funds 
were provided thereafter to sustain a few dozen explorers left behind to maintain 
bases through mid-1941. Like Roosevelt, Byrd regretted that their well-being had 
been jeopardized for any reason, especially since he had drawn heavily from his own 
savings to cover the expedition's costs.35 He complained to his brother, Senator 
Harry F. Byrd, of having spent $50,000 to prepare Bear of Oakland for the 
expedition, yet still being subject to intense criticism if a single dollar of government 
funding were questionably dispersed. 36 
Despite ongoing skepticism about Byrd's integrity from some quarters, The 
New York Times wrote that the more serious issue pertained to the challenge his 
expedition was posing to those nations with standing or forthcoming claims to 
Antarctic territory. It noted that suddenly politics had joined the traditional scientific 
and adventurous motives for exploration.37 Newsweek surmised that Washington had 
to be more committed to the polar domain than suggested by the non-claimant 
policy. 38 No one more than Byrd hoped that this was the case, but he accepted that 
the resurgence of German interest in Antarctica was unlikely given the war in Europe, 
which trivialized the need to uphold, modify or abandon the Hughes Doctrine. 39 
34 See Department oflnterior, U.S. Antarctic Service, to Gaines Food Company, 13 January 1940, 
NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
35 FRUS1939, 2: 11-14; Alden Hatch, The Byrds of Virginia (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1969), 359; The New York Times, 7 July 1939, 5 March 1940, 6 April 1940; The Christian Science 
Monitor, 29 July 1939; Life, 30 October 1939; Reader's Digest, January 1940. 
36 R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 11August1939, BPRC, folder 43. 
37 The New York Times, 6August1939. 
38 Newsweek, 18 November 1940, 19 May 1941. 
39 R.E. Byrd to Secretary ofNavy, [May 1941], BPRC, folder 1410. 
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In November 1940, while the Byrd expedition was underway, Chile declared 
sovereignty over the Antarctic sector from 53° to 90° West. The U.S. Ambassador in 
Santiago reported that the government had acted merely to protect its interests rather 
than to antagonize the hemisphere's Good Neighbor.40 In fact Byrd was 
tremendously popular in Chile. Months earlier the government had given him a 
hero's reception in Valparaiso, and he had established a warm rapport with leading 
officials including the president and foreign affairs minister.41 The Department of 
State recognized that Byrd's personal charm was a tremendous diplomatic asset,42 an 
assertion echoed by U.S. officials as far as New Zealand.43 
The U.S. Antarctic Service, which President Roosevelt had created to permit 
Byrd to coordinate his agenda with cabinet-level officials,44 was disbanded after the 
1939-1941 expedition. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor abruptly and 
decisively re-ordered U.S. priorities, and Byrd played several important roles during 
the war, consistent with his status as a close friend of the president who was already 
decorated with every service medal which the government had to offer.45 Aside from 
helping to establish U.S. bases in the South Pacific and, at least once, flying a fighter 
aircraft over Germany,46 the admiral led efforts to reduce the overlapping 
responsibilities of the service branches. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy and General 
of the Army George C. Marshall commended his diligence, noting that he had been 
40Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 November 1940; Department of State, 
Memorandum by Undersecretary of State, 8 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
41 Claude Bowers to R.E. Byrd, 6 May 1940, BPRC, folder 865; The New York Times, 24 April 1940, 
26 April 1940. 
42 Cordell Hull to F.D. Roosevelt, 1August1940, BPRC, folder 1879. 
43 Patrick Hurley to C. Hull, 14 July 1942, BPRC, folder 1886. 
44 See FRUS 1939, 2: 7. 
45 F.D. Roosevelt to R.E. Byrd, 19 September 1940, BPRC, folder 1879. See The New York Times, 28 
September 1940. 
46 R.E. Byrd to ChiefofNaval Personnel, 10 May 1943, BPRC, folder 306; The New York Times, 4 
December 1944. 
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chosen because of his ability to generate trust among all parties, in addition to his 
expertise.47 
The Allied victory in World War Two left the United States in a strong 
position to influence the world at large and especially the Antarctic, where its 
activities carried virtually no risk of military retaliation. The unpopulated continent 
seemed ideal for testing weapons not already used against the Axis powers, and some 
observers interpreted this as a perfect opportunity to turn "swords into 
ploughshares."48 In early 1946 one retired serviceman gained headlines by proposing 
a variation of that theme-using atomic bombs to blast through the ice cap and gain 
access to otherwise inaccessible minerals. The commentary which this generated 
included an estimate that thirty million bombs as powerful as the one dropped on 
Hiroshima would be required-at the cost of $660 trillion or over two thousand times 
the national debt, and at the risk of flooding coastlines around the world.49 
There is no evidence that the government considered such ludicrous notion, 
though at the end of the year it aroused concern by announcing that Byrd would be 
leading a new expedition, Operation High Jump, which dwarfed the scope and 
objectives of all that had come before. The navy drew from the best of its ranks 
across the country, hand picking over four thousand scientists, technicians and 
managers for the most novel assignments of their careers. An anonymous officer told 
The New York Times that the operation was "highly strategic" in nature, as the 
military establishment had come to view the far south as a primary component of its 
global strategy.50 Since the first priority was gaining access to new sources of atomic 
energy, photographers were hopeful of documenting evidence of fissionable 
47 W.D. Leahy, G.C. Marshall and E.J. King to R.E. Byrd, 15 December 1944, BPRC, folder 2205. 
48 Thomas R. Henry, The White Continent: The Story of Antarctica (New York: William Sloane 
Associates, 1950), ix. 
49 The New York Times, 31January1946, 2 February 1946, 10 February 1946. 
50 The New York Times, 9 November 1946. 
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materials. Time observed that High Jump's military orientation tarnished its scientific 
credibility, and The New Republic more simply declared the beginning of an 
international race for uranium.51 
The Department of State carefully briefed Byrd on the need to publicize the 
expedition's scientific ends, but its effort was gratuitous. The admiral was a highly 
decorated figure who had proved his effectiveness collaborating with top officials, not 
least of all regarding propaganda for his previous expeditions. He repeated the 
diplomatic agenda to his operational commander, Richard H. Cruzen, who fully 
concurred with the need to avoid incriminating press leaks. 52 The Department of 
State complicated its public relations task by failing to engage in any thorough 
investigation of the bases for other nations' claims, and which bases, aside from 
permanent or semi-permanent occupation, might be chosen by the United States. This 
put Byrd in a difficult position, since there ten reporters were accompanying 
Operation High Jump and he, unlike diplomatic officials, could not respond tersely to 
their question and send them home. 53 
When High Jump started back to the United States, Newsweek noted the 
peculiarity of the navy's silence regarding mineral wealth, the expectation of which 
had lent Antarctica a distinctly Cinderella-like quality.54 High Jump had produced no 
evidence ofuranium,55 yet policymakers were not shaken in their beliefthat the quest 
for natural resources, especially those of strategic value, warranted a prolonged effort. 
Byrd privately disdained the nation's "reckless" consumerism, which in his view, like 
51 Time, 18 November 1946; The New Republic, 18 November 1946. 
52 R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 12 August 1946, BPRC, folder 1412. See Newsweek, 2 December 1946; 
Hatch, The Byrds of Virginia, 373. 
53 R.E. Byrd to ChiefofNaval Operations, 15 April 1947, BPRC, folder 7295; Department of State, 
Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 12 November 1946; 
Department of State, Memorandum by Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 11 February 
1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; The New York Times, 8 January 1947. 
54 Newsweek, 10 March 1947; Travel, January 1947. 
55 Department of State, Division ofNorthem European Affairs and Division ofNorth and West Coast 
Affairs to Office of European Affairs et al., 8 September 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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that of the government, had started to deplete its mineral and oil reserves. He 
counseled an official claim for this reason, among others, but was dependable in 
following orders inconsistent with his own beliefs and the public record thereof. 56 In 
an obviously scripted press conference upon his return to the United States, Byrd 
denied ever having supported a formal sovereignty claim and insisted that Antarctica 
was of no strategic importance. His second-in-command, Admiral Richard H. 
Cruzen, played devil's advocate, reflecting on the lessons of Alaska. 57 
That widely criticized territorial purchase, for a sum that yielded a much 
greater return in natural resources, allowed the U.S. Navy to present its diversion of 
manpower to the Antarctic as a long-term investment. Cruzen's position was not only 
logical; it revived one of the central issues raised to urge congressional funding of the 
1939-1941 expedition. The New York Times had analyzed countless issues in the 
intervening six years, so many that it did not pause to review its own coverage of the 
previous appropriations debate. With each argument Cruzen employed against Byrd, 
he better qualified as the senior officer's heir apparent. His contention that defending 
the mainland someday might summon the needs to defend the South Pole resurrected 
Byrd's earlier appeals to the Monroe Doctrine.58 For some reason, angst in the 
Department of State that Byrd's statements might contradict official 
policy-whichever direction this might take-did not extend to self-contradictory 
statements made at the government's urging. 59 The government might have intended 
56 R.E. Byrd, Undated Report for Chief of Naval Operations, [circa 194 7], BPRC, folder 7296; FR US 
1948, vol. 1, part 2, General (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 962. 
57 The New York Times, 15 April 1947; New York Herald Tribune, 15 April 1947. For a similar 
reference to Alaska, see Christian Science Monitor Magazine, 29 July 1939. 
58 See The New York Times, 12 January 1939, 8 July 1939, 5 March 1940, 9 February 1947. 
59 Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of 
State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, Office of American Republic Affairs, 
Memoranda on Chile. 
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the press conference to stimulate a national debate or, even more likely, to generate 
public confusion resulting in a useful degree of apathy toward national rights. 
The non-claimant policy persisted despite reports of government plans to 
forward rights in the wake of High Jump.60 Newsweek did not criticize the U.S. 
Navy's failure to state a clear political intention, as this transcended the role of the 
armed services, but it did regret that Washington appeared to be ignoring the 
obvious-that whatever riches might lie beneath it, the Antarctic merited a claim.61 
Travel bluntly alleged that officials were failing to seize the opportunity before 
them.62 His public statements notwithstanding, Byrd shared a more desperate variety 
of this perspective. Securing Antarctica as a base for cold-weather training exercises 
was imperative to narrow the advantage held by the USSR in this arena, lest it 
precipitate an invasion of Alaska or Greenland.63 While he might have been 
encouraged by the tone of some j oumalists, he forecasted a national scandal if his 
security assessment were made known. 64 
The admiral refrained from publicizing the issues that personally distraught 
him, insofar as they related to his perception of the national good, for such behavior 
would have been injurious to the chain of command, civil-military relations and his 
own future. From close involvement with the Roosevelt administration and ongoing 
feedback from his brother in the senate, he appreciated that rumors and press leaks 
could be counterproductive. He discounted this effect in regard to the navy's support 
for High Jump II, since he and the top echelon of the first operation both shared 
60 The New York Times, 6 January 1947. 
61 Newsweek, 10 March 1947. 
62 Travel, January 194 7. 
63 Prospective Commander of High Jump II (Byrd) to Secretary of Defense, 29 August 1949, in Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, JCS 2070, 30September1949, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File. 
64 R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 28 September 1949, BPRC, folder 50. 
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enthusiasm for it and had received informal endorsements from many sectors.65 The 
later cancellation infuriated him most of all because of the false promises made by 
officials throughout the administration. The public explanation citing economics 
heightened his outrage since the navy confidentially admitted its falsehood. While he 
dwelled on a conspiracy involving the Department of Defense and the White House, 
his brother commiserated that the expedition had more than adequate popular and 
congressional support. 66 
L.A. Rose provides an insightful portrait of Byrd in the wake of his Assault on 
Eternity via Operation High Jump, which set that set the standard for modem 
exploration. To an extent the admiral did react "like a jilted lover" to the cancellation 
of High Jump II, but much of his contempt for those who postponed his "South Polar 
dreams," as Rose refers tothem, related to the improbability that Washington would 
advance a sovereignty claim until another expedition were underway. His dreams 
were not those of a small-minded egoist but rather those of a someone whose dearest 
vision was being neglected due to issues such as more frugal opportunities for cold-
weather training in the Arctic. If, as Rose contends, his character was extraordinarily 
complex, the same could be observed of the U.S. role in the world during this period, 
when many far-reaching commitments strained the government's time and 
resources.
67 Byrd's desire to place Antarctica among these commitments was unduly 
optimistic rather than complex. 
Operation High Jump had begun to entangle the United States in a sovereignty 
dispute which by 1948 bore evidence of intractability. Efforts by Byrd to promulgate 
65 R.E. Byrd to Paul Siple, 13 August 1948; R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 6 October 1949, folder 1412; 
R.H. Cruzen to Byrd, 28 June 1949, BPRC, folders 812, 1412. 
66 R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, folder 33; H.F. Byrd to R.E. Byrd, 30 September 1949, 
BPRC, folders 33, 50. See Washington Time Herald, 26 August 1949. 
67 See L.A. Rose, Assault on Eternity: Richard E. Byrd and the Exploration of Antarctica, 1946-47 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 252-53. See Peter Beck, The International Politics of 
Antarctica (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 41. 
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the neutrality of his government had little chance of success and virtually none of 
leading the Southern Cone nations and Britain to refrain from pressing their 
contradictory rights. The admiral refused to accept that High Jump II would have 
exacerbated the three-sided dispute. There was "no reason whatsoever," he believed, 
to hold another expedition hostage to international relations,68 yet events involving 
Deception Island suggested that the Truman administration's restraint was well-
justified. Not only did the island's name aptly convey the spirit of mistrust; its natural 
harbor and strategic location were ideal, causing the British to regard it as the "key" to 
the Falkland or Malvinas Dependencies.69 
Washington viewed non-claimancy as the best means of distancing itself from 
this controversy, but the alternative, while offering no panacea, might have helped to 
forestall the naval displays of 1948. That is, the announcement of U.S. rights over the 
archipelago in question might have deterred Britain from dispatching the battle cruiser 
Nigeria to rebuke the Southern Cone nations' ambitions. London had sought to 
involve the International Court of Justice, only to have Santiago and Buenos Aires 
insist that their rights were beyond The Hague's jurisdiction. Their counterproposal 
to meet in Argentina incurred a British rejection for approximately the same reason: 
each power sought a venue perceived to be in its favor.70 As Nigeria headed south 
with plans to join Snipe at Deception Island, 71 Argentina sent two cruisers and six 
torpedo boats for operations in Tierra del Fuego, and President Gabriel Gonzalez 
68 R.E. Byrd to A.W. Radford, 7 September 1949, BPRC, folder 2799. 
69 Colonial Office (Eastwood) to Ministry of Food (Feavearyear), 17 May 1950, in Colonial Office to 
Foreign Office, American Department, no. 88442/1/50, A 15225/3, 17 May 1950, PRO, FO 371/81139. 
See Vivian Fuchs, Of Ice and Men: The Story of the British Antarctic Survey 1943-73 (Oswestry, 
Shropshire: Anthony Nelson, 1982). 
70 See Oliver Holmes, "Antarctic Claims Raise Colonial Issue in Americas," Foreign Policy Bulletin 39 
(1960), 180-81. 
71 Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 604, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
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Videla personally led a mission to assert Chile's presence in what it called Tierra 
O'Higgins.72 
This situation appeared to confirm the prediction by The New Republic of a 
"dog-eat-dog context to grab land and squabble over bases."73 Walter Sullivan 
insinuated that the strategic position of U.S. icebreakers at Marguerite Bay was no 
coincidence, 74 but periodicals generally trivialized the developments. For example, 
Time and Newsweek noted that British and Argentine crews maintained sufficiently 
cordial relations when docked at Deception Island to hold soccer matches, their only 
point of contention being which side should be regarded as the home team.75 The 
engaging tenor of these reports sided with British perceptions that the current incident 
was little more than a comic operetta. While the Nigeria standoff aroused the appetite 
but not the enterprise for blood-letting,76 questions of national prestige were 
motivating officials to engage in activities which were dangerously unproductive.77 
The Nigeria incident somewhat tempered the anger which Byrd felt over the 
cancellation of Operation High Jump II. As a veteran military strategist, he grasped 
that his own endeavors were less important than the need for harmony among 
Washington's Cold War allies. The Department of State months later proposed a 
condominium arrangement with the seven claimant nations to deter possible Soviet 
advances. The claimants were amenable to this objective but recoiled at the price at 
which it was to be achieved: the renunciation of their sovereignty rights. While the 
Southern Cone nations and Britain were least willing to entertain this, given their 
72 The New York Times, 10 February 1948, 19 February 1948. 
73 The New Republic, 18 November 1946. 
74 The New York Times, 22 February 1948. 
75 Time, I March 1948; Newsweek, 1 March 1948. 
76 See Paul Siple, 90° South: The Story of the American South Pole Conquest (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1959), 83. 
77 See Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, 27 February 1948, A-480, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
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nationalistic sentiments, Chile refused to be perceived as a spoiler. It responded with 
the Escudero Plan to postpone debate over conflicting claims for five to tend years 
during which the other aspects of a condominium could be negotiated.78 This 
alternative seemed reasonable on its own terms but had no mitigating effect on 
Anglo-American disquietude over the harsh rhetoric and increasing solidarity of the 
Southern Cone nations. 79 
In June 1950 the Soviet Union insisted that no final decisions should be made 
without its participation, and it alluded to the 1819-1821 Bellingshausen expedition 
as a possible basis for its own sovereignty claim. The Department of State withheld 
any response to the USSR, augmenting its non-recognition, non-claimant policy with 
non-communication. 80 Byrd, who publicized his dread of Soviet encroachment in the 
far south, also publicized his resolve to lead another expedition after the Korean War. 
He appreciated that the government had chosen silence as the best means to avoid 
provoking a Soviet claim or expedition, yet in his view it was equally necessary to 
maintain an active U.S. presence. As the case for Operation High Jump II, his 
enthusiasm was rebuffed, the navy flatly denying that it had any plans for another 
Byrd expedition.81 
One of the few recent patterns in which officials could take solace was the 
abeyance of further Nigeria incidents. The corresponding window of opportunity to 
reach some kind of agreement, eight-power or otherwise, began to close in February 
1952 when Argentine soldiers prevented a team of British geologists from 
78 See Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg." 
79 The New York Times, 24 February 1948; Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and 
Northern European Affairs (Hulley) to Office ofNorth and West Coast Affairs (Mills), 4 January 1950; 
Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) et al., 16 
January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Foreign Office Minute, 19 February 1953, no. 83, PRO, FO 
371. 
80 Embassy in Moscow (Kirk) to Department of State, 20 July 1950, no. 177, control 8747, NARA, RG 
59, 702.022; Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, 20 July 1950, PRO, FO 463. 
81 The New York Times, 24 November 1951. 
195 
disembarking at Hope Bay in the Antarctic peninsula.82 Intensive Anglo-American 
negotiations suspended conflict only until the next February when British personnel 
dismantled small Argentine and Chilean bases on Deception Island.83 The U.S. Navy 
had been nowhere in the vicinity, yet Latin Americans fumed that Washington denied 
the applicability of its hemispheric defense commitments. 84 With the re-emergence of 
this issue, the opportunity for barring Soviet participation passed, straining relations 
among the four powers well beyond hope for a condominium arrangement. No one 
lamented this more than Byrd, who stalwartly questioned the benefits of withholding 
an official claim. 85 
During this interlude one self-motivated citizen, Elizabeth A. Kendall, 
appealed for the government to do "something constructive and progressive." She 
chastized its allegiance to the Hughes Doctrine, as occupation was a highly uninviting 
prospect even when so much was at stake. Antarctica's untapped mineral resources, 
she ventured, might be sufficient to ignite a war-as both the United States and 
Britain recognized after the Deception Island incident. 86 Kendall held that 
formalizing a U.S. claim would be the best means of postponing that risk until further 
exploration could justify or deny the need to field a military deterrent. Senators had 
been responsive to her recommendation for Moscow to waive its "shadowy claims" as 
a settlement for its wartime debt, and the committee for public works urged 
82 The New York Times, 3 February 1952. See Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, 34-35; 
David Winston Heron, "Antarctic Claims," Foreign Affairs 32 (1954), 661-67. 
83 Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Department of State, 23 February 1953, no. 1067, NARA, RG 
59, 702.022; Colonial Office (Harrison) to Foreign Office (Garvey), 26 March 1953, A 15212/196, 
PRO, FO 371. 
84 Department of State, Office of European Affairs to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, NARA, RG 
59, 800.014; Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to Embassy in London, 10 April 1953, A-1362, NARA, 
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85 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern 
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reconsideration of this altemative.s7 The Department of State held firm in opposition 
to this tack or any other proactive stance to defend U.S. Antarctic rights.ss Events 
soon outpaced whatever influence Kendall or Byrd might have exerted. 
In late 1954 President Dwight D. Eisenhower orderedAtka to the region west 
of the Antarctic peninsula, just beyond the unclaimed sector from 90° to 150° West. 
Its purpose was to investigate the forthcoming U.S. contribution to the 1957-1958 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) announced by the United Nations. The New 
York Times referred to this as "blood-tingling news" for Americans who had been 
deprived of vicarious adventure since Operation High Jump. While acknowledging 
that the National Security Council had sanctioned the voyage for strategic reasons, the 
editors permitted themselves a bit of exuberance since Antarctica was still "the last 
frontier." By including the Soviet Union among the dozens of nations to collect 
scientific data worldwide, and specifically among those to be active on the white 
continent, the IGY fulfilled a cycle in the service of Atka, which had been part of 
lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.s9 A broader interpretation unsettled those sectors 
of the government and populace intent on stemming the tide of communism; 
Antarctica, before the announcement of the IGY, had been an ideal location for 
attaining this goal. 
Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, Antarctic advisor to the Department of State, 
referred to a "gentleman's agreement" to avoid political controversy during 
preparations for the IGY and the 18-month period itself.90 That held in action but not 
87 Senate Committee on Public Works (Case) to Assistant Secretary of State (McFall), 10 February 
1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
88 Assistant Secretary of State (McFall) to Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
(Connally), [20 July 1950], NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
89 The New York Times, 5 October 1954, 29 November 1954. See John H. Roscoe, "Exploring 
Antarctica Vicariously: A Survey of Recent Literature," Geographical Review 48, no. 3 (1958): 406-
27. 
90 Paul C. Daniels, "The Antarctic Treaty," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., Frozen 
Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 31-45. 
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in spirit, as reports envisioned the final destiny of Antarctica as a U.S., British or joint 
Anglo-American zone for nuclear tests.91 Walter Sullivan leveraged his credibility as 
science editor of The New York Times in favor of this idea, as the continent had no 
indigenous human population and relatively few species of plants and animals. This 
purpose, he wrote, was consistent with the navy's diversion of eighteen hundred 
sailor, seven vessels and an air squadron to Operation Deep Freeze I in the 1955-1956 
season. 92 Navy spokesmen made no implication of having this purpose, but they did 
allude to the possibility of a forthcoming claim, as Deep Freeze I planned to act on the 
16-year-old objective to establish permanent bases.93 
Byrd was pleased by another opportunity for command after the cancellation 
of High Jump II, but quite displeased that the Soviet Union was among the nations 
that the IGY had called to duty in the far south-along with the seven claimant 
nations, Belgium, Japan and South Africa. The admiral shared the concern of the 
National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff that the twelve-nation plan to 
establish nearly sixty outposts threatened to erode the basis for a U.S. claim.94 Before 
and after he arrived in Antarctica, Byrd remarked that until Washington acted he 
would have to consider Little America his personal property.95 Good humor helped to 
conceal his anxiety over the government's failure to recognize the claims that he had 
made on its behalf with encouragement from the Department of State. Each day he 
was growing more prone to accept the perspective of Elizabeth A. Kendall, who 
91 For example, Embassy in Santiago (Sanders) to Department of State, 14 March 1955, no. 645, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
92 The New York Times, 26 October 1954, 3 April 1955, 21December1955. 
93 The New York Times, 3 November 1955. 
94 Joint Chiefs ofStaff(Cams), Memorandum for the ChiefofNaval Operations, 14 January 1955, SM-
29-55; Joint Chiefs ofStaff(Hillyard), Memorandum for Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, 3 April 
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excoriated non-claimancy as an insult to all U.S. Antarctic explorers, past and 
present.96 
British officials in Washington believed that Antarctica had no immediate 
strategic value, as Byrd had stated after High Jump, but warned, in keeping with his 
true opinion, "Things change very fast in the world."97 The number of origin of bases 
under construction attested to this, as did the ability of the government to invest $250 
million in the IGY without encountering much opposition in congress.98 Over the 
months of illness before his death in March 1957, Byrd had the opportunity to witness 
his own five Antarctic expeditions being continued by George Dufek, commander of 
the remaining Operations Deep Freeze, which would implement a sustainable U.S. 
presence. The New York Times attributed this presence to a single factor-that Byrd 
had driven "the opening wedges and planted the American flag."99 As there could be 
no doubt of the admiral's significance, there could be no assurance that the 
government would recognize it as fully as he had hoped. 
Later in the year, congressional interest reached an unprecedented level 
prompting six representatives to visit the continent to keep abreast of scientific 
breakthroughs surrounding the IGY, as well as the political climate and its bearing on 
U.S. policy. One congressman coupled a decades-old assertion of the region's 
strategic value with a new hope that it also might become a popular tourist 
destination. While tourist destinations also could be strategic-Paris, for 
example-the congressman's statement revealed tension between military and utopian 
objectives. The House Foreign Commerce Committee recommended a course 
beneficial to either set of objectives: abdicating the Hughes Doctrine and making a 
96 See FRUS 1939, 2: 11-14; E.A. Kendall to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 17 July 1950. 
97 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political 
Affairs (Wilson), 20 September 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
98 See National Geographic Magazine, October 1959. 
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sovereignty claim. One senator, eager to carry this initiative further, called for 
prohibiting the construction of Soviet bases, and his attitude was gaining popularity in 
congress. 100 
There was every sign that the IGY would accompany a major political 
development, and it did in March 1958 when the Department of State circulated a 
second internationalization proposal. In permitting the retention of sovereign rights 
but denying their enforcement, the proposal became an acceptable basis for 
Washington to host negotiations with the eleven other IGY nations active in the far 
south.101 Chile had drafted the political moratorium a decade years earlier as a means 
of excluding the USSR, 102 so its application now was less than ideal. Lamenting that 
the United States had allowed the Soviet Union to participate in the IGY, The 
Christian Century bleakly summarized, "Beggars can't be choosers" while American 
Mercury elaborated, "We're losing the Antarctic."103 Kendall, who for years had kept 
the government informed of her disgust for the non-claimant policy, now berated the 
government for its readiness to "hand away rich territory" for the sake of a few 
idealistic scientists. 104 
This lone citizen activist had followed the press carefully, read and reread 
official statements, and found nothing to allay her concern that no action was being 
taken to protect U.S. rights. She noted the irony that the government was investing 
heavily in radar systems for the north polar vicinity while opening the south to the 
100 The New York Times, 1November1957, 29 November 1957, 14 February 1958, 17 February 1958; 
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102 See Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1948, no. 495, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014. 
103 The Christian Century, 25 June 1958; American Mercury, November 1958. 
104 E.A. Kendall to Committees and Individual Members of Congress, 16 November 1958, in Senate 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (Dworshak) to Assistant Secretary of State (Macomber), 16 
September 1959; E.A. Kendall to Secretary of State (Herter), 8 December 1958, NARA, RG 59, 
399.929. 
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communist enemy. While apparently unconcerned that the British presence in the 
Falkland Dependencies perturbed the other American republics, she questioned why 
the Rio Treaty was not being invoked if only to exclude the Soviet Union. In short 
she viewed internationalization as a concept better suited for Mars than for Earth, a 
planet brimming with weapons of mass destruction and divided by superpowers 
willing to use them. She pleaded for officials to be "realistic" and deal with 
establishing "concrete sovereignty" rather than adhering to the non-claimant policy 
that in her well-informed opinion marked "a complete reversal of thrift, common 
sense [and] wisdom."105 
In October 1959, the informal twelve-power negotiations evolved into the 
Antarctic Conference held in Washington. This major event opened with an address 
conveying wonderment that more was known about the bright side of the moon than 
about the Antarctic interior. This foretold of what Kendall had dreaded: the frozen 
continent would be dealt with like an extra-terrestrial body, not a realm in which U.S. 
rights stretched back to the 1820-1821 voyage ofNathaniel Palmer. While Time 
correctly predicted ~ treaty maintaining the political status quo, its reference to the 
friendly atmosphere of the conference was not entirely accurate. 106 Passionate debate 
emerged over a long-denied U.S. scheme to use the continent as a testing ground for 
nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation faced strenuous opposition from an unlikely 
coalition between the Southern Hemisphere nations and the Soviet Union. In the end 
it yielded, lest the conference dissolve and thereby rob the United States of the 
105 Ibid.; E.A. Kendall to Appropriations Committee and Individual Members of Congress, 11 
September 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
106 Time, 26 October 1959. 
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international prestige which officials had prioritized over more tangible, historically 
based objectives. 107 
The Antarctic Treaty, signed in December 1959, equally compromised the 
ambitions of the twelve signatory nations by leaving sovereignty claims in place but 
denying their enforcement. That provision removed the most serious impediment to 
unlimited technical cooperation. Peter Briggs describes the treaty as laying the 
harmonious foundation for a laboratory at the bottom of the world or, as Richard S. 
Lewis puts it, devoting a continent to science. 108 These impressive themes dominated 
headlines of the era, replacing skepticism toward the U.S. non-claimant policy. 
Between one and five thousand personnel now occupied Antarctic year-round, 109 with 
more likely to follow given the treaty's liberal accession clause and increasing 
expeditions by the original signatories. Lewis naturally conveys enthusiasm for the 
treaty's scientific implications, but notes that the conference leading to it might never 
have occurred but for the unfeasibility of resource exploitation. 110 
A great ideal had been achieved under many questionable pretences. For the 
other treaty signatories the most questionable of these had involved the U.S. non-
claimant policy, which seemed to guise an un-stated agenda. Fortunately the 
Department of State had imposed a veil of secrecy over the conference to prevent 
issues such as nuclear testing from igniting protests abroad,111 and the U.S. delegation 
107 See Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 604, NARA, RG 59, 
800.014; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office ofUnited Nations Political and 
Security Affairs (DePalma), 5 March 1956; Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of 
State (Owen), Notes for National Security Council Briefing, 9 December 1959, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022; U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary 
of State (Merchant), 17November1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. See The New York Times, 3 March 
1955. 
108 Peter Briggs, Laboratory at the Bottom of the World (New York: D. McKay Company, 1970); 1970; 
Lewis, A Continent for Science. 
109 Lewis and Smith, Frozen Future, x. 
110 Lewis, A Continent for Science, 282. See Walter Sullivan, "Antarctica in a Two-Power World," 
Foreign Affairs 36 (1957), 154-66. 
m See Daniels, "The Antarctic Treaty." 
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had been willing to compromise. At the same time, the government had committed a 
strategic lapse in not taking measures to encourage the treaty's ratification. One 
senator denounced the outcome as marking a "dismal end to one of the brightest, 
proudest chapters of American history."112 He and twenty-one of his colleagues saw 
no evidence of the superb foresight that America attributed to the United States. 113 
Instead, they saw evidence of what Kendall referred to as a "free-for-all" that 
benefited Moscow while disgracing past and present U.S. explorers.114 
In the lag of U.S. exploration following Operation High Jump, The New York Times 
jested that Byrd had chosen to renew the theme of untapped mineral wealth to justify 
his lust for adventure. 115 Indeed the spirit of the 63-year-old admiral hearkened to 
earlier decades when he was an Annapolis cadet known for his thrill-seeking 
impulse. 116 Once he had invited a long-time friend to accompany him on a treasure 
hunt in Nova Scotia "just for the fun of the thing."117 By that standard the Antarctic 
offered still greater rewards and diversion. In pursuit of these objectives he 
simultaneously grew convinced of the imperative to forward national rights and aged 
into a grandfatherly figure who personified U.S. Antarctic exploration. One fellow 
aeronautics enthusiast put it more forcefully that he had become a model 
"representative of the people," though he had neither been elected nor appointed to a 
diplomatic post. 118 
112 Time, 22 August 1960. 
113 See America, 27 August 1960. 
114 E.A. Kendall to Committees and Individual Members of Congress, 16 November 1958. 
115 The New York Times, 25 November 1951. 
116 Reader's Digest, January 1940. The New York Times once referred to Byrd's "penchant for hunting 
out trouble and getting away from it with a whole skin," such as when "he flew thirty-five miles behind 
enemy lines in a P-38 with flak bursting around him' and then dropped low to observe "hundreds of 
German infantrymen taking pot-shots at him from the ground." The New York Times, 4 December 
1944. 
117 R.E. Byrd to R.B. Fosdick, 7 May 1932, BPRC, folder 1649. 
118 J.E. Mooney to R.E. Byrd, 2 June 1941, BPRC, folder 2272. 
203 
A ware that he would be heading south again, as commander of Operation 
Deep Freeze I, his blood must have tingled as journalists' did in vicarious 
expectation. 119 He expressed satisfaction that his Antarctic endeavors were 
generating more favorable press than his earlier ones in the Arctic.120 This 
understatement corresponded to his occasional discomfort with having others regard 
him as a celebrity-presumably more because of the attention it drew to his personal 
affairs rather than any aversion to praise. 121 In one protest of what he regarded as 
inaccurate coverage, he acknowledged his over-sensitivity to criticism. 122 This 
tendency, however, did not cause him to shy from public involvement, for between 
expeditions he made nationwide speaking tours and participated in broadcasts devoted 
to Cold War themes. 123 He was not simply the best-known explorer of the era. 124 He 
was an individual known by his unusually multifaceted associations. 
In his later years, Byrd might have underestimated his popularity, concerned 
by the re-emergence of indictments directed against his character and business 
ventures, which had declined substantially by the time of Operation High Jump. So 
too he might have questioned the responsiveness of the public to his instigation of a 
pro-claimant lobby. While this form of activism would have violated his chain-of-
command orientation as a naval officer, his confidence in elected and appointed 
officials had begun to falter over the years that they ignored him or made false 
promises. Operation Deep Freeze I to some extent counteracted what he referred to as 
119 See The New York Times, 5 October 1954. 
120 R.E. Byrd to National Defense Committee, 5 October 1954, BPRC, folder 2223. 
121 R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 26 October 1939; R.E. Byrd to G.P. Putnam's Sons, 18 March 1941, 
BPRC, folders 43, 1699. 
122 R.E. Byrd to United Press Associates, 9 May 1947, BPRC, folder 2793. 
123 R.E. Byrd to R. Parker, 13 November 1947; R.E. Byrd to O.K. Armstrong, 28 February 1949, 
BPRC, folders 2173, 1079. 
124 Time, 18 November 1946, 31December1956; The Christian Science Monitor, 29 July 1939; Rose, 
Assault on eternity, 18 
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his "martyrdom complex,"125 but his gloom over the government's devotion to the 
Hughes Doctrine must have consolidated after his last command. He knew of the 
forthcoming IGY and might have presumed that, ifthe government failed to reverse 
its stance beforehand, it was extremely unlikely to do so while cooperating in the field 
with eleven other powers. 
Once retired from active duty after Operation High Jump, 126 Byrd might have 
considered himself justified in taking advantage of his widespread popularity to speak 
as a private citizen and urge his fellow Americans to abandon the outdated Hughes 
Doctrine. It is difficult to believe, given his stature and the mood of the press, that 
such an effort would have failed. It is less difficult to appreciate his hesitation since, 
by leading a grassroots movement, he would have lost credibility among most 
officials and risked besmirching his legacy. A few more years of good health might 
have eroded his inhibition to re-enter the realm of domestic politics on his own terms 
instead of as an unflagging lobbyist for the Roosevelt administration. 127 In any case 
his death at the crucial juncture of 1957 deprived the United States of a resource at 
once symbolic and practical, unlike the nation's Antarctic policy. 
Howard J. Wiarda write that culture filters, shapes and mediates all human 
responses, which in turn can vary greatly among individuals who shared the same 
universal goal. He links the complexity of measuring cultural influence on policy to 
how socio-economic factors lead different groups to incompatible viewpoints. 128 
While his perspective resounds with self-evident clarity germane to most issues, it is 
not applicable to widespread dissatisfaction regarding U.S. non-claimancy. For 
1 ~5 R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, BPRC, folder 33. 
126 The New York Times, 23 February 1948. 
127 See Text of Radio Address by R.E. Byrd on Columbia Broadcasting Service, 12 November 1937; 
R.E. Byrd to F .D. Roosevelt, 18 March 1941; Text of Speech by R.E. Byrd at Madison Square Garden, 
New York City, 18 August 1941, BPRC, folders 3503, 2902. 
128 Howard J. Wiarda, The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Transition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 2-3. 
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Americans, the Antarctic was a novel abstraction unrelated to their civil liberties or 
personal standard of living. Its mineral wealth, which might have benefited all 
Americans, ended up benefiting none. The least troubling aspect of this outcome was 
its equitability, as also the case regarding a sovereignty claim. Any loss or gain was 
so far removed from the daily routine of citizens that a majority could either tolerate 
or welcome Antarctica's apparent exemptions from power politics.129 
With some form of public encouragement, it remains likely that many would 
have joined the indefatigable crusade waged by Elizabeth A. Kendall. Her 
biography-unfortunately not to be found among her letters preserved among 
Department of State papers-might or might not have been as intriguing as the readily 
available accounts of Byrd's life. She remains invaluable for this chapter. With her 
assistance, perhaps the Antarctic Colony Associates would have received government 
assistance, as requested, to maintain a U.S. presence in Antarctica consistent with the 
Hughes Doctrine.130 Instead the Department of State responded without a trace of 
encouragement, 131 and the state of Florida witnessed the demise of one of its most 
eccentric not-for-profit organizations. 132 
The eight votes by which the Antarctic Treaty won ratification certainly might 
have been swayed by influences other than Byrd, although his popularity and 
convictions made him the leading candidate to become an exponent of U.S. Antarctic 
nationalism. There is no record of the slogan "Little America for the Little 
129 See Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic 
History 3 (1979), 115-28. 
130 Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse), to Secretary of State (Acheson), 7 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 
702.022. 
131 Department of State, Division ofNorth and West Coast Affairs (Hulley), to Antarctic Colony 
Associates (Krouse), 7 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
132 Sheldon W. Boggs, who had drafted the 1948 U.S. internationalization proposal, was impressed by 
that Associates' detailed proposal which made "more sense than I thought possible from such a 
seemingly fantastic enterprise." Department of State, Office oflntelligence Research (S.W. Boggs) to 
Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Hulley), 27 September 1950, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
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Americans" ever having gained currency, yet traces of that sentiment were 
perceptible. The Department of State hoped to stifle it since the U.S. policymaking 
tack required tremendous flexibility. Analysts are bound to disagree over the wisdom 
of that approach, and it should be hoped that they will disagree over the relevancy of 
pro-claimant opinion. The likes of Kendall and George D. Krouse, founder of the 
Antarctic Colony Association, deserve the attention-whether as biographical 
subjects in their own right or as neglected components of geopolitical maneuvering. 
As posited by The Times [London] indices, journalism is an indispensable tool 
for understanding any nation's history, and herein it has demonstrated that U.S. 
reporters shared Byrd's common sense pertaining to the Antarctic. They also 
displayed ample insight pertaining to the region's geopolitical implications. Those 
affiliated with The New York Times wrote with eloquence deserving of front-page 
column space, which it frequently gained. Walter Sullivan is a particularly engaging 
figure for historians. Through his newspaper reports and more academic literature, he 
affirmed that journalists can fulfill their professional duties, such as meeting a 
reasonable standard of objectivity, without having to conceal their sense of 
patriotism. 133 
At times Sullivan and his colleagues Bernard Kalb, Edward A. Morrow and 
C.L. Sulzberger did engage in what David Broder refers to as "imaginative exercises" 
which can mislead the public either intentionally or due to the non-availability of 
pertinent information. 134 They nonetheless provided a useful and generally accurate 
overview of the foreign policy agendas harbored by the superpowers and claimant 
nations. Alarmist speculation regarding Chile and Argentina emerged, but did not 
133 See Sullivan, "Antarctica in a Two-Power World"; Sullivan, Quest for a Continent (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957); Ted Galen Carpenter, The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises 
and the First Amendment (Washington: Cato Institute, 1995), vii. 
134 David S. Broder, Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News is Made (New York: 
Simon and Shuster, 1987), 94. 
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provide an effective segue for explaining U.S. non-claimancy.135 Journalists deserved 
credit for simply predicting or encouraging a policy reversal rather than misplacing 
blame that it never occurred. Given the tension between massive U.S. exploration 
and the government's insouciant attitude toward declaring rights, neither ordinary 
Americans nor the journalists who informed them were able to distinguish between 
rumors and truth. 136 It is noteworthy that officials sometimes confronted the same 
situation. 137 
Walter LaF eber refers to the challenge posed to diplomatic historians by social 
historians who contest the value of research devoted exclusively to the interaction 
between or among governments. He also applauds that challenge for having 
prompted diplomatic historians to integrate a larger number of culturally oriented 
perspectives into their work, 138 ideally achieving what Barry Rubin describes as a 
balance between official details and journalistic conjecture. 139 The domestic context 
of the U.S. non-claimant policy, like the international context thereof, was based on 
official conjecture. As the seven claimant nations properly suspected that the United 
States might reverse its position and make a sovereignty claim, journalists expected as 
much and diplomats actively kept that possibility under consideration even as twelve-
power negotiations were underway. 140 
135 See Jason Kendall Moore, "Seven Penguins and an Olive Branch: Antarctic Politics in The New 
York Times," Estudios Norteamericanos 2, no. 4 (2001): 125-36. 
136 G.W. Allport and L. Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (New York: Russell and Russell, 1947), 
24; Howard Kurtz, Media Circus: The Trouble with America's Newspapers (New York: Times Books, 
1993), 144; A.E. Weiss, Who's to Know? Information, the Media and Public Awareness (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 7. 
137 See Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et 
al., 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
138 Walter LaFeber, "The World and the United States," American Historical Review 100, no. 4 (1995), 
1015-33. 
139 Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over Foreign Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), vii. 
140 See Jason Kendall Moore, "Alliance of Mistrust: The United States, Britain and Chile in the Quest 
for Antarctic Sovereignty, 1952-1959," Estudios Norteamericanos 3, no. 3 (2004): 187-205. 
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The history of the Antarctic Treaty benefits from applying LaFeber's 
perspective to the corollary between policymaking and public opinion. While the 
frozen continent lacked any culturally oriented perspective derived from an 
indigenous population, U.S. press reports offered the closest possible approximation 
thereof, reinforced by Byrd's perspective. The admiral's letters are a priceless 
resource in attempting to simulate what might be described as the U.S. Antarctic 
mentality. With increasing urgency he appealed for officials to foreward a 
sovereignty claim. Policymakers agreed that the continent was valuable, though not 
valuable enough to risk the controversy which might surround the announcement of 
U.S. rights-an alternative which they preferred to save for a possible breakdown of 
the twelve-power negotiations. 
The Department of State's dread of a Soviet counterclaim served to rationalize 
the unwillingness of officials throughout the government to spend more time 
attempting to reach a consensus. U.S. policy lacked the assertiveness which 
characterized U.S. exploration. Officials were neither fully devoted to non-claimancy 
nor able to project that appearance abroad. Their concern about provoking the USSR 
was exaggerated given the nature of their 1958 proposal to leave claims in place but 
prohibit their enforcement. It is conceivable that a U.S. claim might have derailed the 
twelve-power negotiations which culminated in the Antarctic Treaty. It equally 
conceivable that a U.S. claim made at that time, with the understanding that it was 
merely nominal, would have been satisfactory.141 A similar plan had been given 
active consideration in relation to forming the eight-power condominium arrangement 
which the United States proposed in 1948.142 
141 In that case a Soviet counterclaim also would have been nominal and had no effect on the United 
States' tribute to its own explorers. 
142 See Department of State, Office ofUndersecretary of State (Butler), Memorandum on Antarctica, 
27 May 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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Unlike the vast majority of officials in Washington, 143 Byrd linked the 
question of U.S. sovereignty to both his assessment of the national interest and his 
personal prestige. 144 His reaction to the cancellation of Operation High Jump II 
evidenced his difficulty separating the two. His letters on the subject bear evidence of 
self-pity and admitted bitterness-for which he later and perhaps gratuitously 
apologized. 145 Long before his obituaries aptly restated the fact, 146 he was recognized 
as a national hero who, regardless of his business connections, had done more than 
anyone other North American to publicize Antarctica's strategic significance.147 His 
prestige in Chile was especially noteworthy as that nation made the most concerted 
effort to displace the initial U.S. hope for it or the six other claimants to renounce 
their sovereignty. 148 The Department of State was well justified to acknowledge that 
his popularity was a diplomatic resource,149 and its neglect of his advice naturally 
contributed to his disappointment. 
As Byrd was returning to the United States with Operation High Jump, he 
informed the navy of his difficulty convincing journalists that the non-claimant policy 
was anything other than a "smokescreen."150 Indeed he regarded it as such, as many 
143 With the possible exception of Sheldon W. Boggs and Robert E. Wilson, the Department of State's 
leading Antarctic specialists who both favored advancing a national claim based on exploration and 
drafted numerous plans to that effect. 
144 For example, R.E. Byrd to Vice Chief ofNaval Operations (Radford), 12 August 1949; R.E. Byrd to 
A.W. Radford, 9 October 1953, BPRC, folder 2799. 
145 Byrd implied an apology by encouraging one of his friend and colleagues to destroy a letter he had 
written, which in hindsight seemed "very bitter." He clarified, "I am not bitter. I am sore as hell." 
R.E. Byrd to A.W. Radford, 7 September 1949. He once wrote to his brother of his "martyr complex" 
which he attributed to "the rotten treatment I have received." R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, 
BPRC, folders 2799, 50. 
146 For example, The New York Times, 12 March 1957. One obituary encapsulated Byrd's perspective 
by recalling a question he had once posed to reporters: "What good is Antarctica? What good is a 
baby?" Newsweek, 25 March 1957. 
147 Perhaps his only rival in this regard was Chilean President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla with whom 
Byrd shared many characteristics, and from a technical perspective, Chile is as American as the United 
States. See Jason Kendall Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in U.S.-Chilean 
Antarctic Relations through 1959," Estudios Norteamericanos3, no. 2 (2003): 69-80. 
148 See Jason Kendall Moore, "Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: 
U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949," Journal of Latin American Studies 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-38. 
149 Cordell Hull to F.D. Roosevelt, 1August1940, BPRC, folder 1879. 
150 R.E. Byrd to C.W. Nimitz, BPRC, folder 7295. 
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of his public declarations strongly implied. The Department of State's concern that 
he was speaking too forthrightly of the continent's value was understandable, 151 
though its own officials had no reason to believe that their statements would be able 
to counteract widespread perception that they must be entertaining the same 
thoughts. 152 By incessantly coupling the non-claimant policy to the reservation of all 
rights, they attempted to guise their objectives in a manner which at the same time 
implied them. Byrd's frustration with this circumstance was shared by many 
officials, journalists and citizens such as Elizabeth A. Kendall and George D. 
Krouse. 153 
The Snow Cruiser provides an apt metaphor for U.S. Antarctic policy. Over 
the two decades which preceded the Antarctic Treaty, the United States possessed 
great technological and economic resources. Its was well prepared to become the 
leader of the "free world," and in many cases it used that position both wisely and to 
its own advantage. The Antarctic Treaty was certainly beneficial for the world at 
151 For reference to Byrd's statement, see Department oflnterior, U.S. Antarctic Service, Memorandum 
for R.E. Byrd, 22 August 1939; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs to 
Office of American Republic Affairs et al., 29 November 1946; Embassy in Santiago (Millard) to 
Secretary of State, 10 January 1947, no. 14796; Department of State, Division ofNorth and West Coast 
Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947; Embassy in Paris 
(Caffery) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1947, no. 7582, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Embassy in 
Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Secretary of State, 29 July 1954, no. 50, control 12841; Office oflnter-
American Affairs (Herron) to Office of South American Affairs (O'Conner), 30 July 1954; Embassy in 
Buenos Aires (Siracusa) to Department of State, 5 August 1954, no. 95; Department of State, Office of 
Undersecretary of State (Bishop) to Office of Secretary ofDefense (Godel), 26 May 1955; Department 
of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European 
Affairs (Crowley), 27 April 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
152 For official declarations reserving all rights, see The New York Times, 8 November 1940, 28 
December 1946, 9 August 1948, 10 January 1956, 14 March 1956, 15 April 1956, 1June1959. For 
official reference to the reservation of all rights, see FRUS 1939, 2: I; FRUS 1947, vol. I, General 
(Washington: USGPO, 1973): 1043-50; Deparment of Interior, Board of Geographical Names (Burri!), 
to Department of State, Division of Geography (Saucerman), 25 April 1946; Ambassador in Santiago 
(Bowers) to Secretary of State, 3 March 1948, no. 121, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Department of State, 
Memorandum of Conversation, Office of South American Affairs (Dearborn), 30 August 1954; 
Department of State, Office of Legal Adviser (Phleger) to Secretary of State, 30 January 1955; 
Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Santiago, 7 August 1956, A-26; Department of State, Bureau 
oflnternational Organization Affairs (DePalma) to Bureau of European Affairs et al., 9 August 1956; 
Department of State to Chilean Embassy in Washington, 14 September 1956; Deputy Undersecretary 
of State (Daniels) to Secretary of State, 9 December 1957; Department of State, Office of the 
Undersecretary of State (Richard) to Bureau oflnter-American Affairs (Rubottom), 8 January 1958; 
Embassy in Lima (Sayre) to Department of State, [15 May 1958], no. 853, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
153 For one particularly bleak assessment, see FRUS 1948, 112: 1003. 
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large, given its demilitarization protocols and nuclear test ban, yet it came to fruition 
without affirming the least token of U.S. rights. Officials appeared to enjoy the 
opportunity to assure a different outcome without serious repercussions, but their 
policy suffered from the unrecoverable design flaw of non-claimancy. Likewise the 
Snow Cruiser was an engineering marvel which failed abysmally because it had been 
tested in sand rather than snow.154 Though the many Americans disappointed by the 
non-claimancy were unsure who to blame, they could be certain that it was neither 
Byrd nor the Armor Institute of Chicago. 
It would be tempting but inaccurate to portray the admiral as both a cultural 
symbol and a political actor. The reviewed documents do not indicate that he again 
sought to involve himself in domestic politics, as he had as a lobbyist for the 
Roosevelt administration. 155 Even if toward the end of his life he had more actively 
publicized his support for a U.S. claim, the White House was unlikely to have 
responded. It had neglected the more objective arguments made in favor of a claim 
by diplomatic specialists whose assessment of the national interest was in now way 
linked to enhancing their personal prestige. Whether or not Byrd was as egomaniacal 
as sometimes portrayed, 156 one obituary defined his legacy as related to "the 
advancement of scientific knowledge for the benefit of all mankind. "157 The 
Department of State would continue to portray U.S. policy as such, less out of 
154 Freitag and Dibben, "Dr. Poulter's Antarctic Snow Cruiser," 130, 136. 
155 See R.E. Byrd to F.D. Roosevelt, 18 March 1941, BPRC, Folder2902. 
156 For example, Morgan Sherwood, "Review of Alone on Jee," Journal of American History 86, no. 3 
(1999): 1426-27. 
157 Richard B. Black, "Obituary: Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd, 1888-1957," The Geographical 
Journal 123, no. 2 (1957): 278-79. Black continued that Byrd's death "was received in all quarters of 
the globe with deep sorrow and cognizance that a great man of the century had passed," as recognized 
by "editorials in the leading papers and grassroots publications of the world." Richard B. Black, 
"Obituary: Richard Evelyn Byrd," Geographical Review 47, no. 4 (1957): 579-81. 
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conviction than because cultural or humanistic symbolism had become more 
expedient than political action.158 
The next chapter evaluates U.S. Antarctic policy relative to the nation's 
security policies which internally led to persecution of communists and alleged 
communists, and which externally precipitated a reliance on the doctrine of massive 
nuclear retaliation. These issues help to explain why U.S. Antarctic opinion failed to 
produce substantial opposition to the 1959 treaty, the terms of which required the 
government both to leave its own rights unstated and to cooperate with the Soviet 
Union. 
158 The Antarctic Treaty has aptly been referred to as a "form of non-solution" based on political 
evasion. Finn Sollie, "The Political Experiment in Antarctica," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. 
Smith, eds., Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica (New York: Quadrangle Books, 
1973), 46-63. 
6. U.S. National Security 
In August 1960 the United States became the sixth of twelve nations to ratify the 
Antarctic Treaty. The senate might have approved it by a wider margin if Admiral 
Richard Evelyn Byrd had not died three years earlier. As the most famous U.S. 
explorer of the era, he had consistently urged a declaration of rights to help exclude 
the Soviet Union or, if that were impossible, to demonstrate a firm commitment to 
defend U.S. interests. By demilitarizing the frozen continent and indefinitely 
suspending the question of sovereignty, the treaty produced a result which was 
satisfactory though inconsistent with the anticommunist objectives which largely 
motivated U.S. policy at home and abroad. It is possible that Byrd, contrary to his 
own beliefs, might have helped to assuage concerns that the treaty's inclusion of the 
USSR was unwise. 1 In his absence, the government left senators to ratify the treaty 
based on the assumption that it must be in U.S. interests or the Department of State 
would not have tabled the draft upon which it was based. 2 
This chapter analyses the national security dynamics which influenced U.S. 
policy from the end of the Second World War through the nation's ratification of the 
Antarctic Treaty. U.S.-Soviet relations grew increasingly hostile over this period. 
While other chapters address the diplomatic and military components of the 
superpowers' rivalry, this chapter explores the linkage between the internal and 
external communist threat as perceived by U.S. officials.3 President Harry S. Truman 
initiated a loyalty program to expel communists and communist sympathizers from 
1 See chapter five. 
2 Senator Richard B. Russell made a statement to this effect. The New York Times, 11 August 1960. 
3 In short Russians were viewed as "the external devil" while domestic communists and others who 
refused to "accept the imperatives of American hegemony" were viewed as the internal devil. Thomas 
J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 69-70. 
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the federal government, lest they undermine his effort to halt Soviet expansion. The 
effectiveness of this program, as measured by dismissals and resignations, was not 
insubstantial, and it was reinforced by the emergence of Senator Joe McCarthy. 
When Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953, he strengthened the loyalty 
program and did not intervene against legislation which outlawed the domestic 
Communist Party. These developments paralleled expanding U.S. obligations and the 
widespread conviction that the Soviet Union should not be appeased.4 
Sanjay Chaturvedi writes that the senate's debate of the Antarctic Treaty grew 
heated, most notably over the inclusion of the USSR. The treaty's defeat, he 
observes, remained a distinct possibility until the end.5 The Department of State had 
contemplated a negative outcome in part because it had refrained from any effort to 
promote the treaty. The Soviet Union's participation in the 1957-1958 International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) had made its involvement in a final agreement likely but 
nonetheless unpalatable. Even after the IGY had commenced, the department had 
sought "to ease the Russians out if possible. "6 This circumstance highlights the 
treaty's counterintuitive nature. That is, it legitimated the Soviet Union's presence in 
Antarctica while Washington sought to contain or reverse that presence everywhere 
else. 
Byrd had failed to convince the government that Antarctica held strategic 
importance. In one of his most urgent appeals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he outlined 
4 See Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1975), 115; The New York Times, 26 May 1958. By January 1957 the United States had 
established bases or rights for bases in 38 nations, and was engaged in discussions with twenty others. 
FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 19, National Security Policy (Washington: USGPO, 1990), 411. 
5 Sanjay Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis (New Delhi: Segment Books, 
1990), 97. 
6 Department of State, Memorandum by Office oflnter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 
22 July 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
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contingencies which seemed trivial relative to events such as the Berlin blockade. 7 At 
the time, however, the government was taking extreme measures to combat the risk of 
internal subversion posed by a miniscule segment of the population. The membership 
of the Communist Party had decreased substantially since the end of the Second 
World War, and even then it had been negligible.8 Byrd inflated the white 
continent's significance no more than his fellow citizens inflated the government's 
susceptibility to being overthrown. While his devotion to U.S. values and institutions 
was well-publicized, it was no assistance in his effort to alter the government's stance 
toward the Antarctic or to build public support to that end. During the period under 
consideration, the continent lacked sufficient drama or intrigue to hold the American 
public's attention. 9 
Meanwhile congressional investigations found that some Americans not only 
preferred the communist system, but were willing to betray their nation. One of the 
most disturbing cases involved Alger Hiss, a former Department of State employee 
alleged to have forwarded materials to the Soviet Union. Another involved a report 
that Truman had promoted a treasury official despite knowing that he was a Soviet 
spy. The House of Representatives complied with Truman's refusal to testify, but the 
fact that it had subpoenaed a former president revealed the nation's obsession with 
security. According to Murray B. Levin, most Americans viewed the investigations 
7 For example, Byrd called for intensifying the U.S. Antarctic program to gain cold-weather training 
opportunities. The navy agreed that the continent was ideal for this, but neither it nor the Joints Chiefs 
of Staff shared his concern that the nation might be unable to defend itself from the Soviet Union if its 
troops were to overrun Greenland. U.S. Navy (Dennison) to Department of State, Division of Northern 
European Affairs (Cumming), 22 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 
2070, 30 September 1949, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File;. 
8 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (London: 
Secker & Warburg, 1978), 185. 
9 This was unlike the best-selling novels which Mickey Spillane wrote in the 1950s. Their protagonist, 
Mike Hammer, had no qualms about violence, no respect for civil liberties and-presumably-no 
interest in the Antarctic. See Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 34-37. 
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as a "perfectly sensible" response the Soviet challenge.10 Far less sensible was the 
need to involve the USSR in Antarctica. Events such as the Korean War and Berlin 
crisis had demonstrated officials' willingness to negotiate under pressure and 
compromise when necessary. However, the frozen continent posed no risk of a large-
scale war if the treaty were to fail. 11 
In January 1945 Representative John E. Rankin introduced a bill to establish the 
special committee on un-American activities on a permanent basis. When created 
seven years earlier it had been known as the Dies Committee in reference to its 
sponsor Martin Dies. 12 Its investigation of subversive movements within the United 
States had been discontinued before the nation entered the Second World War.13 
Aside from failing to uncover any pressing dangers, it had earned notoriety for as its 
bombastic methods. Witnesses had often been harangued and denied the protections 
taken for granted in a court oflaw. Rankin preferred to dwell on the committee's 
record of exposing possible threats to the nation's internal security. After a heated 
debate, he forced a roll-call vote which succeeded by a narrow margin to establish the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The editors of The New York 
Times responded without enthusiasm, for it seemed likely that the term un-American 
would be applied to any opinion with which the committee disagreed. 14 
10 Murray B. Levin, Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1971), 220. 
11 In 1953 there had been some risk ofa limited conflict between the Britain and the Southern Cone 
nations, Chile and Argentina. See chapter three. 
12 The New York Times, 4 January 1945. See Robert Griffith, "American Politics and the Origins of 
'McCarthyism' ,"in Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., The Specter: Original Essays on the 
Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974), 1-17; John Earl 
Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 66. 
13 Robert K. Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1952), 17-18. 
14 They correctly foresaw a resurgence of"persecution in place of impartial investigation." The New 
York Times, 5 January 1945. 
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Within weeks of the Japanese surrender, the HUAC chose to investigate the 
Communist Party of the United States. This decision, though linked to concern about 
the Soviet Union's post-war ambitions, more specifically related to declarations by 
the party's chairperson, William Z. Foster. He berated the injustices of the capitalist 
system as well as the Truman administration's apparent disregard for the United 
Nations. He also revealed that the party would be taking a more radical position than 
during the war, based on confronting all vestiges of imperialism at home and 
abroad. 15 When called before the HUAC, Foster and three other Communist Party 
leaders refused to substantiate if they were beholden to foreign influences, and the 
hearings quickly turned as acrimonious as before the HUAC had been granted 
permanent standing. Under the best circumstance, the witnesses might not have been 
completely forthcoming. Instead, they were confronted with hostility and disclosed as 
little as possible. 16 
The HUAC believed that the Communist Party exercised far greater influence 
than its size seemed to suggest. Its membership had rapidly declined after reaching an 
all-time high of eighty thousand the previous year.17 Equally dangerous communists 
were thought to remain outside the party, advancing their ideology through the media 
and various front organizations. The committee's decision to question radio 
broadcasters was, according to Foster, "the most outrageous infringement of 
American freedom in one hundred years."18 The conduct of the hearings supported 
that perspective. For example, Rankin called one witness as a "slime-mongering 
kike" and then grew so incensed that he was barred from the floor for the remainder 
15 The New York Times, 19-20 September 1945, 18 October 1945. See Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, 
The American Communist Party: A Critical History, 1919-1957 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 437-48. 
16 The New York Times, 20 September 1945, 23September1945, 27 September 1945, 7 October 1945. 
17 This number was given by the Communist Party. Other sources held that the membership had 
surpassed 100,000 in the pre-war era. See The New York Times, 7 March 1948, 23 September 1956. 
18 The New York Times, 19 October 1945. 
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of the day .19 Many non-communist organizations such as the Veterans League of 
America protested his anti-Semitism, but to no avail. He would continue to 
overshadow the more moderate chairperson and other members.20 
The discovery of a Soviet spy ring in Canada in early 1946 underscored the 
seriousness of the objective before the HUAC. Rankin warned that it spread 
throughout the United States, utilizing some or all of the organizations already 
thought to be infiltrated by communists. The Department of State assured the public 
that there was no evidence ofthis,21 yet at a press conference President Truman 
refused comment on an earlier statement that he had not succumbed to "the unholy 
fear" of the USSR which had become typical of many Americans.22 Events suggested 
that a degree of concern, if not fear, was warranted. The HUAC proceeded to 
investigate suspected front organizations including the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee, the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, and the National 
Council for Soviet-American Friendship. By refusing to submit the documents 
requested of them, their leaders reinforced the impression that they were Soviet 
agents. The house voted decisively in favor of charging them with contempt of 
congress.23 
In August 1946 the Department of State announced the dismissal of forty 
employees believed to be involved with foreign governments unsympathetic to the 
United States. The official statement, which did not mention the Soviet Union, was 
issued to counteract rumors that hundreds or thousands had been dismissed for 
19 The New York Times, 13 February 1946. See Albert Fried, ed., McCarthyism, the Great American 
Red Scare: A Documentary History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 16. 
20 The New York Times, 25 February 1946, 15 April 1946, 18 May 1946. 
21 The New York Times, 17 February 1946, 20 February 1946. 
22 The New York Times, 22 February 1946. 
23 See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953 (Hodder and Stoughton, 
Limited, 1955), 291-95; The New York Times, 9 March 1946, 29 March 1946, 8 June 1946, 2 August 
1946. 
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ideological reasons. Forty dismissals were far less than predicted, yet the department 
indicated that it would be rigorous in it continuing to screen employees. 24 The 
Department of War followed this trend, barring unreliable personnel from sensitive 
positions and officer-training schools.25 Fifty war veterans gathered in Washington to 
protest the assumption that communists were necessarily disloyal. They emphasized 
their message by purporting to be members of the Communist Party. While many 
Americans believed that the Soviet government was opportunistic and reversed its 
policies whenever necessary, the protesters believed that this was true of their own 
government. 26 
As a senator Truman had criticized the Dies Committee for generating an a 
climate of distrust and xenophobia.27 As president he found it necessary to support 
the objectives of the HUAC, if not the committee itself. In November 1946 he 
established a commission to investigate the loyalty of the federal government's two 
million employees. An earlier investigation had found widespread evidence of 
disloyalty, especially within the Department of State. Truman ordered the 
commission-formed by representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, 
Treasury and War, in addition to the Civil Service Commission-to evaluate that 
finding and uncover any new evidence of possible treachery.28 This initiative was in 
keeping with the "bitterly reactionary" mood of congress, as David Caute describes 
it.29 At the same time the president sought to ensure that the accused parties would be 
24 The New York Times, 8 April 1946, 14 August 1946. 
25 The New York Times, 9 March 1946. 
26 See The New York Times, 24 March 1946. 
27 Truman, Memoirs 2: 291-95. 
28 The New York Times, 26-27 November 1946. 
29 Caute, The Great Fear, 27 
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dealt with in an equitable manner.30 It did not bode well that headlines referred to 
loyalty program as a purge.31 
As the commission was preparing its report, the Department of Justice arrested 
Gerhart Eisler, a German native reputed to be one of the Communist Party's foremost 
strategists. Officials announced that he had violated the Enemy Alien Act of 1798. 
Interestingly the act had never been used-or intended for use-except in time of war. 
A more plausible explanation was that Eisler had been arrested to guarantee his 
appearance before the HUAC. His wife claimed to be astonished since during the war 
they had experienced no difficulties pertaining to their immigration status or beliefs. 32 
Once detained on Ellis Island in New York City, Eisler was unable either to flee or 
participate in activities which the Soviet Union reportedly used to infiltrate other 
societies. Former communists told the HUAC that these activities included provoking 
race riots, distributing anti-capitalist propaganda, and urging friendship with the 
USSR.33 
In March 1947 President Truman appealed to congress for $400 million to 
assist Greece and Turkey in their struggle against communism. There were many 
reasons why the legislature would embrace this and proceed to carry the doctrine of 
containment even further. Neither the Soviet Union's presence in Eastern Europe nor 
its uncooperative attitude in the United Nations could be denied. As important was 
that Truman employed metaphors of disease and other calamities to indicate the 
United States would perish unless citizens were willing to confront the dangers 
surrounding them. The president's stoic manner heightened the effectiveness of the 
message, demonstrating his own capacity to face great adversity without overreacting, 
30 Truman, Memoirs 2: 291-95; Freeland, The Truman Doctrine, 137-38. 
31 The New York Times, 26-27 November 1946, 13 April 1947, 12 September 1947. 
32 The New York Times, 5 February 1947. 
33 The New York Times, 21January1946, 2 August 1946, 9 February 1947. See Carr, The House 
Committee, 234. 
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as well as the nation's capacity to save the world in the process of saving itself. 34 
According to Thomas J. McCormick, he believed that the exaggerated nature of his 
speech was necessary to gain public support. 35 
Weeks later Truman issued Executive Order 9835, otherwise known as the 
Loyalty Order, in accord with the commission's report that a substantial number of 
federal employees were unreliable. The communist threat overseas had permeated the 
very fabric of the nation, 36 and the administration sought to do as much as possible on 
both fronts. The Loyalty Order called for investigating all federal employees and 
dismissing those who were unable to alleviate concerns pertaining to their background 
or current affiliations. Government agencies began to forward lists of their employees 
to the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation to be cross-referenced with its files. The 
program's administrative component was predicted to cost $50 million while no 
amount could be estimated for the field investigations, as the need for them had yet to 
be determined.37 It remained inconceivable that the total sum would approach the 
$400 million. If only in this way, internal security appeared to be less onerous than 
the external variety.38 
The Department of Justice began compile a list of communist-front 
organizations, as the commission had also recommended. 39 Membership therein was 
to be regarded as sufficient grounds for dismissal. Attorney General Tom Clark 
assumed the responsibility of reviewing all information and deciding which 
organizations to include. The Loyalty Order deferred to his judgment in defining a 
34 Robert L. Ivie, "Fire, Flood and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the 
Truman Doctrine Speech," Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, 3 (1999): 570-91. 
35 McCormick, America's Half-Century, 75-77. 
36 Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 9. 
37 The New York Times, 13 April 1947. 
38 The Civil Service Commission and Federal Bureau oflnvestigation spent approximately $36 million 
on the program through 1952. Eleanor Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1953), 148-49. 
39 Truman, Memoirs 2: 291-95. 
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"subversive" organization, as well as a "sympathetic association" if an individual's 
membership therein could not be substantiated.40 The loyalty program helped to 
"scare hell out of the country," as Truman had once been advised in relation to foreign 
policy.41 It also reinforced the public's tendency to view internationally minded 
liberals as communists.42 Truman hoped to demonstrate that it was possible to be a 
liberal anticommunist, but the loyalty program failed to confirm this.43 It led to 
approximately twelve hundred dismissals and six thousand resignations of individuals 
whose beliefs--or suspected beliefs-had been thoroughly stigmatized.44 
In July 1947 congress approved the National Security Act. It most notably 
established the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president on foreign 
policy issues which held military significance. The members were to include 
representatives of each branch of the armed services, the secretary of state and the 
newly created position of secretary of defense-which was to be held by a civilian to 
prevent the military establishment from wielding undue influence. Walter Millis 
suggests that this objective was difficult to achieve since none of the members was 
democratically elected, and the civilians among them fully accepted the military 
perspective that force had become a necessary evil.45 At the time it was contemplated 
that the nation's militarization might be detrimental to individual freedoms, but few 
40 See The New York Times, 23 March 1947, 12September1947. 
41 This phrase was used by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. Alan D. Harper, The Politics of Loyalty: 
The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946-1952 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Publishing Corporation, 1969), 46-47. 
42 Ralph S. Brown Jr., Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the United States (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1958), 6. 
43 See Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security 
State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119. 
44 Barton J. Bernstein, "America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism," in Barton J. Bernstein, 
ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 
289-321. 
45 See Walter Millis, "The National Security Act," in Raymond G. O'Connor, ed., American Defense 
Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
1965), 307-11; Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council, 1945-1947," Journal of 
American History 59, no. 2 (1972): 369-88; Anna Kasten Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution 
of the National Security Council," Journal of American History 72, no. 2 (1985): 360-78. 
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questioned the need to give security considerations first priority.46 General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, who had led the Allies to victory in Europe, remarked that the nation 
again required Minute Men if democracy were to survive in the world.47 
The HUAC did its part by sending members to the west coast where 
communists were reportedly thwarting the production of films which championed the 
American way of life. A number of actors claimed that this was an extension of the 
Roosevelt administration's pressure to glorify the Soviet system. They cited the 1943 
film Song of Russia as the most blatant example, and chairperson J. Parnell Thomas 
agreed, informing congress that it was obviously hostile to U.S. values. 48 While 
preparations began for a more extensive investigation, the film industry sought advice 
from former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in relation to maintaining its freedom 
of expression without being socially irresponsible. Civil libertarians applauded this 
move as helping to counteract the impression that Hollywood was teaming with 
saboteurs. They hoped that the involvement of Byrnes would deter unfair allegations, 
such as when Hollywood had once been blamed for making anti-Nazi pictures as a 
ploy to draw the nation into the war.49 
In the interim Victor A. Kravchenko, a defector, told the HUAC that he had 
seen many classified U.S. documents when employed by the Soviet purchasing 
commission. He warned that spies were everywhere and virtually all Soviet officials 
posted in the United States were active in this capacity. He also maintained that 
communist sympathizers were more dangerous than actual communists whose 
publications like The Daily Worker were clearly propaganda, whereas other 
46 The New York Times, 27 July 1947, 21 September 1947. 
47 The New York Times, 24 September 1947. 
48 Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 57-58; Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold 
War, 127; Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace?, 71; The New York Times, 15 May 1947. 
49 The New York Times, 8 June 1947, 13 September 1947. 
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publications sought to exploit the open-mindedness ofreaders.50 His testimony 
augmented fears that internal subversion, if left unchecked, might lead to the demise 
of the U.S. system. 51 Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, 
did not question the reliability of.Kravchenko. He simply compared the HUAC to a 
dog which had chosen to lick its stomach because it had nothing else to do. He added, 
"Sometimes this attracts spectators. "52 
The committee opened its film hearings in October, making room for over a 
hundred reporters and permitting national networks and Washington radio stations to 
record every word. The witnesses and interrogators displayed a full range of emotion, 
and the crowd often burst into applause when anticommunist sentiments were given 
voice.53 The most poignant evidence ofun-Americanism arose when some 
individuals refused to say if they were or even had been members of the Communist 
Party. The question, they argued, infringed upon their First Amendment freedom of 
expression and association. One of them pointed out that General Eisenhower had 
refused to designate his political affiliation, and "what's good enough for [him] is 
good enough for me." 54 This humorous response did not sway the determination that 
they were in contempt of congress. Each of the Hollywood Ten, as they were known, 
was sentenced to one year in jail despite protests from many prominent individuals 
and organizations. 55 
Concern about a possible war with the Soviet Union failed to dispel unease 
about the manner in which the hearings had been conducted. Contrary to 
50 The New York Times, 23 July 1947. 
51 See The New York Times, 27 December 1946, 10 December 1947. 
52 The New York Times, 23 July 1947. 
53 The New York Times, 22 October 1947, 26 October 1947. 
54 The New York Times, 29 October 1947. 
55 Brown, Loyalty and Security, 150-51, 155; Lary May, "Movie Star Politics: The Screen Actors' 
Guild, Cultural Conversion and the Hollywood Red Scare," in Lary May, ed., Recasting America: 
Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
125-53. 
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expectations, the press coverage was generally negative.56 The "big show," as one 
headline referred to it, undermined the public's faith in the qualities which 
distinguished American institutions from those of other nations.57 The witnesses had 
not been permitted defense counsel, and some journalists portrayed the HUAC as 
more dangerous than the conspiracy allegedly taking place in Hollywood. The major 
studios and professional associations uttered no such opinion. Instead they chose to 
bar individuals believed to harbor communist sympathies, and requested further 
congressional oversight. They also started making a larger number of anticommunist 
films, regardless of their merit, and continued to blacklist some of the most talented 
writers and performers. 58 
In April 1948 the HUAC unanimously endorsed a bill to imprison for up to a 
decade any communist leader found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the 
government. The bill refrained from outlawing the Communist Party or targeting its 
members indiscriminately. Representative Richard M. Nixon explained that citizens 
would be allowed to believe anything they pleased as long as they refrained from 
illegal activities. He had no desire to limit free speech, but rather "to strike a body 
blow at the American cadre of the Soviet-directed communist conspiracy."59 The 
House accepted this logic and passed the Mundt Bill, as jointly sponsored by Karl E. 
Mundt and Nixon.60 The bill called for communist and communist-front 
organizations to register with the attorney general and to include this fact on their 
publicity materials. Furthermore their members were to be denied passports.61 
56 Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 73-75. 
57 The New York Times, 23October1947. 
58 See Les K. Adler, "The Politics of Culture: Hollywood and the Cold War" in Griffith and Theoharis, 
The Specter, 240-61; The New York Times, 23 October 1947, 26 November 1947. 
59 The New York Times, 10 April 1948. 
60 This was alternately known as the Mundt-Nixon Bill. Carr, The House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, 80. 
61 The New York Times, 20 May 1948. 
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William Z. Foster promptly denounced the Mundt Bill and vowed that the 
Communist Party, which he chaired, would never abide it. He also vowed that 
American communists would refuse to join any war with the USSR, as they believed 
that the United States would be responsible for its instigation. Soon thereafter federal 
authorities arrested Foster and eleven of the party's other leaders, all of whom had 
been under investigation for over a year. As the Mundt Bill had not yet become law, 
the government charged them with violating the Smith Act of 1940, which also 
prohibited conspiracies to overthrow the government and carried the same penalties. 
The communists denied being involved with any form conspiracy, and they had 
anticipated the charge. They released a previously prepared statement claiming that 
their arrest was part of the "criminal bipartisan" effort to provoke a war with the 
Soviet Union.62 
Many Americans believed that the measures taken against domestic 
communists were unnecessarily severe.63 However, they generally agreed with 
Truman that the USSR bore responsibility for postwar difficulties and should be 
resisted at every opportunity. With this in mind the president called for an immediate 
draft to be supplemented by a long-term program of universal military training. 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall elaborated that diplomacy, though an essential 
component of the nation's democratic vision, would only result in appeasement unless 
it were backed with force. 64 The training program failed to gain congressional 
support, but a selective service bill passed in June 1948. It required all men between 
18 and 26 years of age to register for military service and, if called, to serve for a 
period of 21 months. This constituted the first peacetime draft in U.S. history, 
62 The New York Times, 29 May 1948, 21July1948. 
63 The New York Times, 4 August 1948. 
64 The New York Times, 18 March 1948. 
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underscoring the nation's resolve to meet the communist threat wherever it might 
emerge.65 
By the end of the year the HUAC investigation of Alger Hiss, a former 
Department of State employee, produced compelling evidence of espionage. 
Hundreds of microfilmed documents were found at his home, lending credibility to 
the allegation that he had once been part of a network which forwarded classified 
material to the Soviet Union. Former Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle 
announced that he took the charge very seriously. In the past he had known that Hiss 
was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but had refused to believe that this necessarily 
compromised his integrity. 66 While it was true, as Hiss argued, that his sympathy had 
been consistent with the Roosevelt administration's policies toward the USSR, the 
microfilm revealed a serious breach of protocol. This handicapped his effort to 
discredit the proceedings. It still could not be proved that Hiss had been a spy, but a 
federal grand jury found ample cause to indict him for perjury.67 
In October 1949 the ruling against the Communist Party leaders set a dismal 
prospect for Hiss who was then awaiting a second trial as the first had resulted in a 
hung jury. It found eleven of the defendants guilty of conspiring to overthrow the 
government, and six of their lawyers guilty of contempt of court. One received a 
commuted sentence of three years in prison, due to his distinguished service in the 
second world war, while the others each were sentenced to five years in prison.68 
Their lawyers were sentenced to between one and six months depending on how 
flagrant the judge viewed their behavior over the course of the nine-month trial, one 
65 Hogan,A Cross of Iron, 144-46, 155, 158. 
66 The New York Times, 4 December 1948, 15 December 1948. 
67 Allen Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 42-43; 
Fried, Nightmare in Red, 23; The New York Times, 15-16 December 1948. 
68 The judge indicated that he would have issued longer sentences, but in 1948 congress had reduced 
the maximum penalty for violating the Smith Act from ten to five years. The New York Times, 22 
October 1949. 
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of the longest ever held. The American Politburo, as the eleven were known, declared 
that the verdict reflected the government's complete disregard for the Bill of Rights. 
No evidence indicated that they had planned or advocated the overthrow of the U.S. 
government, only that their articles and speeches were compatible with the idea-as 
was now deemed illegal. 69 
Three months later the perjury charge against Hiss also resulted in a five-year 
sentence. The court ruled that he had deliberately misled the HUAC regarding his 
involvement with Whittaker Chambers, his accuser who had been a communist until 
the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact. 7° Chambers emerged as a minor celebrity 
despite his ideologically tainted background. He wrote a best-selling memoir whose 
greatest enthusiasts included Richard M. Nixon. The Berlin blockade had heightened 
the appeal of its anticommunist message while further discrediting the Roosevelt 
era. 
71 Secretary of State Dean Acheson nonetheless expressed sympathy for Hiss, 
whom he regarded as having been an outstanding public servant despite his poor 
judgment in copying official documents. Nixon called the secretary's position 
"disgusting" since for him and many others Hiss was not only a perjurer, but a 
traitor.72 
Senator Joe McCarthy gained headlines in February 1950 by proclaiming that 
a large number of communists and communist sympathizers remained in the 
Department of State. He initially held that 205 individuals warranted this description, 
though he soon reduced the estimate to 57 and then back up to 81. His demand for an 
investigation was coupled with a warning. If President Truman failed to cooperate, he 
69 David A. Shannon, The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the 
United States since 1945 (Chatham, New Jersey: The Chatham Bookseller, 1959), 197-99; The New 
York Times, 15-16 October 1949, 22 October 1949. 
70 Weinstein, Perjury, 3-5. 
71 See Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War, 18-19; Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace?, 181. 
72 See Weinstein, Perjury, 506-7; The New York Times, 26 January 1950. 
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would expose the Democratic Party as abetting the international communist 
movement.73 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee promptly established a 
subcommittee devoted to internal security, chaired by Millard Tydings but dominated 
by McCarthy, who became the first witness to testify.74 While the Truman 
administration correctly predicted that McCarthy would be unable to substantiate his 
allegations, it falsely assumed that he would discredited as a result. 75 His alarmist 
tack seized the public imagination to such a degree that the president abandoned his 
refusal to tum over the government's loyalty files.76 
The National Security Council took a broader perspective of these issues 
which served to advance McCarthy's career. Its sixty-eighth report, referred to as 
NSC-68, called for massive rearmament to counteract the USSR' s hostility to the 
"free world."77 The report held that the risk of military conflict was necessary to 
block further Soviet expansion, lest individual liberties be jeopardized everywhere on 
the planet.78 Stephen E. Ambrose writes that this assumption carried with it the 
responsibility to expand U.S. military commitments as far as possible.79 The 
secretary of state recognized that the report's portrayal of the world was somewhat 
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North Carolina Press, 1992), 13; Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the 
Origins of McCarthy ism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971 ), 16; The New York Times, 12 February 
1950. 
74 Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), 270-71. 
75 See Harper, The Politics of Loyalty, 137-38. 
76 Fried, Nightmare in Red, 126-28. 
77 Norman Graebner, "The Sources of Post-War Instability," in Norman Graebner, ed., The National 
Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3-36; 
Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States andthe Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 85. 
78 A passage of the report maintained that "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat 
everywhere." John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive 
History, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 205. 
79 Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Military Dimension: Berlin, NATO and NSC-68," in Thomas G. 
Paterson, ed., The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 
1974), 175-84. 
230 
arbitrary, but he viewed this as necessary to persuade others to heed its dictates.so It 
is noteworthy that it had been written not by military officials but by the Department 
of State's Policy Planning Staff. sr As the containment doctrine expanded, so too did 
the need for the armed services to enforce fundamentally political objectives.s2 
George Kennan, the primary architect of containment doctrine, had recently 
left the Policy Planning Staff due to his concern that the government was 
overemphasizing its military component. His strategy had called for long-term 
vigilance based on the premise that the Soviet Union sought to avoid a direct 
confrontation as much as the United States did. s3 He viewed NSC-68 as preparing the 
nation for total war in false hope of achieving total victory, either through 
intimidation or open conflict. s4 While accepting the need for military preparedness, 
he disagreed with the extent called for by Paul Nitze-the author of the report who 
had succeeded him as chairperson of the Policy Planning Staff-for it suggested that 
all regions of the world held equal importance for the United States.s5 NSC-68 
amounted to a "papal bull," in the words of William Appleman Williams, s6 rather 
than viable blueprint to defend national interests and promote them when 
appropriate. s7 
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The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 suggested that the Soviet 
strategy to dominate the planet included giving tacit support to other communist 
regimes. 88 The NSC believed that Moscow was not necessarily ready for a final 
showdown with the west, but hoped that the conflict would damage U.S. prestige 
around the world and engender hostility throughout Asia.89 The North Korean 
invasion had been timed as though to have this effect; McCarthy was already calling 
the president's anticommunist credentials into question, and he suddenly gained 
another reason to attack the secretary of state.90 Neither friends nor foes of Dean 
Acheson could deny that he had excluded South Korea from the perimeter of nations 
which the United States designated as vital for its own security and pledged to 
defend.91 Partisanship had reached such a divisive level that Truman avoided seeking 
congressional authority to respond to one of the most blatant cases of aggression since 
Pearl Harbor.92 
Acheson regained some of his prestige by claiming that the Kremlin had 
forced the nation to lead the "struggle against evil."93 Americans were receptive to 
this kind of terminology and dubious that the communist enemy had yet been 
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eradicated at home. 94 In September congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950 
by an overwhelming majority in both houses.95 It tightened existing subversion laws 
and required all communist and communist-sympathetic organizations to register with 
the attorney-general, whom it vested with the authority to deport foreign 
subversives.96 While these objectives were similar to his own, Truman regarded them 
as too draconian.97 He vetoed the legislation in an attempt to preserve citizens' 
constitutional rights. Congress overrode the veto, and the board established to review 
the federal loyalty standard recommended more stringent criteria. Dismissals had 
previously been based on "reasonable grounds" to suspect disloyalty, whereas now 
"reasonable doubt" of loyalty would be sufficient.98 
The president approved NSC-68 the same month as the Internal Security Act 
became law, but hesitated to pursue the total victory against communism which it 
implied. In April 1951 he replaced General Douglas Macarthur as commander of the 
UN forces attempting to defeat the North Koreans.99 The general had repeatedly 
publicized his dissatisfaction with the government's unwillingness to use the atomic 
bomb. Though Truman was seriously considering this alternative-and had 
publicized this fact-he wished to leave no doubt that he would be the one to make 
the final decision. 100 In this way his dismissal of Macarthur affirmed the principle of 
civilian control over the military. However, it provoked outrage throughout the 
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nation. Not only were Truman and Acheson burned in effigy; Republicans threatened 
to begin impeachment proceedings. McCarthy denounced the general's fate as a 
victory for communism, and millions of Americans throughout the nation greeted 
Macarthur like a returning hero. IOI 
The Truman administration recognized the infeasibility of its original hope to 
unify the Korean peninsula by military means. U.S. allies were unwilling to go 
beyond the terms of the UN mandate to defend the south, for anything more held the 
risk of igniting a global conflict. 102 In June the Soviet Union proposed an armistice 
which established borders similar to those which would be accepted two years later. 
At the time the White House sought to avoid being charged with appeasement. 103 
Since the war had been depicted as nothing less than "a holy mission," consenting to 
the armistice would have been morally offensive as well as politically imprudent. 104 
The public nonetheless responded to Eisenhower's pledge in the 1952 presidential 
election to pursue a negotiated settlement. 105 His simultaneous pledge to support the 
liberation of Eastern Europe left no doubt of his anticommunist resolve. I06 Americans 
viewed the selectiveness of this approach as necessary and in November proceeded to 
elect the first Republican president since Herbert Hoover.107 
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Eisenhower had supported McCarthy's re-election campaign while distancing 
himself from the extreme tactics used to rid the government of communists.108 
Shortly after taking office, he found that it was impossible to distinguish between the 
senator and his behavior. McCarthy now directed allegations against the Voice of 
America (VOA), which fell under the Department of State's jurisdiction. The 
conspiracy which he targeted involved everything from where transmitters had been 
placed, to the nuances of scriptwriting, to cases of Soviet speeches being broadcast 
without further comment. The Voice of America, McCarthy insisted, should be called 
the Voice of Moscow.109 The least preposterous evidence related to four hundred 
books by communist authors discovered in VOA libraries overseas. The new 
secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, banned the books and dismissed the employees 
believed responsible for having purchased them.110 
In April 1953 Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450, greatly expanding 
the loyalty program instigated by his predecessor. It required all facets of federal 
employees' behavior to be consistent with the interests of national security. The 
grounds for dismissal now included alcoholism, homosexuality and other forms of 
immorality which might compromise their reliability. 111 The new program included 
no formal mechanisms such as Truman's loyalty review board. Rather it took a 
highly decentralized approach, permitting each government agency to conduct its own 
investigations, and denying employees the right to appeal. 112 According to Richard 
M. Fried, the president sought to demonstrate that he was addressing the loyalty issue 
108 Broadwater, Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade, 33. 
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as forcefully as McCarthy, but while upholding due process.113 The morale of civil 
servants nonetheless began to plummet. One Department of State employee 
remarked, on condition of anonymity, "I am making an intense effort to fade into the 
wallpaper. " 114 
The end of the Korean War in July 1953 relieved one source of the anxiety 
upon which the McCarthy thrived,115 yet the pillars of nation's Cold War policy 
remained firmly in place. The defense budget had approximately quadrupled, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization had proved essential, and officials still believed 
that communist victories anywhere posed a threat to national interests. 116 While the 
concept of total victory no longer seemed feasible, the U.S.-led crusade for freedom 
would proceed in a manner which Charles R. Morris describes as strategically 
amorphous. 117 General Macarthur had drawn attention to the same phenomenon. 
After being dismissed, he had testified before congress that the Truman 
administration lacked any coherent plan for the war. 118 Years later most Americans 
accepted its termination as sufficient, as this was what Eisenhower had pledged and 
delivered. 119 
In November the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 
regained the publicity which it had enjoyed in the pre-McCarthy era. The attorney 
general declared that Truman had nominated Henry Dexter White, then assistant 
secretary of the treasury, to become director of the International Monetary 
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Fund-despite knowing that he was a Soviet agent. Truman denied this and 
emphasized that he had asked White to resign as soon as evidence of his disloyalty 
had emerged. 120 He adamantly refused to testify before the HUAC about the incident. 
The fact that he had been subpoenaed, he claimed, demonstrated that the Eisenhower 
administration had embraced McCarthyism. Rancor persisted even after the HUAC 
indicated that it would not force him to comply.121 The former president held a 
nationwide broadcast to defend his integrity, only then to be attacked by J. Edgar 
Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One headline aptly 
summarized that the prestige of all parties and the nation as a whole had been 
seriously damaged. 122 
Eisenhower, though keenly anticommunist, sought to avoid dealing directly 
with McCarthy in hope that the senator would self-destruct. 123 This success of this 
became foreseeable when his charges extended to the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the U.S. Army, in the latter case leading to senate hearings from April to June 1954. 
McCarthy alleged that a dentist employed at the army post in Fort Monmouth, New 
Jersey, had been promoted despite reports which identified him as a security risk. 124 
In short he resurrected the same kind of charges directed against Harry Dexter White. 
Though the case of health worker was minor by comparison, it was deemed worthy of 
attention, and the proceedings confirmed Truman's opinion that McCarthy was "a 
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political gangster."125 The senator attacked the army's special counsel so viciously 
that at one point he broke into tears.126 Most Americans, unsettled by the frequency 
of such incidents, began to view McCarthy as an incorrigible bully and source of 
national disgrace. 127 
In August 1954 the senate unanimously approved the Communist Control Act 
which classified the Communist Party as an appendage of Moscow. As such it was 
deprived of any legal standing and barred from taking part in elections. Members 
were permitted to be subversively minded as long as they refrained from joining the 
conspiracy to which their party was allegedly devoted. 128 No one more than Eugene 
Dennis could have appreciated the irony of this situation, for he had been found guilty 
of the conspiracy in question, as well as for contempt of court and contempt of 
congress. At the time he was still in prison reflecting on how to preserve the future of 
the Communist Party and his role as its general secretary. He would succeed in part 
because of his willingness to blame for excesses of Stalinism, rather than U.S. 
legislation, for the steep decline in party membership.129 
As the year came to an end, the senate chose to rebuke McCarthy. His 
belligerence during the army hearings might have been sufficient cause alone. He had 
sealed his fate by taking responsibility for one of his assistant's effort to have a friend 
released from military service ostensibly for the sake of the investigation. This 
misuse of authority was perhaps more serious than questions of etiquette, though the 
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senate avoided a formal censure in favor of passing a condemnation which limited 
none of McCarthy's rights. 130 The desired effect was achieved. The senator's 
offensive tactics became a relic of the past, and the bitter partisanship which had 
divided the nation for nearly five years began to recede. However, the phenomenon 
of McCarthyism would outlive the senator, who happened to have begun his career as 
a Democrat. 131 Even the most progressive members of congress appreciated the need 
to be perceived as staunchly anticommunist. 132 
Bertrand Russell observed that the government's persecution of citizens 
remained extremely intolerant.133 The risk of treason was not entirely fictitious, he 
conceded, but it was being dealt with in a hysterical and counterproductive manner. 134 
An increasing number of U.S. officials agreed with the British philosopher. For 
example, one former member of the Subversive Activities Control Board had become 
an outspoken critic of the loyalty program. Thousands of federal employees had 
resigned or been dismissed without being given the opportunity to face their accusers 
or because of their past affiliations which had been consistent with the nation's 
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.135 Most Americans remained oblivious to the 
need to uphold the civil liberties of dissidents, 136 but as Russell hoped, they had not 
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been completely desensitized to the virtue of political moderation. 137 American 
communists would still face "massive retaliation," as the U.S. military strategy was 
known, but it would be somewhat less massive than in the past. 138 
McCarthy's death in May 1957 evoked little passion in the United States. The 
balanced tone of the press related to the low profile which he had kept in the two and 
a half years since being reprimanded. His unhealthy appearance had also discouraged 
most journalists from reveling in his demise. The British press, on the other hand, 
was less restrained. Among the many scathing editorials which followed, one 
referred to him as the most-hated man in the world. McCarthy might have viewed 
that status as a tribute to his self-promotion, for as he once remarked, his personality 
had become more important than his message. 139 His legacy was unique though his 
agenda had been fundamentally compatible with the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations. As Robert Griffith writes, he was the product rather than the 
instigator of the U.S. Cold War mentality.140 
In June 1957 a Californian took his life rather than having to testify at the 
HUAC hearings in San Francisco. His final letter stated his unwillingness to be 
"assassinated by publicity." Federal authorities had repeatedly questioned him about 
his former affiliation with leftist organizations and unsuccessfully demanded that he 
reveal the names of the others who had been involved. 141 His case was neither 
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unprecedented nor limited to U.S. citizens.142 Two months earlier, a Canadian 
ambassador had jumped to his death in response to senate allegations that he was a 
communist. Both the Ministry of External Affairs and the Department of State had 
expressed confidence in his integrity, yet the senate had proceeded with the 
investigation. After the suicide, the Canadian government expressed disappointment 
with the U.S. legislature while opposition leaders charged it with-"murder by 
slander."143 
Supreme Count decisions gradually began to restore the civil liberties which 
had been abridged in the quest for national security. The most important required that 
convictions under the Smith Act be based on evidence of an actual conspiracy to 
overthrow the government, rather than an affinity for the writings of bygone Soviet 
rulers. 144 The federal loyalty program continued but limited its focus to sensitive 
positions. 145 While congressional investigations declined sharply, this was less due to 
public opposition than to the lack of evidence that they remained necessary. They had 
reflected nearly ubiquitous support for the nation's position in the Cold War while 
encouraging the self-censorship of meaningful dissent. 146 The U.S. reign of terror, 
though mild by French or Soviet standards, had been remarkably effective. 147 
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Americans were relieved that McCarthyism yielded to Nixonism, a less 
belligerent version of the same phenomenon, 148 and they had to accept that the 
limitation of either one. Millions of foreign communists remained diametrically 
opposed to U.S. interests,149 and the Soviet Union had appeared to surpass U.S. 
technology for delivering intercontinental missiles. 150 Public anxiety over the 
growing number and destructives of nuclear weapons had contributed to spy scares. 151 
In their aftermath, war scares had also reached new heights. The Eisenhower 
administration continued to portray the communist threat in ominous terms to ensure 
that citizens would remain vigilant. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gained the 
most notoriety for the harshness of his rhetoric. 152 For example, Life magazine 
depicted him as a war-monger who traveled the world seeking to terrify foreigners as 
much as he terrified Americans. 153 
In November 1958 the Soviet Union insisted on renegotiating the four-power 
occupation status of Berlin. Otherwise it pledged to support the East German 
government in any war which might result from western non-compliance. Since the 
admission of West Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization three years 
earlier, 154 the United States had repeatedly held that any attack against it would be 
tantamount to a declaration of war.155 Eisenhower had determined that it would not 
automatically resort to nuclear weapons in that case, but recognized that there might 
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be no other way to halt Soviet troops. 156 Since the ultimatum over Berlin held the 
possibility of forcing him to apply the doctrine of massive retaliation, he proposed 
that general negotiations, including topics such as arms control and disarmament, 
which might help to defuse the crisis. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was willing 
to consider this, for he also recognized that military conflict would be self-
destructive. 157 
Neither side was prepared to back down in the "war of nerves" which 
followed. 158 The United States insisted that the USSR had no legal basis for 
withdrawing from the occupation agreement, 159 which the USSR insisted had been 
nullified by West Germany's admission to NATO. The six-month deadline for a 
resolution, imposed by the Soviet Union, led to a compromise: a foreign ministers 
conference rather than the summit meeting which Khrushchev preferred. Delegations 
from the four occupying powers and East and West Germany convened in Geneva 
from May to August 1959, and the Soviet Union withdrew its deadline and pledged 
not to cede control of its sector to East Germany while negotiations were 
underway .160 Some analysts regretted that the crisis was promoting western 
acquiescence to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Not only had Khrushchev 
announced his preference for a divided Germany; the conference had bestowed 
legitimacy on the East German govemment.161 
156 FRUS1958-1960, vol. 3, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington: 
USGPO, 1996), 79-97. 
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The Geneva Conference had started to allay concerns that the White House 
was so obsessed with military issues as to discount the value of negotiations. 162 
Eisenhower went further by inviting Khrushchev to visit the United States, and the 
immediate risk of a global conflict subsided when the Soviet premier accepted. In 
September 1959 Americans responded with horror and delight as he toured a number 
of major cities before proceeding to Camp David for discussions with Eisenhower. 
Charles E. Morris describes his visit as a "traveling circus."163 Khrushchev, though 
not always charming, was less inhuman and recalcitrant than Americans had 
expected. 164 He praised Eisenhower for having had the courage and wisdom to invite 
him, 165 and for recognizing that peaceful coexistence was more than a slogan. 166 Like 
the conference, the visit served to demonstrate that the U.S. attitude toward 
communism was far more permissive than at the height of McCarthyism. 167 The 
Communist Party, still outlawed but permitted to function, interpreted this as proof 
that U.S. Cold War policies had failed. 168 
Six weeks later the Antarctic Conference opened in Washington, attended by 
delegations from the four nations-Britain, France, the Soviet Union and United 
States-whose conflict over Berlin had yet to be resolved. The other delegations 
were of less importance in the struggle between democracy and communism, and they 
hoped to prevent it from engulfing the frozen continent. The treaty which they helped 
to negotiate included articles which prohibited nuclear tests and the disposal of 
162 Repeated statements by the secretary of state had generated this impression. See The New York 
Times, 16 January 1958; George F. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 
(1959): 187-210. 
163 Morris, Iron Destinies, 153. 
164 USWA 1959: 163-64. 
165 SIA 1959-60: 42-43. 
166 See FRUS 1958-1960, vol. 9, Berlin Crisis I959-1960; Germany; Austria (Washington: USGPO, 
1993), 40-41, 50-51; Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," Foreign Affairs 36, no. 3 
(1958): 371-82. 
167 See FRUS 1958-1960, 9: 42-45. 
168 The New York Times, 3 November 1959. 
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radioactive waste. 169 Though disputes emerged, they were resolved in a more genuine 
spirit of peaceful coexistence than applicable to the populated continents. The seven 
nations with territorial claims had yielded to the inclusion of five others whose rights 
were either less credible or undeclared. 170 To do otherwise would have been unlikely 
as both superpowers were among the non-claimants, yet the treaty signed in 
December 1959 exempted one region from the security dilemmas which confounded 
the rest of the planet. 171 
The ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, which had not yet been sent to the 
senate, met a potential setback in May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down an 
U.S. reconnaissance plane over its territory. 172 Eisenhower had already determined 
that a comparable violation of U.S. airspace might warrant a declaration of war, and 
there were no indications that Khrushchev would respond lightly. The president had 
authorized the flights upon assurances that they were unlikely to be discovered, and 
the incident met his worst fears of a publicity disaster. 173 After his initial denial, 
followed by various half-truths and untruths, he accepted full responsibility and 
insisted that surveillance was necessary to defend the nation from a Soviet missile 
attack. He refused either to blame others within his administration or to apologize to 
Khrushchev. Fortunately, the Soviet premier refrained from any military response, 
169 See chapter one. 
170 The seven claimant nations were Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and 
Norway. The five non-claimants were Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 
171 See Phillip W. Quigg, A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica (New York: McGraw Hill 
Book Company, 1983), 153; Richard S. Lewis, A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure (New 
York: Viking Press, 1965), 282. Ronald Powaski writes that the Antarctic Treaty provided the one of 
the few "bright spot[s]' in a dismal year of international relations. Powaski, The Cold War, 125. 
172 The Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs observed that this incident "was the reality, Camp David 
the illusion, of international politics." SIA 1959-60: 10. 
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simply abandoning his summit meeting with Eisenhower in Paris. 174 
George Kennan regarded the U-2 incident as destroying the career of the one 
Soviet statesman with whom a more peaceful form of coexistence might have been 
achieved.175 Most Americans, on the other hand, blamed Khrushchev for both the 
failure of the summit and the ongoing dispute over Berlin, whereas they admired the 
"dignity" which had motivated their president to accept responsibility for the 
incident. 176 Charles R. Morris writes that the goodwill surrounding Khrushchev's 
visit had now been irretrievably lost. 177 The Soviet premier was no longer praising 
Eisenhower, but excoriating his attempt to justify an unjustifiable action-however 
differently Americans chose to view it. 178 The senate was left to debate the Antarctic 
Treaty in a much different environment than when it had been signed eight months 
earlier. Its ratification affirmed that the U.S. commitment to peace had not been fully 
extinguished. 179 
This outcome was also desirable from a practical standpoint. In 1958 the 
Department of State had tabled the internationalization proposal which laid the 
groundwork of the treaty. The first U.S. internationalization proposal, circulated one 
decade earlier, had not succeeded primarily due to its call to renounce sovereignty. 
Many senators favored a declaration of the nation's rights since the second proposal 
allowed territorial claims to remain in place, though not to be enforced. Documents 
reveal that they appreciated the patriotic merit of a claim, as espoused most fervently 
174 He also cancelled the president's invitation to visit the USSR. Lunak, "Khrushchev and the Berlin 
crisis," 67-68; FRUS 1958-1960, 10/1: 522-28, 532-33. 
175 Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1986), 379. 
176 See Diggins, The Proud Decades, 337-38. 
177 Morris, Iron Destinies, 147. 
178 FRUS1958-1960, 9: 439-40, 452-53; Beschloss, Mayday, 259. 
179 In his state-of-the-union address, Eisenhower had referred to the Antarctic Treaty as "one instance 
where our initiative for peace has recently been successful," and stressed that the U.S. "is always ready 
to participate with the Soviet Union in serious discussions of these or any other subject that may lead to 
peace with justice." The New York Times, 8 January 1960. 
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by Elizabeth A. Kendall, apparently the only American concerned enough about the 
issue to engage in a letter-writing campaign. They also appreciated her desire to 
exclude the USSR. 180 The fact remained that the nation's credibility was at stake 
since it had invited Soviet participation. Given the pace of Antarctic diplomacy, a 
better alterative might have been impossible or required another ten years to 
negotiate. 181 
The New York Times commended the senate for displaying "political wisdom and 
maturity" in the face of Soviet military threats and an ongoing campaign of espionage 
directed against the American people. According to the editors, the ratification was a 
productive means of combating "the paranoid atmosphere reigning in Moscow."182 
This observation demonstrated that the atmosphere reigning in Washington bore 
traces of McCarthyism. Congressional investigations had waned, yet citizens 
remained subject to fines or imprisonment if they failed to comply. The Supreme 
Court had limited the scope of the Fifth Amendment by requiring witnesses to provide 
self-incriminating testimony while exempting them from prosecution based on their 
own words. This ruling failed to uphold the spirit of the Fifth Amendment as self-
incriminating testimony might lead to further revelations from which a citizen would 
not be exempt from prosecution.183 The attitude of The New York Times toward the 
ratification of the Antarctic Treaty betrayed the us-versus-them logic which the 
180 See chapter five. 
181 Peter Briggs writes that the delay between the two U.S. proposals revealed that "diplomacy is a slow 
business." Peter Briggs, Laboratory at the Bottom of the World (New York: David McKay Company, 
Inc., 1970), 17. 
182 The New York Times, 12 August 1960. 
183 Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 341; Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), 367; The New York 
Times, 27 March 1956. 
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government had institutionalized. 184 
The wisdom of the treaty was less certain than the anticommunist mood of the 
nation and the gravity of the Berlin crisis. The traits widely attributed to the Soviet 
Union-by journalists, senators and the public at large-were not those of a reliable 
partner in the Antarctic or anywhere else. 185 They were the traits of a nation which 
still sought to overthrow the U.S. government despite the relative harmlessness of the 
American Politburo.186 Any rationale for including it in the treaty lacked harmony 
with the federal loyalty program and national security apparatus. The "Soviet thrust 
into the Antarctic," of which Congressional Record had warned, could be expected to 
continue in spite of the treaty's demilitarization clauses. 187 While this risk was benign 
compared to Soviet troops overrunning Europe, a substantial minority of senators had 
attempted to defeat it. Their effort was unsuccessful despite being more consistent 
with the American thrust in world affairs. 
Senator Richard B. Russell summarized that his colleagues who favored the 
treaty did so only because of their "blind and unreasoning faith in the Department of 
State." The treaty was not "diametrically" opposed to U.S. national interests, as he 
claimed, 188 but the Department of State had made no effort to clarify the arguments in 
its favor. Indeed there was some merit in seeking to cooperate with the Soviet Union 
in Antarctica. Publicity of its scientific achievements -the most likely 
184 See Levin, Political Hysteria in America, 220; Hogan, A Cross of Iron, 209. 
185 For example, in his state-of-the-union address in 1954, Eisenhower said, "When a citizen knowingly 
participates in the communist conspiracy he no longer holds allegiance to the United States." Opinion 
polls indicated that eighty percent of Americans favored his proposal to deprive such individuals of 
their citizenship. By 1960 the "communist conspiracy" appeared somewhat less foreboding, but the U-
2 affair put an end to the emerging detente. See Beschloss, Mayday, 357; Whitfield, The Culture of the 
Cold War, 14-15; The New York Times, 8 January 1954. 
186 Attorney General J. Howard McGrath stated that the conviction of the eleven communists was based 
on their intent rather than their behavior. He elaborated, "I do not think [they] could accomplish the 
overthrow of the government. Let us not be hysterical and lose our balance over it." The New York 
Times, 21 October 1949. 
187 Congressional Record, 17 July 1957. 
188 The New York Times, 11August1960. 
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"threat"-was bound to flourish regardless of its presence in the Antarctic. 189 As 
important, the failure of the treaty would not have encouraged it to withdraw from the 
continent. The Department of State had enjoyed the opportunity to make such 
arguments in favor of ratification, but chosen to let it pass. Russell was correct that 
the faith demonstrated by his colleagues was unprompted. Whether it was also 
unjustified depended on perceptions of the treaty's significance-which the majority 
of senators determined was minor enough to justify setting aside traditional national 
interests. 
As Sanjay Chaturvedi notes, this outcome was not guaranteed. 190 In fact the 
day of the vote a Department of State official commented that the treaty appeared to 
lack the necessary support. 191 The eight-vote margin by which it passed was a 
welcome surprise, but no cause for jubilation. The department had taken a passive 
approach because it also questioned the wisdom of involving the USSR, though 
attempting to exclude it might have been counterproductive. Once the Soviet 
presence in Antarctica had been established, in preparation for the International 
Geophysical Year (I G Y), officials took a conciliatory line while nurturing hope that 
it might be voluntarily rescinded.192 This hope had always been distant, and it passed 
altogether when many of the IGY participants, including the Soviet Union, chose to 
extend their activities in the far south. 193 While the treaty provided effective 
189 For concern about this kind of Soviet propaganda in the Antarctic, see Embassy in Wellington 
(Crutcher) to Department of State, 10 March 1958, no. 479, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in 
Moscow (Mark) to Department of State, 15 August 1958, no. 115, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. These 
documents reflect the more general concern that "applause for communist science in many parts of the 
world is applause for communism itself." See Edward Teller and Allen Brown, The Legacy of 
Hiroshima (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 144. 
19° Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica, 97. 
191 The New York Times, 11 August 1960. 
192 For example, Department of State, Memorandum by Office oflnter-American Regional Political 
Affairs (Wilson), 22 July 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
193 The National Security Council initially favored drafting a U.S. territorial claim in consultation with 
the friendly claimant nations, to be announced after the completion of the IGY on 31 December 1958. 
It was rumored that the USSR planned to stay thereafter. The Department of State sought to limit post-
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guidelines for preserving the status quo, the Department of State was not oblivious to 
concerns that it still might fail to "mollify an implacable aggressor."194 
Senator Thomas J. Dodd argued that the Treaty, despite its many noble 
objectives, had to be viewed as "an act of appeasement" since it made the USSR an 
equal partner with the United States and ten other "free world" nations. 195 What he 
viewed as appeasement, others viewed as idealism, necessity or both. Five years 
earlier the charge of appeasement would have generated more alarm. A decade earlier 
it might have caused the entire government to quiver, as when McCarthy made his 
initial allegation that the Department of State was infested with communists. 196 
However, by 1960 some form of appeasement had become necessary to prevent the 
dispute over Berlin from igniting a nuclear confrontation. If the Antarctic Treaty had 
been defeated on the grounds that it constituted appeasement, then Eisenhower might 
have been subject to charges of treason. Not only had he invited Khrushchev to visit 
the United States; the Communist Party claimed to have benefited as a result. 197 
The Department of State viewed the treaty's ratification much as it had viewed 
the press conference which followed Operation High Jump's return to the United 
States in April 1947. Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd and his second-in-command held 
in a friendly debate as regards the strategic value of Antarctica. Byrd, contrary to his 
IGY activities to a minimum and thus discourage the USSR's involvement in a final resolution. 
However, this was an extremely infeasible objective since the USSR, like most nations active in the 
Antarctic at this time, expected that the United States was preparing a claim and still hoped to exclude 
it, in keeping with the first internationalization plan. See Department of State, Bureau oflnter-
American Affairs (Snow) to Secretary of State, 26August1957, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; Department 
of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels) to Secretary of State, 13 November 1957, 
NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
194 In a letter to editor, Senator Thomas J. Dodd denounced the treaty as "a gratuitous giveaway of 
American rights in the hope that this will somehow mollify an implacable aggressor." The New York 
Times, 11 July 1960. 
195 For the similar opinions of Senators Clair Engle and Ernest Gruening, see The New York Times, 15 
June 1960. 
196 See Melvyn Leffler, "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War," 
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197 One headline declared, "Communists Here See Party Gaining" from Khrushchev's trip. The New 
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250 
personal convictions, insisted that it was minimal while Admiral Richard H. Cruzen 
held that it was sufficient to warrant a declaration of U.S. rights. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the event was staged in hope of gauging public opinion. The press 
was favorable to a declaration of U.S. rights, though the issue was not of great 
importance to Americans at large.198 The ratification process forced senators to 
grapple with the merit of a treaty which clearly did "appease" the Soviet Union, and 
the Department of State was uncertain both of the outcome and which one it might 
prefer. 199 
The non-ratification of the treaty would have a minor source of embarrassment 
for the Eisenhower administration-at least domestically. Dread pertaining to Soviet 
advances was understandable, but the U.S. Navy had proved its aptitude in the region 
and the risk of major hostilities was infinitesimal. Likewise the loyalty program and 
federal legislation had virtually eliminated the threat of internal subversion. A Soviet 
offensive in Antarctica was no more likely than the Communist Party overthrowing 
the government. In the scope of world affairs, Antarctica was a flea on the back of a 
dog, as David Caute describes the Communist Party of the United States.2°0 To 
collaborate with the Soviet enemy in such an environment provided a token of 
goodwill which was more difficult or impossible to achieve elsewhere. 
The first internationalization proposal, which the Department of State 
circulated in June 1948, had sought to exclude the Soviet Union from the Antarctic by 
forging a condominium arrangement with the seven claimant nations. This objective 
198 This was a consistent trend. See Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a 
Resource Age (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985), 21. 
199 The non-ratification of the treaty might have led to the formation of a three-power arrangement with 
Australia and New Zealand, as clandestinely under discussion in case the twelve-power negotiations 
were to break down-as often seemed likely. Another three-power arrangement was under 
consideration by Argentina, Britain and Chile. There is no evidence that these arrangements could 
have been implemented. In some ways they might have been more difficult than the Treaty. See Jason 
Kendall Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and 
Chilean-Australian Relations through 1959," Revista de Historia 13-14 (2003-4): 173-78. 
20° Caute, The Great Fear, 185. 
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was perfectly in keep with the Truman Doctrine to halt the spread of communism, and 
it gained a sense of urgency when the Soviet qnion blockaded western access to 
Berlin. The claimant nations, though not all staunchly pro-U.S., responded favorably 
to the anti-Soviet nature of the proposal. They contested the need to renounce their 
sovereignty, as called for, and pursued means of surmounting this issue. The 
following August, Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose to revise U.S. policy in 
accord with the Chilean Escudero Plan, which had called for "shelving" the 
sovereignty issue for five to ten years during which the technicalities of the 
arrangement could be negotiated.201 
This hopeful development failed to produce results for a variety of reasons, 
none of which related to the common objective of excluding the USSR. Between the 
initial U.S. proposal and Acheson's acceptance of the Escudero Plan, China fell under 
communist rule and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed. Shortly 
thereafter the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon, further highlighting the 
need for a consensus in the Antarctic. Negotiations stalled as U.S. attention shifted to 
the Korean War, and the claimant nations had little reason to believe that the Soviet 
Union would annex the continent in the near future. The U.S. commitment to an 
eight-power agreement seemed likely to persist as the Truman administration had 
instigated the loyalty program and begun criminal proceedings against leaders of the 
Communist Party. 
The outlook for an agreement improved, at least conceptually, when the 
Eisenhower administration strengthened the loyalty program and congress outlawed 
the Communist Party. The goal of excluding the Soviet Union from the frozen terrain 
complemented these policies but was less urgent from a domestic standpoint. The 
201 See chapter one. 
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U.S. role in the world now adopted the doctrine of massive retaliation. While there 
was no cause to threaten its application in Antarctica-since Washington had not 
announced a territorial claim and the region fell outside the purview of either NATO 
or the Warsaw Pact-Eisenhower's anticommunist resolve was beyond question. 
Unfortunately, from a North American standpoint, preparations for the International 
Geophysical Year ushered the Soviet enemy to the shores of the last continent. The 
second U.S. internationalization proposal sought to avoid controversy by involving 
the USSR. This change of policy was not unreasonable, though many of the claimant 
nations-like some officials within the Department of State-questioned its 
validity.202 
Like the senators who voted in favor of the treaty, the Eisenhower 
administration appreciated the case in favor of a national claim as well as the 
hypothetical benefit of reverting to an eight-power arrangement. Its decision to 
include the USSR entailed a degree of frustration which was more readily understood 
than internalized. The perspective of Thomas J. Dodd and his colleagues failed to 
resonate since Antarctica had no constituency, and anti-communist themes were more 
effectively applied to people and conspiracies rather than a distant continent primarily 
known for its scientific value. The senate debate might have been more memorable if 
McCarthy or Byrd had been involved, and resulted in a more decisive vote one way or 
the other. The final margin was adequate but uninspired.203 The same might be 
observed of the treaty, for it was the product of forced optimism rather than of 
virtue.204 
202 See chapter one. 
203 The 66:21 margin by which the Treaty passed was very narrow compared to the overwhelming or 
unanimous margin given to anticommunist legislation. The tally was 38 Democrats and 28 Republicans 
in favor, and 17 Democrats and 4 Republicans against. The New York Times, 11 August 1960. 
204 Moore, "The Constructive Limits." 
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Barton J. Bernstein asserts that Truman was a victim of his own policies as 
they gave rise to McCarthyism.205 Eisenhower might have borne no direct 
responsibility for the former president being called before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, 206 but his anticommunist policies were even more rigid. The 
Antarctic difficulty which faced his administration paralleled Truman's in relation to 
McCarthyism. The Department of State had made countless declarations in favor of 
international cooperation at the bottom of the world, and the Soviet Union had sought 
the opportunity to participate in a final resolution. For the Eisenhower administration 
to deny it that opportunity would have exposed the disingenuousness of its own 
rhetoric. As Truman was not forced to testify, the government was not forced to 
pursue an arrangement without Soviet participation-which might have been more 
difficult than the alternative.207 A sense of relief accompanied both outcomes. 
As the government would have had little difficulty making an Antarctic claim, 
it would have had little difficulty arresting thousands or tens of thousands of domestic 
communists. It refrained from either course lest the apprehension surrounding its 
policies be fully legitimated. Journalists accurately reported that it was considering a 
territorial claim and using the continent for further military testing. Others held that 
the nation's persecution of domestic communists offended the nation's traditional 
devotion to free speech and association. Meanwhile the government denied abusing 
or planning to abuse its power, and its denial was not implausible. In the Antarctic it 
maintained a status quo to its own detriment while its purge of domestic communists 
led to no more than a few hundred arrests, followed by many acquittals or relatively 
short sentences. U.S. Cold War policies, though often poorly formulated or 
205 See Bernstein, "America in War and Peace," 131; Freeland, The Truman Doctrine, 360. 
206 Eisenhower told the press that he would not have subpoenaed Truman, whom he claimed to regard 
as a patriot, and that he had not been informed beforehand of the attorney-general's declaration 
regarding Harry Dexter White. The New York Times, 12 November 1953, 17 November 1953. 
207 See footnote 199. 
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counterproductive or both,208 were tempered by the nation's innate political 
conservatism.209 
The next chapter pertains to the arms race which brought not only the 
superpowers but all humanity to the brink of Armageddon. While this issue has been 
discussed in several of the preceding chapters, it merits separate consideration to 
underscore the influence of world opinion on the United States' decision to accept the 
Antarctic Treaty's inclusion of a nuclear test ban. This decision, though inconsistent 
with U.S. national security policies, incurred no serious risks. The only risk was that 
the USSR might retain the diplomatic advantage which it gained primarily through 
advocating a global test ban. 
208 See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Post-War International 
System," International Security 10, no. 4 (1986): 99-142. 
209 See Kohn, American Nationalism, 223; Levin, Political Hysteria in America, 220. 
7. The Anti-Nuclear Movement 
In the 1920s U.S. journalists began to include scientific developments among the most 
newsworthy events, a trend which greatly increased after the Second World War 
demonstrated that technology was capable of altering the course ofhistory.1 Research 
and development during the Cold War assumed a military emphasis to the detriment 
of those scientists who sought funding for purely theoretical work.2 Though nuclear 
physics had once fallen into that category, the government was loath to believe that 
other fields would lead to such monumental breakthroughs--or that they would be 
needed in the effort to protect the "free world" from communist aggression. Many 
scientists needed no encouragement to join security-related projects while others did 
so only out of necessity and contrary to their predisposition to believe that science 
should be used for the benefit of all humankind. Michael Aaron Dennis write that, in 
this regard, many scientists appeared to be communists or communist sympathizers, 3 
yet the vast majority were prudent enough not to state or imply any affinity for the 
Soviet model. 4 
Journals such as Social Studies of Science have detailed many of the politically 
related aspects of science during the Cold War,5 a topic which is herein limited to the 
1 Bruce V. Lewenstein, "Cold Fusion and Hot History," Osiris 7 (1992): 135-63. 
2 By the late 1950s, approximately half of U.S. engineers and one quarter of scientists were employed 
by the federal government, and approximately two-thirds of scientific research at universities and in 
industry was government funded. Warner R. Schilling, "Scienists, Foreign Policy and Politics," in 
Scientists and National Policymaking, Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1964), 144-73. See also Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: The 
Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 13; Daniel J. 
Kevles, "Scientists, the Military, and the Control of Postwar Defense Research: The Case of the 
Research Board for National Security, 1944-46," Technology and Culture 16, no. I (1975): 20-47. 
3 Michael Aaron Dennis, "Accounting for Research: New Histories or Corporate Laboratories and the 
Social History of American Science," Social Studies of Science 17, no. 3 (1987): 479- 518. 
4 For a discussion of the self-censorship of government critics, whether scientists or otherwise, see the 
previous chapter. 
5 For example, C. Stewart Gilmor, "Federal Funding and Knowledge Growth in Ionospheric Physics, 
1945-81," Social Studies of Science 16, no. I (1986): 105-33; David A. Hounshell, "Epilogue:-
Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; Rethinking the Social 
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arms race, the most universally significant, well-publicized, and contentious 
application of human ingenuity. After the success of the U.S. atomic bomb, the 
development of which he had overseen, J. Robert Oppenheimer wrote that nuclear 
physicists had known a sin for which they would never be able to deny 
responsibility.6 Few U.S. officials felt a similar sense of guilt or any guilt whatsoever. 
One senator expressed the more popular sentiment that the United States must "move 
forward with the atomic bomb in one hand and the cross in the other."7 The 
government's effort to do so was less successful than anticipated, as discussed in the 
previous chapters, and its "atomic diplomacy" met with increasing negative opinion 
which helped to exempt at least one continent, the Antarctica, from weapons of mass 
destructions. 8 
Proposals to regulate the use of atomic energy met limited success after the 
Second World War. The development of peaceful initiatives, such as reactors, failed 
to curtail the possibility that the next major war would eradicate human civilization. 
The link between science and destruction was more salient than that between science 
and international cooperation, the declared objectives of U.S. Antarctic policy. Early 
suggestions to use atomic bombs to gain access to continent's mineral resources were 
never pursued for many reasons, such as the danger of flooding coastlines.9 By the 
mid-1950s that risk seemed benign compared to a nuclear exchange in which 
Study of Science and Technology," Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 289-97; David K. van 
Keuren, "Cold War Science in Black and White: U.S. Intelligence Gathering and Its Scientific Cover at 
the Naval Research Laboratory, 1948-62," Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 207-29; Mark 
Solovey, "Introduction: Science and the State during the Cold War: Blurred Boundaries and a 
Contested Legacy," Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 165-70. 
6 Quoted in Brian Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms 
Race (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1983), 85. 
7 Senator Edward Martin quoted in Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 87. 
8 The term "atomic diplomacy" gained currency in the 1960s and was closely associated with the New 
Left. Since then many other authors have agreed with the premise of the term that the United States 
sought to use its briefly held atomic monopoly to extract concessions from the Soviet Union. See 
Lloyd J. Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting," 
Journal of American History 72, no. 4 (1986): 888-907. 
9 The New York Times, 31January1946, 2 February 1946, 13 February 1946. See chapter five. 
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hundreds of millions would perish and the survivors would envy the dead. 10 
International negotiations pertaining to the future of Antarctica never dwelled on that 
scenario, though in the final days of the Antarctic Conference in Washington, the U.S. 
delegation objected to a Soviet proposal to include a nuclear test but quickly yielded 
due to pressure from the Southern Hemisphere nations. 11 
This chapter provides an overview of the anti-nuclear movement and its 
bearing on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. While previous chapters have alluded to the 
"bomb" relative to U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-British relations, as well as U.S. national 
security policies, this chapter analyses the increasing hostility of world opinion 
toward the U.S. nuclear program. A U.S. rejection of the test ban would not have 
altered the global balance of power. However, it would have incurred extremely 
negative publicity at a time when officials were actively seeking to improve their 
nation's reputation abroad. The Soviet Union's reputation, though by no means 
impeccable, benefited from its persistent calls for a global test ban and the prohibition 
of the use of nuclear weapons. 12 In early 1958 it announced a voluntary suspension 
which the United States and Britain agreed to uphold after finishing their current 
series of tests. Five years later the three nations signed and ratified a formal ban 
which did not extend to underground tests. In the interim the Antarctic Treaty had 
exempted one continent from all forms of nuclear tests. 
The 1963 ban held greater significance as no nuclear warheads had been 
stationed in the far south and, even if the treaty had not included a ban, tests would 
have required justification in keeping with its demilitarization protocols. Without 
10 See John Strachey, On the Prevention of War (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 7-8; Bertrand 
Russell, Has Man a Future? (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), 33. 
11 See chapter three. 
12 See Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1957), 365-66. 
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success the U.S. delegation sought to reserve this possibility. 13 The reviewed 
documents affirm press coverage at the time that it had not expected the Soviet 
proposal, 14 so its position was not as fully developed as it otherwise might have been. 
By default it reflected the conviction that nuclear tests, however justified, were 
essential to deter Soviet aggression. This conviction had been reinforced by the non-
use of weapons of mass destruction since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Its applicability 
to the Antarctic remained questionable in light of the region's minimal strategic 
importance. The risk of Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe was exponentially 
greater while bombers, submarines and short-range missiles provided more efficient 
means of delivering a strike. U.S. acceptance of the ban indicated that officials 
viewed tests in the Antarctic as desirable though non-essential. 
This chapter dwells on how U.S. officials responded to the Soviet "peace 
offensive" which they viewed as a guise to undermine their national security, much as 
Soviet officials viewed the U.S. linkage of inspection rights to arms control proposals 
as a guise for espionage. 15 The "peace offensive" led to the Antarctic Treaty's 
inclusion of the first nuclear prohibition in history. While equivocal bans were briefly 
considered, they were abandoned in favor of the Soviet-sponsored total ban. 16 A 
growing number of anti-nuclear activists called for imposing such a ban worldwide. 
They included communists, non-communists and anti-communists who believed that 
13 See U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary of 
State (Merchant), 17 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Department of State (Fergusson), 
Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. 
14 For example, The New York Times, 28 November 1959. 
15 See Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after 
Hiroshima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 25; Henry A. Kissinger, "Missiles and the 
Western Alliance," Foreign Affairs 36, no. 3 (1958): 383-400; John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and 
Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs 36, no. 1 (1957): 25-43; USWA 1958 (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1959), 55-57. 
16 U.S. documents are not entirely consistent with British documents on the positions assumed by the 
Argentine, Australian and Soviet delegations. The discrepancies pertain to which delegation first 
presented a ban and whether it was to be comprehensive in nature. See Embassy in Washington 
(Caccia) to Foreign Office, 22 October 1959, A 15214/260; Embassy in Washington (Hankey) to 
Foreign Office (Hildyard), 5 November 1959, A 15214/332, 5 November 1959, A 1521, PRO, FO 371. 
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self-preservation must transcend questions of ideology. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower acknowledged that their campaign directly influenced his acceptance of 
the voluntary test suspension in 1958, at which point it was still gathering momentum. 
It is true that few of the activists might have regarded the Antarctic Treaty as germane 
to their quest to save people rather than penguins, 17 yet they indirectly contributed to 
the U.S. decision to accept the test ban. 
Many of the physicists involved with developing the atomic bomb 
recommended consulting with the Soviet Union before using it against Japan, in hope 
that an arms race might be avoided. After their advice was neglected and relations 
with the Soviet Union quickly soured, they began to mobilize public opinion in favor 
of international control mechanisms which would not benefit either side in the Cold 
War. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists offered a range of perspectives which sometimes 
diverged from that of the editor, Eugene Rabinowitch, who never tired of criticizing 
U.S. policy. The government dismissed the publication as unfairly biased while 
having to accept that its tenor was gaining currency around the world. 18 This chapter 
draws heavily from the Bulletin since most of its contributors wrote with first-hand 
knowledge not only of science but of the moral dilemmas related to its application. 
They helped to counteract the public's tendency to ignore questions oflife-and-
death, 19 offering strategic insights which U.S. officials selectively adopted. 
In December 1938 two physicists at the University of Berlin split an atom of uranium 
by bombarding it with neutrons, a process known as fission which substantiated 
17 A Department of State official had once adopted this reasoning to determine that the UN trusteeship 
system was inapplicable to Antarctica. Department of State, Office of European Affairs (Raynor) to 
Division ofNorthem European Affairs (Green), 27 January 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
18 See Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, vol. 2, Resisting the Bomb: A History of 
the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970 (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 134-35. 
19 See Philip Wylie, "Panic, Psychology and the Bomb," BAS 10, no. 2 (1954): 37-40, 63. 
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Albert Einstein's hypothesis that mass held the potential to release a great amount of 
energy. 20 While the physicists did not immediately grasp the military significance of 
their experiment, this became the subject of hundreds of articles written by other 
physicists and sensationalized by the press. The doomsday themes which 
characterized science fiction suddenly encroached upon the realm of fact. Journalists 
around the world began to speculate that the future of the planet might be imperiled if 
further experiments were conducted. Scientific American observed that tabloids could 
not have hoped for better material and that their most alarming predictions were not 
beyond comprehension. 21 Less than half a century had passed between the discovery 
of radioactivity and the splitting of the atom; now scientists were poised to make even 
more rapid breakthroughs. 22 
Years earlier the Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard had warned that the atom 
held a tremendous capacity for destruction. Shortly after fleeing to Britain to escape 
persecution by the Third Reich, he had acquired two patents related to the 
construction of an atomic bomb though failed to generate interest within the 
government. 23 The 193 8 experiment heightened his revolve to develop a weapon 
before the Germans did, and this objective was shared by other refugee scientists, 
many of whom were Jewish. In late 1939 Szilard drafted a letter to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, warning that Germany might use uranium from Czechoslovakian mines 
to develop an atomic bomb. Einstein lent his name to it in hope that the message 
20 Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to 
the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 3. 
21 Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), 77-80. The editor of Scientific American publication later elaborated, "Man 
has taken his life in his hands." Arthur Herzog, The War-Peace Establishment (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1963), xi-xii. 
22 Brian Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race 
(London: Pluto Press Limited, 1983), 40. 
23 Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons (London: Michael Joseph, 1981 ), 3-7. 
261 
would not be ignored, and indeed it was not.24 After reading the letter, Roosevelt 
declared, "This requires action." It has been suggested that those words marked the 
U.S. entry into the nuclear arms race.25 
Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and Development in 
June 1941, placing it under the direction ofVannevar Bush, an engineer by training 
who also chaired the National Defense Resources Board established the previous year 
to develop military applications for science. The office shared this objective while 
focusing more specifically on uranium research. 26 American scientists shared 
Szilard's belief that this was only prudent and, like Roosevelt and many other 
officials, they regarded their nation's entry into the war as extremely likely. The 
following month British physicists determined that an atomic bomb was theoretically 
feasible and should be pursued with haste given the assumption that the side which 
first developed the technology would also be the first to use it. In October Bush 
gained authorization to proceed with the research directed to that end, and the 
following year Roosevelt ordered the production phase to commence.27 
The Manhattan Project, as the secret U.S. initiative was know, brought civilian 
scientists under military jurisdiction for a longer and more closely supervised period 
than even before.28 Bush maintained positive relations with army personnel, whereas 
24 Lapp, The New Priesthood, 48-49; Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its 
Legacies, 3rd ed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 27. 
25 Powaski, March to Armageddon, 4-5. 
26 The board was later placed under jurisdiction of the office. Donald C. Swain, "Organization of 
Military Research," in Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., eds., Technology in Western 
Civilization, vol. 2, Technology in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
535-48. For further elaboration, see James Phinney Baxter III, Scientists against Time (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1946), 14-15. 
27 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission, vol. 1, The New World, 1939-1946 (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1962), 45-46; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 13, 30-31; Lapp, The New 
Priesthood, 60. 
28 Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Reardon, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 6; James L. Penick, Jr., et al., eds., The Politics of American 
Science 1939 to the Present, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1972), 10. 
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the scientists often displayed contempt for individual officers or the army's 
bureaucratic procedures or both. 29 Herbert York and Allen Greb somewhat 
misleadingly refer to the scientists as equal partners in the Manhattan Project. 30 This 
was the ideal to which Bush aspired, yet many of the scientists regarded themselves as 
more important to the war effort than the military itself, and they resented being 
subject to rigid system of compartmentalization which hampered their ability to share 
information. The army, on the other hand, resented their hubris and aversion to the 
chain of command. Its concern about espionage, though understandable, 
inadvertently delayed the bomb's production.31 
Another divisive issue arose over the whether an atomic weapon should be 
used unless absolutely necessary. In the perspective of General Leslie D. Grove, 
commander of the Manhattan Project, the more important question was whether it 
would achieve victory more quickly than otherwise possible and thereby save 
American lives. This perspective contradicted the scientists' hope for atomic energy 
to eventually be used to benefit all humanity. 32 Most of all it was anathema to Niels 
Bohr's hope that U.S.-Soviet relations would not degenerate into an arms race. A 
Danish Jew, regarded as one of the world's leading physicists, he joined the 
Manhattan Project in 1944 and urged informing the Soviet Union of it.33 In a 
discussion with Roosevelt that August, it seemed that his idea might be given serious 
consideration. However, Roosevelt believed that the weapon might be useful in 
counteracting Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe, and he not only ignored Bohr's 
29 Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 44. 
30 Herbert York and Allen Greb, "Scientists as Advisers to Governments," in Joseph Rotblat, ed., 
Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1982), 83-99. 
31 See Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 48, 58-61; Lapp, The New Priesthood, 62. 
32 Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 58, 92 
33 Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 
1945-1949 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 31-32; Robert Gilpin, American Scientists 
and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 42-44. 
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recommendation; he placed him under surveillance to prevent any unauthorized 
disclosure of information. 34 
With the defeat of Germany rapidly approaching in early 1945 and no 
evidence that either it or Japan had made substantial progress in developing an atomic 
bomb, 35 many scientists lost enthusiasm for the Manhattan Project. Their motivation 
had related to saving the world from Hitler, whom they resented far more than the 
Japanese leaders who had ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor. 36 In March 
Einstein-who was never directly involved with the project-appealed to Roosevelt. 
He noted Bohr's concern about the poor communication between scientists and the 
military, as well as the risk of an arms race if the USSR were not consulted prior to a 
U.S. decision to use the bomb.37 Szilard also wrote a letter to the president which 
repeated these themes and urged a demonstration of the bomb's strength coupled with 
an invitation for the Soviet Union to participate in establishing a system of 
international control.38 The president died in April 1945 before reading either of the 
letters or choosing to act upon similar advice from Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson.39 
Harry S. Truman assumed the office of chief executive after serving as vice 
president for less than three months. He had conferred with Roosevelt on only two 
occasions, neither of which the former president had deemed appropriate for 
34 Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy (La 
Grange Park, Illinois: American Nuclear Society, 1982), 13-14; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for 
Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," Journal 
of American History 60, no. 4 (1974): 1003---44; Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins 
of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-45," American Historical Review 
78, no. 4 (1973): 945-68; Niels Bohr, "For an Open World," BAS 6, no. 7 (1950): 216-17, 219. 
35 See Powaski, March to Armageddon, 12-13. 
36 See Pringle and Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons, 32. 
37 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 61-63. 
38 See Leo Szilard, "Atomic Bombs and the Postwar Position of the United States in the 
World-1945," BAS3, 12 (1947): 351-53. 
39 Powaski, March to Armageddon, 10-11; Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 59. [Review 
citations.] 
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mentioning that the United States was on the verge of developing a weapon which, in 
the best case, would revolutionize the nature of international relations and serve to 
promote the nation's democratic ideals.40 In the interim Stimson had re-evaluated his 
position, contemplating that the time had come for the United States to speak with 
actions rather than words.41 The new president appointed a special committee to 
report on this issue and accepted its conclusion that no prior demonstration should be 
made in case the weapon failed, and that the first and only objective should be ending 
the war as quickly as possible.42 
Some of the Manhattan Project's leading figures, including Szilard and Bohr, 
dissented with the special committee's report. They issued a "solemn petition" 
known as the Franck Report which emphasized the need to view atomic energy in 
terms of the long-range objective of preventing an arms race with the Soviet Union 
rather than as a military expedient.43 The primary author was James Franck, a 
German physicist and Nobel laureate who believed that Japan should be given ample 
warning and the Soviet Union informed of the U.S. strategic agenda, lest postwar 
relations be mired in conflict. An informal poll found that many of the physicists in 
Chicago and Manhattan, for example, opposed using the bomb without making a 
demonstration beforehand,44 but their position was not typical of the tens of thousands 
of individuals affiliated with the project.45 It was more widely held among British 
scientists, some of whom compared using the atomic bomb against Japan to using a 
40 See Powaski, March to Armageddon, 13, 16; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 8. 
41 Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 74-75. 
42 See Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (London: Andre 
Deutsch Publishers, 1962), 265; Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, 16-18. 
43 See Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists, 
James Cleugh, trans. (London: Penguin Books, 1956), 169-70; Russell, Has Man a Future?, 20-21; 
Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable, 109. 
44 Powaski, March to Armageddon, 17-18; Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 
44-47; Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 107-8. 
45 See Lapp, The New Priesthood, 81-82; Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 41-42. 
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sledgehammer to crack a nut.46 
After Germany surrendered in May, officials throughout the Truman 
administration believed that Japan faced imminent defeat.47 It was known to be 
seeking the opportunity to discuss a conditional surrender with the Soviet Union, 
which had not yet entered the war in the Pacific and lacked enthusiasm to assume an 
intermediary role.48 Assistant Secretary of State Joseph D. Grew urged the White 
House to abandon its demand for an unconditional surrender and instead permit Japan 
to retain its emperor, as this was its only request. Allied broadcasts suggested that the 
emperor might be left in place after an unconditional surrender, but avoided making a 
firm commitment.49 There remained a number of ways to force the issue, such as 
further conventional bombing or a naval blockade. The atomic bomb was no longer 
essential from a military perspective,50 yet there remained many incentives to use it. 
For example, the government had invested over $2 billion for which it would 
eventually be held accountable.51 
In July Truman received news that the atomic bomb had been successfully 
tested, releasing the explosive force of nineteen thousand tons ofTNT.52 While this 
force could be achieved by traditional means, it required thousands of aircraft and 
46 Ronald W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb: The Untold Story of Britain's Part in the Weapon that 
Changed the World (London: Phoenix House Ltd., 1961 ), 191, 200; Lieberman, The Scorpion and the 
Tarantula, 156-59. 
47 V annevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving 
Democracy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 91 
48 See Edward Teller and Allen Brown, The Legacy of Hiroshima (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 
1962), 18-20; Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1954), 119-22. 
49 Powaski, March to Armageddon, 20-21. 
50 See John Newhouse, The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars (London: Michael Joseph, 
1989), 47; Stephen Harper, Miracle of Deliverance: The Case for the Bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985), 204; Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The 
Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 210; Barton J. 
Bernstein, "Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Non-Combatants, Using the Bomb, and his Defending 
the 'Decision'," Journal of Military History 62, no. 3 (1998): 547-70. 
51 Roosevelt had once remarked that the $2 billion spent on the bomb would never be investigated if it 
worked, though it would be mercilessly investigated by congress if it did not. Lapp, The New 
Priesthood, 63. 
52 Tom Huntington, "Dawn over Trinity," American History 36, no. 1 (2001): 18-21. 
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extensive logistical support. 53 The atomic bomb provided "the miracle of 
deliverance" in a single warhead. 54 Truman chose to withhold the details from the 
Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, as their meeting continued at the Potsdam Conference. 
When Stalin mentioned Japan's desire for a conditional surrender, Truman replied 
that he questioned its sincerity and would continue to demand unconditional terms.55 
He also mentioned, as an aside, that the United States had developed a weapon which 
might be helpful in forcing the Japan to acquiesce. What he failed to grasp was that 
Stalin already knew of the bomb by way of a Soviet agent within the Manhattan 
Project and, as the scientists had predicted, he regarded the U.S. position as 
tantamount to "atomic blackmail." Truman's only strategic deception was believing 
that he was in control. 56 
As discussed in chapter two, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
succeeded in bringing the Second World War to an end. Citizens throughout the 
Allied nations experienced a great sense of relief accompanied, at least initially, by a 
sense of jubilation. They were also forced to contemplate that the world would never 
be the same. One television broadcaster acknowledged that the atomic bomb was one 
of the greatest scientific achievement in modem times while suggesting that it could 
also be compared to Frankenstein. A St. Louis newspaper carried this theme further, 
claiming that the bomb had signed humankind's death warrant. James Reston of The 
New York Times wrote that Americans glimpsed their own future "in that terrible 
flash" ten thousand miles away while another journalist ventured that it would have 
been better if the bomb had failed and then been "bundled up in a sack and lost in a 
53 See George Thomson, "Hydrogen Bomb: The Need for a Policy," International Relations 26, no. 4 
(1950): 463-49. 
54 See Harper, Miracle of Deliverance. 
55 Hewlett and Anderson, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission 1: 386-87, 397-98. 
56 Vladislav M. Zubok, "Stalin and the Nuclear Age," in John Lewis Gaddis et al., eds., Cold War 
Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 39-61. See Bernard Brodie, "The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker," BAS 4, no. 12 (1948): 377-83. 
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river like an unwanted kitten." The title of an article in The Saturday Review grew so 
popular as to become a part of everyday speech: "Modern man is obsolete." 57 
A survey of Manhattan Project scientists after Japan's surrender found that 
most denied feeling any sense of no remorse. 58 They viewed themselves as simply 
having followed orders like those soldiers who had been on the front lines, and took 
pride in the fact that their research had saved up to a half million U.S. lives.59 That 
perspective contained an element of validity even though Japan might have been 
defeated by other means or surrendered upon assurances that the emperor would be 
retained, as he finally was, to the bemusement of many past and present observers.60 
What disturbed those individuals who had signed the Franck Report was not the loss 
of life in itself, but rather that it had not been absolutely imperative and had served to 
further antagonize the Soviet Union. Though many were communist sympathizers, 
their objection to bomb's use was not ideologically based. To an extent they felt 
guilty by association with what they regarded as the government's short-sidedness.61 
These scientists, though disappointed by their failure to influence the course of 
the Manhattan Project, remained devoted to the cooperative use of atomic energy.62 
George Kennan, leading architect of the containment doctrine, remarked that they 
were "as innocent as six-year-old maidens," and military officials held them in even 
lower esteem, as their stance often coincided with Soviet propaganda that the United 
57 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic 
Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 4-5, 14-15, 40. 
58 Weart, Nuclear Fear, 113. 
59 See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions 1945 (Hodder and Soughton Limited, 
1955), 347. That official estimate was greatly exaggerated. Paul Joseph, "Forgetting and 
Remembering Hiroshima in the U.S.," Policy Review 12, no. 2 (2000): 291-97; Stanley Goldberg, 
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States was an aggressive nation.63 In November they formed the Federation of 
Atomic Scientists, quickly renamed the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to 
reach a broader constituency. Within months it attracted over three thousand 
members, established liaisons with sixty non-governmental organizations, and 
launched Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the cover of which featured a doomsday 
clock set at seven minutes to midnight. It also followed Szilard's recommendation to 
create a parallel organization, directed by Einstein, which began raising funds to 
prevent humanity from being extinguished. 64 
The FAS sought to assure that the Manhattan Project would be brought under 
the political system of checks and balances to limit the risk that the bomb might be 
used again. In pursuit of this objective it sent over thirty members to Washington to 
lobby against the May-Johnson Bill which called for placing the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), which assumed control of Manhattan Project,65 under military 
jurisdiction. There they made their presence known through the media, appeals to 
individual legislators and testimony before congress.66 Their enthusiasm and sincerity 
were as unmistakable as their youthful appearance. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. 
Anderson Jr. write that as "boy scientists challeng[ing] the giants of politics at their 
own game," they presented the nation with a real-life version the hit movie Mr. Smith 
Goes to Washington. 67 Meanwhile Szilard contributed to the alternative McMahon 
Bill which called for placing the AEC under civilian control,68 and he and his 
63 Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb 1: 71, 263-64. Kennan later opposed the arms race and, more 
specifically, the government's decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. John Major, The Oppenheimer 
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colleagues warranted much of the credit for its ratification as the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946.69 
The legislative process had entailed a number of compromises which the FAS 
found disconcerting. The Atomic Energy Act included severe restrictions on the 
exchange of information, 70 much like those which had delayed the production of the 
bomb by up to a year.71 It also outlined harsh penalties, including the death sentence, 
for the unauthorized disclosure of information. While excluding active military 
personnel from the AEC, it welcomed retired officers as they were technically 
civilians regardless of their patterns ofthought.72 Jessica Wang insightfully notes that 
the establishment of civilian control did not ensure a commitment to civilian 
objectives.73 After the defeat of the May-Johnson Bill, the FAS lost much of its 
enthusiasm for domestic politics. As neither congress nor the executive branch 
appeared eager to cooperate with the Soviet Union,74 it retreated to its original 
objective to convince the public that atomic weapons should be placed under 
international control.75 
In June 1946 the United States presented the United Nations with a plan to 
create an international agency to ensure that all atomic energy programs and uranium 
reserves would be used for peaceful purposes. The agency was to have full inspection 
rights as well as the authority to order military retaliation against any nations found to 
be engaged in non-peaceful research. Those nations which had already acquired 
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military stockpiles were to destroy them at some point in the future once the 
inspection system had proved effective.76 The plan was widely perceived as a means 
of preserving the U.S. atomic monopoly, and Bernard Baruch, after whom it was 
named, furthered that impression by adopting a belligerent tone. 77 As the Soviet 
Union refused to accept the plan, the United States refused to accept its demand for a 
prohibition of the use and production of atomic weapons and the destruction of all 
existing stockpiles.78 John Newhouse writes that the arms race which the Baruch Plan 
sought to prevent had already gained too much momentum. 79 
While the UN debate was underway, the United States conducted two atomic 
tests in the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific, and they were among the most widely 
reported events since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki eleven months earlier. 
The first test was much less powerful than expected. The second, though also 
disappointing from a military standpoint, 80 proved to be as sensationalistic as 
journalists could have hoped. The warhead was detonated underwater and spewed 
radioactivity in all directions, thoroughly contaminating a fleet of abandoned vessels, 
which was later sunk as it could not be decontaminated. This experiment indicated 
that radiation had a poisonous effect whether used for military purposes or for 
scientific research, as Time magazine pointed out.81 A survey found that ninety 
percent of Americans were aware of the tests and seventy-five percent that they had 
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involved ships. 82 The survey did not specifically address radiation, yet this issue 
began to emerge as one of the scientists' foremost concerns. 
Those Americans who favored the atomic tests recognized that they were 
unhelpful in building the spirit of international cooperation upon which the success of 
the Baruch Plan depended. 83 Others feared that they were antithetical to that spirit, as 
Stalin suggested in an interview with American journalists. The Truman 
administration, he declared, sought to intimidate the Soviet Union with atomic 
weapons, but in that regard they were "quite insufficient."84 It had become clear to all 
parties that further UN debate served little purpose as the USSR consistently vetoed 
U.S. proposals, and there were few signs that either of the superpowers was willing to 
compromise. 85 Without much remorse the members of the UN commission on 
atomic energy permitted it to expire in mid-1948. 86 Approximately sixteen months 
later, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic weapon, ending the U.S. 
monopoly more quickly than some officials had expected. 87 Eugene Rabinowitch, 
editor of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, expressed hope that this development 
would lead Washington to assume a more conciliatory approach. 88 
The General Advisory Committee of the AEC, chaired by J. Robert 
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Oppenheimer, the highly esteemed physicist regarded as father of the atomic bomb,89 
issued a unanimous report which urged the government not to pursue the development 
of the hydrogen bomb. Such a weapon relied on fusing rather than splitting atoms and 
was believed capable of producing exponentially greater destruction which, if used on 
a large scale, might exterminate humankind.90 The committee believed that an 
increased production of atomic bombs would be sufficient deter the Soviet Union. Its 
report stressed the need to place "some limitations on the totality of war" while the 
FAS warned that ifthe United States developed a hydrogen bomb, the USSR would 
feel compelled to do likewise.91 In January 1950 President Truman dismissed the 
report in favor of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs view that national security must not be 
jeopardized for any reason, even ifthat meant pursuing a "weapon of genocide."92 
As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. internal security policies had 
reached an excessive level which was soon carried further by the outbreak of the 
Korean War. Stanley Weart refers to this situation in explaining the death sentences 
issued to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for atomic espionage.93 The otherwise 
unexceptional couple was charged with having been part of a network which passed 
classified information about the Manhattan Project to the Soviet Union, as supported 
by the testimony of several witnesses, one of whom had already confessed his guilt. 94 
During the trial Julius made the unwise decision to speak highly of the communist 
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system,95 encouraging the judge to hold him and his wife responsible for the loss of 
American lives in Korea and the possible loss of millions more as a result of the 
Soviet Union's possession of the atomic bomb.96 However valid this position might 
have been, eastern bloc nations and some Americans viewed the Rosenbergs as heroes 
in the quest for nuclear parity and the de-escalation of Cold War tensions.97 
In October 1952 the Supreme Court refused to review their sentence, and 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to grant clemency despite appeals from 
British politicians, U.S. clergymen, and world-renowned figures including Albert 
Einstein and Pope Pius XXII.98 While the Rosenbergs awaited execution, the United 
States regained the lead in the arms race. It conducted the first test of a hydrogen 
weapon, and as foreseen its destructiveness was without precedent. The explosive 
force was approximately one thousand times greater than bomb dropped over 
Hiroshima, and the test site, an island in the Eniwetok Atoll, was transformed into an 
underwater crater which stretched one-mile in diameter.99 Many observers believed 
that this had the effect of defeating any hope for an arms control agreement with the 
Soviet Union. Oppenheimer was not the most outspoken among them, yet he was 
known to disagree with the government's position. 100 
The strategic advantage gained by the United States lasted less a year. The 
Soviet Union tested its first hydrogen weapon in August 1953, gravely undermining 
95 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (London: 
Secker & Warburg, 1978), 62-66. 
96 Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 115-16; Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety, 292. 
97 John F. Neville, The Press, the Rosenbergs and the Cold War (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
1995), 139; Michael E. Parrish, "Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs," American 
Historical Review 82, no. 4 (1977): 805-42. 
98 Caute, The Great Fear, 66-68. 
99 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1959), 154; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower 
and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 3; Powaski, 
March to Armageddon, 59. 
'
00 Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1976). 
274 
the self-confidence of the "free world."101 The doomsday clock on the cover of 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, one of the era's best-known symbols, advanced from 
seven to two minutes before midnight. 102 Compounding Americans' trepidation was 
the appearance that their government lacked a coherent strategic vision. Hamilton 
Fish Armstrong pointed to the reluctance of the Eisenhower administration either to 
appease the USSR or to launch a preventative war or to simply preserve the doctrine 
of containment-which it denounced as both inadequate and immoral. 103 There were, 
he implied, no other alternatives. The Council on Foreign Relations suggested that 
one might be found in accepting the notion of peaceful coexistence, as the White 
House appeared to be doing in spite of its harsh rhetoric. 104 
That December Eisenhower delivered his famous Atoms-for-Peace proposal 
before the United Nations. It called for governments to contribute fissionable 
materials to an international agency which would direct them to the benefit of 
humankind. 105 During the speech over three thousand delegates remained absolutely 
silent, then unanimously burst into applause and cheered as never before in the history 
of the organization. 106 The initial euphoria falsely suggested that the proposal would 
be accepted and perhaps even lead to a more comprehensive agreement. 107 While 
every nation admired the spirit of Atoms-for-Peace, many within and outside the 
Soviet bloc objected to the control mechanisms to be established, which suggested 
that the foremost U.S. objective was to prevent other nations from developing atomic 
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weapons.108 Kenneth Osgood describes the proposal in relation to Vice President 
Richard M. Nixon's recommendation to make a dramatic proposal which the Soviet 
Union would never accept, and thus score a victory in the realm of psychological 
warfare. 109 
The Soviet delegation to the United Nations noted the incompatibility of the 
proposal's objective to relax international tensions and its refusal to ban the use of 
nuclear weapons. 110 U.S. officials maintained, as they would throughout the decade, 
that such a ban would only be meaningful once effective means of regulation were put 
in place. While many variations of this theme were being debated, the superpowers 
engaged in the most potent military build-up in history .111 In March 1954 the United 
States conducted a test in the Marshall Islands, specifically in the Bikini Atoll, one of 
twenty-nine atolls over which it had been granted a UN trusteeship after the Second 
World War. 112 The test produced a radioactive cloud much larger than anticipated, 
contaminating a 7,000-square-mile region and requiring the immediate evacuation of 
246 islanders, many of whom contracted radiation sickness. The twenty-three crew 
members of Lucky Dragon, a Japanese fishing vessel which had strayed into the 
vicinity and gone unnoticed, were similarly afflicted-and one of them perished as a 
result. 113 
In an attempt to control the negative publicity generated by this, Eisenhower 
invited AEC Chairperson Lewis Strauss to join him at a press conference. For weeks 
the White House had released no pertinent details and the AEC gone no further than 
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to issue a 42-word statement acknowledging that the test had taken place.114 Strauss 
now clarified that, like a second less widely reported test, it had "added enormous 
potential to our military posture,"115 and he provided assurances that radioactive 
fallout was less dangerous than widely feared. 116 In response to a question about the 
capacity of the weapon, he indicated that it was sufficient to destroy any metropolis 
and much or all of its vicinity. Robert Divine writes that this replaced concern over 
fallout with near panic over a nuclear holocaust. 117 The next day The New York Times 
published a map outlining the blast radius if local readers were to be targeted. 118 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill viewed the U.S. tests as 
transforming the hydrogen bomb from a nightmarish abstraction into a topic which 
dominated public opinion around the world. 119 Unlike some Conservatives, he 
opposed the Labour Party's proposal for a test suspension and played an active role to 
ensure that it was defeated. 120 He proved less influential on the world stage in part 
because of his reputation for being pro-American, and in part because Britain had 
recently gained the status of a nuclear power. 121 Albert Einstein and Pope Pius XII 
again united, this time to be among many eminent figures calling for a worldwide test 
ban. In the governmental realm they were joined most notably by Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. 122 Thousands of ordinary Americans also took it upon 
themselves to send letters to the White House in support of a ban. The vast majority, 
however, shared the official perspective that further tests were necessary to deter 
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Soviet aggression. 123 
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) not only questioned the wisdom 
of the government's military policy; it challenged the legitimacy of the program to 
dismiss individuals from the AEC on the basis of their past or present affiliations and 
beliefs. This program applied to all federal employees, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, but disproportionately impacted atomic scientists. 124 For example, the FAS 
made no effort to deny that many of its members were communists, former 
communists and communist sympathizers. 125 Eugene Rabinowitch warned that the 
program hindered American science, 126 as the Soviet bloc had produced many the 
world's finest researchers-and was continuing to do so. 127 Oppenheimer also 
addressed this issue in Bulletin of the American Scientists and urged the government 
to uphold America's long tradition of freedom. 128 Unlike the editor, he refrained from 
comparing the employment program to a Soviet purge or suggesting that his opinions 
were in any way "heretical."129 He merely questioned if the production of more and 
more powerful weapons benefited U.S. national securityY0 
Oppenheimer's criticism, though highly restrained, encouraged the 
government to revisit allegations that he was an agent of the Soviet Union. 131 For 
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many years officials had known of his sympathy for communism, his close affiliation 
with Communist Party members-including his wife, brother and former 
mistress-and his membership in organizations believed to be controlled by 
communists. At the time they had determined that his sense of honor would prevent 
him from disclosing any classified information. 132 In December 1953 Eisenhower 
suspended his security clearance pending further investigation and placed him under 
surveillance to prevent him from fleeing the nation. 133 The AEC hearings were held 
four months later and gained more attention than the senate proceedings in which 
Senator Joe McCarthy alleged that the army had been infiltrated by communists. 
Until now Oppenheimer had been regarded as an "untouchable" patriot. 134 
The views which Oppenheimer expressed during the hearings were moderate, 
even apologetic at times, 135 and the scientific community largely supported him. 
Though it encompassed a wide range of political opinion, it agreed that that an 
adverse decision would undermine the trust essential to its ongoing cooperation with 
the government. 136 Unfortunately, in its perspective, the AEC chose not to reinstate 
his security clearance. No new evidence had been uncovered that called his loyalty 
into question. Rather the AEC identified inconsistencies in his testimony and 
determined that no risks should be taken in defending the nation from potential 
threats. 137 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists attributed the decision more specifically to 
his opposition to the hydrogen bomb.138 A former president of the FAS remarked, 
"Seldom on this side of the Iron Curtain has a citizen who has served his country as 
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well as J. Robert Oppenheimer been more miserably rewarded by his government."139 
The Eisenhower administration continued to promulgate the doctrine of 
massive nuclear retaliation while seeking to limit the risk of confrontation. It opposed 
the elimination or reduction of its stockpile or the prohibition of the first use of 
nuclear weapons lest Soviet troops overrun Western Europe. 140 In July 1955 the 
president met with British, French and Soviet leaders in Geneva to promote 
international cooperation and table the Open Skies proposal to permit the aerial 
inspection of nuclear facilities. 141 This proposal, though far less ambitious than either 
the Baruch Plan or the Atoms-for-Peace proposal, failed to break the arms control 
stalemate.142 The Soviet Union dismissed it as a guise for espionage while, like the 
United States, actively participating in the First Geneva Conference on the Peaceful 
Use of Atomic Energy which opened the following month. Scientists from thirty-six 
nations presented over one thousand papers which scrupulously avoided military 
issues. 143 As Einstein once remarked, physics was less complicated than politics. 144 
Ralph E. Lapp, a regular contributor to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, was 
among many observers who questioned if the "spirit of Geneva" would yield 
meaningful results. After studying debris from the U.S. test in the Bikini Atoll, he had 
determined that the warhead had been designed to maximize radioactive fallout. 
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Another physicist had reached the same conclusion, renewing fears that the 
government was withholding pertinent data from the public.145 In February 1955 the 
AEC attempted to counteract this impression by releasing one of its most detailed 
reports to date which admitting that radiation was a serious issue. Newsweek 
magazine referred to the report as confirming "the terrible truth" of the atomic age. 
For citizens throughout the nation that entailed having to accept that the tests being 
conducted in Nevada produced large radioactive clouds which drifted thousands of 
miles and were not necessarily harmless.146 For nearby ranchers it meant having to 
believe, as the AEC insisted, that their was no direct relationship between the sudden 
death of their cattle and their exposure to fallout. 147 
The anti-nuclear movement achieved a major breakthrough in July 1955 when 
British philosopher Bertrand Russell issued an appeal for governments to put the 
interest of humanity before their perceived strategic advantage. He had drafted it in 
collaboration Einstein who had died earlier in the year and spent his last days 
lamenting the arms race. Nine other prominent individuals had also endorsed it, not 
as citizens of the six nations which they represented but, in the text's words, "as 
members of the species man whose continued existence is in doubt." One week later 
fifty-two Nobel laureates issued a similar appeal, calling for governments to renounce 
the use of nuclear weapons. 148 H. W. Brands describes this as repudiating the logic of 
the Eisenhower administration's defense strategy which linked the survival of the 
United States to the destruction of the world. 149 The two appeals helped to rekindle 
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hope that a sense of self-preservation, if not morality, would produce an international 
accord. 150 
The Eisenhower administration did not immediately pursue this objective 
since many officials questioned both the motivation of its supporters and the 
reliability of the Soviet Union to fulfill its international agreements. 151 As the 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) welcomed members regardless of their 
ideology, the Russell-Einstein declaration enlisted the support of Frederic Joliot-
Curie, a French communist who had recently gained headlines for insisting that no 
truly "progressive" scientist would collaborate with the U.S. program in any way. 152 
The nation's participation in the Geneva Conference had started to dispel the 
impression that it was only concerned with war, and the National Security Council 
recognized the need to gain further "psychological advantages."153 One alternative 
was to propose a one-year test moratorium. Not only would this serve to extend the 
U.S. technological lead and prevent the USSR from proposing a moratorium after it 
had gained a stronger position; it might decrease the popularity of Soviet proposals to 
reduce or eliminate current stockpiles, which the United States opposed under any 
circumstance.154 
In July 1957 scientists from the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union-the 
three nuclear powers-and seven other nations met in Nova Scotia at the first 
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. The FAS and British Atomic 
Scientists' Association had been discussing it for many years and redoubled their 
effort following the Russell-Einstein declaration. The conference demonstrated that 
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individuals from opposite sides in the Cold War were capable of pursuing universal 
objectives. While many speakers dealt with highly technical issues, 155 Eugene 
Rabinowitch took the opportunity to chastise the U.S. government for refusing to 
consider any nuclear agreement which did not include foolproof controls. He insisted 
that this qualification was unrealistic, as foolproof controls did not exist, and that an 
imperfect agreement would still be preferable to none. 156 Though the conference 
failed to generate much publicity in the United States, it greatly solidified an 
international network of scientists devoted to cooperating both within and outside 
their laboratories. 157 
Tests that year convinced much of the world that the nuclear powers had little 
concern for the danger of radioactive fallout. For example, a series of Soviet tests had 
circled the globe with debris and contaminated rainfall over Japan. Instead of 
expressing remorse, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev boasted of possessing bombs 
powerful enough to melt the icecaps and flood the entire planet. Robert Divine 
describes this as symptomatic of the insensitivity of the nuclear powers, or as one 
Japanese scientist declared, their willingness to use the rest of the world like guinea 
pigs. As U.S. opposition was also substantially rising, 158 Linus Pauling, a Nobel 
laureate chemist based in California, had little difficulty gathering signatures for his 
petition to end nuclear tests. By January 1958 he had gathered over nine thousand 
from dozens of nations, including prominent U.S., British and Soviet scientists, and 
forwarded the petition to the United Nations. 159 While this organization was unable to 
155 Wittner, Rebels against War, 251; Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb 2: 33-34. 
156 Eugene Rabinowitch, "About Disarmament," BAS 13, no. 8 (1957): 277-82. 
157 See Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb 2: 35-37; Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Frozen Map," 
BAS 13, 6 (1957): 208-11, 215. 
158 Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 119-20, 141-42. 
159 By July Pauling had gathered over eleven thousand signatures. See Wittner, The Struggle against 
the Bomb 2: 37-39; Pringle and Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons, 248-49; Emelyanov, "Scientists in 
Opposition to the Arms Race," in Rotblat, Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament, 101-12. 
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act independently of the nuclear powers, many members heartily embraced the 
petition.160 
As British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan predicted, 161 the Soviet Union 
renewed the issue of a test suspension which it had brought before the United Nations 
three years earlier as a resolution to prohibit atomic weapons. 162 This time it directly 
approached the United States with the more limited proposal for a two- to three-year 
suspension. The United States had considered taking the initiative in this regard but 
determined that further tests were more beneficial than the publicity to be gained by a 
proposing a suspension, especially after the launch of Sputnik had dramatically 
affirmed the Soviet Union's technological expertise.163 It rejected the Soviet 
proposal, insisting that it must be linked to effective control mechanisms. This 
response was predictable as the USSR had consistently opposed such mechanisms for 
over a decade. 164 Somewhat less predictable was that the it announced a voluntary 
test suspension in March. While this generated immense pressure on the Anglo-
American nations to do likewise, they opted to proceed with their scheduled tests. 165 
Among the many organizations to protest this development, the U.S. National 
Committee for Non-Violent Action took the most sensationalistic tack. Four of its 
members attempted to sail into the zone where the government was conducting a 
series of tests known as Operation Hardtack. In May their small vessel, Golden Rule, 
was intercepted in Hawaiian waters en route to the Marshall Islands. After being put 
on probation for attempting to defy the Atomic Energy Commission's regulations, 
160 See The New York Times, 11 August 1958. 
161 FRUS1958-1960, vol. 7, part 2, Western Europe (Washington: USGPO, 1993): 796. 
162 See Yearbook of the United Nations 1955: 8-9. 
163 See FRUS 1955-1957, 20: 232; Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 200; Powaski, The Cold War, 124; 
James R. Killian, Jr., Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to 
the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977), 2-6. 
164 For example during the 1946 debate over the Baruch Plan. See FRUS 1946, 6: 765-66. 
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they made a second attempt and again failed. During the trial Earle Reynolds, a 
former AEC employee, his wife and their two teenage children admired the 
defendants' resolve to protest the tests, possibly at the expense of their own lives. 
After the defendants were found guilty imprisoned for two months, Reynolds and his 
family chose to follow their example and did so with greater success. Their small 
vessel, Phoenix, was not intercepted until it had deeply penetrated the test zone.166 
Laurence S. Wittner credits these incidents with significantly raising the 
profile of the anti-nuclear movement. Throughout the United States, citizens formed 
picket lines outside federal buildings and AEC facilities. One of their most 
memorable slogans was "Stop the tests, not the Golden Rule," and Reynolds became a 
household name as he carried that message further. While free on bail, he made eight 
television appearances, twenty-one radio broadcasts, and dozens of public speeches. 
Government officials implied that he must be a communist. 167 Linus Pauling had 
once been called before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to confront the 
same allegation, which he had denied. 168 Indirectly both men had joined the Soviet-
championed effort to place the good of humanity before national security 
considerations. 169 So too had thousands of other men and woman affiliated with 
organizations such as the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in addition to 
over one hundred thousand Japanese university students who boycotted their classes 
166 See Wittner, Rebels against War, 246-49; The New York Times, 2 May 1958, 8 May 1958, 2 July 
1958. 
167 Wittner, Rebels against War, 249. 
168 Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb 2: 139. Much earlier in 1950 Senator Joe McCarthy had 
alleged that Pauling was a communist. John Wintterle and Richard S. Cramer, Portraits of Nobel 
Laureates in Peace (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1971), 226. 
169 The National Security Council viewed this as part of the Soviet "peace offence" while the U.S. 
delegation at the United Nations insisted that nations should not be expected to compromise their 
security unless disarmament agreements included verification procedures. FRUS 1955-1957, vol. 19, 
National Security Affairs (Washington: USGPO, 1990): 27-38; Yearbook of the United Nations 1955: 
8-9. 
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in protest of the U.S. tests. 170 
Operation Hardtack yielded results which bolstered earlier predictions that a 
suspension would not substantially disadvantage the United States, and government 
scientists determined secret underground tests would be extremely difficult to 
conceal. These factors influenced Eisenhower' s willingness to now accept a 
voluntary one-year suspension.171 Also, as he remarked to a French official, the 
suspension seemed helpful in counteracting the impression that the United States was 
a war-mongering nation. 172 Robert Divine explains Eisenhower's change of position 
more generally in terms of his increased receptiveness to the world opinion.173 At the 
time Eugene Rabinowitch wrote that the suspension would have been more useful if 
adopted before the United States had decided to pursue the hydrogen bomb. 174 No 
longer were there any means of denying humanity the opportunity to destroy itself or 
to reverse the risks attributed to radioactive fallout. 175 
By the time the voluntary test suspension entered into force in early 
November, the United States had conducted well over a hundred explosions, the 
Soviet Union less than half that many and Britain merely twenty-one. 176 Ralph E. 
Lapp accordingly held the United States responsible for the majority of debris which 
had been released into the atmosphere since the end of the Second World War. 177 The 
Department of Health announced that radiation levels in Los Angeles were 
170 See Richard Taylor, Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958-1965 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 26-27; The New York Times, 16 May 1958. 
171 See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1967), 111-12; Gilpin, American Scientists, 197; Divine, Blowing on 
the Wind, 226-27; Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," Foreign Affairs 
37, 1 (1958): 1-18. 
172 Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb 2: 182-83. 
173 Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 211-12. 
174 Eugene Rabinowitch, "Nuclear Bomb Tests," BAS 14, no. 8 (1958): 282-87. 
175 See Ralph E. Lapp, "Fallout Hearings: Second Round," BAS 15, no. 7 (1959): 302-7; Boyer, By the 
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detrimental to human safety, igniting a small-scale panic among residents in the 
-vicinity of test sites in Nevada and New Mexico. Though some senior military 
officials held that the U.S. nuclear deterrent had reached an excessive level, the air 
force enacted plans to station inter-continental ballistic missiles throughout the nation 
with the immediate hope of deterring a Soviet miscalculation over the future of 
Berlin. 178 Rabinowitch wrote that the logic of competitive coexistence was likely to 
prevent the superpowers from engaging in direct conflict while cautioning that there 
was no guarantee that logic of any sort would prevail. 179 
The three nations honored the suspension despite the non-compliance of 
France, which soon tested its first nuclear warhead; the downing of a U.S. spy plane 
over Soviet territory; menacing declarations by Soviet leaders; and perpetual discord 
over the future of Berlin. 180 Their restraint during this tumultuous period was 
admirable, but it was not unlimited. In April 1961 the United States attempted but 
failed to overthrow the Cuban government, highlighting its intolerance for 
communism as well as its reluctance to enforce its will in the face of adversity. This 
contributed to the Soviet Union's recommencement of testing later in the year and, 
more directly, to the full-scale crisis which erupted the following October. 181 
President John F. Kennedy implied that he would stop at nothing to reverse the Soviet 
Union's deployment of missiles in Cuba. While his strong leadership helped to secure 
that objective, he also made two major concessions: a pledge to refrain from further 
coup attempts and a pledge to withdraw missiles from Turkey, stationed as close to 
178 The New York Times, 31October1958, 31March1959. 
179 Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Berlin Crisis: Will Deterrence Work?" BAS 15, no. 4 (1959): 151-54. 
180 See Roberts, The Nuclear Years, 50; Bethe, The Road to Los Alamos, 55. 
181 See Thomas G. Paterson and William J. Brophy, "October Missiles and November Elections: the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962," Journal of American History 73, no. 1 (1986): 87-
119. 
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the USSR as the Soviet missiles in Cuba had been to the United States.182 
In July 1963 the superpowers and Britain reached a formal agreement barring 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space. The Cuban missile crisis 
had provided a new sense of urgency to reach some form of agreement, yet the partial 
test ban fell short of the most idealistic expectations. It permitted any number of 
underground tests so long as they did produce radioactive fallout beyond a signatory 
nation's own borders. 183 Kennedy still had reason to hail it as a "victory for 
[hu ]mankind," albeit one which would not "resolve all conflicts, or cause the 
communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers ofwar."184 However, 
there were two communist ambitions which it had defeated: a complete ban and a 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It had also defeated the Anglo-American 
hope to establish an inspection regime. The compromise solution provided a degree 
of hope that the Cold War would not precipitate a global catastrophe.185 In this way it 
had been tailored to accommodate world opinion, as Eisenhower had explained his 
acceptance of the voluntary test ban. 186 
The day the treaty entered into force in October, Linus Pauling received the 
Nobel Peace Prize for his role as one of the world's foremost anti-nuclear activists. 
Pauling regretted the limited scope of test ban but acknowledged that it was a 
milestone in the quest which he hoped would lead to the abolition of war. The New 
York Times identified one of his most repeated observations as being that the question 
182 Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question, 145-47. 
183 For the text of the treaty, see The New York Times, 26 July 1963. 
184 The New York Times, 27 July 1958. 
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of humankind's survival trivialized issues such as capitalism and communism. He 
had first uttered words to that effect more than a decade earlier when called before 
congress to explain his affiliation with communist-sympathetic organizations.187 The 
same sentiment had led many of the scientists affiliated with the Manhattan Project to 
establish the Federation of American Scientists and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
With numerous other organizations and individuals, they achieved a major success in 
influencing how governments perceived rationality .188 
The Antarctic Treaty's inclusion of a nuclear test ban was less consequential than the 
one signed four years later, which itself only modified the arms race. Glenn E. 
Schweitzer observes that underground tests continued at a rapid pace. 189 Perhaps, as 
many U.S. senators feared, the 1963 test ban did slow the development of new 
weapons. 190 The Kennedy administration viewed this risk as preferable to further 
atmospheric tests which were subjecting the planet to a tiny sample of what would 
follow a nuclear exchange. The test ban helped to ensure that the "fragile truce" 
reached in the Antarctic, as The New York Times referred to it, 191 would be upheld 
worldwide. The anti-nuclear movement had gained tremendous influence before the 
Cuban missile crisis had highlighted the need for some form of agreement. While 
Eisenhower acknowledged this, his successor went even further, enlisting Norman 
187 The New York Times, 11 October 1963. 
188 See Taylor, Against the Bomb, 5-9, 26-27; A.P. Vinogradov, "Prospects for the Pugwash 
Movement," BAS 15, no. 9 (1959): 376-78; P.E. Hodgson, "The British Atomic Scientists' Association, 
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Cousins, editor of The Saturday Review and member of the National Committee for a 
Sane Nuclear Policy, to help negotiate the agreement.192 
The world opinion which bore upon the voluntary test suspensions from 1958 
to 1961 also bore upon the final days of the Antarctic Conference.193 The nuclear test 
ban appeared to be gratuitous as all participants concurred on the need for de-
militarization.194 By the time of the conference, however, the United States had 
threatened not to renew the voluntary suspension as there had been little progress 
toward a formal agreement. 195 Its position might have been intended to hasten such 
an agreement, preferably by eroding the Soviet Union's aversion to inspection rights. 
Published U.S. documents reveal a variety of opinions among officials.196 Neither 
published nor unpublished documents provide an extensive justification for the U.S. 
delegation's initial opposition to the test ban proposed for Antarctica. 197 What they 
do reveal is that the Southern Hemisphere nations unanimously sought to avoid any 
possibility of being subject to radioactive fallout. 198 While the cost-benefit ratio of 
conducting tests in the far south was questionable, the same was widely observed of 
the arms race. 199 
192 Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb 2: 142-43, 423-25. 
193 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961 (London: 
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From the perspective of the superpowers and Britain, one possible benefit of 
conducting tests in the Antarctic was that the fallout might not have reached the 
Northern Hemisphere. At the same time the United States and Soviet Union had 
proved willing to subject their own citizens-and each other's citizens-to heightened 
levels ofradiation. Their tests in Nevada and Siberia, for example, contaminated 
rainfall from Japan to Midwest America while U.S. tests in the South Pacific 
displaced generations of islanders, and the first British test had entailed a similar risk 
for Australians.200 The early determination of the Department of State and National 
Security Council had not been fundamentally altered by the escalation of the arms 
race during the 1950s; Antarctica was still a region of minimal strategic 
importance.201 The anti-nuclear sentiment which encouraged the United States to 
accept both test bans was prevalent among Americans. Otherwise it would have 
exerted much less influence even on those politicians, such as Adlai Stevenson, who 
advocated a test ban. 202 
The Department of State announced that the 1963 test ban had been phrased in 
a manner to prevent the Soviet Union from conducting allegedly peaceful atmospheric 
explosions. While this helped to persuade a majority of senators that it was in keeping 
with national interests,203 it also demonstrated that the superpowers would continue to 
presume the worst of each other in spite of formal progress. This aspect of their 
200 See Edward A. Dougherty, "At the Crossroads in Hiroshima," Peace Review 10, no. 4 (1998): 625-
31; William Penney, "The Monte Bello explosion," BAS 8, 9 (1952): 295-96; Ralph E. Lapp, "Global 
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relationship was not altered by the Kennedy administration's decision to adopt a 
doctrine of flexible rather than massive retaliation.204 It is understandable that the 
Department of State's announcement failed to recall that during the Antarctic 
Conference it had sought to avoid a clause barring peaceful explosions since, under 
certain circumstances, it believed, U.S. explosions might be described as such.205 The 
Southern Hemisphere nations had insisted on an unequivocal ban not because they 
had been deceived by the Soviet "peace offensive," but because they were disinclined 
to glorify the intentions of either superpower. 
The success of the Antarctic Conference required the United States to modify 
its promotion of science and international cooperation, the incessantly stated objective 
of its policy toward the far south. The Manhattan Project had fundamentally 
transformed science, leading to the creation of a defense industry which diverted 
funds from non-applied research.206 In his farewell address Eisenhower warned of the 
military-industrial complex which his own policies had generated for the sake of 
national security, precipitating the arms race of which the Franck Report had 
warned. 207 During the Antarctic Conference the United States yielded to a bloc of 
nations which shared little in common except for questioning its defense-oriented 
interpretation of science and its tendency to link international cooperation to the 
204 See A.J.C. Edwards, Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace (Houndmills: 
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maintenance or expansion of its strategic advantage.208 It is noteworthy that the 
Soviet Union refrained from maligning U.S. intentions as the Department of State 
maligned Soviet intentions related to the 1963 test ban. In part this might have been 
due to its ability to ratify either agreement-or any agreement-without engaging in a 
truly open debate. 
Kenneth Osgood writes convincingly of the Eisenhower administration's 
reliance on "psychological warfare" in its negotiations with the Soviet Union.209 
There is ample evidence of this in the realm of arms control and some pertaining to 
the Antarctic Conference. This is not to suggest that the trends were identical but they 
were analogous. As the United States did not instigate debate over the test ban, the 
issue can be viewed as a form of the Soviet Union's competing "psychological 
warfare" which greatly benefited from its advocacy of a test ban and a prohibition of 
the use of nuclear weapons.210 This revealed the limitations of U.S. planning, which 
dwelled on the failure of the conference rather than its success.211 A declaration of 
U.S. rights based on exploration or other criteria would have been favorably received 
by many Americans, as discussed in chapter five, but perhaps less so than a test ban, 
which also would have generated favorable publicity abroad. U.S. Antarctic policy 
contained elements of success, in the form of two internationalization proposals, yet 
failed to maximize their propagandistic value. 
208 In March 1958 the National Security Council contemplated accommodating the Soviet Union since 
the U.S. strategic advantage could no longer be taken for granted. The following August it suggested 
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The first proposal was tabled in 1948 at a time when the United States still 
held an atomic monopoly.212 Chapter two has addressed Truman's failure to 
capitalize on recommendations to use the bomb to extract Soviet concessions in 
Eastern Europe. Indeed that would have been a difficult objective even for his 
predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was vastly more experienced and 
charismatic. Here the more significant issue is that Truman proved unable to use the 
bomb to secure the comparatively simple objective of reaching an eight-power 
agreement for a continent in which the Soviet Union had not been active for over a 
century. By the time of the second proposal a decade later, Eisenhower had found 
that hydrogen weapons provided no better leverage. His decision to involve the 
Soviet Union in Antarctic-related discussions was understandable in light of the 
"delicate balance of terror" which overshadowed international relations.213 It also 
underscored that fact that technology had become a source not of power, but of 
impotence. 214 
U.S. officials regretted that between the internationalization proposals, the 
Soviet Union did not hesitate to compete for regard as "the most peaceful atom user." 
Harold Nieburg uses that term in reference to the trend instigated by Eisenhower's 
Atoms-for-Peace proposal which sought to mitigate the negative publicity 
surrounding U.S. tests.215 Soviet tests generated less negative publicity since they 
were fewer in number and conducted away from the western media. For this and 
other reasons, U.S. officials had not expected the USSR to open one of its nuclear 
reactors to inspection and then pledge to assist Eastern bloc nations in building their 
212 By many accounts the primary objective of the Baruch Plan had was to preserve that monopoly. For 
example, Edward A. Shils, "Some Political Implications of the State Department Report," BAS 1, 9 
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own. They sought to regain the lead by pledging the same to a greater number of their 
own allies, aside from opening the formerly top-secret laboratory in Los Alamos to 
public scrutiny. Nieburg writes of these incidents as helping to establish the Olympic 
spirit which guided the two Geneva Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy.216 
The Antarctic Conference involved less showmanship than the Geneva 
Conferences since it was not a public event. What the conferences shared was an "air 
of unreality" which had for many years characterized the sovereignty dispute, the 
formal exchange of protests and technical justifications for excluding the USSR.217 
Until the final days of the conference in Washington, Soviet representatives appeared 
to be "all milk and honey."218 The unexpected debate over the test ban reminded all 
parties that the spirit of Geneva was not unlike the spirit of the International 
Geophysical Year, which British officials privately mocked.219 The failure of the U.S. 
delegation to anticipate the debate suggested that it had been deceived by its own 
rhetoric, or at least numbed to the possibility that the Soviet "peace offensive" might 
abruptly be carried to the far south. Its decision to compromise entailed no serious 
repercussions or loss of prestige. Rather it highlighted the fundamentally reactive 
nature of U.S. Antarctic policy. 
As H. Robert Hall emphasizes, the process of getting the Antarctic-interested 
nations "to the table" was highly convoluted.220 Once there the risk persisted that 
they might fail to reach an agreement, as the three nuclear nations had failed to in 
216 Nieburg, Nuclear Security and Foreign Policy, 92-94. 
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relation to arms control. The voluntary test suspension had been adopted only as a 
stop-gap measure. The same might have been true of the Chilean Escudero Plan to 
suspend the question of sovereignty only while other aspects of an internationalization 
agreement were negotiated--except that the question of sovereignty was to remain 
indefinitely suspended. This demonstrated that avoidance techniques could 
sometimes be used with success. The Atoms-for-Peace proposal offered a less 
notable example of this, as it failed to place any limit on military tests or the 
stockpiling of weapons. The world opinion to which Eisenhower attributed the 
voluntary test suspensions did contribute to both the Antarctic Treaty and the 1963 
test ban, yet it was not fully heeded. 
On some level Escudero might have empathized with why many scientists 
regretted having been involved with the Manhattan Project. The United States 
misdirected his plan much as it misdirected the atomic bomb from a certain 
perspective. The Antarctic Treaty, unlike the arms race, produced a result which all 
parties found satisfactory. Escudero warranted much credit for this even though his 
role as an advisor to the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry had been relatively passive. 
He might have been displeased with the Soviet Union's involvement,221 but he was 
unlikely to have blamed himself for it as much as Albert Einstein did for having 
encouraged the U.S. government to develop the atomic bomb.222 Both men had 
reason to feel either betrayed or neglected. What had become apparent by the 
Antarctic Conference was the need for peaceful coexistence, and regardless of their 
221 The reviewed documents contain no indication ofEscudero's opinion on this issue. 
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the height ofMcCarthyism he publicly urged intellectuals to refuse to testify before the House Un-
American Activities Committee and Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, as he himselfrefused to. 
In his perspective, citizens had a responsibility to sacrifice their "personal welfare in the interest of the 
cultural welfare" of the United States. See The New York Times, 12 June 1953, 17 December 1953. 
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intentions or past mistakes, they and many others significantly furthered this 
objective. 
This theme has been the most overarching contained herein, yet it cannot be 
duly evaluated in isolation from the others. The conclusion provides a synopsis of 
each of the selected Cold War contexts, two in relation to diplomacy, two in relation 
to public opinion. Thereafter it suggests projects which might be derived from this 
one, and suggests possible implications for the ongoing debate over the nature of 
history. 
Conclusion 
For the sake of drawing broader parallels than otherwise possible, this thesis has 
emphasized the contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy as much as the policy itself. Its 
synopsis of the McCarthy era, for example, has demonstrated the extent to which 
anticommunism permeated the American society .1 The term McCarthyism remains 
widely used as a synonym for intolerance. Antarctic specialists are as familiar with it 
as any other kind of specialist, yet terms such as "Escuderoism" have yet to enter the 
vocabulary of either specialists or generalists. Cold War historians who mention the 
continent do so only in passing as it was extremely remote from human civilization. 
The treaty's domestic ratification, however, hinged upon the support of politicians 
who generally shared McCarthy's viewpoint despite their past condemnation of his 
behavior. The treaty's inclusion of the Soviet Union diverged most poignantly from 
this context, yet in each of the selected contexts, U.S. Antarctic policy entailed 
ambivalent motivations which contributed to an impression of unreliability. While 
Antarctic literature does not analyze this issue at length, it happens to reinforce the 
traditional perspective that the treaty was a miraculous achievement.2 
Thomas Postelwait suggests that history might reveal no more than the 
documented traces of undocumented memories. 3 If so, the same might be held of 
Antarctic history, yet politically oriented accounts neglect the multiplicity of ways in 
which Cold War dynamics bore upon the treaty's formation. The reviewed U.S. and 
British archives indicate that strategic perspectives extended to the South Pole, albeit 
1 See chapter six. 
2 See the works of Peter Beck, San jay Chaturvedi, Jack Child, Klaus J. Dodds, Richard S. Lewis, Julius 
Goebel, H. Robert Hall, Christopher C. Joyner, Phillip W. Quigg and Deborah Shapley, as cited in 
chapter one. 
3 Thomas Postlewait, "Writing History Today," Theatre Survey 41 (2000): 83-106. 
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with the understanding that relatively little was at stake.4 There is no shortage of 
Antarctic-related documentation from the era under consideration-an era which Cold 
War historians have analyzed from an endless number of non-Antarctic perspectives.5 
This thesis has modified Postelwait's logic in analyzing the generally undocumented 
Antarctic traces of well-documented Cold War memories.6 As observed at the time, 
U.S. officials involved with the region did think in terms of long-range bombers and 
nuclear missiles,7 yet they chose to pursue the benefits associated with peaceful 
scientific cooperation. 
The Antarctic Treaty's suspension of sovereignty, based on the Chilean 
Escudero Plan, established the modus vivendi for an agreement which grew 
overshadowed by the superpowers' conflict. Perhaps more than other aspects of the 
treaty, it appeared to be in keeping with the "spirit of Geneva" to resolve conflicts 
through negotiation rather than force. Bipolar rivalries extended to many economic 
and ideological realms which alone did not account for the Cold War. The rivalries 
focused on sovereignty and the defense thereof, leading the formation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact and the arms race of which many 
scientists had warned. By voluntarily withholding their sovereignty in the Antarctic, 
the United States and Soviet Union suspended traditional geopolitics, as defined in 
terms of projecting influence beyond internationally recognized borders. The U.S. 
4 Chilean archives also reveal strategic thinking, yet on the global level the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
wielded little influence, unlike the Foreign Office and Department of State. 
5 For example, John Earl Haynes, "The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of 
Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and anti-Communism," Journal of Cold War Studies 2, 
no. 1 (2000): 76-115. 
6 For example, U.S. and British archives contain limited, somewhat incompatible references to the 
debate over the treaty's inclusion of the nuclear test ban. If exclusively relied upon, these archives 
would have provided an insufficient basis for chapter seven, yet when evaluated relative to the anti-
nuclear movement, they have assumed far greater significance. Likewise, an account of the treaty's 
domestic ratification might be viewed as unrelated to McCarthyism, yet the remnants of that 
phenomenon, coupled with the U-2 incident, lent a degree of credibility to the charge of 
"appeasement," as discussed in chapter six. 
7 The New York Times, 5 October 1954. 
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Navy's 1946-194 7 expedition indicated that a formal claim was under consideration. 
The government withheld action primarily due to the military establishment's 
wariness to add to its responsibilities which already extended around the globe. 
Another factor was that a U.S. claim might have provoked a Soviet counter-claim.8 
U.S.-Soviet relations influenced the multilateral negotiations surrounding 
Antarctica, but in themselves were highly unpredictable and subject to miscalculation. 
For example, the United States excluded Korea from the perimeter of nations which it 
vowed to defend, only then to spend three years embroiled in a conflict which 
appeared to have been inspired from the Soviet Union and which directly involved 
China. Its reluctance to assist the anticommunist uprisings in East Berlin and 
Hungary demonstrated further inconsistencies between the theory and practice of its 
ideals. Like its briefly held atomic monopoly and later doctrine of massive 
retaliation, its stance toward the Antarctic failed to deter its enemies or reassure it 
allies. There were increasing signs that the Cold War would extend to the bottom of 
the world, though few as to what that might entail. The stated U.S. objective to 
promote science and international cooperation was not entirely plausible in an era 
when officials reserved the right to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the 
Soviet Union, which often boasted of its own capacity to obliterate its adversaries.9 
The sovereignty dispute between Britain and the Southern Cone nations, Chile 
and Argentina, exacerbated the difficulty of reaching an internationalization 
agreement. It revealed that, to some extent, the "free world" nations were divided 
among themselves. While determining the future of Antarctica was not among the 
highest U.S. priorities, it held vastly greater importance for these three nations. Their 
threats of war nearly did reach fruition after the British Navy destroyed Chilean and 
8 See chapters one, two and seven. 
9 See chapter two. 
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Argentine outposts in the disputed archipelago. The United States helped to diffuse 
the controversy without providing any guarantee of the course which its own policy 
might take. A declaration of its rights over the unclaimed sector from 90° to 150° 
West would have assured Britain and the Latin American nations that a new level of 
complexity would not be added to their own territorial quarrel. This alternative was 
withheld not only due to concerns of provoking a Soviet claim, but also due to the 
belief that U.S. rights extended over most or all of the frozen terrain. 10 
The trilateral quest for an agreement faced nearly as many hurdles as the 
multilateral quest. Anti-U.S. sentiment rose substantially after World War Two. 
Though less pronounced in Britain and Chile than in Soviet-bloc or non-aligned 
nations, it remained significant. The two nations were united in their desire to secure 
U.S. financial and military assistance while preserving the sense of dignity which 
fuelled their quarrel over Antarctica. They also shared a sense of frustration toward 
the U.S. refusal to become directly involved. These issues contributed to their 
willingness to negotiate their own arrangement, in cooperation with Argentina, in case 
the twelve-power negotiations of the second U.S. internationalization proposal were 
to fail. Their disappointment that the United States insisted on being involved was 
understandable, as was their own contingency planning. Indeed the controversy 
surrounding the region was most noteworthy in that it divided loyalties within and 
between Cold War factions. 11 
The diplomatic contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy-presented in the first four 
chapters-revealed elements of uncertainty. The first internationalization proposal 
sought to avoid Soviet or UN involvement as either way U.S. officials would have 
compromised their freedom of action. It was tabled at a time when they were 
10 See chapters three and four. 
11 Ibid. 
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considering the announcement of rights as well as means of reducing tensions 
between the Southern Cone nations and Britain. They discouraged British calls for 
arbitration at the International Court of Justice at The Hague as they were met with 
calls to take the dispute before the Organization of American States, where the issue 
was likely to generate perceptions of Anglo-American collusion. Neither of these 
bodies nor any other clearly held jurisdiction over Antarctica. The second U.S. 
internationalization proposal sought to preserve that aspect of the status quo without 
fully alleviating the risk that the Soviet Union might attempt to involve the United 
Nations for the sake of portraying itself as the champion of the unrepresented nations. 
The only certainty was that the future of the region would now be largely determined 
by Cold War exigencies. 12 
U.S. policy enjoyed a greater degree of flexibility than British or Chilean 
policy, for example, as the North American public did not regard Antarctica in highly 
nationalistic terms. Some journalists began to echo the sentiments of Elizabeth A. 
Kendall, the lone citizen activist discussed in chapter five, and much of the world 
respected the legacy of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd. The prospect of announcing a 
formal claim based primarily on his exploration would have appealed to many North 
Americans, but it was not among their foremost priorities. The widely reported race 
to Antarctica with Germany before the Second World War emerged thereafter as a 
uranium race with the claimant nations, a topic which made for engaging, though not 
alarming headlines. Operation High Jump highlighted the navy's capacity to defend 
or advance national interests if that were to become necessary or preferable. Later 
U.S. expeditions, though less massive, remained formidable. As Americans took 
12 See chapters one through four. 
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abundance for granted and were confident of their nation's military strength, 13 they 
lacked a sense of urgency toward the Antarctic. 14 
The danger related the Soviet Union's involvement was far less than the 
danger that its troops might overrun Western Europe or that its agents might seriously 
undermine U.S. internal security. President Harry S. Truman's program to rid the 
federal government of disloyal employees was not without basis, though it reached 
extreme proportions which were carried further by Senator Joe McCarthy. The 
phenomenon known as McCarthyism grew larger than any individual, for it addressed 
the nation's core values and role in world affairs. Antarctica seemed trivial by 
comparison, yet its ratification by the senate had not been taken for granted. The 
Department of State did not lobby on its behalf as the treaty could be viewed as 
appeasing the Soviet Union, as had been repeatedly alleged of officials throughout the 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Six years had passed since the senate rebuked 
McCarthy, but that had been due to his manner rather than his ideas. U.S. politics 
remained saturated in anticommunism. 
The treaty gained the two-thirds margin needed for ratification because 
senators had faith that the government would not have proposed the draft upon which 
it was based, and then accepted amendments during the conference, unless the treaty 
were consistent with the nation's best interests. The senators who disagreed shared 
Kendall's perspective that the treaty offended the legacy of U.S. explorers, involved 
the Soviet Union for no valid reason, and discarded common sense to appease a few 
idealistically minded scientists, if not the Soviet Union itself. The Eisenhower 
administration had accepted that the treaty required a suspension of traditional Cold 
War thinking. The USSR had re-established its Antarctic presence during the 
13 See David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1954). 
14 See chapter five. 
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International Geophysical Year and for many years insisted on participating in any 
agreement. To deny it that opportunity would have been highly impractical. 
Moreover opponents of the treaty were unable to suggest that it would jeopardize U.S. 
security. The government permitted these issues to sell the treaty, and they were 
sufficiently obvious to have that effect. 15 
A more pressing issue, and indeed the most pressing issue before humanity, 
was the arms race.16 Rumors that the U.S. nuclear agenda might extend to Antarctica 
were not supported by any evidence that Operation High Jump of the later Operations 
Deep Freeze transported weapons of mass destruction or sought to deploy them. At 
the same time the rumors were not simply communist propaganda, as Eisenhower 
sought to dismiss them. The U.S. delegation initially objected to including a test ban 
in the treaty in hope that, at some point in the future, U.S. nuclear tests in the 
Antarctic might be viewed as consistent with the treaty's demilitarization clauses. 
World opinion had turned against the United States in this regard, heavily influenced 
by the Soviet Union's announcement of a voluntary test suspension in early 1958, 
which the Anglo-American nations agreed to honor and which remained in effect 
during the Antarctic Conference. 17 
The public opinion contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy-presented in the last 
three chapters-included a number of divergent variables. U.S. Antarctic opinion was 
mild though generally favorable to the declaration of a national claim. U.S. opinion 
toward the Soviet Union was hostile but increasingly receptive to the need for 
peaceful coexistence. It had also grown less favorable to nuclear tests. The anti-
nuclear movement held exponentially greater significance than the pro-claimant 
15 See chapters five and six. 
16 Arnold Toynbee, for example, referred to the arms race as the "challenge of our generation." Quoted 
in H.E. Wimperis, "Atomic Energy Control: The Present Position," International Affairs 24, no. 4 
(1948): 515-23. 
17 See chapter seven. 
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movement embodied by, and mostly limited to, Byrd and Kendall whose best efforts 
failed to alter the course of U.S. policy. By declaring rights in the Antarctic, the 
government would have incurred allegations that it was as self-interested as the seven 
other nations which had done so, and more deceptive as it had long refused to 
recognize the validity of rights based on exploration, discovery or any other criteria. 
In that case it would have undermined its prestige without gaining any substantial 
benefit. Officials had no desire to offend the legacy of Byrd and other American 
explorers; rather they hoped to nurture their own reputation for seeking the pacifistic 
resolution of disputes. 18 
In both the diplomatic and public opinion contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy, 
officials faced difficulty gaining support for an agreement in which they themselves 
lacked unequivocal faith. The non-claimant policy failed to allay widespread 
concerns that the White House might yet declare rights over the entire continent. 
Officials repeatedly stated their reservation not of their own rights, or the rights of the 
Western Hemisphere-a notion entertained by the Roosevelt administration-but of 
all rights. Statements of that nature fuelled concerns about U.S. unreliability.19 As a 
representative of the Department of State once told reporters, U.S. Antarctic policy 
under constant review and was prepared to adapt to new circumstances.20 This 
explanation revealed that the policy was less a policy than a series of fluctuating 
responses. While the second internationalization proposal laid the groundwork for 
negotiations, it borrowed the Chilean Escudero Plan and failed to anticipate, much 
18 See chapters five through seven. 
19 See Consuelo Leon Woppke, "'The Western Hemisphere o Hemisferico Occidental': Construccion y 
Deconstruccion de un Concepto Mitico Relevante de !as Relaciones lnteramericanos y Antartica," in 
Leon Woppke, Mauricio Jara Ferdandez et al., ;,Convergencia Antartica? Los Contextos de la Historia 
Antartica Chilena, 1939-1949 (Valparaiso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 2005), 43-60. 
20 The representative was Caspar D. Green of Division of Northern European Affairs, who said in 
response to a reporter's question about U.S. Antarctica policy that "like most foreign policy problems 
is under constant study and that changing circumstances could bring change in this as well as in any 
other policy." Department of State, Memorandum by Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 
11February1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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less to welcome, the need for a nuclear test ban. The United States assumed a form of 
leadership perhaps more accurately described as facilitation. 
Keith Suter writes that signing of the treaty was remarkable in that it took 
place at such a tense interlude of the Cold War. 21 The previous year the Soviet Union 
had issued an ultimatum over the future of Berlin which had carried an implicit threat 
of war. While the meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David 
generated a sense of hope, the crisis had not been resolved.22 Suter portrays the 
treaty as evidence of U.S. dominance in the world and the Soviet Union's acceptance 
that it extended to Antarctica. The treaty, in his estimation, attested to America's 
"unchallenged" power.23 Interestingly U.S. officials at the time agreed that the 
Soviet Union had gained the diplomatic advantage, as judged by world opinion, and 
this had heavily influenced their decision to follow the Soviet-sponsored voluntary 
suspension of nuclear testing, as well as to accept the Soviet-sponsored test ban 
included in the Antarctic Treaty.24 If their power had been unchallenged, they might 
have chosen to resurrect the original eight-power proposal and forced the USSR to 
evacuate. 
Suter's exaggeration of U.S. power is less questionable than others' reference 
to U.S. Antarctic policy as a tribute to the nation's enlightened self-interest. John D. 
Negroponte, Barbara Mitchell, and Lee Kimball, for example, provide idealistic 
summaries which are difficult to reconcile with the contingency plans and widespread 
apprehension discussed herein. 25 They seem to accept at face value Eisenhower' s 
public remarks which were by nature optimistic and much less revealing than press 
21 Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage? (London: Zed Books, 1991), 20-21. 
22 See chapters two and four. 
23 Suter, Antarctica, 10. 
24 See chapter seven. 
25 John D. Negroponte, "The Success of the Antarctic Treaty," Department of State Bulletin 87 (1987): 
2123; Barbara Mitchell and Lee Kimball, "Conflict over the Cold Continent," Foreign Policy 35 
(1979): 124-41. 
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speculation at the time, based largely on official explanations of U.S. objectives. 
Declassified government papers, though essential for diplomatic historians, reveal no 
greater duplicity than many journalists alleged. The uncontroversial ideals espoused 
by U.S. policy-science and international cooperation--came to fruition only because 
officials accepted the need for a measure of peaceful coexistence. While they 
distrusted the Soviet Union's use of that term, at the Antarctic Conference they 
recognized the impracticality of promoting a form of their self-interest which was not 
only enlightened but radioactive.26 
After the Second World War the United States engaged in many forms of 
political warfare-espionage, false propaganda, assassinations, counterfeiting and 
even demolition-to encourage Soviet compliance with an international system which 
advanced the its own strategically oriented interpretation of democracy.27 Some 
politicians reduced this objective to a justification for proceeding "with the atomic 
bomb in one hand and the cross in the other."28 The reviewed documents do no 
suggest that the senators who opposed the Antarctic Treaty were jingoists, but rather 
that the most dangerous form of U.S. self-interest was prohibited at the Antarctic 
Conference due to the joint effort of the Soviet Union and the Southern Hemisphere 
nations. U.S. opposition to the nuclear test ban, though short-lived, underscored the 
nation's failure to anticipate foreign policy challenges, as well as its reluctance to 
divorce science from military applications.29 
26 See chapter seven. 
27 See FRUS 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington: USGPO, 1996): 
719-22, 730-31; Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. Containment: Documents on 
American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 64-69. 
28 In the words of Senator Edward Martin, as spoken in 1950. Quoted in Stephen J. Whitfield, The 
Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 87. For similar 
declarations, see John Lewis Gaddis, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245. 
29 Ralph E. Lapp observed that congress never refused, and rarely hesitated to fund a major defense 
project, a phenomenon which he linked to "a weapons culture which has fastened an insidious grip 
upon the entire nation" dating back to the Manhattan Project, after which "science was never to be 
divorced from weaponry." Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
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John Lewis Gaddis aptly summarizes the theme which unites the four contexts 
presented herein: U.S. influence during the Cold War was often more limited than it 
appeared and lacked a grand design. He makes this determination in light of recently 
declassed Soviet-era documents which, in his perspective, affirm the traditional U.S. 
viewpoint that the USSR was largely to blame for the antagonistic nature of 
superpower relations. Though others disagree with this specific interpretation,30 he 
writes with recognized authority and moderation. It is unsurprising that he omits U.S. 
Antarctic policy from among the things which "we now know," yet that policy also 
generated a false impression ofU.S. leadership.31 As discussed in chapter six, The 
New York Times praised the U.S. decision to include the USSR in the treaty. 
Documents indicate that this decision was made only in response to British pressure, 
and was only feasible given the suspension of sovereignty called for by the Chilean 
Escudero Plan. What deserved praise was not the U.S. decision itself, but officials' 
willingness to heed external influences. 32 
British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin once said, "I think wisdom has come 
late" in reference to accepting the need to resolve his nation's territorial dispute with 
Chile and Argentina. 33 His words were less applicable to that specific 
dispute-which was technically never resolved-than to the Antarctic controversy in 
general. There was much wisdom in the U.S. decisions to uphold the non-claimant 
1968), 12-15. From a more moderate perspective, even James B. Conant conceded, "There can be no 
doubt that politics and science, once quite separate activities, have become intermeshed and at times 
the grinding of the gears produces strong and disturbing noises." Conant, "Science and Politics in the 
Twentieth Century," Foreign Affairs 28, no. 2 (1950): 189-202. J. Robert Oppenheimer wrote the 
atomic bomb severely challenged the idea of progress which had been an integral part of western 
civilization for centuries. Oppenheimer, "Physics in the Contemporary World," BAS 4, no. 3 (1948): 
65-68, 85. For similar themes more poignantly expressed, see D.J. Dooley, "Science as Cliche, Fable 
and Faith," BAS 15, no. 9 (1959): 372-75. 
3° For example, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? 
Rethinking the Marshall Plan," Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (2005): 97-134. 
31 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 27; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do "We Know Now'?", American Historical 
Review 104, no. 2 (1999): 501-24. 
32 See chapter five. 
33 The New York Times, 4 November 1948. 
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policy, involve the USSR, and accept the nuclear test ban, yet it came very late and 
without enthusiasm.34 Perhaps the success of U.S. Antarctic policy must be judged by 
the result to which it contributed rather than by how adroitly or maladroitly it was 
pursued,35 as this would be consistent with the North American tendency to believe 
that truth must be derived from experience. 36 During the Eisenhower administration 
that tendency entailed a highly managerial style of government and the willingness to 
let policies be shaped by events. 37 
U.S. Antarctic policy might be regarded as counterproductive given its failure 
either to assert rights or to exclude the USSR. While the government neglected a 
several innovative recommendations pertaining to the far south, it also neglected the 
recommendations to consult with the Soviet Union before bombing Hiroshima, which 
might have slowed or prevented the arms race. Later it neglected recommendations 
not to develop the hydrogen bomb, lest the arms race never be curtailed. Meanwhile 
the quest for nuclear supremacy failed to prevent it from becoming embroiled in 
conventional wars. The result has been described as entailing both "the high risks of 
34 The eighteen-month event was widely and correctly perceived as being conducive to some form of 
Antarctic agreement. For example, G.C.L. Bertram, "Antarctic Prospect," International Affairs 33, no. 
2 (1957): 143-53. 
35 A declaration of rights would have pleased many Americans while either mildly or greatly 
complicating the prospects for internationalization. Acquiring a new testing ground for nuclear 
weapons also might have pleased some Americans, yet the cost-benefit ratio failed to be enticing. In 
this way, the frozen continent was ideally suited for cooperation between the superpowers, as their 
strategic designs focused on the inhabited continents; what they did elsewhere was peripheral in their 
effort not only to win hearts and minds but also to secure valuable military outposts. See Hans W. 
Weigert, "U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs 25, no. 2 (1947): 250-62; 
Kenneth A. Osgood, "Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies 
4, no. 2 (2002): 85-107. 
36 John P. Diggins, "Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. 
Boorstin," American Historical Review 76, no. 1 (1971): 99-118. This viewpoint, not specifically 
related to U.S. Antarctic policy, was acknowledged by J. Robert Oppenheimer, who wrote that the 
nation's "culture favours practice over contemplation." Oppenheimer, "An Inward Look," Foreign 
Affairs 36, no. 2 (1958): 209-20. 
37 See David B. Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Administration and American Foreign Policy (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 25-27; H.W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the 
National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94, no. 4 (1989): 963-89; Robert Griffith, 
"Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," American Historical Review 87, no. I 
(1982): 87-122; Philip Abbott, "Eisenhower, King Utopus and the Fifties Decade in America," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, 1 (2002): 7-29. 
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strategic warfare" and "the high costs of limited con:flict."38 Compared to this 
scenario, U.S. Antarctic policy was not counterproductive; it merely disappointed a 
minority of citizens and a handful of Department of State employees who offered 
their best insights while dealing with many other issues which would continue to 
occupy them. 
Research topics to be derived from this thesis might include biographical 
sketches of individuals such as Elizabeth A. Kendall whose diligence surprised and 
perhaps amused many officials and politicians. Walter Sullivan, science editor of The 
New York Times, appeared to carry her nationalistic motivations to the furthest 
nuclear extreme , though otherwise he did not fit the profile of a fanatic. 39 George C. 
Krouse, president of the Antarctic Colony Associates, which the governmental 
refused to subsidize,40 might prove equally fascinating . So too might Julio Escudero 
Guzman and Mario Rodriguez, the counselor to the Chilean Embassy in Washington 
who revealed knowing that the United States had betrayed its pledge of confidentiality 
by discussing the Escudero Plan with British officials, and whose manner often 
verged on petulance.41 To varying degrees, all of these individuals possessed the 
spirit of "buccaneering playboys trying to scratch empires from ice," as Manchester 
Guardian once referred to the Southern Cone nations with an equal measure of humor 
and contempt.42 
Other topics might pertain to U.S.-Chilean relations, a topic herein presented 
relative to U.S.-British relations but which maintains properties worthy of 
38 Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 989. 
39 See footnote 20. 
40 Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse) to Secretary of State (Acheson), 7 July 1950; Department of 
State, Division ofNorthem European Affairs (Hulley), to Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse), [7 
July 1950], NARA, RG 59, 702.022. 
41 Jason Kendall Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in United States-Chilean 
Antarctic Relations through 1959," Estudios Norteamericanos3, no. 2 (2003): 69-80. 
42 Embassy in London (Douglas) to Department of State, 25 February 1948; Ambassador in Santiago 
(Bowers) to Secretary of State, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. 
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consideration beyond the scope of previously published studies dwelling on the 
Antarctic.43 President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla held beliefs which appeared 
compatible with the "paranoid" style of anticommunism,44 yet the Chilean reality bore 
evidence of a Soviet-inspired conspiracy which actually did have the potential to 
topple the government. As discussed in chapter four, Gonzalez Videla berated his 
fellow citizens who possessed an "uncontrollable" hatred of the United States,45 yet 
he also demonstrated a strong aversion to U.S. economic policies. Published accounts 
of his meetings with the Department of State and U.S. businessmen suggest that he 
was not exempt from "anti-Yankee" sentiment, but rather that he was able to use it to 
. . gam concess10ns. 
The reviewed archives of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry address 
Antarctica rather than the copper industry, and they have been minimally cited to 
avoid distracting from U.S.-oriented Cold War themes. These sources remain 
tremendously valuable for any number of projects. One of the most human 
diplomatic encounters presented herein took place between Chilean Ambassador in 
London Manuel Bianchi and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. In centuries past their 
heated tempers, roused by the actions and declarations of Gonzalez Videla, might 
have precipitated a duel to the death. Chilean archives hold evidence of many such 
incidents which fully attest to the "pleasure of reading diplomatic correspondence," 
outlined by Gordon A. Craig.46 A collection of Antarctic-related essays published last 
43 Such as Jason Kendall Moore "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in U.S.-Chilean Antarctic 
relations through 1959," Estudios Norteamericanos3, no. 2 (2003): 69-80; Moore, "Maritime Rivalry, 
Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949," Journal of 
Latin American Studies 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-38; Moore, "Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid: U.S.-Chilean 
Relations and the Spectre of Polar Arrivistes, 1950-1959," Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, no. 4 (2003): 
69-93. 
44 See Richard Hoffstadter, The Paranoid Style of American Politics and Other Essays (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1964 ). 
45 The New York Times, 21November1948. 
46 Gordon A. Craig, "On the Pleasure of Reading Diplomatic Correspondence," Journal of 
Contemporary History 26 (1991): 369-84. 
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year by Universidad de Playa Ancha, Chile, attests to the richness of the material.47 It 
should be hoped that more historians will present the far south in a manner which 
holds the attention non-specialists and broadens the perspective of the remainder. 
Some of the previously published research incorporated herein, in modified 
form, originally assumed a more critical tenor toward U.S. Antarctic policy. While 
the author's perspective has not been altered by exploring the general context of U.S. 
foreign relations, greater effort has been made to empathize with the dilemmas faced 
by policymakers, some but not all of whom believed that their national objectives 
were truly enlightened, regardless of the extreme form of forms which they 
occasionally happened to assume. 48 The incompatibility of their perceptions and 
reality is a topic which goes far beyond the scope of this thesis, and other more 
creative or theoretical analytical frameworks have been neglected.49 This thesis has 
subscribed to the notion that, in the words of Karl Lowith, "a single grain of 
[evidence] is preferable to a vast construct of illusions."50 
47 The topics, though diplomatically oriented, extend into the realms of philosophy, journalism, 
geography, culture. Consuelo Leon Woppke, Mauricio Jara Fernandez et al., ;,Convergencia 
Antartica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antartica Chilena, 1939-1949 (Valparaiso, Chile: Editorial 
Puntangeles, 2005). 
48 It has been observed that Americans are prone to believe that their nation's role in the world is 
idealistically motivated. He attributes this in part to their "brainwashing" by government propaganda 
and orthodox historians. George H. Quester, "Origins of the Cold War: Some Clues from Public 
Opinion," Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 4 (1978-79): 647-63. 
49 While theoretically based studies are often regarded as more creative than source-based historical 
accounts, some authors maintain that the use of language is inherently creative and that history is 
capable of being as eloquent, dramatic, and persuasive as the finest literature. Others go as far as to 
suggest that truth of history lies only in the mechanics of its articulation. This structure of this thesis 
has been inspired by such thought, as its multiple perspectives of U.S. Antarctic policy are not 
necessarily complementary or reflective of what actually might have transpired. See Paul Hamilton, 
Historicism (London: Routledge, 1996), 21; Hayden White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," 
in Geoffrey Roberts, ed., The History and Narrative Reader (London: Routledge, 2001 ), 221-36; David 
Harris Sacks, "Imagination in History," Shakespeare Studies 31 (2003): 64-86. 
5° Karl Lowith, Meaning in history (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), v. Lowith wrote 
"truth" in place of"evidence." The substitution seeks to preserve a measure of continuity with footnote 
48 and themes. See also Jeffrey Andrew Barash, "The Sense of History: On the Political Implications 
of Karl Lowith's Concept of Secularization', History and Theory 37, no. 1 (1998): 69-82. 
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